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DTSTART:20251102T020000
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DESCRIPTION:Identification Strategy: A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentiv
 es in Rural Credit Markets How do borrowers respond to improvements in a l
 ender’s ability to punish defaulters? We report the results of a randomize
 d field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprint
 ing borrowers in a context where a unique identification system is absent.
  Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information 
 asymmetries\, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates f
 or borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk\, but had no effect for
  the rest of borrowers. Dean Yang is Associate Professor of Public Policy 
 and Economics at the Ford School of Public Policy and Department of Econom
 ics\, University of Michigan. His areas of research interest include inter
 national migration and remittances\, microfinance\, human capital\, disast
 ers\, international trade\, and crime and corruption. He has worked as a c
 onsultant on development issues for the World Bank\, the Inter-American De
 velopment Bank\, the UNDP\, and in El Salvador and Peru. A native of the P
 hilippines\, he received his undergraduate and Ph.D. degrees in economics 
 from Harvard University.
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DTSTAMP:20260512T191750Z
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SUMMARY:TDPE Presents: Dean Yang
UID:RFCALITEM639141958702756904
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Identification Strategy: A Field Experiment on
  Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets How do borrowers respond to im
 provements in a lender’s ability to punish defaulters? We report the resul
 ts of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impa
 ct of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a unique identification 
 system is absent. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity
  and information asymmetries\, fingerprinting led to substantially higher 
 repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk\, but 
 had no effect for the rest of borrowers. Dean Yang is Associate Professor 
 of Public Policy and Economics at the Ford School of Public Policy and Dep
 artment of Economics\, University of Michigan. His areas of research inter
 est include international migration and remittances\, microfinance\, human
  capital\, disasters\, international trade\, and crime and corruption. He 
 has worked as a consultant on development issues for the World Bank\, the 
 Inter-American Development Bank\, the UNDP\, and in El Salvador and Peru. 
 A native of the Philippines\, he received his undergraduate and Ph.D. degr
 ees in economics from Harvard University.
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