BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
METHOD:PUBLISH
PRODID:-//Telerik Inc.//Sitefinity CMS 15.1//EN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Eastern Standard Time
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20251102T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=11
TZNAME:Eastern Standard Time
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20250301T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:Eastern Daylight Time
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DESCRIPTION:The Moynihan Institute\, and the East Asia Program are proud to
  present&nbsp\;Mark Dallas and Dimitar Gueorguiev.&nbsp\;Previously\, the 
 global order was largely rules-based and functionally integrated through g
 lobal value chains. But\, geopolitics has returned due to the U.S.-China t
 rade and technology conflicts\, the rise of supply chain vulnerabilities h
 ighlighted by COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However\, the 
 geopolitical goals of policymakers and the foreign economic policies they 
 pursue are conditioned by the technologies\, industrial organization and g
 eographies of global industries\, even if policymakers remain unaware of t
 his underlying industrial organization.&nbsp\; Put simply\, economic inter
 dependence varies based on industry structures bequeathed from the prior e
 ra of globalization.&nbsp\; This talk examines information-communication t
 echnology (ICTs) industries that reside at the heart of U.S.-China technol
 ogy conflicts (e.g. semiconductors\, mobile telecom\, high performance com
 putation). It argues that ICTs are organized into ‘massive modular ecosyst
 ems’ that exhibit several key paradoxes.These paradoxes raise fundamental 
 challenges for governments in securing critical supply chains\, and they p
 roblematize policies like ‘decoupling\,’ ‘self-reliance’ and ‘re-shoring’ 
 which both China and U.S. (among other nations) are currently pursuing.&nb
 sp\; They also raise questions about the use of US economic sanctions and 
 export controls against China\, which rely upon overly simplified ‘network
 ed’ typologies that can be governed at key ‘chokepoints\,’ through ‘lists’
  of export restrictions.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;
DTEND:20230412T183000Z
DTSTAMP:20260510T195044Z
DTSTART:20230412T170000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:The Return of Geopolitics: Global Value Chains\, Emerging Technolog
 ies and US-China Relations
UID:RFCALITEM639140250445149210
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>The Moynihan Institute\, and the East Asia 
 Program are proud to present&nbsp\;Mark Dallas and Dimitar Gueorguiev.&nbs
 p\;<br></p><p>Previously\, the global order was largely rules-based and fu
 nctionally integrated through global value chains. But\, geopolitics has r
 eturned due to the U.S.-China trade and technology conflicts\, the rise of
  supply chain vulnerabilities highlighted by COVID-19 and the Russian inva
 sion of Ukraine. </p><p>However\, the geopolitical goals of policymakers a
 nd the foreign economic policies they pursue are conditioned by the techno
 logies\, industrial organization and geographies of global industries\, ev
 en if policymakers remain unaware of this underlying industrial organizati
 on.&nbsp\; Put simply\, economic interdependence varies based on industry 
 structures bequeathed from the prior era of globalization.&nbsp\; </p><p>T
 his talk examines information-communication technology (ICTs) industries t
 hat reside at the heart of U.S.-China technology conflicts (e.g. semicondu
 ctors\, mobile telecom\, high performance computation). It argues that ICT
 s are organized into ‘massive modular ecosystems’ that exhibit several key
  paradoxes.</p><p>These paradoxes raise fundamental challenges for governm
 ents in securing critical supply chains\, and they problematize policies l
 ike ‘decoupling\,’ ‘self-reliance’ and ‘re-shoring’ which both China and U
 .S. (among other nations) are currently pursuing.&nbsp\; </p><p>They also 
 raise questions about the use of US economic sanctions and export controls
  against China\, which rely upon overly simplified ‘networked’ typologies 
 that can be governed at key ‘chokepoints\,’ through ‘lists’ of export rest
 rictions.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
