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National Secuirty Studies Case Study Listings and Descriptions

 
Case ID Title Author(s)

CS 0697-02

Generals Versus the President: Eisenhower and
the Army, 1953-1955
A.J. Bacevich &
Lawrence F Kaplan

CS 1197-03

“Peacekeeping in Bosnia" William C. Banks &
Jeffrey D. Straussman

CS 1197-04

“The Battle to Destroy Chemical Weapons" W. Henry Lambright

CS 1197-05

“Breaking the Market or Preventing Market Breakdown:
The Technology Reinvestment Project"
Sean O’Keefe &
Volker Franke

CS 1197-06

“Obligations of Leadership: The Khobar Tower
Bombing and its Aftermath"
Eliot A. Cohen

CS 0398-07

“From Turbulence to Tragedy: The Crash of
Ron Brown’s Flight in Croatia"

Patricia Ingraham & Barbara Romzek

CS 0998-09

“Four Days in December“ L. Paul Dube

CS 1298-11

“Searching for a Safer Technology: Army-Community
Conflict in Chemical Weapons Destruction”

W. Henry Lambright

CS 0699-12

“To Prevent and Deter International Terrorism: The US
Response to the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy Bombings”
William C. Banks

CS 0699-13

“Rotation from Hell: The 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia
Army National Guard in Desert Shield/Desert Storm”
Eliot A Cohen

CS 0899-14

“Changing Course: Admiral James Watkins
and the DOE Nuclear Complex”
W. Henry Lambright

CS 1099-15

“The Devil and the Demon” William C. Banks

CS 1299-16

“The UN-NATO Coalition: Diplomatic and
Military Interaction in Bosnia”
Thomas A. Keaney &
Scott Douglas

CS 0500-17

“‘Guaranteeing’ Peace Agreements: The US
in the Peru-Ecuador Border Dispute”
Theodore S. Wilkinson

CS 0600-18

“Scott Ritter V Saddam Hussein: The Crisis
over UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq”
David Wise

CS 0700-19

“A Firm and Commensurate Response: US Retaliation
for the Bush Assassination Attempt”
A.J. Bacevich

CS 0900-20

“Burned by the Press: One Commander’s Experience” Richard J. Newman

CS 1000-21

“Escalating the War in Vietnam” Thomas A. Keaney

CS 0901-23

“Worse than an Infection?: DOD’s Struggle
with the Anthrax Vaccination”

John Robinson

CS 1201-24

“Security and Salvation: Bringing Russia aboard
the Space Station”
W. Henry Lambright

CS 0299-101

“Nationland”

James Blandin &
Sean O’Keefe

CS 0102-25

“Separate Powers: The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998” Laurence Pope

CS 1202-29

Philanthropy vs. National Security: Should CARE
Criticize the Military?
Arthur C. Brooks

CS 0103-31

Dan Goldin's Catch-22: Deploying a U.S.-Russian
Space Station
W. Henry Lambright

CS 1102-28

Homeland Security

James Blandin

CS 1202-30

Choosing Sides in South Asia: The 1971 Crisis Thomas A. Keaney & Hans Davies

CS 0603-32

The Predator William C. Banks

CS 0803-33

Squeezing a Balloon: Plan Colombia and America’s
War on Drugs
Volker Franke &
Justin Reed

CS 0903-34

Managing Transition in a Post War Country

John Murray &
Louis Kriesberg

CS 0104-35

Tragedy at Sea: The Collision of the USS
Greeneville and the Ehime Maru
Christopher M. Jones

CS 0697-02

GENERALS VERSUS THE PRESIDENT:
Eisenhower and the Army, 1953-1955

A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence F. Kaplan

In The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington asks: “What does the military officer do when he is ordered by a statesman to take a measure which is militarily absurd when judged by professional standards and which is strictly within the military realm without political implications?” In Huntington's view, the answer is clear: given such a “clear invasion of the professional realm by extraneous considerations…the existence of professional standards justifies military disobedience.”

Between the autumn of 1953 and the summer of 1955, the leaders of the United States Army struggled against a national security policy they thought flawed, dangerous, and even immoral. In opposing the strategy of massive retaliation, senior Army leaders placed themselves at cross purposes with the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower. This case is the story of that conflict. It describes the basis of the Army’s opposition to Eisenhower’s policies and the means by which Army leaders chose to advance their position. It also describes the response by civilian leaders determined to prevail in a controversy that touches on core issues of civilian control: What are the proper limits of dissention by military professionals? How should they express dissent? What, if any, alternatives do senior officers have if their views on policy issues of fundamental importance are disregarded?

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CS 1197-03

PEACEKEEPING IN BOSNIA

William C. Banks and Jeffrey D. Straussman

In August 1995, President Clinton’s Balkan strategy suddenly seemed vindicated. Within days of Congress voting with veto-proof majority to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, the Croatian government launched an offensive against its dissident Serbian minority. Neither the Serb government in Belgrade nor Western nations responded, even though the Croatian operation was similar to the “ethnic cleansing” that the Serbs had earlier committed. When the Serbs continued to attack Muslim military positions in Sarajevo, President Clinton authorized air strikes against the Serbs. This blunted Congress’s drive to override President Clinton’s earlier veto on lifting the arms embargo and effectively brought the warring sides in Bosnia to the bargaining table.

As regional conflicts, ethnic strife, and humanitarian emergencies have mushroomed in the 1990s, the U.S. has provided leadership and resources in these emergent conflict situations. The U.S. commitment to a major peace operation in Bosnia serves to illustrate the evolving complexities of the executive/legislative relationship in national security. This case assesses several critical aspects of this relationship: (1) the application of the Constitution’s war powers to contemporary military operations; (2) the effects of the multilateral operation on U.S. involvement; and (3) Congress’ power of the purse and the President’s spending discretion.

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CS 1197-04

THE BATTLE TO DESTROY CHEMICAL WEAPONS

W. Henry Lambright

In September 1985, Congress approved funds for a new program in chemical weapons development and production, at the same time mandating that the existing stockpile of aging and, in some cases, obsolete weapons be destroyed by 1994. As of today, the initial deadline of 1994 has slipped to a congressionally mandated 2004, a date that most observers expect to slip considerably more. The budget for stockpile destruction is projected to be $12.4 billion, immensely more than the original estimate of $1.7 billion.

The case focuses on the administrative leadership of the four assistant secretaries with primary responsibilities for the Chemical Demilitarization Program between 1985 and 1997. Leadership issues include the level of organization appropriate to be in charge of this program, relations with other agencies and Congress, strategies of implementation, the impact of Presidential policy on administrative efficiency, and the role of the Army in dealing with highly politicized issues involving local citizens. In addition, the case tackles questions of technological and environmental risk and of relations within the DOD among generalist political appointees, military professionals, and technical experts.

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CS 1197-05

BREAKING THE MARKET OR PREVENTING
MARKET BREAKDOWN: The Technology Reinvestment Project

Sean O’Keefe and Volker Franke

In October 1994, the federal government awarded $200 million in federal matching funds from the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) to integrate selected commercial and defense R&D into a single, leading-edge technology and industrial base to promote economic growth while developing national security technology. TRP quickly became the Clinton Administration’s signature project for smoothing the transition for the post-Cold War defense industry and for developing dual-use defense technology through collaborative efforts between industry, government, and academia, all of which shared know-how, skills, and costs. From its inception in 1993, TRP faced enormous criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. Economic conservatives viewed the program as an economy-distorting federal intervention in the private sector. Defense conversion advocates argued TRP subsidies were too small and criticized the project focused too much on “defense reinvestment” at the expense of creating jobs for laid-off defense industry workers.

This case illustrates the controversy over TRP and, more generally, raises questions about the viability of governmental market intervention: How can the U.S. stay militarily superior and economically competitive in the face of uncertain threats, growing fiscal constraints, and revolutionary changes in technology? Should government become involved in the market for the sake of strengthening national security? If so, to what extent and where? Who decides which projects are in the interest of national security?

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CS 1197-06

OBLIGATIONS OF LEADERSHIP:
The Khobar Towers Bombing and its Aftermath

Eliot A. Cohen

On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb exploded at the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, leaving 19 American military personnel dead and injuring hundreds of people from several nations. The bombing resulted in immediate finger-pointing between members of Congress, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Air Force. This case illustrates the events and their aftermath and explores the nature of accountability and leadership in the United States military. By implication, the events described also raise questions about civil-military relations, the strategic challenges of the post-Cold War era, and the nature of service culture.

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CS 0398-07

FROM TURBULENCE TO TRAGEDY:
The Crash of Ron Brown’s Flight in Croatia

Patricia Ingraham and Barbara Romzek

On April 3, 1996, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and 33 others were killed when their plane descended off course and crashed into a mountainside. In retrospect, some of the reasons for the tragic accident are clear. In part, the plane crashed as a result of individual errors. But, institutional conditions also played a role, including political and military circumstances surrounding the Secretary’s mission. Inevitably, questions remain: what accounted for the combination of errors at Dubrovnik and who is to blame for an accident that should have been avoided?

This case highlights the challenge military officers face as they seek to demonstrate initiative and leadership in a time of mission shift, high tempo operations, heightened political scrutiny, and declining resources. Questions raised by the case include whether and to what extent institutional systems of decision-making, reporting, and staff development contribute to mistakes and mishaps, and what adjustments are needed to reduce the probability of future tragedies.

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CS 1298-11

SEARCHING FOR A SAFER TECHNOLOGY:
Army-Community Conflict in Chemical Weapons Destruction

W. Henry Lambright

Welcome to “Dialogue!”—A new form of participatory decision-making for Department of Defense and the Army, a product of post-Cold War environmentalism, aimed at ending a logjam in chemical weapons destruction. In what was seen as a major foreign policy victory by the Clinton Administration, Congress in 1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The subsequent problem was to implement this treaty. The U.S. promised to destroy its stockpile of 30,000 tons of chemical weapons, located at eight continental sites and a remote South Pacific atoll, by 2007. The treaty reinforced a 1985 legislative mandate to dismantle such weapons. There had been earlier deadlines, all missed.

This case examines the challenges of compliance with the 1997 CWC. It tackles issues relating to safety of alternative technology programs, public trust in government, Army public relations and strategies to handle opposition, and the role of science and citizen concerns in formulating policy objectives, assessing risks, and accommodating vastly different interests.

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CS 0699-12

“TO PREVENT AND DETER” INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
The U.S. Response to the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy Bombings

William C. Banks

On August 7, 1998 President Clinton received a pre-dawn wake-up call from National Security Adviser Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger, informing him of terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. On August 20, retaliatory strikes were launched at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. The strikes were the product of a tightly controlled decision process, by a handful of officials. Although the U.S. acted quickly and firmly, questions and criticisms arose early on. What was the decision process? Was the decision to respond with military force effective? Were the strikes lawful? Will the strikes serve the purpose of deterring further acts of international terrorism?

This case raises a number of questions that are central to U.S. national security decision making options for the future: What are the domestic and international legal considerations in deciding whether and how to respond to acts of international terrorism? To what extent must the Congress be involved and what discretion does the Commander in Chief have to act on his own? Legal considerations aside, does the use of force as an instrument of counterterrorism policy pay off? Can the war against international terrorism be won through military means?

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CS 0699-13

ROTATION FROM HELL: The 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard in Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Eliot A. Cohen

As the United States began mobilizing its forces for deployment to the Persian Gulf in the fall of 1990, one critical question was what would happen with the reserves. It was understood that reservists would be needed in many capacities, but would they play a major role in ground combat? The 48th Georgia Army National Guard brigade was an obvious candidate for a prominent role in the battle. It was a roundout brigade of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, a full third of that unit's maneuver force. Previous commanders of the 24th (including then-Major General Norman Schwartzkopf) had insisted that when the division went to war, the 48th would go along with it. Eventually, the 48th was mobilized, but it never got to the Gulf, much less to the battle area. Instead a prolonged, exhausting, and humiliating period of training ensued at both home station and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The senior leadership of the U.S. Army judged that it was simply not ready. How had this happened? The 48th was perhaps the highest priority heavy force in the Army National Guard, and had been identified as such publicly.

The case examines the decision to mobilize the 48th, and then to keep it stateside, as well as the furor that then ensued. The case explores the management of active-reserve relations, and in particular the gap (not unique to this case) between declaratory policy and real belief. Readers get a sense of how active/reserve relations can go awry and what can/should be done to manage, correct, or rescue them. In addition, this case presents an opportunity to reflect on the role of the citizen soldier in a new era of war.

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CS 0899-14

CHANGING COURSE:
Admiral Watkins and the DOE Nuclear Complex

W. Henry Lambright

Admiral James Watkins, recently appointed as Secretary of Energy, was shocked to learn that the FBI and EPA planned a surprise raid on Rocky Flats, a Department of Energy (DOE) facility near Denver, Colorado, responsible for plutonium triggers in nuclear weapons. The FBI and EPA believed Rocky Flats had violated environmental laws in its disposal of dangerous nuclear materials. Watkins feared that if the FBI and EPA tried to force their way into the heavily secured facility, they would provoke a confrontation with the DOE guards and contractor who might mistake them as terrorists. The Rocky Flats raid was but the most dramatic of a number of events concerning conditions at DOE weapons facilities. Watkins found himself in charge of a nuclear time-bomb in which a disaster, real or perceived, could take place at any moment.

This case is a study of a strong personality in a setting of dramatic change. It illuminates not only the possibilities of leadership but also its limits in the American system of government. The case tells the story of how former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins, President Bush’s appointee as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), sought to make his agency more sensitive to its safety and environmental responsibilities. The case examines how Secretary Watkins coped with downsizing DOE’s defense mission as the Cold War ended while enlarging its environmental mission. When he came into office in 1989, the nation’s capacity to build nuclear weapons had been shut down due to safety and environmental problems. He had to take an organization that had always put production first, and make safety and environment co-equal values. This entailed cultural change of the sprawling nuclear weapons complex. Then, the Cold War ended and he had to downsize the defense mission of DOE even as he attempted to maintain that capacity. At the same time, he had to build a new environmental clean-up mission virtually from scratch. Everything he did was subject to debate from all sides, and conducted in a media spotlight.

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CS 1299-16

THE UN-NATO COALITION:
Diplomatic and Military Interaction in Bosnia

Thomas A. Keaney and Scott Douglas

In November 1994, Lieutenant General Michael Ryan, NATO air commander in Southern Europe, organized what was at the time the largest bombing raid in Europe since the end of World War II. The target, an airfield in Croatia, served as a launching base for Serb aircraft conducting bombing raids into Bosnia. Ryan’s task, however, was not to make war on Croatia or on the Serbs, but to support United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. As a result, he had to limit the effects of his attack so as not to hinder diplomatic efforts then underway or compromise the neutrality of the UN forces on the ground. Ryan himself reported through NATO channels ultimately to political authorities in Brussels, Belgium. The UN forces he supported traced their command channels back to UN headquarters in New York. Ryan, an American, commanded mainly U.S. air forces, but his UN peacekeeping force did not include Americans—the United States had refused to take part in this peacekeeping effort. It had taken more than two years to reach a point at which NATO and UN forces could act in coordination to enforce violations of the UN resolutions. The attack on the Croatian airfield was a test of the partnership.

The case examines the political and military actions taken in Bosnia by UN, NATO, and U.S. participants as they attempted to balance negotiations with the use of military force. It exemplifies the difficulties involved in managing peace operations, particularly those requiring coordination among multinational organizations. The case discusses the command and control difficulties involved in coalition operations, raises awareness of the complex relationship of force and diplomacy faced by military forces deployed in peace operations, and provides an understanding of the pitfalls endemic in such circumstances.

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CS 0500-17

“GUARANTEEING” PEACE AGREEMENTS:
The U.S. in the Peru-Ecuador Border Dispute

Theodore S. Wilkinson

Latin America’s oldest and most significant remaining border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted once again in January 1995, only weeks after the much-heralded December 1994 Summit Meeting of the Americas that had been called together by President Clinton in Miami. When the fighting persisted, the U.S., along with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, was called into action to help bring it to an end. To achieve a cease-fire, the U.S. and Latin American guarantors were asked to promise an observer force for the area of border hostilities. Responsibility for the force would fall heavily on the U.S. Department of Defense; the disputed region was inaccessible and virtually uninhabited, and observers would depend on Cincsouth for logistics and helicopters.

The case examines the policy pros and cons that had to be weighed in Washington in early 1995 before taking on any new peacekeeping adventure, bearing in mind recent American experience in Somalia and U.S. legislative resistance to the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia. The case reviews the guarantors’ joint decision on the observer force and discusses the difficulties in getting Peru and Ecuador to negotiate and reach an agreement. The case illustrates several policy dilemmas faced by the U.S.: weighing the costs of sending an observer force against the risks of inaction; orchestrating the four guarantor nations to act in harmony so as to bring pressure on Peru and Ecuador to negotiate and settle; and finding the right mix of political and economic incentives to convince reluctant nationalists on both sides of the dispute to accept the compromise settlement that Presidents Fujimori and Mahuad finally signed on November 2, 1998.

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CS 0600-18

SCOTT RITTER V. SADDAM HUSSEIN:
The Crisis over UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq

David Wise

In September 1998, when he resigned as a United Nations weapons inspector, Scott Ritter was under investigation for espionage. Ritter had been working closely with the CIA in a top-secret spy operation that listened in on conversations of senior Iraqi officials to find out where Saddam Hussein was hiding chemical or biological weapons or components for a nuclear bomb. Ritter had also shared secret CIA U-2 photographs of Iraq with Israel, which led CIA security officials to worry that he might be spying for that country—even though Ritter says he acted with the permission of his UN superior. The CIA had provided the U-2 photos to UNSCOM to assist the UN agency in its mission. As a result, U.S. information, although classified, was made available to an agency comprised of all 21 member nations of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), including Russia and China.

This case examines aspects of the failed UNSCOM mission to carry out the mandate of the UN Security Council to find, remove, destroy, or render harmless Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. It centers in particular on the efforts of one American inspector, William Scott Ritter, Jr. to focus world attention on Iraq’s defiance of the United Nations. Policy questions raised by this case include: What are the risks to the United Nations of the UN calling on the intelligence resources of member states to assist it? What are the costs/benefits of employing covert action (e.g., CIA eavesdropping on Iraq) when overt means (e.g., UNSCOM’s weapons inspection) fail to yield desired results? Should an intelligence agency such as the CIA make classified information available to a UN body composed of many, diverse member nations? Can it still hope to restrict dissemination of the material? What, if anything, went wrong in the U.S.-UN relationship? What lessons can be drawn from the UNSCOM experience for future multinational, UN-led operations?

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CS 0700-19

A FIRM AND COMMENSURATE RESPONSE:
U.S. Retaliation for the Bush Assassination Attempt

A. J. Bacevich

Late on the night of April 13, 1993, two vehicles carrying a total of ten passengers —all Iraqi citizens—weapons, ammunition, and explosives arrived at the outskirts of Kuwait City on a deadly mission: to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush on his forthcoming visit to Kuwait. To the assassins’ dismay the daring plot unraveled before it got fully underway. The ringleaders were arrested by Kuwaiti authorities and Mr. Bush departed Kuwait without incident. Following an independent CIA investigation that had concluded that the assassination plot had originated in Baghdad, the Clinton Administration authorized retaliatory measures to persuade Saddam Hussein that “such behavior is unacceptable.” On June 26, U.S. forces launched a total of 23 cruise missiles against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in downtown Baghdad. In a television address shortly after the attack, President Clinton characterized the attack as “a firm and commensurate response” that would “send a message” to any would-be source of state-sponsored terrorism, deter any future assassination attempts, and “affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations.”

The case examines the Clinton Administration’s response to Iraq’s attempted assassination of former President Bush and explores the interaction between senior civilian and military officials that shaped the military options presented to the President. Questions raised by this case include: To what degree did the “right” factors receive the attention they deserved? Was the attack a success or a failure? Was the civil-military relationship effective? How should the concept of “proportionality” figure in considering the use of force in situations short of full-scale war?

