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DESCRIPTION:Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via Internat
 ional Trade Agreements Authors: Nuno Limao and Patricia Tovar Why do gover
 nments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available 
 for the same purpose? We address this puzzle in the context of redistribut
 ion towards special interest groups (SIGs) by focusing on a set of importa
 nt policies: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our policy choice 
 model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through int
 ernational agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient NTBs
 \; commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining posit
 ion of a government that is weak relative to domestic SIGs. Using detailed
  data we find support for several of the model’s predictions including: (i
 ) tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restr
 ictiveness of NTBs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions
 \; (ii) tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringen
 t when the government is weaker relative to a SIG. Thus\, the results expl
 ain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that th
 e bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commi
 tment in international agreements. Patricia Tovar is Assistant Professor o
 f Economics at Brandeis University. Her research interests are in internat
 ional trade and political economy.&nbsp\;
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SUMMARY:TDPE presents: Patricia Tovar
UID:RFCALITEM639140440163179503
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commit
 ment via International Trade Agreements Authors: Nuno Limao and Patricia T
 ovar Why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient on
 es are available for the same purpose? We address this puzzle in the conte
 xt of redistribution towards special interest groups (SIGs) by focusing on
  a set of important policies: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In o
 ur policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain ta
 riffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of le
 ss efficient NTBs\; commitment has political value because it improves the
  bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic SIG
 s. Using detailed data we find support for several of the model’s predicti
 ons including: (i) tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the lik
 elihood and restrictiveness of NTBs but not enough to offset the original 
 tariff reductions\; (ii) tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted 
 and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a SIG. Thus\,
  the results explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution an
 d suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the politic
 al value of commitment in international agreements. Patricia Tovar is Assi
 stant Professor of Economics at Brandeis University. Her research interest
 s are in international trade and political economy.&nbsp\;
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