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DTSTART:20251102T020000
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DESCRIPTION:“War’s Inefficiency Puzzle: An Examination Using Non-Cooperativ
 e Game Theory.” Guest Speaker: Shane Sanders\, Associate Professor\,&nbsp\
 ;Sports Economics &amp\; Analytics\, Falk College of Sport &amp\; Human Dy
 namics\, Syracuse University.Fearon (1995) demonstrates within a continuou
 s choice\, contest model that conflict is inefficient (payoff-decreasing) 
 when a settlement option exists.&nbsp\; Why\, then\, is conflict observed 
 in various forms?&nbsp\; We demonstrate Fearon’s puzzle within a discrete 
 choice\, game-theoretic model of conflict (i.e.\, within a simplified or s
 tylized game setting that serves to mimic Fearon’s payoff setting).&nbsp\;
  We call the game Fight or Settle.&nbsp\; Within the game\, settlement div
 ision (e.g.\, over a conflicted territory) raises expected payoffs as comp
 ared to conflict division.&nbsp\; Despite being payoff-dominated\, however
 \, conflict division represents a unique Nash equilibrium within the game 
 Fight or Settle.&nbsp\; As such\, we can characterize Fight or Settle as a
  Prisoner’s Dilemma or Tragedy of the Commons type game\, whereby an ineff
 icient outcome occurs as a result of players independently (non-cooperativ
 ely) choosing a strategy. Conversations in Conflict Studies is a weekly ed
 ucational speaker series for students\, faculty\, and the community. The s
 eries\, sponsored by PARCC\, draws its speakers from Syracuse University f
 aculty\, national and international scholars and activists\, and PhD stude
 nts. Pizza is served. Follow us on Twitter @PARCCatMaxwell\, tweet #ConvoI
 nConflict.If you require accommodations\, please contact Deborah Toole by 
 email at datoole@syr.edu or by phone at 315.443.2367.&nbsp\;
DTEND:20180321T174500Z
DTSTAMP:20260514T022950Z
DTSTART:20180321T164500Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Conversations in Conflict Studies with Shane Sanders
UID:RFCALITEM639143081907730501
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>“<strong>War’s Inefficiency Puzzle: An Exam
 ination Using Non-Cooperative Game Theory</strong>.” Guest Speaker: <em>Sh
 ane Sanders</em>\, Associate Professor\,&nbsp\;Sports Economics &amp\; Ana
 lytics\, Falk College of Sport &amp\; Human Dynamics\, Syracuse University
 .</p><p>Fearon (1995) demonstrates within a continuous choice\, contest mo
 del that conflict is inefficient (payoff-decreasing) when a settlement opt
 ion exists.&nbsp\; Why\, then\, is conflict observed in various forms?&nbs
 p\; We demonstrate Fearon’s puzzle within a discrete choice\, game-theoret
 ic model of conflict (i.e.\, within a simplified or stylized game setting 
 that serves to mimic Fearon’s payoff setting).&nbsp\; We call the game Fig
 ht or Settle.&nbsp\; Within the game\, settlement division (e.g.\, over a 
 conflicted territory) raises expected payoffs as compared to conflict divi
 sion.&nbsp\; Despite being payoff-dominated\, however\, conflict division 
 represents a unique Nash equilibrium within the game Fight or Settle.&nbsp
 \; As such\, we can characterize Fight or Settle as a Prisoner’s Dilemma o
 r Tragedy of the Commons type game\, whereby an inefficient outcome occurs
  as a result of players independently (non-cooperatively) choosing a strat
 egy.<br><br> </p><p>Conversations in Conflict Studies is a weekly educatio
 nal speaker series for students\, faculty\, and the community. The series\
 , sponsored by PARCC\, draws its speakers from Syracuse University faculty
 \, national and international scholars and activists\, and PhD students. P
 izza is served. Follow us on Twitter @PARCCatMaxwell\, tweet #ConvoInConfl
 ict.<br><br><em>If you require accommodations\, please contact Deborah Too
 le by email at datoole@syr.edu or by phone at 315.443.2367.&nbsp\;</em></p
 >
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