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DESCRIPTION:Moynihan Institute of Global AffairsSovereignty\, Order and Con
 flictpresentGoverning for Revolution by Megan A. Stewart\, Assistant Profe
 ssor of School of International Service at American UniversityWhy do some 
 rebel groups undertake costly\, intensive\ngovernance projects that trigge
 r resistance and violence\, undermine their\nlegitimacy\, strengthen rival
  rebel groups\, and even put their own combatants\nand civilians at risk\,
  while other rebel groups do not? I argue that the nature\nof rebel groups
 ’ long-term goals determines the nature of rebel governance\nstrategies. R
 ebels with revolutionary goals believe in the necessity and\nappropriatene
 ss of undertaking intensive and maximal governance during war\, even\nthou
 gh these burdensome governance schemes could be saved until after rebels\n
 secure military victory.&nbsp\; By contrast\, rebel groups with non-revolu
 tionary\ngoals limit their governance interventions to prioritize their mi
 litary\nendeavors.&nbsp\;Sponsored by Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs
  and&nbsp\;Sovereignty\, Order and ConflictFor more information\, contact 
 Ryan Griffiths: rgriff01@syr.edu
DTEND:20190909T173000Z
DTSTAMP:20260415T071753Z
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SUMMARY:Governing for Revolution - SOC
UID:RFCALITEM639118198737196471
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs</p><p>
 Sovereignty\, Order and Conflict</p><p>present</p><p><b>Governing for Revo
 lution</b> </p><p>by Megan A. Stewart\, Assistant Professor of School of I
 nternational Service at American University</p><p>Why do some rebel groups
  undertake costly\, intensive\ngovernance projects that trigger resistance
  and violence\, undermine their\nlegitimacy\, strengthen rival rebel group
 s\, and even put their own combatants\nand civilians at risk\, while other
  rebel groups do not? I argue that the nature\nof rebel groups’ long-term 
 goals determines the nature of rebel governance\nstrategies. Rebels with r
 evolutionary goals believe in the necessity and\nappropriateness of undert
 aking intensive and maximal governance during war\, even\nthough these bur
 densome governance schemes could be saved until after rebels\nsecure milit
 ary victory.&nbsp\; By contrast\, rebel groups with non-revolutionary\ngoa
 ls limit their governance interventions to prioritize their military\nende
 avors.&nbsp\;</p><p>Sponsored by Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs and&
 nbsp\;Sovereignty\, Order and Conflict</p><p>For more information\, contac
 t Ryan Griffiths: rgriff01@syr.edu<br></p>
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