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Perspective >> City in Flames


 hen
it comes to public administration, even the most dedicated official may feel
the tug of sameness to everyday work. The objective is building and
maintaining an infrastructure which hums along, day and night. The goal is
no breakdowns, no surprises.
On a
typical workday, Jim Lewis of Claremont, California, may be working on an
employee development program; Scott Mitnick of Thousand Oaks, negotiating
with owners of a regional mall about their expansion plans; and Wally
Bobkiewicz of Santa Paula, keeping tabs on the city water system.
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Related
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"In Harm's Way": Professor Jacob Bendix
(former firefighter) brings a policy perspective to
the wildfire problem
>> read it here
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California wildfires, on the other hand, are potent examples of things gone
awry. They flare up without warning, engulfing huge expanses of brush and
racing toward towns and cities within hours. They can switch paths quickly,
pushed by the Santa Ana winds and carrying huge clouds of finger-sized
cinders which easily ignite smaller blazes along the way. Their
unpredictability is at odds with the city manager’s daily routine.
Last
fall, the skies from Simi Valley to San Diego and San Bernardino turned
black as a number of
blazes—known individually as the Cedar, Otay, Paradise, and Grand Prix
fires—made their way across the land. They began in late October (by human
ignition) and were not
extinguished
until early December. The blazes consumed 376,237 acres and more than 3,326
buildings. Tragically, they claimed 17 lives. (As we went to press, a new
season of wildfires in southern California had begun, with flare-ups near
Lake Elsinore.)
From the
first moment the flames sped toward their communities, Maxwell graduates
Lewis, Mitnick, and Bobkiewicz faced challenges far more daunting than those
encountered in everyday operations. And yet all had done their advance work; all
were ready. Their city resources, in concert with state and federal
assistance, triumphed over the massive, hungry blazes. As city
administrators, they emerged from the crisis with a better sense of their
work and where city resources and intra-agency teamwork needed improvement.
“The test of
our abilities is when there is a
disaster,”
Mitnick says. “We hope never to be tested, but when we are, I hope we’re
ready for it.”
or
Jim Lewis ’98 (M.P.A.), assistant to the city manager for Claremont, the
fires arrived long after regular office hours. It was 11 p.m. when he saw
the wall of fire lunging down the hills toward Claremont. He had ventured to
the fire line to obtain firsthand information. An earlier report had
estimated flames would not reach city limits until 6 o’clock the next
morning, but these wildfires were advancing much faster than the
Williams-Curve fire the year before.
“Watching
this thing cross the foothills was stunning,” Lewis says. Assured of its
proximity, he launched into action.
In the
earliest hours of a natural disaster, the first challenge is one of
deployment and interagency coordination—the most crucial aspect of the
response coordinated by the city manager’s office. Among their tasks:
ensuring that appropriate resources, firefighters, ambulances, and police
units are being promptly dispatched; that disaster relief centers with
assistance groups like the Red Cross are opened quickly; and that victims
have access to short-term and long-term financial reparations.
“It’s not
just the fire and police departments involved in disaster response. They’re
on the front line, but there’s enormous effort behind the scenes,” Lewis
says. “That’s where the heavy lifting for public officials comes into play.
We must focus not just on the immediate incident, but also on disaster
recovery, mitigation, and how we will respond to future events.”
In
Claremont, Lewis says, deployment follows a written plan formulated by
public administration experts and rehearsed periodically through mock
disaster drills. That’s crucial, considering how quickly this kind of
challenge can arise. Lewis worked closely with the Department of Human
Services (Parks and Recreation) to set up shelters. The police department
coordinated public safety. In all emergency response scenarios, Lewis says,
three objectives take priority: saving lives, protecting property, and
restoring normalcy of services to affected areas.
The fires
advanced swiftly on this community of 35,000 residents, traveling at up to
100 miles per hour. In the end, 55 Claremont area homes were destroyed, and
26 others sustained extensive damage—“far less than it should have and could
have been,” Lewis concludes. “We could have lost hundreds of homes instead
of 55.”
Thousand
Oaks was luckier: the fires did not reach the city. But Scott Mitnick ’89 (M.P.A.),
assistant city manager, and the many municipal crews remained in standby
mode until the danger passed. Ultimately, the only damage was the occasional
power outage, caused when city transmission lines were in the path of the
fire beyond city limits.
“The
interesting thing when you have a disaster,” says Mitnick, “is that it
really tests your relationships with other agencies.”
California,
as a state that must battle several potential natural disasters— earthquake,
fire and flood—has prepared well, Mitnick says. “We are the leaders when it
comes to disaster preparedness,” he says.
California
established the Incident Command System more than 30 years ago to provide
for coordinated mutual aid response across California fire departments.
After the disastrous Oakland Hills Fire in 1992, the State established the
Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). It has been refined
constantly since then, thanks to regularly planned drills two to three times
annually. SEMS improves with each natural and manmade disaster, Mitnick
adds, facilitated by a series of stringent local fire rules and building
codes which surpass even those of Los Angeles County.
Many Golden
State cities share coordinated fire-dispatch systems. “No longer does each
city have an autonomous police and fire department. Those days in California
are long over,” he says.
itnick
asserts that the city manager model of public administration has a distinct
advantage over the mayoral arrangement. It requires all city services to
work together.
“Cities can
never spend enough—or too much—on disaster preparedness programs,” he says.
“I can’t tell you we were ready for everything, but I can tell you we were
prepared to the best of our ability.”
In other
metropolitan centers, Mitnick explained, mutual aid scenarios are not a
given. In New York City, for example, discrete political entities commandeer
city facilities like the fire department, police department and water
utility system, resulting in “turf wars” which can slow a city’s response to
an emergency.
“If you see
how disasters are managed in California rather than in New York City, we are
less political,” he says. “I might upset some of your East Coast readers,
but it’s the truth. . . . To be really effective in a disaster, you have to
have good relationships” with other public facilities, he says.
Given the
scope of this disaster, though, good interagency communication wasn’t always
enough. In Santa Paula, a community of 30,000, firefighters were dispatched
quickly and effectively. But, says City Manager Wally Bobkiewicz ’89 (M.P.A.),
when the city requested back-up equipment from other departments, it was
informed that all resources had been dispatched to other areas. The disaster
had by then exhausted the resources of the entire region.
“Had the
wind gone to the north instead of west,” he says, “we would not have had the
resources to fight the fire.” Since then, the Santa Paula fire department
has been asked to draw up a list of needed back-up items.
hether
earthquake, flood, or fire, when a disaster is under way citizens reach for
the telephone or turn to the television to learn what is happening. “If we
are not effective in getting out proper information, the situation could
deteriorate,” Lewis says. When more people are informed, then fewer make
panicked calls to the city government, “so we are free to do our work,”
Lewis says.
“We
responded very quickly,” he adds, “and citizens expect that.”
The City of
Claremont uses its website extensively to disseminate information, which
proved effective when tracking the path of the errant wildfires. Still,
Lewis has built changes into the emergency plan for an even quicker response
the next time.
Unfortunately, infernos often affect power lines first, disabling these
modes of communication and hampering rescue operations. Communication was an
early casualty in Santa Paula, says Bobkiewicz. An offshoot of the Simi
Valley fire tore into electric lines, knocking out major communications:
telephones, then cell phones, and finally cable television reception.
Bobkiewicz
had been watching the wildfires from his bedroom window at
4 a.m., as they first made their way across a pair of mountain ranges just
seven miles from the city limits. “That fire marched down that hill,”
Bobkiewicz recalled, “and in the course of three hours, it traveled 10
miles.”
“There was
pandemonium,” he adds. “We had the potential of a city engulfed in flames.”
The
disaster-response scenario was activated with no problem, starting with the
Emergency Operations Center, based in City Hall. But citizens, cut off from
TV and telephone, knew nothing about the services available. Meanwhile, the
morning sky over Santa Paula had gone from brown to black.
The only
means of communication was a hand-held city radio system. Once maligned as
bulky and heavy, it was now responsible for transmitting crucial information
between city departments about the fire’s approach. While the radios
expedited communication at a difficult time, their battery power faded
within hours. Bobkiewicz has since purchased banks of battery chargers for
the Emergency Operations Center.
Firemen were
instructed to rush out to the airport, which seemed threatened by the
advancing blazes. The flames ultimately did not singe the airfield; they
were contained in a riverbed before shifting direction and sprinting toward
the ocean. Another fire on the city’s north flank was contained in a canyon.
“It was a relatively small fire, all things considered,” Bobkiewicz says.
Within
hours, Santa Paula’s telephone service was restored. Cellphone service
returned later that afternoon. However, it took eight hours for TV reception
to be fixed. Bobkiewicz used the local government cable channel to
disseminate information and to correct the wild stories that had run rampant
during the media blackout.
In Thousand
Oaks, Mitnick says that, as a result of last fall, he will learn to work
more closely with local media. “We did get complaints that a lot of people
did not know what was going on,” he says. “They felt they did not get enough
information.” A local ad hoc Citizens Committee was formed to improve
communications.
fter
the fires were contained, the work of public management people moved into a
new phase. They worked with relief programs to establish centers offering
medical attention and shelter. And at this time, federal and state
organizations arrived to facilitate the arduous task of assessing damage and
reimbursing residents and businesses for the property losses they had
suffered.
Caroline
West ’01 (M.P.A.), an official with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), was flown west in the days following the wildfires, and served as
the FEMA congressional liaison in the Pasadena Disaster Field Office. Over
the course of three weeks, West traveled up and down the coast to brief
politicians, so they could properly address citizens seeking financial
relief to help them recover from the devastation. “We really taught them
what we could do in terms of aid,” she says.
West also
went to disaster field offices and listened to wildfire victims tell of
losing their homes and most or all of their possessions. “I was not prepared
for that,” she says. “People were trying to salvage some remnants of their
lives.”
Explaining
to state and local governments what assistance is available falls to FEMA
consultants such as Steve Hagerty ’93 (M.P.A.), who runs the Evanston,
Illinois-based Hagerty Consulting, Inc. Members of his firm were in
California in November to help FEMA expedite claim requests.
“Local
governments are often unaware of the benefits they can receive. Our job is
to educate them and help prepare their grants,” he says. (While his team was
in California, Hagerty himself was in New York City, completing FEMA’s
response to 9/11.)
As part of
the federal recovery team, Hagerty’s consultants sometimes need to deliver
disappointing news to applicants. “A lot of local governments believe the
federal disaster program should make them whole,” Hagerty says.
“Unfortunately, due to the regulations FEMA must operate under, that’s not
always the case.”
Although
many FEMA regulations are set in stone, others remain open to
interpretation. “It’s those that are open to interpretation that often
result in the local government’s filing an appeal if they disagree with
FEMA’s decision,” says Hagerty. Still, Hagerty, who has consulted to FEMA
for 10 years, says, “There’s more of an emphasis today, than ever before, on
getting funds out the door. While there are a few issues FEMA and the local
government may disagree upon, these pale in comparison to the efforts made
by all parties to recover in the wake of this disaster.”
One week
after being interviewed, Jim Lewis was flying to Washington, D.C., to
challenge FEMA on Claremont’s eligibility for reimbursement claims.
“While
the fire has stopped burning,” Lewis says, “my work has not.”
This article appeared
in the Spring 2004 print edition of Maxwell Perspective; ©
2004 Maxwell School of Syracuse University. To request a copy,
e-mail
dlcooke@maxwell.syr.edu.
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