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DTSTART:20251102T020000
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DESCRIPTION:Trade Development and Political Economy Presents: Arghya Ghosh:
  Absorptive capacity\, Foreign Direct Investment and Intellectual Property
  Rights in North-South Trade The authors examine South’s incentive to prot
 ect IPR in a North-South duopoly model where (i) the North firm owns a bet
 ter technology and has the option of serving the South market via exports 
 or FDI\, and (ii) the South firm can invest in absorptive capacity to redu
 ce the technology gap. While FDI by North firm makes absorption easier for
  South\, investment in absorptive capacity by the South firm might be high
 er or lower with FDI. For a given level of trade cost\, the North firm pre
 fers FDI to exports if the IPR protection is sufficiently strong. The auth
 ors find a non-monotone relationship between trade cost and the degree of 
 IPR protection that maximizes South welfare. Strengthening IPR protection 
 improves South welfare by encouraging North’s FDI for intermediate values 
 of trade cost. Arghya Ghosh is Associate Professor of Economics at the Uni
 versity of New South Wales in Sydney\, Australia. His research interests a
 re in international trade and industrial organization.
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DTSTAMP:20260511T040843Z
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SUMMARY:Trade Development and Political Economy Presents: Arghya Ghosh
UID:RFCALITEM639140549231970388
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Trade Development and Political Economy Presen
 ts: Arghya Ghosh: Absorptive capacity\, Foreign Direct Investment and Inte
 llectual Property Rights in North-South Trade The authors examine South’s 
 incentive to protect IPR in a North-South duopoly model where (i) the Nort
 h firm owns a better technology and has the option of serving the South ma
 rket via exports or FDI\, and (ii) the South firm can invest in absorptive
  capacity to reduce the technology gap. While FDI by North firm makes abso
 rption easier for South\, investment in absorptive capacity by the South f
 irm might be higher or lower with FDI. For a given level of trade cost\, t
 he North firm prefers FDI to exports if the IPR protection is sufficiently
  strong. The authors find a non-monotone relationship between trade cost a
 nd the degree of IPR protection that maximizes South welfare. Strengthenin
 g IPR protection improves South welfare by encouraging North’s FDI for int
 ermediate values of trade cost. Arghya Ghosh is Associate Professor of Eco
 nomics at the University of New South Wales in Sydney\, Australia. His res
 earch interests are in international trade and industrial organization.
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