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CS 0900-20

BURNED BY THE PRESS:
One Commander’s Experience

Richard J. Newman

When U.S. Army troops deployed to Bosnia late in 1995, there were about two dozen news reporters “embedded” with various units—essentially, living and traveling with them. Commanders decided that embedding reporters with units would help get the Army’s story out, generate support for the mission among the American public, and enhance the morale of the soldiers. But inevitably, some stories also produced controversy. A front-page story in the Wall Street Journal in December 1995 quoted Col. Greg Fontenot, commander of the lead brigade, making a number of highly controversial statements. The story produced discomfort for U.S. officials and the Army hastily conducted an official investigation, casting a cloud of doubt around a popular commander in the midst of an operation and disrupting the rhythm of the deployment. Although Fontenot was ultimately cleared, he was passed over for promotion to brigadier general, despite the fact that he had been widely viewed as one of the most capable colonels in the Army. While it may never be known whether the controversial publicity produced by the Journal article influenced the Army’s decision not to promote Fontenot, the widespread impression among soldiers is that the Army “punished” Fontenot for producing bad press by effectively cutting his career short.

This case examines the Fontenot incident in detail, documenting how a commander’s seemingly innocent remarks became the subject of a career-threatening investigation. It also explores how senior officials in the theater of operations, at command headquarters in Germany, and in Washington affected the outcome. The case analyzes one of the central dilemmas officers face when deciding whether, and how, to deal with the press: any benefit (positive publicity) tends to accrue to the military as an institution, while the risk (negative publicity) is borne largely by the individual officer. Ultimately, the case study asks how officers can minimize personal risk when dealing with the press.

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CS 0901-23

WORSE THAN AN INFECTION?:
DOD’s Struggle with the Anthrax Vaccination

John Robinson

Until recently, Capt. Clifton Volpe was a model pilot for the Air Force who consistently received high marks from his commanders. That all changed when he refused a direct order to take a vaccination against anthrax in preparation for a deployment to the Persian Gulf. Although Volpe was only the second active duty pilot to be discharged from service for refusing the shot, his case represents an important flash point in a lingering problem for DOD leaders. DOD estimates only 350 personnel have been discharged for refusing to take the vaccine. However, some of those discharged, like Volpe, are pilots—a community that is a precious commodity in these days of far-flung deployments.

This case highlights the unique challenge confronting the DOD for carrying out an effective plan to protect its forces against the threat of biological warfare without diminishing readiness. In addition, the anthrax vaccination plan has sparked an active resistance movement in the ranks, raising questions about the Pentagon’s leadership and about the mistrust of the military leadership by rank and file personnel. An overriding concern, and perhaps much deeper challenge, however, is the open questioning of military orders—something that tears at the very fabric of the institution.

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CS 1201-24

SECURITY AND SALVATION:
Bringing Russia aboard the Space Station

W. Henry Lambright

As the Clinton Administration took power in January and February 1993, national security officials became aware that the Russians were about to transfer rocket technology to India, a move fraught with missile proliferation peril. However, instead of imposing trade sanctions to punish Russia, the Clinton Administration decided to bring Russia aboard the International Space Station. This decision marked a turning point of historic significance for space policy. Born out of Cold War rivalry the Space Station now came to symbolize post-Cold War cooperation. Integrating Russia “securitized” the Space Station, linking post Cold War foreign policy, Big Science and geopolitics and aided NASA at a critical moment to gain funding to keep the program alive.

This case outlines the sequence of decisions that lead to the development of the International Space Station which has emerged as a prime model for large-scale cooperation across nations in science and technology. Decision-making constituted coalition building and it took much time to assemble a “winning” coalition. Whether successful in the end, the story of the International Space Station provides invaluable lessons about the dynamics of post-Cold War cooperation and the era of globalization. The case illustrates these lessons and the tension between U.S. control of a program and deference to other sovereign nations and their claims.

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CS 0102-25

SEPARATE POWERS:
The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998

Laurence Pope

In early 1998, the Clinton Administration was under pressure. Its covert support of mainly Kurdish Iraqi opposition groups based in northern Iraq under the banner of the Iraqi National Congress had collapsed in 1996 after an attempt by the INC to coordinate an offensive against the Iraqi Army ended in a rout, and the imprisonment of hundreds, perhaps thousands, inside Saddam Hussein’s gulag and torture machine. This case is the account of legislation adopted during this period, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Opposed by the bureaucracy at State, Defense, CIA, and the NSC staff, the ILA was signed into law by President Clinton on October 31, 1998, at one of the weakest moments in his presidency. Without reference to UN Security Council Resolutions which had been the underpinning of international efforts since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the ILA committed the United States to a policy of seeking the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.

This case examines the Clinton Administration’s (and to some extent the current Bush Administration’s) response to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. The ILA, which remains on the books, declares it to be U.S. policy to seek the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the question of whether action should be undertaken to affect the removal of that regime continues to be debated. That larger debate is not the issue here. The case focuses rather on a particular attempt to legislate foreign policy and is intended as a vehicle for exploring the difficulties created by such legislative mandates for the women and men of the executive branch.

