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DESCRIPTION:Daniel Patton of the Secure World Foundation will present at th
 e August Institutional Grammar Research Initiative (IGRI) virtual research
  seminar.Abstract:The landscape of outer space utilization and exploration
  is expanding from primarily scientific research to include economic outco
 mes\, and private-sector space technology. Simultaneously\, the space indu
 stry is experiencing dramatic growth. The future of space exploration like
 ly includes additional space stations\, exploration of other planets\, and
  in-situ resource utilization. Mismanagement of space could result in Kess
 ler syndrome or monopolies of rare space resources. These changes in the s
 pace economy demand consideration of space as a global commons. However\, 
 perspectives on space as a global commons vary widely and have economic\, 
 legal\, and political implications. Beginning with Lloyd [1] and Hardin [2
 ]\, I examine commons criteria and apply them to terrestrial and extraterr
 estrial domains. Using a rivalry and excludability continua I show differe
 nces between three separate space domains (earth orbit\, celestial bodies\
 , and interplanetary space) and compare them to common pool resources on e
 arth. These earth domains include the oceans\, atmosphere\, and Antarctica
 . I evaluate space management strategies already in place like the Outer S
 pace Agreement\, the Rescue Agreement\, the Liability Convention\, and the
  Registration Convention. I also consider why other agreements like the Mo
 on Treaty and the Bogota Declaration have been less successful. Understand
 ing the complex space economy and the absence of management consensus\, I 
 attempt to evaluate space domain management. Ostrom’s institutional analys
 is [3] and Ostrom and Crawford’s institutional grammar [4] are tools used 
 to identify management gaps. I then consider the challenges in achieving r
 obust institutional performance for space domains. [1] Lloyd\, W. F. (1833
 ). Two Lectures on the Checks of Population. [2] Hardin\, G. (1968). The T
 ragedy of the Commons. Science\, 1243-1248. [3] Ostrom\, E. (1990). Govern
 ing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Camb
 ridge University Press.[4] Crawford\, S. Ostrom\, E. (1995). A Grammar of 
 Institutions. American Political Science Review 89 (3): 582–600.
DTEND:20230801T170000Z
DTSTAMP:20260511T003506Z
DTSTART:20230801T160000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Space as a Global Commons: Analysis and Performance
UID:RFCALITEM639140421065998016
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>Daniel Patton of the Secure World Foundatio
 n will present at the August Institutional Grammar Research Initiative (IG
 RI) virtual research seminar.</p><p>Abstract:</p><p>The landscape of outer
  space utilization and exploration is expanding from primarily scientific 
 research to include economic outcomes\, and private-sector space technolog
 y. Simultaneously\, the space industry is experiencing dramatic growth. Th
 e future of space exploration likely includes additional space stations\, 
 exploration of other planets\, and in-situ resource utilization. Mismanage
 ment of space could result in Kessler syndrome or monopolies of rare space
  resources. These changes in the space economy demand consideration of spa
 ce as a global commons. However\, perspectives on space as a global common
 s vary widely and have economic\, legal\, and political implications. <br>
 </p><p>Beginning with Lloyd [1] and Hardin [2]\, I examine commons criteri
 a and apply them to terrestrial and extraterrestrial domains. Using a riva
 lry and excludability continua I show differences between three separate s
 pace domains (earth orbit\, celestial bodies\, and interplanetary space) a
 nd compare them to common pool resources on earth. These earth domains inc
 lude the oceans\, atmosphere\, and Antarctica. I evaluate space management
  strategies already in place like the Outer Space Agreement\, the Rescue A
 greement\, the Liability Convention\, and the Registration Convention. I a
 lso consider why other agreements like the Moon Treaty and the Bogota Decl
 aration have been less successful. </p><p>Understanding the complex space 
 economy and the absence of management consensus\, I attempt to evaluate sp
 ace domain management. Ostrom’s institutional analysis [3] and Ostrom and 
 Crawford’s institutional grammar [4] are tools used to identify management
  gaps. I then consider the challenges in achieving robust institutional pe
 rformance for space domains. </p><p>[1] Lloyd\, W. F. (1833). Two Lectures
  on the Checks of Population. </p><p>[2] Hardin\, G. (1968). The Tragedy o
 f the Commons. Science\, 1243-1248. </p><p>[3] Ostrom\, E. (1990). Governi
 ng the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambr
 idge University Press.</p><p>[4] Crawford\, S. Ostrom\, E. (1995). A Gramm
 ar of Institutions. American Political Science Review 89 (3): 582–600.</p>
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