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DTSTART:20251102T020000
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DESCRIPTION:Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage\,\nUtilization\, and Welfare Effect
 s. This paper presentation evaluates the labor\nmarket effects of sick pay
  mandates in the United States. Using the National\nCompensation Survey an
 d difference-in-differences models\, we estimate their\nimpact on coverage
  rates\, sick leave use\, labor costs\, and non-mandated fringe\nbenefits.
  Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 13 percentage\npoint
 s from a baseline level of 66 percent. Newly covered employees take two\na
 dditional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick 
 pay\ncrowds-out other non-mandated fringe benefits. We then develop a mode
 l of\noptimal sick pay provision along with a welfare analysis. Sponsored 
 by the Economics Department. For more information\, please contact Emily O
 'Brien at eobrie08@syr.edu.&nbsp\;
DTEND:20200304T173000Z
DTSTAMP:20260514T160759Z
DTSTART:20200304T160000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Applied Micro Seminar: Nicolas Ziebarth
UID:RFCALITEM639143572798031138
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage\,\nUtilization\
 , and Welfare Effects. This paper presentation evaluates the labor\nmarket
  effects of sick pay mandates in the United States. Using the National\nCo
 mpensation Survey and difference-in-differences models\, we estimate their
 \nimpact on coverage rates\, sick leave use\, labor costs\, and non-mandat
 ed fringe\nbenefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 
 13 percentage\npoints from a baseline level of 66 percent. Newly covered e
 mployees take two\nadditional sick days per year. We find little evidence 
 that mandating sick pay\ncrowds-out other non-mandated fringe benefits. We
  then develop a model of\noptimal sick pay provision along with a welfare 
 analysis. </p><p>Sponsored by the Economics Department. </p><p>For more in
 formation\, please contact Emily O'Brien at eobrie08@syr.edu.&nbsp\;</p>
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