

# Combating Corruption in Liberia: Assessing the Impact of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)

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*Post-conflict recovery and anti-corruption programs have a mixed record of success, particularly those venturing reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the aftermath of a devastating 14-year civil war, Liberia's governmental institutions are undergoing significant reform with the assistance of key bilateral and multilateral donors. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), a partnership between the Government of Liberia and international donors, uses hands-on "robust economic interventions" to improve governance and transparency. This paper will explore whether programs such as GEMAP, if contributed to and supported by citizens of the host country, enforced by in-country leadership and sustained by cooperation from international donors, can effectively be utilized to improve economic performance and combat corruption in a post-conflict environment.*

## Introduction

This paper will examine the potential for donor-driven programs to reduce government corruption and improve economic performance in the context of a post-conflict environment, using the Liberian Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) as a case study. In the context of similar anti-corruption and economic recovery programs in other post-conflict states—such as neighboring Sierra Leone—newly elected governments have struggled to implement reforms to root out systemic corruption (Dufka & Takirambudde, 2007). The lack of enforcement by government leadership or inconsistent financial and technical support from donors can severely hamper anti-corruption initiatives. Research of the Liberian case suggests that such programs can be implemented effectively if a combination of the following factors are in place: extra-governmental input and assistance to program implementation provided by citizens or civil society representatives; contributions, support and active enforcement of the program by in-country leadership; sustained commitment of resources and technical assistance from donors; and provisions for the transfer of skills to host country officials post-implementation.

The rebuilding of a post-conflict state requires intervention in multiple development areas, several of which include security reform, reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, and stabilizing economic and political institutions. Current practitioners suggest that time sensitivity and broad interventions in multiple areas are required to reduce the potential for renewed conflict:

Experience suggests that a complex set of conditions must be created quickly in order to rebuild indigenous governance. Ensuring

security, providing assistance through a transparent and coherent plan of action, coordinating donors' activities, establishing strong and legitimate national authority, strengthening democratic political processes, transferring responsibility and resources for development for a new government, stabilizing the economy and strengthening social capital and human assets must all be done in quick succession (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005, p. 15).

Given the complexity and cross-cutting nature of the aforementioned activities, it can be hypothesized that failure to make measurable progress in one area could forestall progress in others. While this paper will not explore the coordination of various stakeholders in Liberia's post-conflict reconstruction effort beyond the scope of GEMAP, it is important to note that the intervention merges the efforts of donors, government and national leadership to secure good governance.

Despite the early indications of positive impact following the implementation of anti-corruption and economic recovery programs in countries such as Liberia, questions about the capacity of governments to maintain reforms once the transition period concludes must be explored.

## Historical Context and Development of the GEMAP Program

The small, resource-rich West African nation of Liberia once enjoyed relative economic prosperity, featuring foreign investment and the export of timber, diamonds and rubber to major markets; however, the extensive damage wrought during a fourteen-year civil war launched in 1989 crippled public services and

government infrastructure (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2008). Coupled with the downward spiral of the country's physical infrastructure, corruption and financial mismanagement drove the country deep into debt. According to estimates by the European Commission (2004), Liberia was \$2.9 billion in debt by the end of 2003, nearly half of which was owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Tax revenues were widely believed to be lining the pockets of President and warlord Charles Taylor and his inner circle.<sup>1</sup> As a strong indication of the international community's distrust of the corruption and economic mismanagement in Liberia, the United Nations Security Council placed sanctions on Liberia's timber and diamonds and imposed an arms embargo and travel ban on individuals who "constitute a threat to the peace process in Liberia" (United Nations Security Council, 2003).

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana in 2003, the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) - an international body of members including the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union, African Union, United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and governments of the United States and the United Kingdom - agreed to collaborate to put Liberia back on the path to economic recovery.<sup>2</sup> As an initial step, donors attempted to implement an economic recovery program following the Liberia Reconstruction Conference held in February 2004 with a transition tool called the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF). The RFTF featured agenda leadership by the NTGL, donor pledges that exceeded \$500 million, and a broad mandate of human development, elections, security and economic and governance reform (National Transitional Government of Liberia [NTGL], 2005b). However, increased reports of corrupt practices within the transitional body and limited progress due to the focus on short-term issues created grave concern that recovery efforts and donor funds had yet again gone to waste.<sup>3</sup>

Spurred by the disturbing results of a European Commission audit of the NTGL's fiscal management in early 2005, the donor community resolved to build on the concept of the RFTF and implement "robust economic interventions" in Liberia to combat corruption (Dwan & Bailey, 2006). The audit provoked grave concerns that the continued siphoning of government funds to private interests, as well as the lack of surveillance over natural resources would plunge the country back into conflict. After several intense rounds of negotiation between the donor community and the NTGL over leadership structure and priorities, a program concept emerged that would allow international donors to forcefully intervene to manage assets and expenditures, as well as build the capacity of

Liberian government. To this end, the donor community proposed the initial framework for GEMAP.

The NTGL - though in agreement over the need for increased involvement of the donor community in Liberia's economic recovery - balked at the suggestion of a forced "donor-trustee" relationship. Indeed, several proposals and counter-proposals for intervention emerged offering varying degrees of authority for the donor community and implementation became the subject of heated exchange.<sup>4</sup> Specific battles over submitting GEMAP for the endorsement of the Security Council, appointing an IMF-selected Chief Administrator to head the Central Bank of Liberia and the lack of a clearly defined exit strategy caused the NTGL to protest the program. Only after repeated threats of suspension or withdrawal of foreign assistance, particularly from the United States, did the Chairman of the NTGL agree to sign the document. More than one year after the release of the European Commission audit, GEMAP was signed in Accra on September 9, 2005.

GEMAP is a highly contextual program intended to reform and build the capacity of the financial and economic institutions in Liberia. The document explicitly recognizes the sovereignty of Liberia's government in its economic recovery process, but proposes the systematic integration of international experts, transparent processes and management contracts to drive reform and report progress to the donor community providing aid to Liberia.

In 2005, Liberia welcomed the first democratically elected female president in Africa into office. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's inauguration in January 2006 marked the close of the two-year post-conflict period under the NTGL and an opportunity to implement GEMAP under a new administration. Upon entering office, Sirleaf vowed to uphold the Government of Liberia's commitment to GEMAP and to combat corruption at all levels, noting in her 2006 Inaugural Address:

Corruption erodes faith in government because of the mismanagement and misapplication of public resources. It weakens accountability, transparency and justice... If we are to achieve our development and anti-corruption goals, we must welcome and embrace the Governance and Economic Management Program (GEMAP) ... working with our international partners... to deal with the serious economic and financial management deficiencies in our country (Sirleaf, 2006).

To solidify her commitment to GEMAP and Liberia's economic recovery, Sirleaf rapidly dismissed nearly 17,000 government workers during her first months in office and vowed to declare her assets as well as those

of her Cabinet members (Smith, 2006). As will be discussed later in this paper, Sirleaf's continued dedication to GEMAP implementation was a critical element in the program's successes to date.

### **GEMAP Program Structure and Implementation**

GEMAP is intended to provide technical assistance to and monitoring of the Liberian government in six key areas: Financial Management and Accountability, Improving Budgeting and Expenditure Management, Improving Procurement Practices and Granting of Concessions, Establishing Effective Processes to Control Corruption, Supporting Key Institutions and Capacity Building. The five state-owned enterprises (SOEs) selected to receive GEMAP assistance during the initial phase are: National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, Liberia Petroleum Refining Corporation, Forestry Development Agency and Bureau of Maritime Affairs. A brief description of each component of GEMAP follows below.

#### *Financial Management and Accountability*

As the centerpiece of economic reform, GEMAP efforts to protect Liberia's revenue streams and strengthen financial management are focused on centralizing revenue within the Ministry of Finance and disbursing funds through controller-monitored government accounts maintained at the Central Bank of Liberia. Previous accounting practices revealed government ministries disbursing payments from multiple bank accounts at multiple banks. To facilitate this effort, the IMF selects the Chief Administrator of the Central Bank to ensure that standards for transparency and fiscal responsibility are met. Finally, internationally recruited experts including financial controllers, port and forestry specialists with binding co-signing authority are placed within key agencies to establish transparent financial systems and guide senior management of the ministries.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Improving Budgeting and Expenditure Management*

To reform the government's deteriorated budgetary system, GEMAP proposes to realign allotments from the Bureau of the Budget with financial commitments at the ministry level and cash disbursement from the Cash Management Committee (CMC). Prior to the intervention, ministries reported not receiving information on allotments in a timely manner. External funding will also support the purchase and installation of an Integrated Financial Management Information System to cut through bureaucratic processes that hamper payment processes. International experts will also staff a Technical Secretariat to advise the CMC on planning and expenditures.

