BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 METHOD:PUBLISH PRODID:-//Telerik Inc.//Sitefinity CMS 15.1//EN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Eastern Standard Time BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20251102T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:Eastern Standard Time TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20250301T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:Eastern Daylight Time TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DESCRIPTION:Trade Development and Political Economy Present: Jennifer P. Po oleTrade and Labor Reallocation with Heterogeneous Enforcement of Labor Re gulationsAuthors: Rita K. Almeida and Jennifer P. PooleSpeaker: Jennifer P . Poole (University of California\, Santa Cruz)Abstract: This paper revisi ts the question of how trade openness affects labor market outcomes in a d eveloping country setting. The authors explore the fact that plants face v arying degrees of exposure to global markets and to the enforcement of lab or market regulations\, and rely on Brazil’s currency crisis in 1999 as an exogenous source of variation in industry-specific real exchange rates an d hence\, access to foreign markets. Using administrative data on employer s matched to their employees and on the enforcement of labor regulations a t the city level over Brazil’s main crisis period\, the authors document t hat the way trade openness affects labor market outcomes for plants and wo rkers depends on the stringency of de facto labor market regulations. In p articular\, the authors \; show that after a trade shock plants facing stricter enforcement of the labor law decrease job creation and increase job destruction by more than plants facing looser enforcement. Consistent with their predictions\, this effect is strongest among small\, labor-inte nsive\, non-exporting plants\, for which labor regulations are most bindin g. The authors also note a stronger impact of enforcement on younger worke rs. Finally\, their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that incre ased regulatory enforcement limits the plant-level productivity gains asso ciated with trade openness. The latter implies that increasing the flexibi lity of de jure regulations will allow for broader access to the gains fro m trade.Short Bio: Jennifer Poole is an Assistant Professor of Economics a t the University of California\, Santa Cruz. \; Her research interests include international trade\, applied microeconomics\, and Latin American development. Her work has been published in the Review of Economics and S tatistics and in World Development. DTEND:20130325T210000Z DTSTAMP:20260306T060429Z DTSTART:20130325T200000Z LOCATION: SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Trade Development and Political Economy present: Jennifer P. Poole UID:RFCALITEM639083558698907322 X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Trade Development and Political Economy Presen t: Jennifer P. Poole
Trade and Labor Reallocation with Heterogeneous En forcement of Labor Regulations

Authors: Rita K. Almeida and Jennife r P. Poole

Speaker: Jennifer P. Poole (University of California\, S anta Cruz)

Abstract: This paper revisits the question of how trade openness affects labor market outcomes in a developing country setting. Th e authors explore the fact that plants face varying degrees of exposure to global markets and to the enforcement of labor market regulations\, and r ely on Brazil’s currency crisis in 1999 as an exogenous source of variatio n in industry-specific real exchange rates and hence\, access to foreign m arkets. Using administrative data on employers matched to their employees and on the enforcement of labor regulations at the city level over Brazil’ s main crisis period\, the authors document that the way trade openness af fects labor market outcomes for plants and workers depends on the stringen cy of de facto labor market regulations. In particular\, the authors \ ; show that after a trade shock plants facing stricter enforcement of the labor law decrease job creation and increase job destruction by more than plants facing looser enforcement. Consistent with their predictions\, this effect is strongest among small\, labor-intensive\, non-exporting plants\ , for which labor regulations are most binding. The authors also note a st ronger impact of enforcement on younger workers. Finally\, their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that increased regulatory enforcement l imits the plant-level productivity gains associated with trade openness. T he latter implies that increasing the flexibility of de jure regulations w ill allow for broader access to the gains from trade.

Short Bio: Je nnifer Poole is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of C alifornia\, Santa Cruz. \; Her research interests include internationa l trade\, applied microeconomics\, and Latin American development. Her wor k has been published in the Review of Economics and Statistics and in Worl d Development.

END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR