


JOINT ACTION PLAN: NEGOTIATIONS ON THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL



In April 2015, a deal, the ‘Joint Action Plan’, was signed between Iran and selected stakeholders in the international community which lifted economic sanctions levied against Iran in return for Iran dismantling its nuclear weapons program. The negotiations, which stretched over a year, were complicated: the issues were technically complex; environmental factors including domestic politics, geopolitical dynamics, religious sectarian rivalry and corporate interests influenced the negotiating parties; and the culture and negotiating styles of negotiators from more than six countries were different. The simulation of the Joint Action Plan is a six-party, multi-issue negotiation that offers an opportunity to practice international political negotiation across cultures.

This simulation is drawn directly from the actual negotiations that took place in Vienna in 2014-15 between the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany), the European Union, and Iran. For purposes of providing a complete multi-party teaching simulation, India, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have been added as negotiating parties.

The simulation revolves around achieving settlement on five separate issues: (1) reducing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and limiting the number of centrifuges; (2) initiating procedures to account for existing plutonium byproduct and curtailing further enrichment; (3) initiating inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities; (4) lifting economic sanctions; and (5) restricting Iran’s missile capabilities and acquisition of conventional weapons. Although each issue can be negotiated in turn, achieving a final settlement will require the negotiators to

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https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parcc_eparcc.aspx

revisit earlier agreements as the issues become linked through contingencies and side agreements.

The fundamental premise of this negotiation simulation is that cultural differences among negotiators can increase the difficulty of communicating ideas and meaning, magnify the complexity of the negotiations, and reduce the ability to create value. This simulation challenges students to learn how to navigate through very complicated cultural differences. The cultures represented by the negotiating countries have very different orientations toward individualistic versus collective behaviors, religious symbolism and meaning, rationalism versus traditionalism, and other fundamental beliefs. In this simulation, each negotiator is instructed to behave in ways that reflect their culture. For example, how each negotiator displays emotion, emphasizes relationship building, and how quickly and directly they can discuss specific issues rather than using inference and story-telling will differ among negotiators. Cultural differences may also be expressed far shared values regarding risk, decision making, time sensitivity, and openness to change, and this can create rifts in cross-cultural understanding that extend beyond individual communication style and behavior. The initial challenge to the negotiators on cultural differences will be to negotiate a brief negotiation protocol consisting of three parameters: basic rules of conduct, decision rule, and timeframe.

General Information

Iran's nuclear program began in 1957 with the American sponsored 'Atoms for Peace Project' that offered training, fuel, and research to Iran.¹ It crystallized in 1967 when the United States set up the Tehran Nuclear Center and supplied fuel. However, the United States applied sanctions against Iran in 1979, after American relations with Iran were ruptured when the American embassy was stormed and diplomats held hostage.² Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions emerged later in 1984 when the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei was president and Iran was in the middle of the war with Iraq.³ Iran felt the need to have its bomb for deterrence as it feared that the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein (supported by the United States), would eventually threaten Iran with a nuclear weapon.⁴ Other countries continued to engage in

¹ Semira NNikou . 'Timeline of Iran's Nuclear Activities'. *Iran Primer*. USIP, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities>, accessed 17 November 2016.

² Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Greg Thielmann. 'Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action'. *An Arms Control Association Briefing Book*, August 2015.

³ 'Iran's Nuclear History'. *Intelligence of Iran*, <http://www.iranintelligence.com/program-history>.

⁴ Shane Harris, and Matthew M. 'Investigation Exclusive: CIA files prove America helped Saddam as he gassed Iran', *Foreign Policy*, 26 August 2013, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/>, accessed on 16 January 2016.

nuclear cooperation with Iran: Russia helped in training personnel and the enrichment process.⁵ China supplied uranium and Pakistan illegally sold Iran centrifuges and reactor designs.⁶ The West continued to object to Iran's nuclear program in keeping with an American-led strategy for the Middle East. This strategy was centered on safeguarding energy security for the West by supporting regional dominance by American ally and Iran's main rival, Saudi Arabia; and ensuring the survival of Israel.⁷ Iran, however, always maintained that it had a sovereign right to pursue a nuclear program and that its program was for peaceful purposes. After the subjugation of its immediate rival, Iraq, by the United States in 2003, Iran began to play an increasingly dominant role in the geopolitics of the region, worrying the West. The increasingly evident involvement of Iran in Iraq in support of anti-American Shia forces and Iran's increasingly bellicose statements about 'wiping out Israel' created enormous domestic pressure in the United States to act against Iran.⁸ The discovery of Iran's 'secret' nuclear facilities by the CIA in 2003 and the growing sophistication of Iran's missile capabilities made the neutralization of its nuclear weapon program imperative.⁹ The UN and Western countries applied increasingly stricter sanctions from 2006 onwards. The sanctions began to have a telling effect on Iran's economy. However, Iran's defiance only grew. As Iran's nuclear weapons program progressed, missile capabilities increased, and the situation in the Middle East transformed with the rise of the ISIS, the urgency for a negotiated settlement has grown. Various efforts at mediation and compromise by the EU, Russia, Iran, the United States as well as Brazil and Turkey, between 2003 and 2012, failed to fructify.¹⁰ However, these efforts contributed to developing an understanding of both sides' views as well as the gradual coalescing of negotiation stances on Iran's nuclear program.

While Iran's nuclear program and tensions are a source of concern globally, certain countries have been particularly involved on the issue. These are: the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) and Germany, henceforth referred to as the P5+1; the European Union less France and Germany henceforth

⁵ "Nuclear History". *Intelligence on Iran*. 2015. <http://www.iranintelligence.com/program-history>, accessed on 03 October 2015.

⁶ Yourish Karen and Delano D'Souza. 'Father of Pakistani Bomb Sold Nuclear Secrets'. *An Arms Control Association Briefing Book*. 01 March 2004. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/Pakistan.

⁷ Ramberg Bennett. 'Osirak and Its Lessons for Iran Policy'. *Arms Control Organization*, 02 May 2012. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_05/Osirak_and_Its_Lessons_for_Iran_Policy, accessed on 02 October.

⁸ Louis Charbonneau. 'In New York, defiant Ahmadinejad says Israel will be "eliminated"', *Reuters*, 24 September 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-ahmadinejad-idUSBRE88N0HF20120924>, accessed on 28 December 2016.

⁹ Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council. Personal communication. 05 June 2008; George J. Tenet, then-Director of Central Intelligence. 'DCI Remarks on Iraq's WMD Programs'. 05 February 2004. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html, accessed on 20 January 2016.

¹⁰ Devenport. *ibid*.55.

mentioned as the EU; Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and India. The international body monitoring the issue on behalf of the UN is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran's nuclear program based on both uranium and plutonium is centered on four main facilities:

- (a) The main nuclear power plant at Bushehr which produces electricity for the national power grid and plutonium as a byproduct. Plutonium is a fissile element (could be used for nuclear weapons).
- (b) The 'secret' heavy-water (a critical component for plutonium production) facility at Arak where separated plutonium and enriched uranium are made, both of which are fissile material.
- (c) The centrifugal plant at Natanz where uranium is enriched. Enriched uranium is used only for weapons and has no other utility. This facility is at the center of a dispute with the international community.
- (d) The second fuel enrichment plant at Fordow. This is an underground facility located under a mountain near the holy city of Qom. It houses the centrifuge cascades used for enrichment and was built when Iran felt that Israeli and American strikes threatened Natanz.

Since 2012, the Iranians have accelerated their efforts in critical sectors: uranium enrichment at the Natanz and Fordow facilities; conversion work in Isfahan, heavy water reactor activities in Arak, weapons and munitions production in Parchin; and light water (generally used for civilian reactors) work at the Bushehr reactor. The installation of more centrifuges at Iran's underground facility at Natanz is a particular cause for concern to the West and Israel as it now allows Iran to enrich uranium without fear of air strikes. This capability increases Iran's geopolitical leverage and makes it even more compelling for the West to negotiate.¹¹ The nuclear weapons development is matched by progress in the weapon delivery platforms, particularly missiles. Notwithstanding international sanctions against its missile program, Iran has developed missiles like the Ashura and Shabab-3, which have both conventional and nuclear payload capabilities.¹² The increasing range, accuracy, and payloads of Iran's missiles threaten to upset the military and nuclear balance in the region compounding the chaos created by the rise of ISIS and sectarian violence.

¹¹ Eiran Ehud and Martin B. Malin. 'The Sum of all Fears: Israel's Perception of a Nuclear-Armed Iran'. *The Washington Quarterly*. Summer 2013. 77-89.

¹² Anthony H. Cordesman. 'Iran's Rocket Missile Forces and Strategic Options'. *CSIS Report*. 07 October 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/141007_Iran_Rocket_Missile_forces.pdf, accessed on 17 January 2016.

Prevailing Situation

The Middle East has witnessed volatile and dynamic geopolitical changes since 2010: the rise of the ISIS; the proxy Sunni –Shia war between Iran and the Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia; and the escalation of war rhetoric between Iran and Israel. The vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the reversal of the existing political power dynamics have resulted in a sectarian civil war engulfing the Levant. This civil war has manifested as a proxy sectarian conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The relations between these two countries have deteriorated to such an extent that they have severed diplomatic ties with each other over the execution of a Shia cleric by Saudi Arabia and the retaliatory sacking of the Saudi embassy in Teheran. The atrocities by the ISIS in the Levant and the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen have further aggravated the tensions in the Middle East. The presence of Iranian special forces and its traditionally anti-Israel proxies, like the Hezbollah, in Syria that support the Assad regime has made Israel nervous about the Iranian footprint on its borders. Israel already fears Iran's growing nuclear and missile capabilities and has threatened to bomb Iran's nuclear plants if the program is not curtailed. Iran has replied with fiery rhetoric assuring massive retaliation, possibly through its missile force.¹³ However Iran increasingly faces compulsions to negotiate as a decade of sanctions has resulted in considerable economic hardships fueling political dissent and internal unrest.¹⁴ In the short term, sanctions have also affected Iran's financial ability to counter Saudi Sunni hegemony in the region.¹⁵ Iran therefore urgently requires the lifting of economic sanctions as well as political support to hedge against Sunni powers. Iran also hopes for relief on sanctions against its missile program and acquisition of conventional weapons so as to meet its security needs in the region.¹⁶ The West, though it strongly opposed Iran's nuclear weapons program, is greatly concerned over the rise of the ISIS and has developed increasing strategic congruence with Iran on this issue, setting the stage for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.¹⁷

¹³ 'Iran says will 'retaliate' if attacked, in response to Israel. *Al-Arabiya*. 28September 2012, available at <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/28/240624.html>, accessed on 17 January 2016.

¹⁴ Sabrina Peterson. 'Iran's Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Western Sanctions, *International Affairs Review*. May 2013. <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428>, accessed on 17 January 2016.

¹⁵ 'Iran pours thousands of soldiers to prevent Assad collapse, deepening controversy over \$150 billion Iran deal windfall'. The Israel Project (TIP). 20 January 2016. <http://www.theisraelproject.org/iran-pours-thousands-of-soldiers-to-prevent-assad-collapse-deepening-controversy-over-150-billion-iran-deal-windfall/>, accessed on 17 January 2016.

¹⁶ *UN Security Council Resolution 1929* dated 09 June 2010, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf ; *UN Security Council Resolution 2231* dated 20 July 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.

¹⁷ 'Nuclear Power in Iran'. *World Nuclear Association*, August 2015, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Iran/>, accessed 03 Oct 15.

Negotiations- A Collaborative Process

The Iran nuclear deal negotiations known as the Joint Action Plan is a preliminary framework agreement to be reached between Iran, a group of world powers (P5 and Germany), the EU, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and India.¹⁸ The agreement seeks to ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains peaceful and restricted to civilian use only. It hopes to achieve nuclear stability by greatly increasing the time required for Iran to build a bomb, from weeks to years, thereby preventing a sudden rash act and offering time for mediation. In return for abiding by the agreement, economic sanctions applied on Iran since 2006 would be lifted giving much-needed relief to the Iranian people. Sanctions on Iran's missile program are also to be negotiated. Israel and Saudi Arabia are extremely concerned about the negotiations on Iran's nuclear program as, apart from its effect on the nuclear balance in the region, the negotiations would also result in the release of \$150 billion in back dues to Iran once the economic sanctions are lifted. These funds would help Iran strengthen its military as well as enhance its position in the regional proxy war to the detriment of Saudi Arabia and Israel.¹⁹ Consequently, the interests of these countries have to be factored in the negotiation process.²⁰ The Western pressure on Iran has not been entirely effective due to opposition from countries like India, which apart from fundamentally disagreeing with the provisions of Non Proliferation Treaty, also oppose the sanctions due to deep historical, cultural, religious and commercial linkages with Iran.²¹ Concurrently, the burgeoning strategic relationship between India and the United States, deep India-Israel defense ties, and critical energy and labor linkages between India and Saudi Arabia have forced India to adopt a balanced position.²² The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recommended that representatives from the key stakeholder countries convene to design a collaborative process to negotiate the substantive issues.

The first task is to design a structured, effective process for negotiating the key issues jointly. The second step is to discuss the issues, identify a range of options for addressing the parties' interests, and if possible, to negotiate a deal on Iran's nuclear program. It is important that negotiators be familiar with the negotiation styles and culture of the countries represented at the negotiating table to ensure a smooth and productive negotiation process. Negotiators,

¹⁸ *Joint Plan of Action Archive*, United States Department of Treasury website, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/jpoa_archive.aspx, accessed on 16 Sep 2015.

¹⁹ Carnegie Experts on the Iran Nuclear Deal. *Carnegie Endowment Institute for Peace website*. 2015. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/15/carnegie-experts-on-iran-nuclear-deal/idon>, accessed on 16 Sep 2015.

²⁰ 'Why Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose Iran nuclear deal', *Al Jazeera*, 14 April 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/saudi-arabia-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal-150401061906177.html>, accessed on 16 Sep 2015.

²¹ P. R. Kumaraswamy. 'India Defies Oil Sanctions on Iran', *Perspective Papers*, The Begin -Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. 19 March 2012. <http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/india-defies-oil-sanctions-on-iran/>, accessed on 13 Jan 2016.

²² Simon Denyer. 'India walks tightrope as U.S. toughens Iran sanctions'. *Washington Post*. 14 February 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-walks-tightrope-as-us-toughens-iran-sanctions/2012/02/10/gIQAwRRVDR_story.html, accessed on 16 Jan 2016

accordingly, need to prepare for themselves a brief on the likely negotiation styles of each party as part of preparatory actions.

The Parties

There are six negotiators (or negotiator teams) at the table. Each negotiator or team represents the interests of one or more countries. The negotiators representing the P5+1 countries and the European Union are nationals of one country only but represent the interests of all parties that compose the respective coalitions.

Iran. Iran's desired outcome is that all sanctions are lifted immediately with minimum conditions. It seeks freedom to pursue its nuclear program in keeping with its sovereignty and with minimum interference. Capabilities to achieve its security goals need to be maintained. The deal has to be acceptable not only to the Iranian political leadership but also to the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Leader, and a Muslim cleric.

P5 + 1. This party represents the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany. This coalition's primary goal is to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is restricted to peaceful use through a comprehensive and foolproof monitoring mechanism. The leader of the group is the United States, which has traditionally had an extremely hostile relationship with Iran. The negotiations are part of the public discourse in the United States and are a politically sensitive issue.

EU. The European Union (minus Germany and France) has a similar position as the P5+1 but also has had deep commercial links with Iran. The EU desires an early lifting of economic sanctions for humanitarian reasons and wants to revive its traditional trade interests in Iran.

Israel. Israel intends to ensure that Iran never poses a threat to its security and therefore is opposed to any deal which allows Iran to pursue any form of military nuclear activity. It is also concerned about Iran's missile and conventional military capabilities. It is deeply suspicious of Iran and proposes a hard line on negotiations. Israel commands significant political influence in the US administration, Congress, as well as with the American people. The United States has to cater to Israel's interests for political, strategic and military reasons.

Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a prime actor in the Sunni-Shia rivalry in the Middle East and is opposed to any deal that strengthens Iran economically and strategically. It is particularly concerned about Iran's missile and conventional military capabilities. The

Saudis are the lynchpin of American strategy in the Muslim world and the Middle East, and it is imperative that its interests be considered in a final agreement.

India. India considers nuclear sanctions biased for de facto nuclear powers and dangerous to India's nuclear program. The sympathies of India's large Muslim population and the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia are the biggest suppliers of oil to India are other factors affecting India's stance. At the same time, India does not wish to jeopardize its growing strategic partnership with the US or with Israel, which is India's top defense partner. India wants economic sanctions on Iran to be lifted immediately with an inspection regime that does not blatantly violate Iran's sovereignty.

Negotiating the Process

The first goal of the negotiators is to develop some basic process rules for guiding the negotiation. Before discussing the substantive issues, the participants must resolve three procedural matters:

1. What are the basic rules of conduct to be followed by the negotiators?
2. What is the decision rule for the negotiations?
3. What is the time frame for the negotiations?

Negotiating The Issues

The second goal of the negotiators is to negotiate the key issues to form a Joint Action Plan, which will serve as a preliminary framework agreement.²³ The agreement will seek to ensure that Iran's nuclear program remained peaceful and restricted to civilian use only as well as set the terms for removal of sanctions. The comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program.²⁴ The discussions have narrowed down to the following issues:

1. Reduction of existing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stockpiles and limitations on the numbers of centrifuges to ensure enrichment only to meet the requirement for civilian uses.
2. Initiation of strict procedures for accounting of plutonium by-product and curtailment of all further enrichment.

²³ 'Joint Plan of Action Archive'. *United States Department of Treasury website*, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/jpoa_archive.aspx, accessed on 16 Sep 2015.

²⁴ 'Joint Plan of Action on Iran's Nuclear Program'. *New York Times*. 24 November 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/11/25/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-document.html?_r=1&_, accessed on 01 Oct 2015.

3. Initiation of regular inspections of all nuclear facilities by the IAEA.
4. The lifting of economic sanctions in a time bound manner and modalities of re-application in the case of violations.
5. Restrictions on Iran's missile capabilities and acquisition of conventional weapons.

DRAFT NEGOTIATION PROTOCOL

1.0 Purpose and Products of the Negotiation

- 1.1 The purpose of this negotiation is to develop a comprehensive international agreement on Iran's nuclear program. The final agreement is to be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council and incorporated into international law.
- 1.2 Each negotiating entity will approve the final agreement under its legislation and administrative processes to lift sanctions as defined in the agreement.
- 1.3 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must approve any and all relevant requirements regarding uranium enrichment, nuclear accounting, and other nuclear regulatory agreements before the lifting of economic sanctions.
- 1.4 The following issues will be discussed and negotiated and will comprise the final agreement:
 - A. Reduction of existing highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles currently existing in Iran and limitations on the number of Iranian centrifuges to ensure enrichment only to meet the requirement for civilian uses.
 - B. Initiation of procedures for accounting of plutonium byproduct and reduction of further enrichment.
 - C. Initiation of regular inspections of all nuclear facilities by the IAEA.
 - D. The lifting of economic sanctions against Iran in a time bound manner and modalities of reapplication in the case of violations.
 - E. Restrictions on Iran's missile capabilities and acquisition of conventional weapons.

2.0 Participants and Roles and Responsibilities of the Negotiators

- 2.1 The following countries will be represented in the negotiations:
 - A. Iran
 - B. P5 + 1- This party represents the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany and will be led by the United States
 - C. The European Union minus France and Germany
 - D. Israel
 - E. Saudi Arabia
 - F. India
- 2.2 Each negotiator team agrees to represent his or her constituency by regularly seeking input, advice, information, and feedback from the relevant ministers and departments of state. While at the negotiating table, negotiators must be prepared to represent the interests of their constituents officially during negotiations and act accordingly.

- 2.3 While at the negotiating table, any negotiator may halt negotiations at any time to confer with his or her ministerial or departmental staff and/or superiors. Negotiations must resume within 48 hours after a break is called.

3.0 Negotiator Communication

- 3.1 Each negotiator agrees to listen carefully and respectfully to other negotiators and will avoid interrupting other negotiators.
- 3.2 Parties will avoid personal attacks (verbal and otherwise) during discussions.
- 3.3 Parties will be respectful to the other negotiators in their public communications outside of the negotiating table.
- 3.4 Parties will not attribute positions or statements to other negotiators in their public communications outside of the negotiating table.

4.0 Decision Rule

- 4.1 A final agreement must be reached by consensus. All parties must agree on the package of proposals that will become a definitive agreement. Consensus means all parties can live with the final package though they may not fully agree with all elements of the package.
- 4.2 All parties signatory to the final agreement must be willing to move the agreement in its entirety through each country's approval process.
- 4.3 Any party not signatory to the final agreement is released from all obligations to ratify the agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM IRAN

This group will consider various options relating to each of the five issues on the table. These instructions describe the general strategy you should follow. The attached option sheet provides more detail about Iran's specific preferences for each option.

The foreign policy decision-making process in Iran is complex with several power centers.²⁵ Apart from the government, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG), which is loyal to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has a major say in economic and national security decisions especially the nuclear program.²⁶ The following instructions were formulated after a meeting at the highest level including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the President, Hassan Rouhani; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Commander, Major General Mohammed Ali Jafari; Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Ali Tayyebnia and the Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif:

1. Iran has struggled hard against Western hostility to uphold its 'inalienable, sovereign right' to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. It will seek to retain that right while ensuring that the crippling economic sanctions are lifted immediately. To counter the covert 'anti-Shia' conflict waged by the Saudis in the region, Iran will also try and ensure that its military capabilities are not unduly restricted.²⁷
2. The following is a list of Iran's most vital interests and priorities:
 - Iran is **particularly concerned** that its civilian nuclear program is unhindered by restrictions. To that effect limits on enrichment must not hinder the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
 - Iran would **prefer** that spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) are retained in-country, and it retains the rights to complete the work on Arak reactor which produces plutonium in keeping with future security needs in light of Israel's nuclear weapons.²⁸

²⁵ "The Power structure in Iran", *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html>, accessed on 29 November 2015.

²⁶ Alireza Nader, 'Iran Primer: The Revolutionary Guards'. *United States Institute for Peace*, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards>, accessed on 29 November 2015.

²⁷ 'Ayatollah Khamenei sends a letter to President Hassan Rouhani about the JCPOA', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran, <http://en.mfa.ir/index.aspx?siteid=3&pageid=2012&newsview=363361&pro=nobak>, accessed on 29 November 2015.

²⁸ Glen Kessler. 'Iran's claim that Israel has 400 nuclear weapons'. *Washington Post*. 01 May 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/05/01/irans-claim-that-israel-has-400-nuclear-weapons/>, accessed on 29 Nov 15.

- Iran, while preferring that a nuclear inspection regime remains limited and unobtrusive, is **willing to compromise** on its extent if it is discreet. Inspection of military sites, however, is not desirable.
- Iran is **particularly concerned** that economic sanctions are lifted immediately, and it is dues are released as soon as possible. The snapback clauses on sanctions must be as lenient as possible to avoid vulnerability to manipulation.
- Iran would **strongly prefer** that curbs on its conventional military and missile capabilities are minimized.

Negotiation Style

The Iranian negotiators are likely to be highly competent, articulate and proficient, given their experience in negotiations on nuclear issues. Given their cultural background and negotiation style, Iranian negotiators are likely to be emotional, indirect, and at times ambiguous regarding their stances. They are liable to adopt highly unrealistic stances initially in keeping with guarding their sovereignty and pride. They are likely to be hostile and complain about historical injustices towards their country by the West. They may even frame the contentious issues regarding religious hostility, i.e. Crusaders, and Jews versus Islam; or Bad versus Good. They are likely to be passionate when highlighting the suffering of the common people to justify the early lifting of sanctions. The Iranian negotiation team is liable to consist of individuals belonging to different factions, have differing loyalties and who may be even covertly reporting to various power centers in Iran with differing stances on the negotiations. This feature may result in the Iranian team requiring more time to develop internal consensus. Therefore, it may be difficult clearly to discern the Iran stances and their BATNAs initially and may need several rounds of negotiation. The Iranian negotiators may seek to build personal rapport and understanding before entering into substantive negotiations. Given their hierarchical system, the negotiators may not often have the full authority to clinch deals, are like to be cautious and may require referring to their leaders on seemingly minor aspects. The Iranians are likely to view the Israelis and Saudis to be particularly hostile and are liable to adopt tough, dogmatic stances against these parties. They are liable to expect both India and the EU to be supportive on the early lifting of sanctions and Indian backing on the issue of inspection.

Option Sheet for Iran

	<u>Issue # 1: Uranium Enrichment</u>	
	<u>Options</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 70 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 10 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 8000 in the next 20 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	1 st
2	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 80 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 7 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 7000 in the next 15 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	2 nd
3	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	3 rd
4	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	4 th
	<u>Issue # 2: Plutonium Accounting</u>	
1	Arak reactor retained in present form and production of plutonium monitored; ship out 50 % spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 5 years.	1 st
2	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out 75 % fuel rods, balance accounted for and monitored; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 10 years.	2 nd
3	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.	3 rd
4	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 20 years.	4 th
	<u>Issue # 3: IAEA Inspection</u>	<u>Priority</u>

1	Pre-arranged hour access to civilian nuclear sites only; partial enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA access to sites within 90 days of reported suspicious activity.	1st
2	24 hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.	2nd
3	24 hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.	3rd
4	24 hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) and IAEA access to sites within 25 days of reported suspicious activity.	4th
	<u>Issue # 4: Economic Sanctions</u>	
1	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file;	1st
2	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 3 years based on progress; For 7 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; after 7 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file;	2nd
3	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 7 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 5 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file;	3rd
4	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 10 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 7	Unacceptable

	years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file;	
	<u>Issue # 5: Missile & Conventional weapons Restrictions</u>	
1	A heavy arms embargo lifted immediately and missile restrictions remain in place for 3 years.	1
2	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.	2
3	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.	3
4	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 8 years and missile restrictions in place for 10 years.	Unacceptable

CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM P5+1

This group will consider various options relating to each of the five issues on the table. These instructions describe the general strategy you and your fellow negotiators should follow. The attached option sheet provides more detail about P5+1 specific preference for each option.

The following instructions were formulated and conveyed to the negotiation committee:

1. The P5 + 1 has over the years arrived at common ground, and while internal differences exist, the group has been receptive to the leadership of the United States in setting the terms for negotiations with Iran. The groups seek a deal which ensures the complete and permanent cessation of Iran's program to build nuclear weapons.
2. The following is a list of P5 + 1 most vital interests and priorities:
 - P5+1 is **particularly concerned** that Iran's nuclear program is rendered totally incapable of producing weapons. To that effect limits on enrichment as well as plans must be strict and binding.
 - P5+1 is **particularly concerned** that all existing fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) are moved out of the country, and the Arak reactor is rendered incapable of producing any weapon-grade fissile material.
 - P5+1 **strongly prefers** that the monitoring and inspection regime be all encompassing, accurate and penetrative with access to all sites, particularly military ones at the shortest notice.
 - P5+1 would **prefer** that measures to curb Iran's conventional military, and missile capabilities be retained.
 - P5+1 while preferring that lifting of economic sanctions and release of dues be lifted based on progress on implementation of measures by Iran is **willing to compromise** considering the hardships faced by the Iranian people. The snapback clauses on sanctions, however, need to be enforced on confirmation of violation of the agreement.

Negotiation Style

The P5+1 negotiators are likely to be highly competent, articulate and proficient, given their experience in negotiations on nuclear issues. Notwithstanding its mixed composition (from China, Russia, Europe and the U.S.A), the P5+1 is likely to adopt an American style to negotiations given its American leadership and influence. American negotiators are likely to appear more rational and logical than their Iranian counterparts. However, it is probable that they too initially adopt highly unrealistic stances in keeping with the traditional anti-Iran rhetoric in their country and imagery of 'evil'. They are likely to project the dangers of Iranian

nuclear weapons program and its violations of IAEA guidelines. Their negotiation style is liable to be more direct, less formal and BATNAs are likely to be more discernable. The P5+1 negotiators are likely to push for quick negotiations within a definite timeline and would be more focused on tangible results rather than building relationships. While the team, led by Secretary of State, John Kerry, is likely to have been delegated substantial powers, given the involvement of six countries in the group, developing internal consensus will also be part of the overall negotiation process. The Americans are likely to view the Iran team as rigid, ideological and even insincere requiring several rounds before trust is established. The team is likely to expect substantial support from Israel and Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent from the EU.

Option Sheet for P5+1

	<u>Issue # 1: Uranium Enrichment</u>	
	<u>Options</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 70 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 10 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 8000 in the next 20 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	Unacceptable
2	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 80 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 7 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 7000 in the next 15 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	3rd
3	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	2nd
4	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	1st
	<u>Issue # 2: Plutonium Accounting</u>	
1	Arak reactor retained in present form and production of plutonium monitored; ship out 50 % spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 5 years.	Unacceptable
2	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out 75 % fuel rods, balance accounted for and	3r

	monitored; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 10 years.	
3	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.	2nd
4	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 20 years.	1st
	<u>Issue # 3: IAEA Inspection</u>	
1	Pre-arranged hour access to civilian nuclear sites only; partial enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA access to sites within 90 days of reported suspicious activity.	Unacceptable
2	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.	3rd
3	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.	2nd
4	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) and IAEA access to sites within 25 days of reported suspicious activity.	1st
	<u>Issue # 4: Economic Sanctions</u>	
1	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	2nd
2	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 3 years based on	1st

	progress; For 7 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; after 7 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	
3	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 7 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 5 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	3rd
4	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 10 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 7 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	4th
	<u>Issue # 5: Missile & Conventional weapons Restrictions</u>	
1	A heavy arms embargo lifted immediately and missile restrictions remain in place for 3 years.	Unacceptable
2	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.	3rd
3	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.	2nd
4	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 8 years and missile restrictions in place for 10 years.	1st

CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM ISRAEL

This group will consider various options relating to each of the five issues on the table. These instructions describe the general strategy you should follow. The attached option sheet provides more detail about Israel's specific preferences for each option.

The following instructions were formulated and conveyed to the negotiation committee:

1. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considers Iran's nuclear weapons an existential threat to Israel and initially completely opposed negotiations.²⁹ He has even antagonized relations with the White House and worked with the United States Congress, where he has tremendous support, to ensure either the delay of the deal or adoption of very strict conditions.³⁰ Israel seeks a deal which ensures the complete and permanent cessation of Iran's program to build nuclear weapons.
2. The following is a list of Israel's most vital interests and priorities:
 - Israel is **particularly concerned** that Iran's nuclear program is rendered totally incapable of producing weapons. To that effect limits on enrichment as well as plans must be strict and binding.
 - Israel is **particularly concerned** that measures to curb Iran's conventional military, and missile capabilities are retained.
 - Israel is **particularly concerned** that all existing fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) are moved out of the country, and the Arak reactor is rendered incapable of producing any weapons-grade fissile material.
 - Israel strongly **prefers** that the monitoring and inspection regime be all encompassing, accurate and penetrative with access to all sites, particularly military ones at the shortest notice.
 - Israel **prefers** that lifting of economic sanctions and release of dues be lifted based on progress on implementation of measures by Iran. The snapback clauses on sanctions must be strict and implemented at the slightest violation of the agreement.

Negotiation Style

The Israeli negotiators are likely to be highly knowledgeable and skilled in negotiations, given their experiences with the Palestinians. The negotiators are likely to be blunt, direct and forceful in their approach. Given their cultural and religious backgrounds, they are likely to be

²⁹ Isabel Kershner. 'Iran Deal Denounced by Netanyahu as 'Historic Mistake''. *New York Times*, 14 July 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-israel.html?_r=0, accessed on 28 November 2015.

³⁰ Jeffrey Goldberg. 'Netanyahu's Victory Over Iran'. *Washington Post*. 11 September 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/netanyahu-israel-victory-iran/404965/>, accessed on 29 November 2015.

highly dogmatic about their stances. The vociferous and public stance adopted by their president highlighting Israel's existential fears from Iran's nuclear program likely reduces their scope for compromise. It is probable that they initially adopt highly unrealistic stances in keeping with the traditional anti-Iran rhetoric in their country. They are liable to project the dangers of Iranian nuclear weapons program and its violations of IAEA guidelines. Their negotiation style is likely to be direct, informal and BATNAs are likely to be easily discernable. The Israeli negotiators would be eager for final negotiations and concrete results in a short time frame and are likely to be less interested in building rapport. While it is probable that the negotiators would have substantial authority to make most decisions, negotiators may seek their leader's approval on the main issues. The Israelis are likely to view the Iranian team as rigid, ideological and even insincere requiring several rounds before trust is established. The team is likely to expect substantial support from the P5+1 and EU on most issues, discreet backing from Saudi Arabia and would hope for India to remain neutral.

Option Sheet for Israel

	<u>Issue # 1: Uranium Enrichment</u>	
	<u>Options</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 70 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 10 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 8000 in the next 20 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	Unacceptable
2	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 80 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 7 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 7000 in the next 15 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	3rd
3	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	2nd
4	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	1st
	<u>Issue # 2: Plutonium Accounting</u>	
1	Arak reactor retained in present form and production of plutonium monitored; ship out 50 % spent fuel rods from the country as long as	Unacceptable

	this reactor exists; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 5 years.	
2	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out 75 % fuel rods, balance accounted for and monitored; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 10 years.	3rd
3	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.	2nd
4	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 20 years.	1st
	<u>Issue # 3: IAEA Inspection</u>	
1	Pre-arranged hour access to civilian nuclear sites only; partial enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA access to sites within 90 days of reported suspicious activity.	Unacceptable
2	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.	3rd
3	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.	2nd
4	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) and IAEA access to sites within 25 days of reported suspicious activity.	1st
	<u>Issue # 4: Economic Sanctions</u>	
1	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released	Unacceptable

	on implementation day; after 5 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	
2	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 3 years based on progress; For 7 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; after 7 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	<u>3rd</u>
3	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 7 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 5 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	<u>2nd</u>
4	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 10 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 7 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	<u>1st</u>
	<u>Issue # 5: Missile & Conventional weapons Restrictions</u>	
1	A heavy arms embargo lifted immediately and missile restrictions remain in place for 3 years.	Unacceptable
2	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.	3
3	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.	2
4	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 8 years and missile restrictions in place for 10 years.	1

CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM SAUDI ARABIA

This group will consider various options relating to each of the five issues on the table. These instructions describe the general strategy you should follow. The attached option sheet provides more detail about Saudi Arabia's specific preferences for each option.

The following instructions were formulated and conveyed to the negotiation committee:

1. Saudi Arabia has worked hard to ensure its primacy as the leader of the Islamic world and the dominant Muslim power in the Middle East. It is presently engaged in a proxy war with Iran and Iran's nuclear program is a worry as the Saudis do not have nuclear weapons and depend on Pakistan for a tenuous nuclear security.³¹ It is also concerned in the short term of Iran strengthening its military and asymmetric warfare capabilities from the funds released after economic sanctions are lifted. Saudi Arabia, therefore, seeks a deal which restricts Iran's nuclear program; and contains enhancement of its missile and conventional military capabilities; and limits its support to pro-Shia forces through the regulated flow of dues and calibrated lifting of sanctions. At the same time, it does not want to earn the ire of the Islamic world by appearing to side with the West and Israel against a fellow Muslim country which is in pursuit of nuclear power.
2. The following is a list of Saudi Arabia's most important interests and priorities:
 - Saudi Arabia is **particularly concerned** that measures to curb Iran's conventional military, and missile capabilities are retained.
 - Saudi Arabia is **particularly concerned** that Iran's nuclear program is rendered totally incapable of producing weapons. To that effect limits on enrichment as well as plans must be strict and binding.
 - Saudi Arabia is **particularly concerned** that all existing fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) are moved out of the country, and the Arak reactor is rendered incapable of producing any weapons-grade fissile material.
 - Saudi Arabia **strongly prefers** that the monitoring and inspection regime be all encompassing, accurate and penetrative with access to all sites, particularly military ones at the shortest notice.
 - Saudi Arabia **prefers** that lifting of economic sanctions and release of dues be lifted based on progress on implementation of measures by Iran. The snapback clauses on sanctions must be strict and implemented at the slightest violation of the agreement.

³¹ Mark Urban. 'Saudi nuclear weapons 'on order' from Pakistan'. *BBC Newsnight*. 06 November 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846>, accessed on 28 November 2015.

