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DESCRIPTION:The Moynihan Institute’s South Asia Center presents&nbsp\;Steph
 an Stohler\, associate professor of political science.Free press protectio
 ns are fundamental to constitutional democracy\, yet their enforcement var
 ies when judges themselves face media scrutiny.&nbsp\;Drawing on 658 decis
 ions from nine democratic countries and the European Court of Human Rights
 \, Stohler and co-author Matthew Ingram (SUNY Albany) show that judges are
  significantly less likely to uphold press rights when coverage targets th
 e judiciary rather than elected officials or bureaucrats.&nbsp\;This patte
 rn persists across different constitutional systems and legal traditions\,
  even after accounting for legal doctrine\, coverage tone\, and institutio
 nal strength.Using regression analysis\, sentiment scoring\, and qualitati
 ve case studies\, we demonstrate that judges often invoke distinct justifi
 cations when limiting press freedoms. By examining judicial decision-makin
 g through the lens of institutional self-interest\, this article contribut
 es to scholarship on judicial behavior\, comparative constitutional law\, 
 and freedom of expression. Our findings reveal a fundamental limitation in
  constitutional governance: rights enforcement weakens when judges face ac
 countability pressures. These dynamics raise serious questions about wheth
 er judges can reliably protect critical oversight as democracies worldwide
  increasingly entrust unelected judges with decisions that shape citizens'
  lives.Stephan Stohler is an associate professor of political science at S
 yracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He 
 holds a Ph.D. and J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. His research f
 ocuses on law and courts. He is the author of&nbsp\;Reconstructing Rights:
  Courts\, Parties\, and Equality Rights in India\, South Africa\, and the 
 United States. He is currently writing a book about the internet and the F
 irst Amendment.
DTEND:20260331T180000Z
DTSTAMP:20260510T233622Z
DTSTART:20260331T163000Z
LOCATION:
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:The Effect of Judges' Institutional Interests on a Free Press: Sout
 h Asia\, Europe\, and the Americas
UID:RFCALITEM639140385829612050
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>The Moynihan Institute’s South Asia Center 
 presents&nbsp\;Stephan Stohler\, associate professor of political science.
 </p><p>Free press protections are fundamental to constitutional democracy\
 , yet their enforcement varies when judges themselves face media scrutiny.
 &nbsp\;Drawing on 658 decisions from nine democratic countries and the Eur
 opean Court of Human Rights\, Stohler and co-author Matthew Ingram (SUNY A
 lbany) show that judges are significantly less likely to uphold press righ
 ts when coverage targets the judiciary rather than elected officials or bu
 reaucrats.&nbsp\;<span style="background-color: rgba(0\, 0\, 0\, 0)\; colo
 r: inherit\; font-family: inherit\; font-size: inherit\; text-align: inher
 it\; text-transform: inherit\; word-spacing: normal\; caret-color: auto\; 
 white-space: inherit">This pattern persists across different constitutiona
 l systems and legal traditions\, even after accounting for legal doctrine\
 , coverage tone\, and institutional strength.</span></p><p><span style="ba
 ckground-color: rgba(0\, 0\, 0\, 0)\; color: inherit\; font-family: inheri
 t\; font-size: inherit\; text-align: inherit\; text-transform: inherit\; w
 ord-spacing: normal\; caret-color: auto\; white-space: inherit">Using regr
 ession analysis\, sentiment scoring\, and qualitative case studies\, we de
 monstrate that judges often invoke distinct justifications when limiting p
 ress freedoms. By examining judicial decision-making through the lens of i
 nstitutional self-interest\, this article contributes to scholarship on ju
 dicial behavior\, comparative constitutional law\, and freedom of expressi
 on. </span><span style="background-color: rgba(0\, 0\, 0\, 0)\; color: inh
 erit\; font-family: inherit\; font-size: inherit\; text-align: inherit\; t
 ext-transform: inherit\; word-spacing: normal\; caret-color: auto\; white-
 space: inherit">Our findings reveal a fundamental limitation in constituti
 onal governance: rights enforcement weakens when judges face accountabilit
 y pressures. These dynamics raise serious questions about whether judges c
 an reliably protect critical oversight as democracies worldwide increasing
 ly entrust unelected judges with decisions that shape citizens' lives.</sp
 an></p><p><strong>Stephan Stohler</strong> is an associate professor of po
 litical science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
  Public Affairs. He holds a Ph.D. and J.D. from the University of Pennsylv
 ania. His research focuses on law and courts. He is the author of&nbsp\;<e
 m>Reconstructing Rights: Courts\, Parties\, and Equality Rights in India\,
  South Africa\, and the United States</em>. He is currently writing a book
  about the internet and the First Amendment.</p>
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