GLOBAL EUROPE 2006-2007

Each fall semester Syracuse University brings a small group of graduate students to Europe to participate in the Global Europe Program. For the 2006-2007 program eight students were selected from a highly competitive pool of applicants.

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NATO AND THE WAR ON TERROR

(by Renée de Nevers, Assistant Professor, Public Administration, Maxwell School of Syracuse University)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) current engagement in missions ranging from Bosnia to Darfur suggests that the alliance has overcome the doubts about its future that arose after the Cold War. The war on terror that followed the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, would appear further to reinforce NATO’s significance. Several of NATO’s current activities, such as its missions in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean, are closely linked to the war on terror, and other NATO missions are also contributing to this fight. This apparent vibrancy, however, may not accurately reflect NATO’s current condition. NATO is the United States’ premier alliance, and most of Washington’s closest allies are members. But what is NATO’s contribution to the U.S. war on terror?

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HOW PRIME MINISTERS MANAGE THE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS:

THE AGENT-STRUCTURE NEXUS

How are we to explain that a prime minister such as Israel’s Ariel Sharon exercised considerable influence on foreign policy making in a coalition cabinet consisting of a number of parties with several differing interests, whereas Britain’s John Major could not have as much impact although he was the leader of the sole and single-party in power? Although the majority of world’s democracies are parliamentary in structure, only in the past two decades, has there been an upsurge of interest in the research on the effect of prime ministers on policymaking process. Havva Karakas-Keles, a PhD candidate in the political science department and a graduate assistant in the Moynihan European Research Centers, is conducting her dissertation research on prime ministers and different cabinets in Great Britain, Germany and Israel.

The phrases thatcherism and ozalism hint at the level of influence a prime minister can have on a country’s politics (Jones 1991). Despite the fact that influential prime ministers such as Britain’s Margaret Thatcher and Turkey’s Turgut Ozal do not constitute the rule, prime ministers can influence the decision-making process at varying degrees. The concept ‘cabinet government’ hints at a ‘collective and collegial endeavor’ of all cabinet members (Blondel and Muller-Rommel 1993), and prime ministers are often considered ‘first among equals’ within the cabinet (Jones 1991). The authority to make foreign policy is shared in parliamentary democracies, in both single party and coalition cabinets. In addition, prime ministers depend on a ‘vote of confidence’ from the parliament, which implies a certain restriction on their power. In coalition cabinets, decision-making authority is further fragmented between two or more parties and individual ministers (Kaarbo 2005; Martin and Vanberg 2004; Hagan 1993). Despite these restrictions on prime ministerial power, prime ministers play an important role within the executive, shaping the decision-making process by influencing over the flow of information, decision venues and by pushing their own agendas. However, to what extent and under what conditions prime ministers control and influence that process vary in different cabinet settings. The British prime minister, who is the leader of the political party with the highest number of votes and a parliamentary majority, does not act under the same institutional constraints as the Israeli prime minister who most of the time has to manage many parties within a coalition. In addition, research on leadership and leadership style emphasizes that leaders differ in terms of how they react to political constraints. While some leaders respect political constraints and act within the boundaries of them, other leaders challenge these constraints (Hermann 1999; 2003). Would exclusive emphasis on either institutional constraints (structure) or personality differences of prime ministers (agency) explain the whole story?

Earlier studies on leadership and prime ministers can be grouped at two opposite poles: whereas the studies on prime ministers in comparative politics prioritize institutional constraints with regard to power position of a prime minister, leadership studies emphasize variation in leadership style (Kaarbo 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). Studies on prime ministers adressed the office and the role of prime ministers in parliamentary systems (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Helms 2005; Helms 1996). Scholars of leadership argue that what the leaders are like can have an impact on foreign policy, policymaking and policy choices (Hermann 1980, 1984, 1999, 2003; Hermann and Preston 1994; Preston 2001; Kaarbo 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Kaarbo 2001). These scholars generally focused on the power of prime ministers in tention to one or the other factor. Structural approaches to the question tend to 1993; Rose 1991). These scholars generally focused on the power of prime ministers in terms of parliamentary control, and hiring and firing ministers (Helms 1996; Andeweg 1993; Rose 1991). These studies at both poles are limited by their almost exclusive attention to one or the other factor. Structural approaches to the question tend to downplay the extent to which individual prime ministers can shape the process, while psychological perspectives understate the importance of external constraints within which any agent is to act. In seeking to improve upon these approaches, Karakas-Keles carries out a systematic comparison of prime ministerial management of foreign policymaking processes under different cabinet arrangements which attends simultaneously to institutional constraints (mainly power sharing rules within the cabinet, parliament’s dominance over prime minister or the existence of small but powerful political parties with veto power, etc) and the leadership styles of individual prime ministers (whether a prime minister challenges or respects these constraints). In other words, her research focuses upon the interaction between agent and structure in cabinet politics. Following the structured-focused comparison method (George and Bennett 2005), her research focuses on a total of six cabinet decision-making cases from the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and Israel (two cases from each country). In each country she focuses on two prime ministers with different leadership styles (one constraint challenger, one constraint respecter) and she explores one specific foreign policymaking case from each prime minister’s term (within country variation). Her research is guided by the following question: How does the interaction between leadership style and institutional constraints shape the prime ministerial management of the foreign policy decision-making process in various types of cabinets? When acting under institutional constraints such as the limitations posed by parliament, or the presence of other parties in the coalition, prime ministers are hypothesized to control the policymaking process to varying degrees depending on the level of institutional constraints and whether prime ministers will challenge the constraints or comply with these constraints. One can ask the fol-
lowing question: If a leader is a constraint challenger, can he dominate the decision-making process and push his own agenda even in a constraining cabinet?

Karakas-Keles analyses foreign policy-making cases from three different parliamentary democracies that range from single party cabinets to predominantly minimal winning coalition cabinets, and to grand coalition cabinets (Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, respectively). In the minimal winning coalitions, each party within the government is necessary to a form a majority government (Woldendorp et al. 2000). Riker defines a minimal winning coalition as “one which is rendered blocking or losing by the subtraction of one of its members” (1962: 40). On the other hand, grand coalitions are formed when two dominant political parties come together and form the government with the help of one or more smaller parties. Great Britain has had predominantly single party cabinets (one party with a parliamentary majority taking all government seats) except for one single party minority government in 1974. British prime ministers, the leader of the governing party that generally holds the absolute majority in the House of Commons, is assumed to have a huge political leverage when we also add his/her monopoly in appointing ministers (King 1991; Woldendorp et al. 2000). They have the ability to dominate the majority in the Commons since the 1867 Reform Act (Thomas 1998). However, this situation cannot overshadow the degree to which the parliament influences the prime minister and policymaking (Riddell 2004). On the other hand, Germany has had predominantly minimal winning coalition governments since 1960. Although German Chancellor has a powerful position (in that he can appoint and dismiss ministers) within the government, there are checks to his power such as what is called “ministerial autonomy” that provides room for ministers to “conduct the policy of their own departments on their own responsibility within a minimum of control as long as they do not depart from overall government policy” (Smith 1991, p. 91). Israel has had predominantly coalition multi-party cabinets due to its electoral system. Furthermore, these small parties often have veto power that puts the coalition cabinets in a vulnerable position. Moreover, Israeli prime ministers cannot appoint ministers although they can remove them. All these weaken prime minister’s power position vis-à-vis government and parliament (Woldendorp et al. 2000). The brief overview of the characteristics of cabinet politics in each country reveals that these three countries are well-representative of single-party cabinet, minimal winning coalition and grand coalition dominant parliamentary democracies (across country variation). In terms of the data, this research relies on parliamentary debates, responses to parliamentary questions, expert writings on the office of prime ministers, memoirs, biographies and speeches of the relevant prime ministers and ministers of the time.

Karakas-Keles’ research is quite relevant to the long-lasting debate on the stability of the coalition governments and the quality of decisions made under coalition cabinets. Furthermore, her research will shed some light on the nature of coalition decision-making which has not been addressed until recently. Moreover, her research also improves our understanding of decision-making in parliamentary cabinets which constitute a good portion of world’s democracies yet mainly stay understudied. Karakas-Keles carried out preliminary research for her dissertation in London during the summer of 2007. This research was supported by a Goekjian summer grant from the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs. Under the supervision of Dr. Peg Hermann, she will carry further research for her dissertation in Europe and Israel thanks to a doctoral dissertation improvement grant she recently received from the National Science Foundation.

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Bernhardsdottir holds a Cand Ocean degree (macroeconomic) from the faculty of Economics and Business Administration at the University of Iceland, MA in political science and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the same university. In her career Bernhardsdottir has worked both for the private and the public sector in Iceland.

