BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
METHOD:PUBLISH
PRODID:-//Telerik Inc.//Sitefinity CMS 15.1//EN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Eastern Standard Time
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20251102T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=11
TZNAME:Eastern Standard Time
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20250301T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:Eastern Daylight Time
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DESCRIPTION:Natarajan Balasubramanian on "Screening\nSpinouts?\nHow Noncomp
 ete\nEnforceability Affects the Creation\, Growth\,\nand Survival\nof New 
 Firms"Natarajan Balasubramanian\, Whitman School of Management\, Syracuse 
 UniversityThis\npaper examines how the enforceability of noncompete\ncoven
 ants affects the creation\, growth\, and survival of spinouts and other ne
 w\nentrants. The impact of noncompete\nenforceability on new firms is ambi
 guous\, since noncompetes\nreduce knowledge leakage but impose hiring cost
 s. However\, we posit that\nenforceability screens formation of within-ind
 ustry spinouts (WSOs) relative to\nnon-WSOs by dissuading founders with lo
 wer human capital. Using data on 5.5\nmillion new firms\, we find greater 
 enforceability is associated with fewer\nWSOs\, but relative to non-WSOs\,
  WSOs that are created tend to start and stay\nlarger\, are founded by hig
 her-earners\, and are more likely to survive their\ninitial years. In cont
 rast\, we find no impact on non-WSO entry\, and a negative\neffect on size
  and short-term survival.&nbsp\;Authors:\n\nEvan Starr\,\nUniversity of Ma
 ryland\n\nNatarajan Balasubramanian\,\nSyracuse University\n\nMariko Sakak
 ibara\, University of California\, Los AngelesOpen to the public.Sponsored
 \nby Trade Development and Political Economy Group at the Moynihan Institu
 te of Global Affairs&nbsp\;    
DTEND:20160321T210000Z
DTSTAMP:20260317T124410Z
DTSTART:20160321T200000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:TDPE presents: Natarajan Balasubramanian
UID:RFCALITEM639093338506352002
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p></p><p><b>Natarajan Balasubramanian on "Scr
 eening\nSpinouts?\nHow Noncompete\nEnforceability Affects the Creation\, G
 rowth\,\nand Survival\nof New Firms"</b></p><p><b>Natarajan Balasubramania
 n\,</b> <i>Whitman School of Management\, Syracuse University</i></p><p>Th
 is\npaper examines how the enforceability of noncompete\ncovenants affects
  the creation\, growth\, and survival of spinouts and other new\nentrants.
  The impact of noncompete\nenforceability on new firms is ambiguous\, sinc
 e noncompetes\nreduce knowledge leakage but impose hiring costs. However\,
  we posit that\nenforceability screens formation of within-industry spinou
 ts (WSOs) relative to\nnon-WSOs by dissuading founders with lower human ca
 pital. Using data on 5.5\nmillion new firms\, we find greater enforceabili
 ty is associated with fewer\nWSOs\, but relative to non-WSOs\, WSOs that a
 re created tend to start and stay\nlarger\, are founded by higher-earners\
 , and are more likely to survive their\ninitial years. In contrast\, we fi
 nd no impact on non-WSO entry\, and a negative\neffect on size and short-t
 erm survival.&nbsp\;</p><b>Authors:</b><p>\n\n</p><b>Evan Starr</b>\,\n<i>
 University of Maryland</i><p>\n\n</p><b>Natarajan Balasubramanian\,</b>\n<
 i>Syracuse University</i><p>\n\n</p><p><b>Mariko Sakakibara\,</b> <i>Unive
 rsity of California\, Los Angeles</i></p><p>Open to the public.<i><br></i>
 </p><b><i>Sponsored\nby Trade Development and Political Economy Group at t
 he Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs&nbsp\;</i></b><p> </p><p> </p><p> 
 </p><p> </p><p></p>
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR