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DTSTART:20251102T020000
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DESCRIPTION:"Tools of the Weak: &nbsp\;The Prosecutor of the International 
 Criminal Court and the&nbsp\;UN Security Council."&nbsp\; Cora True-Frost\
 , &nbsp\;Assistant Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College of 
 Law. &nbsp\;Description:&nbsp\;The International Criminal Court (“ICC” or 
 “the Court”) is an independent institution. &nbsp\;It is mandated to prose
 cute “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
  a whole.” &nbsp\;Despite the Court’s formal autonomy\, however\, its foun
 ding treaty\, the Rome Statute\, permits the powerful and political UN Sec
 urity Council (“Council” or “UNSC”)\, inter alia\, to refer to the Court s
 ituations\, including those in non-State Parties\, and to defer the Court’
 s ongoing proceedings. The question of the Court’s ability to be effective
  is ripe as the ICC enters its fourteenth year of operations and continues
  to be beleaguered by criticism. &nbsp\;Supporters worry about its longevi
 ty and have curtailed their expectations of the Court’s potential. &nbsp\;
 In addition\, perceived bias\, to the extent that states’ protests are sin
 cere\, has damaged states parties’ understandings of the independence and 
 fairness of the Court—indeed\, Kenya and South Africa have openly consider
 ed withdrawing from the Rome Statute\, and in January 2016\, the African U
 nion recommended that its Open-Ended Committee of African Ministers on the
  ICC consider a roadmap on possible withdrawal from the ICC. &nbsp\;This t
 alk will explore one way the Prosecutor of the ICC might address effective
 ness and independence concerns: by declining future UN SC referrals\, as w
 ell as the tradeoffs involved in that course of action.Pizza will be serve
 d. Follow us on Twitter at:&nbsp\;     \n    PARCCatMaxwell\, tweet #Convo
 InConflict.
DTEND:20160324T173000Z
DTSTAMP:20260312T170045Z
DTSTART:20160324T163000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Conversations in Conflict Studies presents Cora True-Frost
UID:RFCALITEM639089172456020970
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p></p><p><b>"Tools of the Weak: &nbsp\;The Pr
 osecutor of the International Criminal Court and the&nbsp\;UN Security Cou
 ncil."&nbsp\;</b> <i>Cora True-Frost</i>\, &nbsp\;Assistant Professor of L
 aw at the Syracuse University College of Law. &nbsp\;</p><p>Description:&n
 bsp\;The International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”) is an indepen
 dent institution. &nbsp\;It is mandated to prosecute “the most serious cri
 mes of concern to the international community as a whole.” &nbsp\;Despite 
 the Court’s formal autonomy\, however\, its founding treaty\, the Rome Sta
 tute\, permits the powerful and political UN Security Council (“Council” o
 r “UNSC”)\, inter alia\, to refer to the Court situations\, including thos
 e in non-State Parties\, and to defer the Court’s ongoing proceedings. The
  question of the Court’s ability to be effective is ripe as the ICC enters
  its fourteenth year of operations and continues to be beleaguered by crit
 icism. &nbsp\;Supporters worry about its longevity and have curtailed thei
 r expectations of the Court’s potential. &nbsp\;In addition\, perceived bi
 as\, to the extent that states’ protests are sincere\, has damaged states 
 parties’ understandings of the independence and fairness of the Court—inde
 ed\, Kenya and South Africa have openly considered withdrawing from the Ro
 me Statute\, and in January 2016\, the African Union recommended that its 
 Open-Ended Committee of African Ministers on the ICC consider a roadmap on
  possible withdrawal from the ICC. &nbsp\;This talk will explore one way t
 he Prosecutor of the ICC might address effectiveness and independence conc
 erns: by declining future UN SC referrals\, as well as the tradeoffs invol
 ved in that course of action.<br><i>Pizza will be served</i>. Follow us on
  Twitter at:&nbsp\;     \n    <a href="https://www.facebook.com/PARCCatMax
 well" title="PARCCatMaxwel">PARCCatMaxwel</a>l\, tweet #ConvoInConflict.</
 p><p></p>
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