BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
METHOD:PUBLISH
PRODID:-//Telerik Inc.//Sitefinity CMS 15.1//EN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Eastern Standard Time
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20251102T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=11
TZNAME:Eastern Standard Time
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20250301T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYHOUR=2;BYMINUTE=0;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:Eastern Daylight Time
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DESCRIPTION:Moynihan Institute of Global AffairsSovereignty\, Order and Con
 flictpresentEli BermanProfessor\, University of California\, San Diego \n\
 nThis paper assesses deterrence between a State and a Non-State\nactor in 
 the context of the Israel - Gaza conflict. We build a comprehensive\ndata 
 set covering 2007- 2014 using original United Nations security reports\,\n
 which capture over 16\,000 Palestinian projectile launches and over 8\,600
 \nIsraeli airstrikes\, recorded with precise timing. We find a conflict\nc
 haracterized by frequent\, short episodes of violence separated by quiet\n
 interludes. Episodes last less than one day and are followed by 3.5 days o
 f calm\,\non average. Most episodes consist only of provocations that go u
 nanswered.\nMoreover\, most retaliation and counter-retaliation do not ind
 uce subsequent\nepisodes. They appear to de-escalate within episode. These
  findings are\nconsistent with a dynamic equilibrium exhibiting incomplete
  deterrence. Our\ndata are inconsistent with the argument that retaliation
  perpetuates or\nescalates this conflict\, though that conclusion could be
  drawn by\nmisinterpreting a dynamic game with a vector autoregression app
 roach. \n\nEli\nBerman is IGCC Research Director for International Securit
 y Studies and\nprofessor of economics at UC San Diego. He co-directs the E
 conomics of National\nSecurity group at the National Bureau of Economic Re
 search and helps lead the\nEmpirical Studies of Conflict Project. He is pr
 esident of the Economics of\nNational Security Association. Publications i
 nclude: Proxy Wars (with\nDavid Lake\, 2019)\, Small Wars\, Big Data: The 
 Information Revolution in\nModern Conflict (with Jacob N. Shapiro and Jose
 ph H. Felter\, 2018) and Radical\,\nReligious and Violent: The New Economi
 cs of Terrorism (2009). \n\n&nbsp\;\n\nFor more information contact Ryan G
 riffiths\, rgriff01@syr.edu. For accessibility accommodations\, please con
 tact jmhoran@syr.edu.\n\n
DTEND:20211018T163000Z
DTSTAMP:20260509T092309Z
DTSTART:20211018T150000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Eli Berman - Mostly Deterred: An Episodic Analysis of the Israel-Ga
 za Conflict
UID:RFCALITEM639139009893463725
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p><b>Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs</b>
 </p><p><b>Sovereignty\, Order and Conflict</b></p><p><br></p><p>present</p
 ><p><b><br></b></p><p><b>Eli Berman</b></p><p>Professor\, University of Ca
 lifornia\, San Diego</p><p><br></p><p> \n\n</p><p>This paper assesses dete
 rrence between a State and a Non-State\nactor in the context of the Israel
  - Gaza conflict. We build a comprehensive\ndata set covering 2007- 2014 u
 sing original United Nations security reports\,\nwhich capture over 16\,00
 0 Palestinian projectile launches and over 8\,600\nIsraeli airstrikes\, re
 corded with precise timing. We find a conflict\ncharacterized by frequent\
 , short episodes of violence separated by quiet\ninterludes. Episodes last
  less than one day and are followed by 3.5 days of calm\,\non average. Mos
 t episodes consist only of provocations that go unanswered.\nMoreover\, mo
 st retaliation and counter-retaliation do not induce subsequent\nepisodes.
  They appear to de-escalate within episode. These findings are\nconsistent
  with a dynamic equilibrium exhibiting incomplete deterrence. Our\ndata ar
 e inconsistent with the argument that retaliation perpetuates or\nescalate
 s this conflict\, though that conclusion could be drawn by\nmisinterpretin
 g a dynamic game with a vector autoregression approach.</p><p> \n\n</p><p>
 <br></p><p><b>Eli\nBerman</b> is IGCC Research Director for International 
 Security Studies and\nprofessor of economics at UC San Diego. He co-direct
 s the Economics of National\nSecurity group at the National Bureau of Econ
 omic Research and helps lead the\nEmpirical Studies of Conflict Project. H
 e is president of the Economics of\nNational Security Association. Publica
 tions include: <i>Proxy Wars</i> (with\nDavid Lake\, 2019)\, <i>Small Wars
 \, Big Data: The Information Revolution in\nModern Conflict</i> (with Jaco
 b N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter\, 2018) and <i>Radical\,\nReligious and 
 Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism</i> (2009). </p><p>\n\n</p>&nbsp\;
 <p>\n\n</p>For more information contact Ryan Griffiths\, <a href="mailto:r
 griff01@syr.edu">rgriff01@syr.edu</a>. For accessibility accommodations\, 
 please contact <a href="mailto:jmhoran@syr.edu">jmhoran@syr.edu</a>.<p><br
 ></p><p>\n\n</p>
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR