BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 METHOD:PUBLISH PRODID:-//Telerik Inc.//Sitefinity CMS 15.1//EN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Eastern Standard Time BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20251102T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:Eastern Standard Time TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20250301T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:Eastern Daylight Time TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DESCRIPTION:The effectiveness of American civil-military relations has ofte n been characterized by the degree of friction between competing preferenc es during the decision-making process. But how do these preferences conver ge or diverge based on the duration or type of security crisis? Although m uch has been written on the general friction between civilian and military elites\, there has yet to be a thorough exploration into how decision-mak ing processes are affected by varying types of security challenges. Dan De tzi of the University of Arizona argues that long-term challenges\, such a s counterinsurgencies or counterterrorism campaigns\, create polycentric a rrangements where contrasting strategies are pursued by self-forming decis ion-making networks within the national security bureaucracy. In this case \, the friction between civilian and military leaders might not matter as much as diverging preferences between organizations within the interagency . He uses the Institutional Analysis and Development framework to map thes e polycentric arrangements to better understand their impact on policy out comes. Using the Institutional Grammar 2.0 to analyze two foundational pie ces of national security legislation\, initial results indicate that the a bsence of certain institutional rules may facilitate ad hoc networks that work independent of formal decision-making processes. These findings imply that policy decisions made by civilian and military elites are likely res haped or dismantled within the bureaucratic system\, thus leading to dispa rate approaches and strategies during long-term security challenges. Futur e research will map both formal and informal decision-making networks (Net worked Action Situations) with data extracted from legislation (formal) an d interviews (informal) using the IG 2.0 to better understand when and how ad hoc networks emerge. DTEND:20221206T180000Z DTSTAMP:20260611T122539Z DTSTART:20221206T170000Z LOCATION: SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Bureaucracies at War: Examining the Defense Decision-Making Constru ct as a Polycentric Arrangement UID:RFCALITEM639167631394815652 X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:

The effectiveness of American civil-militar y relations has often been characterized by the degree of friction between competing preferences during the decision-making process. But how do thes e preferences converge or diverge based on the duration or type of securit y crisis? Although much has been written on the general friction between c ivilian and military elites\, there has yet to be a thorough exploration i nto how decision-making processes are affected by varying types of securit y challenges. Dan Detzi of the University of Arizona argues that long-term challenges\, such as counterinsurgencies or counterterrorism campaigns\, create polycentric arrangements where contrasting strategies are pursued b y self-forming decision-making networks within the national security burea ucracy. In this case\, the friction between civilian and military leaders might not matter as much as diverging preferences between organizations wi thin the interagency. He uses the Institutional Analysis and Development f ramework to map these polycentric arrangements to better understand their impact on policy outcomes. Using the Institutional Grammar 2.0 to analyze two foundational pieces of national security legislation\, initial results indicate that the absence of certain institutional rules may facilitate a d hoc networks that work independent of formal decision-making processes. These findings imply that policy decisions made by civilian and military e lites are likely reshaped or dismantled within the bureaucratic system\, t hus leading to disparate approaches and strategies during long-term securi ty challenges. Future research will map both formal and informal decision- making networks (Networked Action Situations) with data extracted from leg islation (formal) and interviews (informal) using the IG 2.0 to better und erstand when and how ad hoc networks emerge.

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