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CS 0998-09

FOUR DAYS IN DECEMBER

L. Paul Dube

It is December, about three weeks after a Presidential election. In a stunning political upset, the American people cast an impressive majority of their votes for a third party candidate who defied virtually every tenet of conventional wisdom about campaigning for the presidency. Confounding the pundits and pollsters, her campaign succeeded in convincing the American people that values were more important than promises and that the two major parties were more likely to serve specific interest groups than basic American values, which she identified only in the broadest of terms.

Exercise participants are assigned to the President(elect)’s transition staff and tasked to advise the President(elect) whether and how her predecessor’s Defense program should be revised. The exercise is designed to allow and force participants to deliberate the fundamental strategy, policy, and resource underpinnings of the Defense program. Participants, divided into teams, are tasked to establish and articulate the strategy and policy premises of the Defense program that they would recommend to a new President, along with the force levels, programs and resources required to carry it out. Participants must organize themselves, develop a process, assign responsibilities, make judgments about time allocation and sequence of events required.

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CS 0299-101

NATIONLAND

James Blandin and Sean O’Keefe

Nationland faces some difficult budget and defense policy choices. Nationland, a relatively mature democracy, is currently experiencing rapid economic growth and becoming more productive as market oriented reforms take hold. In the near future Nationland is expected to be a significant player in the global economy. However, not everyone has benefited equally from rapid economic growth. Unemployment is growing in the country as the government eliminated state subsidies from unproductive enterprises. As these bankruptcies grow—an inevitable part of the economic transformation—the government must decide how much social protection to provide for those who are left behind Nationland’s “economic miracle.” Given this environment, the leaders of Nationland must establish firm priorities between defense and non-defense spending and decide which programs deserve the most resources.

Exercise participants, assigned to presidential senior national security working groups, will review the national security function of the government, establish a national security policy and determine the proper roles, missions and functions of the armed forces. Next, the groups will determine how important defense spending is compared to other national needs. Finally, the groups will decide how to structure Nationland’s defense budget and how to allocate funds consistent with its policy and strategy objectives.

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CS 1000-21

ESCALATING THE WAR IN VIETNAM:
A Simulation of the July 1965 Deliberations

Thomas A. Keaney

In July 1965, nearly a year after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the situation in South Vietnam has continued to deteriorate despite the build up of U.S. advisors to the South Vietnamese military and the commencement of bombing of the North. Instead, more territory has been lost to the Viet Cong insurgents, and a series of government changes have further destabilized the South Vietnamese regime. President Lyndon Johnson and senior U.S. decision-makers face crucial decisions in their attempts to develop a strategy for dealing with the worsening situation in South Vietnam and for assessing U.S. military activities in the South and for the bombing campaign over the North.

This exercise simulates a meeting of members of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) in July 1965, assembled to discuss and provide recommendations to the President on U.S. policy in Vietnam. Participants play the role of principals in these deliberations and formulate their own positions regarding future national security objectives, resources, and strategy, including the deployment of additional military troops, employment of those forces in a direct combat role, the bombing of North Vietnam, and so forth. The exercise does not reflect an actual meeting of July 1965. Instead, it reflects a series of meetings during the period that involved many of the principals played in the exercise.

In preparation for these deliberations, participants have reference to actual memoranda, reports, and analyses produced at the time, short descriptions on the backgrounds of each principal, and a narrative that reviews the situation in Vietnam in the six to eight months prior to the NSC meeting. Students are advised to develop their own policy recommendations based on their evaluation of the evidence. The exercise stresses the interaction of political and military factors, as well as international and domestic influences, involved in national security decision-making.

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CS 0698-08

CS 1099-15

THE DEVIL AND THE DEMON:
The Threat of Bioterrorism in the U.S.

William C. Banks

With the presidential election looming, the soon-to-be outgoing administration is about to become embroiled in armed conflict abroad. Following a breakdown in the Middle East peace negotiations, several Iraqi Scud missiles were launched at targets in Israel and thousands of Iraqi troops and heavy armor have amassed at the northwest border, near Jordan. The U.S. has deployed air, land, and naval forces to the region and is preparing to launch Operation Sustain Peace. Meanwhile, in the U.S. there is considerable opposition to a large and dangerous commitment of American lives and resources. At the same time, various groups associated with Arab and Muslim causes have threatened to carry out terrorist attacks against targets in the U.S. in retaliation for U.S. involvement in the Gulf. A crisis atmosphere has suddenly gripped the nation. Yesterday, a vial containing live smallpox virus particles was found in the offices of a New York newspaper. A group with the code name “Alpha” has claimed responsibility for the attack and has indicated its intention of killing tens of thousands of Americans if the U.S. commences Operation Sustain Peace.

This simulation provides a mechanism for participants to consider the many strategic, operational, legal, and leadership issues imbedded in defending the U.S. homeland against attack by non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBCs). The simulation demonstrates the potential seriousness of the post-Cold War WMD threat, while it draws attention to the considerable work yet to be done in homeland defense preparedness, by DOD, the military, and others. Participants are asked to formulate a response to a homeland defense crisis triggered by a threatened bioweapons attack, and to adapt the response as more information becomes available during the simulation.

