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DESCRIPTION:With fast-track authority (FTA)\, the US Congress delegates tra
 de-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade ag
 reement. Why would it cede such power? The authors suggest an interpretati
 on in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between
  its members for protectionist rents. In their model: (i) FTA is never gra
 nted if an industry operates in the majority of districts\; (ii) The more 
 symmetric the industrial pattern\, the more likely is FTA\, since competit
 ion for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is sym
 metrically distributed\; (iii) Widely disparate initial tariffs prevent fr
 ee trade even with FTA. Speaker: Bilgehan Karabay is Senior Lecturer in th
 e Department of Economics at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He
  is currently a visiting faculty at the University of Virginia. His resear
 ch interests are in International Trade\, Applied Microeconomic Theory\, P
 olitical Economy and the Economics of Information and Uncertainty. When is
  it optimal to delegate: The theory of fast-track authority By authors: Le
 vent Celik\, Bilgehan Karabay and John McLaren Speaking: Bilgehan Karabay 
 Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics University of Auckland\, Ne
 w Zealand Sponsor: Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs\, Co-Sponsor Trade
 \, Development\, and Political Economy\, Co-Sponsor
DTEND:20120917T213000Z
DTSTAMP:20260309T234228Z
DTSTART:20120917T200000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:TDPE presents: Bilgehan Karabay 
UID:RFCALITEM639086821486025950
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:With fast-track authority (FTA)\, the US Congr
 ess delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to
  amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? The authors sugges
 t an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive co
 mpetition between its members for protectionist rents. In their model: (i)
  FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts
 \; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern\, the more likely is FTA
 \, since competition for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargai
 ning power is symmetrically distributed\; (iii) Widely disparate initial t
 ariffs prevent free trade even with FTA. Speaker: Bilgehan Karabay is Seni
 or Lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University of Auckland i
 n New Zealand. He is currently a visiting faculty at the University of Vir
 ginia. His research interests are in International Trade\, Applied Microec
 onomic Theory\, Political Economy and the Economics of Information and Unc
 ertainty. When is it optimal to delegate: The theory of fast-track authori
 ty By authors: Levent Celik\, Bilgehan Karabay and John McLaren Speaking: 
 Bilgehan Karabay Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics University
  of Auckland\, New Zealand Sponsor: Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs\,
  Co-Sponsor Trade\, Development\, and Political Economy\, Co-Sponsor
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