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DESCRIPTION:Institutions and Export Dynamics (with Luis Araujo and Giordano
  Mion) We study the role of contract enforcement in shaping the dynamics o
 f international trade at the firm level. We develop a theoretical model to
  describe how agents build reputations to overcome the problems created by
  weak enforcement of international contracts. We find that\, all else equa
 l\, countries with better contracting institutions are served by more expo
 rters\, these exporters start their activities with higher volumes\, and t
 hey remain exporters for a longer period. However\, conditional on surviva
 l\, the growth rate of a firm's exports to a country decreases with the qu
 ality of the country's institutions. We test these predictions using a ric
 h panel of Belgium exporting firms that encompasses all Belgium exports fr
 om 1995 to 2008 to every country in the world. Overall\, our findings sugg
 est that weak contracting institutions cannot be thought simply as an extr
 a sunk\, fixed\, or variable cost to exporting firms\; they also affect fi
 rms' dynamics in foreign markets in a non-trivial way. Emanuel Ornelas is 
 on the faculty of the Managerial Economics and Strategy Group at the Londo
 n School of Economics. He serves as an Associate Editor for the Journal of
  International Economics and is Director of the Globalisaton Programme at 
 the Centre for Economic Performance. His work focuses on the effect of ins
 titutions and policies on trade flows\, firm behavior\, and country welfar
 e.
DTEND:20110428T200000Z
DTSTAMP:20260514T153636Z
DTSTART:20110428T200000Z
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SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:TDPE presents: Emanuel Ornelas
UID:RFCALITEM639143553964354383
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Institutions and Export Dynamics (with Luis Ar
 aujo and Giordano Mion) We study the role of contract enforcement in shapi
 ng the dynamics of international trade at the firm level. We develop a the
 oretical model to describe how agents build reputations to overcome the pr
 oblems created by weak enforcement of international contracts. We find tha
 t\, all else equal\, countries with better contracting institutions are se
 rved by more exporters\, these exporters start their activities with highe
 r volumes\, and they remain exporters for a longer period. However\, condi
 tional on survival\, the growth rate of a firm's exports to a country decr
 eases with the quality of the country's institutions. We test these predic
 tions using a rich panel of Belgium exporting firms that encompasses all B
 elgium exports from 1995 to 2008 to every country in the world. Overall\, 
 our findings suggest that weak contracting institutions cannot be thought 
 simply as an extra sunk\, fixed\, or variable cost to exporting firms\; th
 ey also affect firms' dynamics in foreign markets in a non-trivial way. Em
 anuel Ornelas is on the faculty of the Managerial Economics and Strategy G
 roup at the London School of Economics. He serves as an Associate Editor f
 or the Journal of International Economics and is Director of the Globalisa
 ton Programme at the Centre for Economic Performance. His work focuses on 
 the effect of institutions and policies on trade flows\, firm behavior\, a
 nd country welfare.
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