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DESCRIPTION:Lorenzo Magnolfi&nbsp\;is an Assistant Professor of Economics a
 t the University of Wisconsin - Madison. Professor Magnolfi will discuss h
 is study\,&nbsp\;"Political Connections and Market Structure" (co-authored
  with&nbsp\;Camilla Roncoroni)Abstract:This paper empirically investigates
  how political connections affect market structureand quantifies the welfa
 re cost of political influence. We focus on a specific industry\,grocery r
 etail in Italy\, where the largest firm is a network of consumer cooperati
 ves thathas historical links to political parties. We estimate a game-theo
 retic model that accountsfor the interdependence among firms’ entry decisi
 ons and for the effect of political con-nections\, allowing for connection
 s to influence both firms’ payoffs from entry and theirinformation sets. I
 n a counterfactual\, we examine the effects of removing political con-nect
 ions. We find that consumers suffer substantially in markets where connect
 ions actmainly as barriers to entry of competitors of the connected firm\,
  but can also stand to gainfrom connections where links with local politic
 ians help the connected firm to overcomethe burden of entry regulation.For
  more information\, please contact Matt O'Keefe by email at mkokeefe@maxwe
 ll.syr.edu&nbsp\;Sponsored by the Economics Department 
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SUMMARY:Economics presents: Lorenzo Magnolfi
UID:RFCALITEM639140467359414526
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p><a href="http://lorenzomagnolfi.com/" title
 ="Lorenzo Magnolfi">Lorenzo Magnolfi</a>&nbsp\;is an Assistant Professor o
 f Economics at the University of Wisconsin - Madison. Professor Magnolfi w
 ill discuss his study\,&nbsp\;"Political Connections and Market Structure"
  (co-authored with&nbsp\;Camilla Roncoroni)</p><p><b>Abstract:</b></p><p>T
 his paper empirically investigates how political connections affect market
  structureand quantifies the welfare cost of political influence. We focus
  on a specific industry\,grocery retail in Italy\, where the largest firm 
 is a network of consumer cooperatives thathas historical links to politica
 l parties. We estimate a game-theoretic model that accountsfor the interde
 pendence among firms’ entry decisions and for the effect of political con-
 nections\, allowing for connections to influence both firms’ payoffs from 
 entry and theirinformation sets. In a counterfactual\, we examine the effe
 cts of removing political con-nections. We find that consumers suffer subs
 tantially in markets where connections actmainly as barriers to entry of c
 ompetitors of the connected firm\, but can also stand to gainfrom connecti
 ons where links with local politicians help the connected firm to overcome
 the burden of entry regulation.</p><p>For more information\, please contac
 t Matt O'Keefe by email at <a href="mailto:mkokeefe@maxwell.syr.edu" title
 ="mkokeefe@maxwell.syr.edu">mkokeefe@maxwell.syr.edu</a>&nbsp\;<br><em>Spo
 nsored by the Economics Department</em><br> </p>
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