Negotiation Style

The Saudi negotiators are likely to be highly competent and articulate in matters relating to regional security. Given their cultural background negotiation style, Saudi negotiators are likely to be emotional, indirect and initially ambiguous about stances. They would not like for the Muslim world to get the impression that Saudi Arabia is teaming up with the West and Israel against a fellow Muslim country. They are, therefore, likely to convey their positions in a nuanced and subtle manner. However, they share the fears of Iran's nuclear weapons program and are likely to make deals with other parties to achieve their objectives without being seen as the primary agents against Iran. It may, therefore, be difficult to discern Saudi stances and their BATNAs clearly initially and may require several rounds of negotiation. Saudi negotiators may seek to build personal rapport and understanding before entering into substantive negotiations. Given their hierarchical system, the negotiators may not often have the full authority to clinch deals, are like to be cautious and may require referring to their leaders on seemingly minor aspects. They are likely to perceive the Iranians to be particularly hostile and are liable to adopt a hardline stance against them. They are liable to expect the P5+1, Israel and the EU to be supportive of their position on most issues and hope for India to remain neutral.

Option Sheet for Saudi Arabia

	<u>Issue # 1: Uranium Enrichment</u>	
	<u>Options</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 70 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 10 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 8000 in the next 20 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	Unacceptable
2	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 80 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 7 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 7000 in the next 15 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	3rd
3	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	2nd
4	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	1st

	<u>Issue # 2: Plutonium Accounting</u>	
1	Arak reactor retained in present form and production of plutonium monitored; ship out 50 % spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 5 years.	Unacceptable
2	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out 75 % fuel rods, balance accounted for and monitored; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 10 years.	3rd
3	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.	2nd
4	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 20 years.	1st
	<u>Issue # 3: IAEA Inspection</u>	
1	Pre-arranged hour access to civilian nuclear sites only; partial enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA access to sites within 90 days of reported suspicious activity.	Unacceptable
2	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.	3rd
3	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.	2nd
4	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) and IAEA access to sites within 25 days of reported suspicious activity.	1st
	<u>Issue # 4: Economic Sanctions</u>	

1	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years’ sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	Unacceptable
2	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program on implementation day; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 3 years based on progress; For 7 years’ sanctions are subject to snapback; after 7 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	3rd
3	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 7 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 5 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	2nd
4	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 10 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 7 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	1st
	<u>Issue # 5: Missile & Conventional weapons Restrictions</u>	
1	A heavy arms embargo lifted immediately and missile restrictions remain in place for 3 years.	Unacceptable
2	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.	3
3	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.	2
4	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 8 years and missile restrictions in place for 10 years.	1

CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM EU

This group will consider various options relating to each of the five issues on the table. These instructions describe the general strategy you and your fellow negotiators should follow. The attached option sheet provides more detail about EU specific preferences for each option.

The following instructions were formulated and conveyed to the negotiation committee:

1. The EU has over the years arrived at a consensus on the issue and while worries over Iran's nuclear program are paramount, the bloc is for the swift easing of sanction both to give relief to the Iranian people as well to permit economic reengagement with Iran. The EU is for the rapid easing of sanctions, restriction of nuclear weapon capability and restrictions on conventional forces.
2. The following is a list of EU most vital interests and priorities:
 - The EU is **particularly concerned** that Iran's nuclear program is rendered totally incapable of producing weapons. To that effect limits on enrichment as well as plans must strict and binding.
 - The EU is **particularly concerned** that economic sanctions are lifted immediately, and its dues are released at the earliest. The snapback clauses on sanctions must be fair and based on verification of any violation of the agreement by Iran and must not cause undue suffering to the Iranian people.
 - The EU would **strongly prefer** that all existing fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) are moved out of the country, and the Arak reactor is rendered incapable of producing any weapons-grade fissile material.
 - The EU **prefers** that the monitoring and inspection regime be all encompassing, accurate and penetrative with access to all sites, particularly military ones at the shortest notice.
 - The EU **prefers** that measures curb Iran's conventional military, and missile capabilities are retained.

Negotiation Style

The EU negotiators are likely to be very experienced in the field of negotiations given their extensive involvement as neutrals in conflict resolution. Given their cultural backgrounds, they are likely to appear rational and logical and focused on achieving success in the negotiations. They are liable to be direct, if formal, in their negotiation style and try and mediate between different parties. In the absence of strong historical or political antipathies and focused instead on commercial and humanitarian issues, the EU negotiators are likely to adopt realistic positions with easily discernible BATNAs. EU negotiators are likely to try and create a favorable

atmosphere for negotiations and would seek to build personal rapport between the negotiators. While the team is likely to have been delegated substantial powers, given the involvement of several countries in the group, developing internal consensus will also be part of the overall negotiation process. They are likely to view the P5+1, Israelis and the Iranians as the most rigid, the Saudis as more flexible and the Indians as the most flexible and supportive.

Option Sheet for the EU

	<u>Issue # 1: Uranium Enrichment</u>	
	<u>Options</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 70 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 10 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 8000 in the next 20 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	Unacceptable
2	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 80 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 7 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 7000 in the next 15 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	<u>3rd</u>
3	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	<u>2nd</u>
4	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	<u>1st</u>
	<u>Issue # 2: Plutonium Accounting</u>	
1	Arak reactor retained in present form and production of plutonium monitored; ship out 50 % spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 5 years.	<u>4th</u>
2	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out 75 % fuel rods, balance accounted for and monitored; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 10 years.	<u>3rd</u>
3	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; retain spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade	<u>2nd</u>

	plutonium) in the country; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.	
4	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years	<u>1st</u>
	<u>Issue # 3: IAEA Inspection</u>	
1	Pre-arranged hour access to civilian nuclear sites only; partial enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA access to sites within 90 days of reported suspicious activity.	Unacceptable
2	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.	<u>3rd</u>
3	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.	<u>2nd</u>
4	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) and IAEA access to sites within 25 days of reported suspicious activity.	<u>1st</u>
	<u>Issue # 4: Economic Sanctions</u>	
1	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	<u>1st</u>
2	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 3 years based on progress; For 7 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; after 7 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	<u>2nd</u>
3	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress;	<u>3rd</u>

	Sanctions are subject to snapback for 7 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 5 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	
4	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 10 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 7 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	<u>4th</u>
	<u>Issue # 5: Missile & Conventional weapons Restrictions</u>	
1	A heavy arms embargo lifted immediately and missile restrictions remain in place for 3 years.	<u>1</u>
2	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.	<u>2</u>
3	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.	<u>3</u>
4	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 8 years and missile restrictions in place for 10 years.	<u>4</u>

CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM INDIA

This group will consider various options relating to each of the five issues on the table. These instructions describe the general strategy you and your fellow negotiators should follow. The attached option sheet provides more detail about India-specific preferences for each option.

