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DTSTART:20251102T020000
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DESCRIPTION:"The Fragmentation of Reputation" Gautam Bose University of New
  South Wales This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy w
 here principals hire agents for two different kinds of tasks\, in which th
 e agents have differing aptitudes. Principal-agent matches are remade ever
 y period\, but a principal can acquire some information on the past behavi
 or of her current agent. I consider two different reputation mechanisms—on
 e in which an agent’s past record of defections makes no reference to the 
 kind of task (Integrated Reputation)\, and another in which information ab
 out past defections is available separately for each task (Fragmented Repu
 tation). The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted as “personal honor
 ” and performance record (e.g. credit history) respectively. Gautam Bose i
 s at the School of Economics at the University of New South Wales in Sydne
 y\, Australia. His research interests are in development economics and app
 lied economic theory.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;
DTEND:20091026T200000Z
DTSTAMP:20260422T182432Z
DTSTART:20091026T200000Z
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SUMMARY:TDPE presents: Gautum Bose
UID:RFCALITEM639124646721439904
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:"The Fragmentation of Reputation" Gautam Bose 
 University of New South Wales This paper investigates the use of reputatio
 n in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of ta
 sks\, in which the agents have differing aptitudes. Principal-agent matche
 s are remade every period\, but a principal can acquire some information o
 n the past behavior of her current agent. I consider two different reputat
 ion mechanisms—one in which an agent’s past record of defections makes no 
 reference to the kind of task (Integrated Reputation)\, and another in whi
 ch information about past defections is available separately for each task
  (Fragmented Reputation). The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted a
 s “personal honor” and performance record (e.g. credit history) respective
 ly. Gautam Bose is at the School of Economics at the University of New Sou
 th Wales in Sydney\, Australia. His research interests are in development 
 economics and applied economic theory.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;
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