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CS 1202-29

PHILANTHROPY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY:
Should CARE Criticize the Military?

Arthur C. Brooks

Jeff Brooks creates direct-mail fundraising appeals for charitable organizations. His specialty is overseas humanitarian organizations—foreign aid nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In early 2001, CARE International came to Jeff and asked him to redesign its fundraising appeals. Jeff has been working on the CARE account for about a year now, and is considering some important changes to the way the organization portrays itself in its fundraising. Specifically, he is thinking about whether a change in CARE’s policy of impartiality on political issues—such as the role of the U.S. Military—might be worth reconsidering. He is wondering about the impact of such a change. For example, he is pondering whether an activist stance by CARE against American military activities might have an impact on public opinion—perhaps lowering support for military activities—and consequently impact this country’s national security. This case describes Jeff’s dilemma and presents several sources of survey data on national security public opinion and fundraising, which are intended to help illuminate the situation.

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CS 0103-31

DAN GOLDIN’S CATCH-22:
Deploying a U.S.-Russian Space Station

W. Henry Lambright

In 1993, President Bill Clinton directed NASA to bring Russia into the project to build the International Space Station (ISS). Russia thus joined the U.S., Europe, Japan, and Canada in the largest civilian, international R&D project in history. The decision was controversial and complicated, as the former foe became America’s principal partner. Moreover, the decision meant that the initial assembly in space would unite U.S. and Russian components. The complete International Space Station would be built around a U.S.-Russian centerpiece. In most quarters, the decision to unite the U.S. and Russia in space was applauded and even seen as historic. A vocal minority warned against putting Russia in a position where it could influence the pace and direction of the project, making the U.S. and other nations dependent on its actions. The man who helped sell the concept of a U.S.-Russian partnership and then coped with its technical and political reality was NASA Administrator Dan Goldin. Serving from 1992 to 2001, he cajoled, pleaded, and pressed the Russians. He had also to deal with Congress and its criticism. Costs soared and delays lengthened. Goldin was forced to spend money on contingent technologies in case the Russians failed to deliver components.

This case illuminates the role of an agency head seeking to move a large-scale technological program forward in the face of conflicting pressures, some of which were his own making. This case engages readers in discussions about the ability of an administrative leader to combine multiple values, especially international security and domestic budget cutting, while leading a huge and technically demanding project. What is success in this case? What were the ends of policy and were Goldin’s means effective? What did he do right or wrong? Did the very goal of combining security policy and space policy via the Space Station make sense? How was Goldin helped and hindered by President Clinton, the Congress, and the Russians in achieving his goals?

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CS 1102-28

HOMELAND SECURITY

James Blandin

It was 8:30 p.m., September 15, 2001. Margaret Claire, the Deputy to the National Security Advisor, sat at her desk looking out the window in the Old Executive Office Building. Her life and the lives of her fellow citizens had changed forever as a result of the events of September 11th. A new wave of terrorism, involving new weapons, posed a security challenge unlike any ever faced by our nation. It was clear that the need for homeland security was not tied to any specific terrorist threat. Instead, this need was part of our underlying vulnerability as a society and the uncertainty posed by our limited ability to be sure when or where the next terrorist act would occur. Not since World War II had our values and way of life been so threatened. This fact made securing the homeland a national priority.

This exercise is designed to explore the relationship between homeland security objectives, threats to homeland security, and the structuring of governmental programs and organization necessary to achieve homeland security. Participants will be challenged to work through this ends-means relationship in sequential fashion in the two parts of the case. In Part I, participants will deal with questions related to defining homeland security objectives, identifying the major threats to homeland security and finally, developing a strategy for dealing with these threats. In Part II, participants will use the work developed in Part I as the basis for making recommendations on how to organize federal, state and local government to provide homeland security.

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CS 1202-30

CHOOSING SIDES IN SOUTH ASIA:
The 1971 Crisis

Thomas A. Keaney and Hans Davies

In 1971, a simmering dispute between East and West Pakistan boiled over into open conflict that by year’s end had led to the partition of the country, war between India and Pakistan, and tense confrontations both between China and India and the Soviet Union and the United States. While the specifics of the Pakistani dispute directly affected no U.S. interests, nor those of the Soviet Union or China, the dynamics of great power relationships served to engage the United States, and the Soviets and Chinese. American security interests, at the time directed by President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, steered the course for the U.S. policy, but it was not without internal conflict. Not only did Nixon and Kissinger face opposition in Congress, but also in the national security decision-making process they found themselves often at odds with the leadership at both the State and Defense Departments.

This exercise simulates two decision-making meetings of that time, putting participants in the middle of the events of 1971 crisis. It also provides insights in the interaction of the political and military leaders involved and the national security decision-making environment in which they operated. For the exercise, participants are asked to consider themselves members of an inter-agency working group, called at the time the Washington Special Action Group that has been assigned the task of providing recommendations to the President. As preparation for the meeting, participants are provided with documents prepared at the time by the Defense Intelligence Agency and by members of the National Security Council staff to prepare for briefings and discussions in these simulated meetings.