#### *Improving Procurement Practices and Granting of Concessions*

Due to the historical linkages between Liberia's natural resources, government corruption and civil conflict, GEMAP places special emphasis on the reform of procurement, concessions, contracts and licensing. The majority of interventions in this component focus on expanding the competitive bidding process for contracts, monitoring resource flows associated with natural resource usage, joining the Kimberley Process for certifying diamonds and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

#### *Establishing Effective Practices to Control Corruption*

Drafters of the GEMAP program posited that without effective controls to stem the practice of corruption in government, Liberia could again fall victim to fraud and gross financial mismanagement. To address this issue, the program calls for the creation of an independent Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate cases of corruption and advise the Liberian judiciary. To initiate the process, Liberia's Governance Reform Commission has drafted an anti-corruption strategy paper that will form the basis of legislation to create the investigative body. International legal experts will also support and advise the Liberian judiciary in the investigation of corruption cases.

#### *Supporting Key Institutions*

Several of Liberia's key institutions that are responsible for managing government revenue or are critical to the functioning of government are receiving technical assistance in the form of international experts, external audits and building of staff capacity. These institutions include the General Auditing Office, General Services Agency, Governance Reform Commission and Contracts and Monopolies Commission.

#### *Capacity Building*

This element of the program focuses on the strengthening and reforming of Public Administration in Liberia, with special emphasis on reforming the civil service (particularly the resumption of wages and enforcing codes of conduct) and increasing accountability. The capacity building effort also reaches across the aforementioned areas of intervention by focusing on the GEMAP exit strategy for each ministry.

### **GEMAP Management and Oversight**

There are three structural elements that drive the implementation of GEMAP. These include a formal Steering Committee composed of government officials and members of the international community, advisors placed within ministries to provide oversight and technical assistance, and audits of past procedures and incorporation of new procedures to reform the handling of public funds. President Johnson Sirleaf

chairs the Steering Committee, while a representative of the donor community serves as Deputy Chair. Liberian members of the Steering Committee include the Ministers of Finance, Planning, Economic Affairs, Central Bank of Liberia, Contracts and Monopolies Commission, Justice, Governance Reform Committee and a representative from civil society. Local representatives of the African Union, World Bank, United States, Ghana and Nigeria represent the donor community. The Steering Committee plays a critical role in monitoring the activities of GEMAP advisors and contractors, as well driving the implementation process.

Advisors and financial controllers within each ministry and state-owned enterprise serve as a control against corruption; in addition to reporting ministry activity back to donors, advisors possess binding co-signing authority. This layer of checks and balances is coupled with an emphasis on the advisors' training and capacity-building roles in rebuilding the financial processes within their respective ministries. The Government of Liberia indicated as a condition of participation that all advisory efforts by international experts should be conducted in the spirit of leaving sustainable practices behind for Liberians (Republic of Liberia, 2006). To this end, experts can be of any nationality; however Liberians are strongly encouraged to apply for these positions.

Finally, GEMAP incorporates an auditing mechanism into reforms to ensure that standards for transparency and accountability are met. Independent reviews of contracts, particularly those signed – and in some cases initiated – prior to the implementation of GEMAP, are reviewed for validity against criteria developed by the Steering Committee.

## Qualitative and Quantitative Impact of the GEMAP Program

### *Measurement*

There does not appear to be a centralized document or work plan listing all GEMAP activities, outputs and indicators. Formal evaluations of first year of implementation were conducted by GEMAP's Steering Committee and the World Bank in December 2006. However, each of the state-owned enterprises and ministries engaged in GEMAP has developed separate work plans to measure program impact. These documents are available to the public and are updated on a quarterly basis. Despite the ease of access to these documents, vaguely worded program indicators such as "ensure productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness" are often marked as 'achieved' without meaningful interpretation (Liberia Petroleum Refining Company [LPRC], 2007, p. 2). Several program reports reviewed for this paper, such as the final report from the Contracts and Concession Review Commission, suggested that implementation of the GEMAP and

progress on individual activities was severely limited by a lack of capacity within government institutions to develop and enforce transparent processes. Further in-depth evaluations of the individual ministries over a longer term are critical to analyzing GEMAP's broader impact.

### *Program Outcomes and Indicators*

Many positive results have been attributed to the implementation of GEMAP, not the least of which is the 75% jump in government revenues between FY2005 and FY2006 due to aggressive reforms in revenue collection (Ministry of Finance, 2007). In addition, GEMAP is credited with increasing information flows that were critical to the balancing and passing of the national budget in August 2006. The budget was also made available to the public via the Ministry of Finance web site, creating an unprecedented opportunity for public scrutiny and debate (Republic of Liberia, 2006).

Indications are positive that the GEMAP initiative has restored donor confidence. The African Development Bank, World Bank and IMF have cancelled debts to the tune of \$400 million; and as of February 2008, the World Bank and IMF approved Liberia's eligibility for assistance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. The World Bank notes on its Web site:

With the clearance of Liberia's arrears, the World Bank, along with the international community, firmly recognizes the progress made by the Government of Liberia on its reform agenda over the past two years, especially in the areas of economic governance and accountability, infrastructure rehabilitation and the provision of basic services (World Bank, 2007).

The original drafters of the terms of reference for GEMAP implementation intended for the program to be dismantled once Liberia reached the decision level in the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). However, language regarding the dissolution of the program has since been revised to read: "GEMAP will be reviewed periodically to assess progress against benchmarks, results, and resource needs... GEMAP will terminate when Liberia reaches the Completion Point under the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative" (Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program [GEMAP], 2008). Additional benchmarks listed below indicate that the economic and governance reforms initiated under Sirleaf's administration are having additional positive effects, though all should not be wholly attributed to the implementation of GEMAP:

- Eight percent growth in GDP from 2006 to 2007 (Adams, 2008)
- Projected government revenue for 2008 of \$199 million, an increase of \$64 million over the year 2007 (Ministry of Finance, 2007)
- Donor aid from USAID expected to reach \$96.2 million in 2008, an increase of \$27.2 million over the year 2007 (United States Agency for International Development[USAID], 2006)
- United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions on timber, June 2006
- United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions on diamonds, April 2007

### Strengths and Limitations of GEMAP

As GEMAP is one of the first documented efforts of its kind, there are multiple strengths and limitations to its design and implementation, with others certain to emerge as time progresses.

#### *Strengths of GEMAP Implementation*

The program benefits from a unique mix of elements, including a focus on transparency in government activity, layered authority shared between Liberian government officials and international experts, reform-minded leadership and sustained donor support. Each element reflects the highest priority concerns for the Government of Liberia and lays the groundwork for successful implementation of the program.

One of the more innovative aspects of GEMAP's attempts to reduce corruption in Liberia is a holistic approach to enforcing transparency. Through the regulation of revenue flows, concession review, spending of funds according to budget, stopped leakage of revenue on imports and monitoring of transactions across ministries, GEMAP engages the Government of Liberia at multiple levels (Dwan & Bailey, 2006, p. 17). This focus on filtering financial management and accountability throughout the selected ministries has also created unprecedented public access to government performance.

As previously noted, the layered authority shared between government officials and external advisors creates a unique oversight system. Individuals with signing authority within each ministry are selected by the international community and the Economic Governance Steering Committee (EGSC). In addition, shared signing authority assures that programmatic decisions cannot be made without the consent of the international advisors. Should disagreements arise, the EGSC has authority to arbitrate with the Chair, President Sirleaf, maintaining final authority over Committee decisions. This system allows for increased sharing of responsibility and creates a culture of reform among all stakeholders (Dwan & Bailey, 2006, p. 22).

The Government of Liberia's commitment to GEMAP – driven by President Johnson Sirleaf – can be considered a significant strength and the greatest necessity for its successful implementation. Sirleaf's willingness and follow-through on commitments of resources and strict adherence to GEMAP guidelines has had far-reaching implications to date. This can be noted in her recent expunging of all existing forestry concessions, following recommendations from the Forest Concessions Review Committee. In addition, Sirleaf has backed the termination of several management contracts over improper bidding procedures (Dwan & Bailey, 2006). Sirleaf's commitment to act in favor of GEMAP has cemented the program's credibility. Her enforcement of the program supports the culture of comprehensive reform her government seeks to instill (Sirleaf, 2006). This becomes more apparent when one considers that commitments to increased donor intervention proved ineffective for RFTF implementation under the NTGL in 2003. Though laudable in the Liberian context, Sirleaf's support of GEMAP elevates speculation of program's potential in other post-conflict environments lacking similar government commitment.

