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DESCRIPTION:Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs&nbsp\;Center for European 
 Studies&nbsp\;presents&nbsp\;Science and Policy in Extremis: The UK’s Init
 ial Response\nto COVID-19&nbsp\;Drawing on the British Government’s Scient
 ific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) minutes and other documents\, I
  consider the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be l
 earned from the UK’s initial response to coronavirus in the period January
 –March 2020\, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppres
 sion of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression st
 rategy. I argue that SAGE’s major mistake in early 2020 was not that of be
 ing insufficiently precautionary\, but that of relying too heavily on a sp
 ecific set of “reasonable worst-case” planning assumptions. I formulate so
 me proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to “worst-case” thinkin
 g in emergency planning.&nbsp\;Jonathan BirchAssociate Professor of Philos
 ophyLondon School of Economics and Political Science&nbsp\;Dr Jonathan Bir
 ch is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the LSE and Principal Invest
 igator (PI) on the Foundations of Animal Sentience project. In addition to
  his interest in animal sentience\, cognition and welfare\, he also has a 
 longstanding interest in the evolution of altruism and social behaviour. H
 e joined the LSE in 2014. Before moving to London\, he was a Junior Resear
 ch Fellow at Christ’s College\, Cambridge. He completed his PhD at the Uni
 versity of Cambridge in 2013\, with a dissertation entitled Kin Selection:
  A Philosophical Analysis. He has published widely on various topics in th
 e philosophy of the biological sciences\, in journals such as Current Biol
 ogy\, The American Naturalist\, Biological Reviews\, Philosophy of Science
 \, and The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. His first book\,
  The Philosophy of Social Evolution\, was published by Oxford University P
 ress in 2017. In 2014\, he was one of four UK philosophers honoured with a
  Philip Leverhulme Prize\, which recognize “the achievement of outstanding
  researchers whose work has already attracted international recognition an
 d whose future career is exceptionally promising”.Click here to register&n
 bsp\;For more information or to request accessibility arrangements\, pleas
 e contact Havva Karakas-Keles\, hkarakas@syr.edu. 
DTEND:20211129T183000Z
DTSTAMP:20260512T193041Z
DTSTART:20211129T170000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Science and Policy in Extremis: The UK’s Initial Response to COVID-
 19
UID:RFCALITEM639141966416733221
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs&nbsp\;
 </p><p>Center for European Studies&nbsp\;</p><p>presents&nbsp\;</p><p><br>
 </p><p><b>Science and Policy in Extremis: The UK’s Initial Response\nto CO
 VID-19&nbsp\;</b></p><p>Drawing on the British Government’s Scientific Adv
 isory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) minutes and other documents\, I conside
 r the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be learned f
 rom the UK’s initial response to coronavirus in the period January–March 2
 020\, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppression of 
 transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression strategy. 
 I argue that SAGE’s major mistake in early 2020 was not that of being insu
 fficiently precautionary\, but that of relying too heavily on a specific s
 et of “reasonable worst-case” planning assumptions. I formulate some propo
 sals that assign a more circumscribed role to “worst-case” thinking in eme
 rgency planning.&nbsp\;</p><p><br></p><p><strong>Jonathan Birch</strong><b
 r>Associate Professor of Philosophy<br>London School of Economics and Poli
 tical Science&nbsp\;</p><p>Dr Jonathan Birch is an Associate Professor of 
 Philosophy at the LSE and Principal Investigator (PI) on the Foundations o
 f Animal Sentience project. In addition to his interest in animal sentienc
 e\, cognition and welfare\, he also has a longstanding interest in the evo
 lution of altruism and social behaviour. He joined the LSE in 2014. Before
  moving to London\, he was a Junior Research Fellow at Christ’s College\, 
 Cambridge. He completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge in 2013\, w
 ith a dissertation entitled Kin Selection: A Philosophical Analysis. He ha
 s published widely on various topics in the philosophy of the biological s
 ciences\, in journals such as Current Biology\, The American Naturalist\, 
 Biological Reviews\, Philosophy of Science\, and The British Journal for t
 he Philosophy of Science. His first book\, The Philosophy of Social Evolut
 ion\, was published by Oxford University Press in 2017. In 2014\, he was o
 ne of four UK philosophers honoured with a Philip Leverhulme Prize\, which
  recognize “the achievement of outstanding researchers whose work has alre
 ady attracted international recognition and whose future career is excepti
 onally promising”.</p><p><br></p><p><a href="https://syracuseuniversity.zo
 om.us/meeting/register/tJ0vcumqrjssEtYMJb3pCZnBPoBUjB8DVxmC" title="Click 
 here to register">Click here to register</a>&nbsp\;</p><p><br></p><p>For m
 ore information or to request accessibility arrangements\, please contact 
 Havva Karakas-Keles\, hkarakas@syr.edu.<br><br> </p>
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