BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 METHOD:PUBLISH PRODID:-//Telerik Inc.//Sitefinity CMS 15.1//EN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Eastern Standard Time BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20251102T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:Eastern Standard Time TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20250301T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:Eastern Daylight Time TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DESCRIPTION:Daniel Detzi will present at the October Institutional Grammar Research Initiative (IGRI) research seminar.Abstract:How do the interactio ns between bureaucratic organizations shape strategic decision-making duri ng counterinsurgencies? Although similar questions about bureaucratic beha vior have been explored regarding short term crises\, empirical examinatio ns of these interactions during long term conflicts have been less prolifi c. Yet studying bureaucratic interactions offers an opportunity to better understand the challenges associated with counterinsurgencies. This is esp ecially salient following the U.S. failure in Afghanistan but can also app ly to the dynamics of long term conflict in general. By going beyond the f ocus on bureaucratic politics at the level of elite decision-makers during periods of crisis\, this study seeks to explore how the interactions betw een bureaucratic organizations might affect coordination and cooperation a s strategies develop\, unfold\, and evolve during long\, drawn-out conflic ts. Using institutional grammar to gather data from formal legislation\, a s well as from interview transcripts from participants of the counterinsur gency in Afghanistan\, this study employs network analysis to examine both formal and informal defense decision-making institutions. The results of this research indicate that bureaucratic organizations form ad hoc network s during counterinsurgencies\, which differ from interactions mandated by legislation and presidential directives. Specifically\, these ad hoc netwo rks tend to favor trust building measures to facilitate cooperation\, espe cially in the area of strategic assessment where there is a gap in formali zed interactions. The findings imply that strategic processes during long term conflicts are incomplete and that collective action problems are addr essed through informal interactions rather than through formalized process es. DTEND:20241008T170000Z DTSTAMP:20260517T151523Z DTSTART:20241008T160000Z LOCATION: SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Bureaucracies At War UID:RFCALITEM639146133238322460 X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:

Daniel Detzi will present at the October In stitutional Grammar Research Initiative (IGRI) research seminar.

Abstract:

How do the interactions between bureaucratic organizations shape strategic decision-making during counterinsurgencies? Although similar questions about bureaucratic behavior have been explored regarding short term crises\, empirical examinations of these interaction s during long term conflicts have been less prolific. Yet studying bureauc ratic interactions offers an opportunity to better understand the challeng es associated with counterinsurgencies. This is especially salient followi ng the U.S. failure in Afghanistan but can also apply to the dynamics of l ong term conflict in general. By going beyond the focus on bureaucratic po litics at the level of elite decision-makers during periods of crisis\, th is study seeks to explore how the interactions between bureaucratic organi zations might affect coordination and cooperation as strategies develop\, unfold\, and evolve during long\, drawn-out conflicts. Using institutional grammar to gather data from formal legislation\, as well as from intervie w transcripts from participants of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan\, this study employs network analysis to examine both formal and informal de fense decision-making institutions. The results of this research indicate that bureaucratic organizations form ad hoc networks during counterinsurge ncies\, which differ from interactions mandated by legislation and preside ntial directives. Specifically\, these ad hoc networks tend to favor trust building measures to facilitate cooperation\, especially in the area of s trategic assessment where there is a gap in formalized interactions. The f indings imply that strategic processes during long term conflicts are inco mplete and that collective action problems are addressed through informal interactions rather than through formalized processes.

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