**Table 1**

*Funding for support to GEMAP institutions.*

Donor/Partner	Amount	Period
European Commission	\$4,248,199	2006/2007
United States/USAID	\$7,045,532	2006/2007
United Kingdom/DFID	\$353,578	2005/2006
International Monetary Fund	\$900,000	2006/2007
World Bank	\$7,100,000	2005/2007
<b>Total Contributions</b>	<b>\$19,647,309</b>	<b>2005/2007</b>

*Source: Republic of Liberia (2006)*

Finally, the donor community seized on a unique moment to bring reform to Liberia through Sirleaf's administration and continues to invest in the country's economic recovery with significant increases in development assistance. The European Commission, United States, United Kingdom, IMF and World Bank have collectively invested nearly \$20 million from 2005 to 2007 in the implementation of GEMAP (Table 1). Progress reports from the first year of the program indicate that more funding and technical support is forthcoming.

#### *Limitations of GEMAP Implementation*

Perhaps the greatest limitation to implementing a donor-driven project such as GEMAP is the political

environment of the host country. Negative public perceptions of donor infringement on Liberia's sovereignty arose frequently during the negotiation of the GEMAP program. Liberian citizens played a decidedly minimal role in the development of GEMAP, as negotiations occurred between the NTGL and donor representatives at the most senior levels. The World Bank/United Nations joint evaluation of GEMAP points to the political implications of the program as a significant opportunity to adjust future programs:

Few among the international partners, the NTGL, or Liberian civil society seriously questioned the technical analysis or soundness of the solutions proposed....As an initiative introduced in a political context, GEMAP required a political strategy to secure the support of all stakeholders involved (Dwan & Bailey, 2006, p. 19).

Treating the civilian population as a major stakeholder in any post-conflict recovery program may normalize expectations for results and incentivize compliance at the individual level. In the Liberian case, this is particularly critical to reduce improper tax collection and bribing of government officials.

For all of the impact GEMAP is intended to have on government institutions, the program is not intended to produce output. To put this statement in context, large portions of the country lack electricity and are handicapped by poor road infrastructure that limits the delivery of public goods and services to the 12 counties outside Monrovia. GEMAP's intervention in this regard is not to reinstall electric wire or fill potholes, but monitor the flow of tax dollars through the government to ensure that such needs are met. In terms of managing the expectations of Liberian citizens—particularly for the 80% of citizens living below the poverty line—demonstrating that the program is having an effect is difficult to prove (CIA, 2008).

On a micro-level, the terminology used to describe the GEMAP implementation process is left relatively vague—perhaps intentionally. Phrases such as “provide technical assistance” and “establish transparent processes” give little indication of baseline assessments for program activities and planned interventions. GEMAP offers a strong framework or Memorandum of Understanding for partnership between government and the international community, but leaves many details to work plans and intra-Ministry interpretation. Given the program's reliance on government officials to implement GEMAP reforms, more emphasis should be placed on front-end assessment of technical capacity at the ministry and individual levels.

It is important to note that by its very nature, GEMAP is a pilot program for Liberia's revenue-generating ministries. GEMAP proposes no

interventions that address reform in Liberia's judicial system, whose institutions were equally marred by corrupt practices. Indeed, attempts to prosecute illegal concession agreements must often be referred to judges maintaining relationships with the accused. Although rule of law and reform of the judiciary may fall outside the scope of robust economic intervention, it cannot be overlooked if GEMAP's initiatives are to be enforced.

Finally, the question of GEMAP's impact on the macro level must be assessed. It can be argued that the program has increased confidence among members of the donor community in Liberia's capacity for good governance, however if the program has been implemented to assuage the needs of the donor community, it is likely that incentives to sustain reforms could diminish once foreign aid relations stabilize. It is critical that the reforms are not wholly directed at meeting standards set and evaluated based on the country's reliance on official development assistance (ODA).

### **Implications of GEMAP for Post-Conflict States**

For countries seeking to embark on similar economic intervention programs, there are several key lessons to be taken from GEMAP. The primary lesson is to fully recognize the political implications of a partnership between government and the international community at the outset of the project. The initial success of the GEMAP program might encourage members of the international donor community and practitioners to further explore why Liberia did not realize similar success under the donor-initiated RFTF launched in 2004.

Selection of advisors or international experts should be handled delicately and with full participation of the host country. Citizens should also be involved in the development of the assistance strategy. In Liberia, the process was driven and finalized by the international donor community and the NTGL. The average Liberian did not have an opportunity to contribute to or question the effort. An independent evaluator of GEMAP remarked on this difficulty with the program design:

The proposal for robust external intervention in economic governance was controversial and negotiation of the plan was difficult. The process illustrated how International Financial Institutions (IFIs) need to better understand the political nature and dynamics of the processes in which they are engaged (Dwan & Bailey, 2006, p. 5).

Participation of host country citizens is critical to ensuring that reforms to economic processes remain in

place after the GEMAP agreement is dissolved; if that is the case, future elected officials will be forced to assume responsibility for maintaining good governance practices.

An additional consideration for the Government of Liberia and the donors providing aid for GEMAP activities is the burgeoning role of Chinese development aid. Donald Kaberuka, president of the African Development Bank, stated that “China intends to provide about \$20 billion in infrastructure and trade financing to Africa during the next three years, eclipsing many of the continent’s traditional big donors by a single pledge” (as cited in Wallis, 2007). To date, China’s role in Liberia has primarily centered on supporting the growth of private investment, infrastructure development and providing assistance to Liberia’s agricultural sector. Figures outlining Chinese donor support vary by source, however the bulk of funds provided to the African governments by the China-Africa Development Fund are intended to support Chinese enterprises operating, or considering operating in Africa as opposed to direct capacity building of governmental institutions. In this regard, the influx of Chinese aid does not appear to pose a direct conflict to interventions with a GEMAP structure (China Development Bank, 2008).

## Conclusion

One should approach the “good news” coming from Liberia with cautious optimism. Certainly, debt forgiveness and revenue increases are laudable achievements, but may not be totally attributable to the GEMAP intervention. While the program has demonstrated measurable positive progress for improving the corrupt institutions in the Liberian government, much data remains to be collected to determine the true effectiveness of the GEMAP program. Detractors of the program are quick to point out that such a program could not be recreated in other post-conflict states whose governments are less reform-minded.

The most valuable indicator of GEMAP’s effectiveness will emerge when the program outlives its usefulness. As Sirleaf (2006) has noted, “[w]e will ensure competence and integrity in the management of our own resources and insist on an integrated capacity building dimension initiative so as to render GEMAP non-applicable in a reasonable period of time”.

With the aforementioned limitations noted, GEMAP provides an opportunity to set an important precedent for the rebuilding of post-conflict states. The program merges the checks and balances of donor involvement with a focus on the sustainability of sound fiscal management following its dissolution. If the Liberian government and the international community maintain their commitment to supporting the program,

there is reason to be hopeful that Liberia is on a path to economic recovery.

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## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Public budgetary figures for the years 2000 to 2004 were not readily available for this analysis.

<sup>2</sup> For the remainder of this exposition, the term international donor community will refer to the following stakeholders: European Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United States (USAID), and the United Kingdom (DFID).

<sup>3</sup> The NTGL sought to meet expectations for the RFTF to assist Liberia's economic recovery and build international donor support for an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Despite increased government support for the National Elections Commission, Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Processes (DDRR), and an audit of Liberia's Central Bank, RFTF targets were far from being met (NTGL 2005b).

<sup>4</sup> Two counterproposals in particular demonstrate the divergent priorities of the international community and the transitional government. EGAP, proposed by the UN, EU, ECOWAS and the United States featured a steering committee chaired by a government official and donor representative, mandated submission of the program to the Security Council for consideration and veto power for the donor representative. The NTGL's response to EGAP, LEGAP, proposed a program of technical assistance that limited the role of the international community and maintained government sovereignty. More information on both programs can be obtained in Dwan and Bailey (2006).

<sup>5</sup> According to the GEMAP agreement (NTGL 2005a), international experts are to be recruited through "international procurement processes and subject to international norms, controls and accountability standards regarding performance and remuneration, regardless of nationality."