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DESCRIPTION:Trade Development and Political Economy presents: Location-Base
 d Tax Incentives: Evidence from IndiaSpeaker: Ritam Chaury (SUNY Binghamto
 n)Abstract: While\npolicies targeting particular geographic regions are wi
 dely used by\ngovernments\, there have been\nfew rigorous evaluations of t
 heir causal impacts. In this paper\, I study the impact\nof a\nlocation-ba
 sed tax incentive scheme in India. Using aggregated and firm-level\npanel 
 data\, I find\nlarge increases in employment\, total output\, fixed capita
 l\, and the number of firms\nas a\nresult of the program. These increases 
 are due to both the growth of existing\nfirms as\nwell as\nthe entry of ne
 w firms. There is supporting evidence that the new firms\nentering the\ntr
 eated regions\nare larger and more productive. I find no evidence for relo
 cation of firms or\nspillovers in industrial activity between treatment\na
 nd control areas. Finally\, using data from\nhousehold surveys\,\nI show t
 hat wages of workers rise but find no changes in housing rents\nor migrati
 on\nacross the treated and control regions. My results therefore suggest t
 hat the\npolicy increased\nwelfare\, and I also conclude that the policy w
 as cost-effective. This provides\nsupport for\n“place-based” policies to c
 orrect for\nregional economic disparities\, especially in\nsettings with\n
 low labor mobility.Bio: Ritam\nChaurey is\nAssistant Professor of Economic
 s at SUNY-Binghamton. He specializes in\nDevelopment Economics. He holds a
  PhD in Economics from Columbia University.Sponsored by Moyinhan Institute
  of Global Affairs and the Economics Department
DTEND:20151007T171500Z
DTSTAMP:20260514T130921Z
DTSTART:20151007T161500Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:TDPE presents: Ritam Chaury
UID:RFCALITEM639143465619732829
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p></p><p><b>Trade Development and Political E
 conomy presents: Location-Based Tax Incentives: Evidence from India</b></p
 ><p><i>Speaker: Ritam Chaury (SUNY Binghamton)</i></p><p><b>Abstract:</b> 
 While\npolicies targeting particular geographic regions are widely used by
 \ngovernments\, there have been\nfew rigorous evaluations of their causal 
 impacts. In this paper\, I study the impact\nof a\nlocation-based tax ince
 ntive scheme in India. Using aggregated and firm-level\npanel data\, I fin
 d\nlarge increases in employment\, total output\, fixed capital\, and the 
 number of firms\nas a\nresult of the program. These increases are due to b
 oth the growth of existing\nfirms as\nwell as\nthe entry of new firms. The
 re is supporting evidence that the new firms\nentering the\ntreated region
 s\nare larger and more productive. I find no evidence for relocation of fi
 rms or\nspillovers in industrial activity between treatment\nand control a
 reas. Finally\, using data from\nhousehold surveys\,\nI show that wages of
  workers rise but find no changes in housing rents\nor migration\nacross t
 he treated and control regions. My results therefore suggest that the\npol
 icy increased\nwelfare\, and I also conclude that the policy was cost-effe
 ctive. This provides\nsupport for\n“place-based” policies to correct for\n
 regional economic disparities\, especially in\nsettings with\nlow labor mo
 bility.</p><p><b>Bio:</b> Ritam\nChaurey is\nAssistant Professor of Econom
 ics at SUNY-Binghamton. He specializes in\nDevelopment Economics. He holds
  a PhD in Economics from Columbia University.</p><p><i><b>Sponsored by Moy
 inhan Institute of Global Affairs and the Economics Department</b></i></p>
 <p></p>
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