**CRISIS MANAGEMENT RESEARCH**

Since 1998 Bernhardsdottir has been involved in the field of crisis management research. She began her training as a crisis management researcher working for the National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training (CRISMART) in Sweden. She has worked both on her own research and as a coordinator of an Icelandic research group working for CRISMART’s Crisis Management Europe program. The program can be considered the foundation of scientific research at CRISMART. The center cooperates with a number of universities and research institutes developing research methods, supporting crisis management research, and facilitating multidisciplinary and international cooperation (see crismart.org). CRISMART’s scholars have studied nearly one hundred cases of transboundary crises in and around the European Union. The Moynihan Institute partnered with CRISMART and through its Transboundary Crisis Management project has examined how problems of governance are exacerbated when crises cross borders. Over 200 crisis cases have been studied by faculty and graduate students and a database of information about the cases has been developed. From this database, lessons can be drawn about efficient crisis management that can form the basis for training materials for a variety of policy communities as well as provide scholars with an understanding of what is involved in the formation and resolution of such crises. Bernhardsdottir has worked on this database and is also co-teaching a crisis management course for master students in the International Relations and Public Administration programs.

**HOW CULTURE SHAPES CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

In her research Bernhardsdottir is focusing on cultural aspects of crisis management. Why study culture? “It is important to understand the societal context in which a crisis occurs to ensure vigilant crisis preparedness and response,” says Bernhardsdottir. “We need, of course, to know about the resources at hand, what are the prevalent organizational structures, as well as what the customs and standard operating procedures in responding to crises in the specific country are, but we also need to understand the prevalent perspective on crises, or the crisis culture, in that particular country.” Bernhardsdottir considers how four different cultural patterns can shape crisis management, i.e., the way leaders and the public prepare, respond, and learn from crises. The patterns emphasize individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy, and fatalism. “For instance, if we look at preparedness, fatalists will view the future as unpredictable and thus planning as relatively futile; those in a hierarchical culture will stress expertise, order, and resource management in their planning; those in an individualistic culture will focus on the individual household with less collectively based strategies; and those who believe in egalitarianism will demand public participation in any planning as well as collective plans of action.” In a preliminary study, Bernhardsdottir compared the way culture shapes crisis management in Iceland and Sweden. “These two countries belong to the ‘Nordic family’ of Europe and are often clustered together in social science literature. The findings show how countries that share a number of historical, political, and administrative features can differ in their emphasis on cultural orientation which again shapes the way crises are being managed. The Icelandic crisis culture emphasizes public participation and the Swedish culture, while agreement oriented, has a much stronger reliance on experts. The decision-making processes are highly decentralized in Iceland with unclear divisions of responsibility between local actors, while Sweden is more likely to bring in a centralized decision-making group in times of crises. In terms of learning processes, Sweden has a stronger emphasis on systematic evaluation by specialists, while in Iceland such evaluation gives way participation and the right to learn from your own mistakes. I am using this example here to emphasize that at the same time as we need to build a common understanding on the nature of crisis and crisis management, we also have to be aware that we can only partly transfer crisis management findings and lessons from one country to another because the way the public and institutions of various countries go about meeting the concern of how to prepare and respond to a crisis can differ considerably.” Bernhardsdottir is now looking at how culture shapes crisis management in several other countries by using both the Moynihan and CRISMART crisis case databanks.

**FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE**

As mentioned above, the crisis case databanks can be used to support various decision makers in preparing, coping, and learning from crises. Bernhardsdottir has attended several workshops and conferences held by the European Crisis Management Academy (ECMA), an international research consortium that serves crisis managers and academics. She says it is rewarding to see how academic work is being used to trigger changes in processes, rules, and legislation. She herself has conducted research for the National Civil Defense and the Ministry for the Environment in Iceland which suggested changes to improve crisis management in the country. Her studies include responses to avalanches, earthquakes, and ships stranding. In these studies, the lack of long-term relief and recovery planning as a part of Icelandic civil defense became salient.
So did the unclear definition of the role of local governments in dealing with the consequences of the disaster. In 2006, Bernhardsdottrir became a member of a working group for a project sponsored by the Icelandic Centre for Research with the goal to improve disaster management in Iceland. The project is conducted in cooperation with experts and various stakeholders at state and local levels. “The focus is on long-term relief and recovery, i.e., the phase after initial rescue and lifesaving operations are over. The difficulty of relief and recovery efforts in the aftermath of frequent disasters in recent time has proven the need for long-term recovery planning. The recovery phases after the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 are, to name a few, all cases in point,” says Bernhardsdottir. She notes that the United Nations’ “Hyogo Framework” for 2005-2015 reflects this need by making resilience to disasters a priority for action. The emphasis is on including disaster risk reduction in policies, planning, and programming related to sustainable development, relief, rehabilitation, and recovery activities in post-disaster and post-conflict situations in disaster-prone countries. “This phase of crisis management is also interesting from the cultural perspective. Recent discussion on the construction in Afghanistan as a part of the recovery phase presents such a case. Despite having financial resources at hand, the working process is being delayed in large part because of local standards, customs, and businesses: the way of life in Afghanistan.”