The following instructions were formulated and conveyed to the negotiation committee:

1. India views all parties as friends and desires a solution which safeguards Iranian sovereignty and brings relief to the Iranian people while at the same time reducing tensions in the Middle East. India is the swift easing of sanctions, restriction of nuclear weapon capability and limited restrictions on conventional forces.
2. The following is a list of India's most vital interests and priorities:
 - India is **particularly concerned** that economic sanctions are lifted immediately, and its dues are released at the earliest. The snapback clauses on sanctions must be fair and based on verification of any violation of the agreement by Iran and must not cause undue suffering to the Iranian people.
 - India is **particularly concerned** that the regime inspection respects sovereignty, is limited and unobtrusive with adequate notice.
 - India **strongly prefers** that Iran's nuclear program be rendered totally incapable of producing weapons. To that effect limits on enrichment as well as plans must be strict and binding. However, Iran should be allowed to develop its civilian nuclear program. To that effect limits on enrichment must not hinder the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
 - India **prefers** that the majority of existing fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) be moved out of the country, and the Arak reactor is rendered incapable of producing any weapon-grade fissile material. Adequate provisions for deterrence could be permitted.
 - India **prefers** that measures to curb Iran's conventional military, and missile capabilities be retained in a limited fashion. Adequate provisions for deterrence could be allowed.

Negotiation Style

The Indian negotiators are likely to be highly competent, articulate and proficient because of their experience in negotiations on nuclear issues. Given their cultural backgrounds, Indian negotiators are likely to be emotional and ambiguous to a degree in their approach. They are liable to be direct, if informal, in their negotiation style and try and mediate between different parties. The Indians are likely to be dogmatic to a degree because of their historical stance on

the need for respect for sovereignty and due to their perception that the international nuclear regime is neo-colonialist and for the P5 countries. Given their amicable relations with all parties in the negotiation, the Indians are likely to adopt a balanced approach, and along with the EU, mediate for a successful negotiation. They are liable to support the most important issues of each party while compromising on the less critical issues. They are likely to adopt realistic positions with easily discernible BATNAs. Indian negotiators are likely to try and create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations and would seek to build personal rapport between the negotiators before entering into substantive negotiations. While it is probable that the negotiators would have substantial authority to make most decisions, negotiators may seek their leader's approval on the main issues. They are liable to view the P5+1, Israelis and the Iranians as the most rigid, the Saudis as more flexible and the EU as the most flexible and supportive.

Option Sheet for the India

	<u>Issue # 1: Uranium Enrichment</u>	
	<u>Options</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 70 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 10 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 8000 in the next 20 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	Unacceptable
2	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 80 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 7 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 7000 in the next 15 years and limited uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	3rd
3	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	2nd
4	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.	1st
	<u>Issue # 2: Plutonium Accounting</u>	
1	Arak reactor retained in present form and production of plutonium monitored; ship out 50 % spent fuel rods from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 5 years.	4th

2	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out 75 % fuel rods, balance accounted for and monitored; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 10 years.	3rd
3	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; retain spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) in the country; Iran is not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.	2nd
4	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years	1st
	<u>Issue # 3: IAEA Inspection</u>	
1	Pre-arranged hour access to civilian nuclear sites only; partial enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA access to sites within 90 days of reported suspicious activity.	1st
2	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.	2nd
3	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.	3rd
4	24-hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) and IAEA access to sites within 25 days of reported suspicious activity.	4th
	<u>Issue # 4: Economic Sanctions</u>	
1	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years' sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	1st

2	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program on implementation day; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 3 years based on progress; For 7 years’ sanctions are subject to snapback; after 7 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	2nd
3	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 7 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 5 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	3rd
4	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program 12 months after implementation day based on progress; Sanctions are subject to snapback for 10 years; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released in equal tranches over 7 years after implementation day; after 10 years the UN will remove Iran from the UN Security Council's nuclear file.	4th
	<u>Issue # 5: Missile & Conventional weapons Restrictions</u>	
1	A heavy arms embargo lifted immediately and missile restrictions remain in place for 3 years.	4th
2	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.	1st
3	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.	2nd
4	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 8 years and missile restrictions in place for 10 years.	3rd

PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATION WORKSHEET

A. About You

1. What is your overall goal?
2. What is your negotiation strategy: distributive/competitive or integrative/collaborative?
3. What are the issues?
4. How important is each issue to you? Rank issues in order of importance, high to low.
5. What is your best alternative to a negotiated agreement, your BATNA?
6. What are your comparative advantages?
7. What are your interests (what's important to you)?
8. What options can you think of that will meet your interests?
9. What are your targets and your opening bid?
10. What is your resistance point (i.e., the worst agreement you are willing to accept before ending negotiations)? If your BATNA is vague, consider identifying the minimum terms you can accept and beyond which you must recess negotiations and gather more information.

B. About the Other Side

1. How important is each issue to the other parties (plus any new issues that you think they will add)?
2. What is their BATNA?
3. What are their comparative advantages?
4. What are their interests?
5. What options can you think of that might meet their interests and yours?
6. What is their resistance point?

C. The Situation

1. What deadlines exist? Who is more impatient?
2. Can you use your and their comparative advantages for mutual gain?
3. What fairness norms or evaluation criteria/standards exist?
4. What topics or questions do you want to avoid? How will you respond if they ask anyway?

D. The Relationship Between the Parties

1. Will you need to negotiate with the parties again? If so, what are the future consequences of each strategy, tactic, or action you are considering?
2. Can you trust the other parties? What do you know about them?
3. Do the other parties trust you?
4. What do you know about the other parties' styles and tactics?
5. What are the limits to the other parties' authority?

Before you begin negotiations, meet with the other side and together:

- A. Set goals, generate an atmosphere of openness, trust and safety, and create joint value;
- B. Share interests and aspirations;
- C. Agree on rules and procedures to follow during negotiations;
- D. Create a negotiation agenda – identify the issues to be resolved and a range of possible resolutions.