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CS 0603-32

THE PREDATOR

William C. Banks

On the first night of the campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001, the United States nearly had a major success. Officials believed that they had pinpointed the location of supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar. While patrolling the roads near Kabul, an unmanned but armed CIA drone trained its crosshairs on Omar in a convoy of cars fleeing the capitol. Under the terms of an agreement, the CIA controllers did not have the authority to order a strike on the target and, while awaiting approval for the attack, Omar escaped. Following the near miss, no verified intelligence reported seeing much less targeting either Omar or Usama bin Laden during the Afghanistan campaign. Senior leaders of Al Qaeda remained at large, and they were likely relocating early and often to elude detection, capture, or death. However, on November 3, 2001, a missile-carrying Predator drone killed Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda’s chief of military operations, in a raid near Kabul. Then, in early May 2002 the CIA tried but failed to kill an Afghan factional leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Islamic fundamentalist who had vowed to topple the government of Hamid Karzai and to attack U.S. forces.

This case explores a number of issues that are central to the present and likely future national security posture of the United States, ranging range from host government cooperation, collateral damage, and the locus of decision authority, to tactical questions about the appropriate uses of technology and weaponry. Among other issues, the case reviews the emerging policies and procedures that permit targeting terrorists with lethal force, explores the evolving DOD/CIA relationship in this area, and assesses the legal authorities for and potential limits on targeted killing and the utility of targeted killing in the war on terrorism.

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CS 0803-33

SQUEEZING A BALLOON:
Plan Colombia and America’s War on Drugs

Volker Franke and Justin Reed

While Americans are concerned about terrorism and the war in Iraq, Washington has quietly intensified its war on drugs. In particular, U.S. involvement in the Colombian civil war has deepened, as the Bush administration has effectively linked its war on terrorism with its efforts to combat the influx of illegal drugs into the United States. The prime target in America’s war on drugs is Colombia, the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a significant supplier of heroin to the United States.

This case chronicles half-a-century of violence in Colombia, describes the nature and magnitude of U.S. involvement in its bloody civil war, and explores connections between America’s war on drugs and its more recent war on terrorism. The case focuses specifically on the merits of Plan Colombia, the Clinton Administration-initiated strategy of source-country drug eradication, and the effects and implications of the Bush Administration’s decision to intensify previous U.S. counter-drug efforts. Questions raised by this case include: What threats does Colombia’s civil conflict pose to U.S. national security? How does Plan Colombia address those threats? Is Plan Colombia effective in achieving Washington’s counter-drug objectives? Are drug interdiction and eradication legitimate national security concerns? How does the war on drugs affect the traditional roles and missions of the U.S. military? Finally, what is the connection between America’s drug war and its war on terrorism?

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CS 0903-34

MANAGING TRANSITION IN A POST-WAR COUNTRY

John Murray and Louis Kriesberg

In October 2001, a U.S.-led coalition initiated a military attack on Afghanistan to eliminate the al Qaeda terrorist headquarters and training centers that had been responsible for the 9/11 World Trade Center/Pentagon tragedies. A secondary objective was the removal of the Taliban government, which had for many years provided cover for and supported Osama bin Laden’s terrorist organization. By December 2001, the al Qaeda and Taliban forces had been largely defeated, and an internationally supported conference of Afghan leaders had selected Hamid Karzai to head an Afghan Interim Administration. Since that time Karzai has continued to lead a struggling country as it tries to establish a stable governing structure and goes through the process of drafting and approving a new democratic constitution.

Participants in this exercise are assigned specific roles and asked to participate in a meeting with the Deputy National Security Advisor convened to develop a list of issues involved in the current situation, generate the principal options for U.S. reaction, review the consequences of implementing each of those options, and agree, by consensus if possible, on a preferred option. This exercise attempts to accomplish three main objectives: (1) to present innovative ideas about negotiation, facilitation, and problem-solving skills that are useful in handling complex national security issues; (2) to provide a crisis situation and simulated conditions under which senior military officers and civilian officials can apply their process skills toward achieving the task assigned; and (3) to generate a list of useful lessons learned for improving the process by which senior officials approach and resolve major national security problems.

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CS 0104-35

TRAGEDY AT SEA: The Collision of the USS Greeneville and the Ehime Maru

Christopher M. Jones

On the afternoon of February 9, 2001, the USS Greeneville (SSN 772), a U.S. Navy Los Angeles class attack submarine, struck and sunk the Ehime Maru, a Japanese fisheries research and training vessel, nine miles off the coast of Hawaii. The accident, which was precipitated by an emergency main-ballast blow performed as a demonstration for civilian guests aboard the nuclear submarine, left nine Japanese citizens dead and ended the career of the Greeneville’s commanding officer. The episode also raised serious questions about the Navy’s Distinguished Visitors (DV) embarkation program that allowed 16 civilians onboard the Greeneville the day of the collision, including three visitors who were sitting at the ship’s controls at the time of impact.

This case tells the story of tragic incident and reconstructs the events surrounding the day of the accident to the day Commander Scott Waddle was formally punished. The case is designed to allow readers to probe the causes of the mishap and analyze larger issues related to individual accountability, organizational and military accountability, military public affairs programs, and command and control relations.

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