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DESCRIPTION:\n\n\n\nStephan\nStohler\, JD\, PhD\n\nat Rockefeller College\,
  University at Albany\, Department of\nPolitical ScienceThe Illusion of Ju
 dicial Supremacy: Deliberative Regime Theory and\nthe Politics of Inter-Br
 anch Constitutional Interpretation  \n\nJudges\nfrequently alter their pos
 itions on important legal questions and in ways that\nrun counter to the w
 ishes of the political coalitions which appointed them.\nThis type of judi
 cial behavior poses a significant challenge for ``regime\ntheory\,'' which
  holds that governing coalitions appoint judges to uphold their\npolitical
  and ideological commitments in the judiciary. In this paper\, I\nelaborat
 e a new theoretical interpretation of regime theory\, which explains\nwhen
  judges adhere to innovative legal doctrine. The interpretation\, which I\
 nterm ``deliberative regime theory\,'' holds that judges act as partners\,
 \nelaborating the evolving constitutional and legal positions of dominant\
 npolitical regimes. &nbsp\;On this view\, judges will often adopt novel do
 ctrinal\npositions and await democratic endorsement from the elected branc
 hes. To test\nthis argument\, I examine legislative\, executive\, and judi
 cial interpretations\nof constitutional equality guarantees since the pass
 age of the Civil Rights Act\nof 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. &nbsp\
 ;These data are broadly consistent\nwith deliberative regime theory and fu
 rther challenge existing theories of\njudicial supremacy\, which hold that
  courts enjoy the final say on what the\nConstitution means \n\n
DTEND:20151016T173000Z
DTSTAMP:20260511T152026Z
DTSTART:20151016T160000Z
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SUMMARY:Sawyer Law and Politics Program presents: Stephan Stohler
UID:RFCALITEM639140952265644552
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p></p><p>\n\n\n\nStephan\nStohler\, JD\, PhD\
 n\nat Rockefeller College\, University at Albany\, Department of\nPolitica
 l Science</p><i>The Illusion of Judicial Supremacy: Deliberative Regime Th
 eory and\nthe Politics of Inter-Branch Constitutional Interpretation</i><p
 > </p><p><br></p><p> \n\nJudges\nfrequently alter their positions on impor
 tant legal questions and in ways that\nrun counter to the wishes of the po
 litical coalitions which appointed them.\nThis type of judicial behavior p
 oses a significant challenge for ``regime\ntheory\,'' which holds that gov
 erning coalitions appoint judges to uphold their\npolitical and ideologica
 l commitments in the judiciary. In this paper\, I\nelaborate a new theoret
 ical interpretation of regime theory\, which explains\nwhen judges adhere 
 to innovative legal doctrine. The interpretation\, which I\nterm ``deliber
 ative regime theory\,'' holds that judges act as partners\,\nelaborating t
 he evolving constitutional and legal positions of dominant\npolitical regi
 mes. &nbsp\;On this view\, judges will often adopt novel doctrinal\npositi
 ons and await democratic endorsement from the elected branches. To test\nt
 his argument\, I examine legislative\, executive\, and judicial interpreta
 tions\nof constitutional equality guarantees since the passage of the Civi
 l Rights Act\nof 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. &nbsp\;These data are
  broadly consistent\nwith deliberative regime theory and further challenge
  existing theories of\njudicial supremacy\, which hold that courts enjoy t
 he final say on what the\nConstitution means \n\n<br></p><p></p>
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