NATO AND THE WAR ON TERROR
(continued from page 1)

In fact, NATO’s role in the multifaceted struggle against terrorists is minor: the alliance is playing a largely supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The focus of both the European “fight against terrorism” and the U.S. “war on terror” lies elsewhere, leaving NATO’s contribution to efforts to quell terrorism somewhat tangential. NATO’s contribution to the U.S. war on terror can be assessed in the following categories: (1) prevention and defense, (2) denial, (3) counterterrorism, and (4) consequence management, all of which are essential to confronting terrorism.

These categories incorporate both elements of the U.S. strategy and NATO’s political and military aims against terrorism. Efforts to prevent and defend against terrorist actions fall into two main areas: intelligence sharing and surveillance to detect preparations for an attack. NATO has engaged in both activities, primarily through Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). This is NATO’s only article 5 operation, and it was the first substantive military action the alliance took after the September 11 attacks to address the terrorist threat. After deploying in the eastern Mediterranean in October 2001 as a deterrent and surveillance measure in support of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, OAE evolved into a broader counterterrorism initiative covering the entire Mediterranean in 2003. OAE has focused on monitoring shipping and the safety of ports and narrow sea-lanes. NATO also has worked to expand its intelligence-sharing activities as part of OAE, including efforts to develop a network for tracking merchant shipping throughout the Mediterranean. Although intelligence is widely viewed as the most important tool in preventing terrorist attacks, NATO’s intelligence contribution to U.S. efforts against terrorism is limited. The contribution that NATO members make by providing intelligence in the struggle against terrorists occurs largely bilaterally, and it is generated primarily by law enforcement agencies, rather than by allied military intelligence capabilities. The turmoil caused by reports of secret CIA detention centers in Europe, and Italy’s indictment of several CIA officers for operating illegally on Italian soil when they kidnapped a terrorist suspect, also brought to the fore differences in views between the U.S. and key European allies regarding the acquisition and use of intelligence.
Denying terrorists certain weapons and the benefits of state support, ranging from use of a state’s territory to outright control over its government, is a central feature of the U.S. strategy against terrorism. Denial is less evident in NATO’s strategy; the goal of disrupting terrorist activities comes closest to the U.S. concept. NATO is marginally involved in efforts to deny terrorists WMD. Although many of NATO’s European members share the United States’ concern about the proliferation of WMD and their acquisition by terrorists, this has not translated into cooperation through NATO actively to confront this security problem. Instead, individual states have worked bilaterally or through information activities to address WMD proliferation. The alliance is split on the use of preemption as a means to prevent the spread of WMD to states that might let terrorists obtain weapons of mass destruction, and the United States prefers the more informal Proliferation Security Initiative, an activity designed by the George W. Bush administration to constrain the spread of WMD-related technology, as a means to prevent the spread of WMD to terrorists. The alliance does play a significant role in efforts to deny terrorists state support. NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), represents a valuable contribution to the U.S. goal of denying terrorists sanctuary or allies, given al-Qaida’s close ties with the previous Taliban regime, and ongoing efforts to pursue al-Qaida members in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initially ISAF’s mission was limited to patrolling Kabul, but since 2004, ISAF has undertaken a four-stage expansion of its mission, and it assumed responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan in October 2006. At that point, ISAF was NATO’s largest operation, involving about 31,000 troops, including roughly 12,000 U.S. troops under ISAF command. All twenty-six NATO members participate in ISAF, as do ten non-NATO partner countries.

ISAF has suffered from three significant problems. First, since 2003 the alliance has been unable to secure sufficient troop commitments to meet the target force size. Second, many troops in Afghanistan operate under “national caveats” whereby governments place limits on what military activities their troops are allowed to do or where they are allowed to go in carrying out their missions. Third, the Afghan leadership fears that the United States will abandon it, and it is unsure what NATO authority will mean in the long run. Concern has also been raised about whether NATO has the political will and capabilities to fight a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. Since NATO forces assumed responsibility for security in southern Afghanistan, the frequency and intensity of Taliban attacks have increased.

NATO’s offensive, counterterrorism role in fighting terrorism is limited, and the only example of NATO assuming a combat role is found in Afghanistan. But ISAF has a limited mandate, in large measure due to member states’ nervousness about the prospect of taking on counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, as well as concern that acknowledging the potential combat elements of the mission would make it even harder to obtain sufficient troop commitments to ISAF. Nonetheless, commanders now bluntly acknowledge the war-fighting nature of the mission. Lt. Gen. David Richards, the British general in charge of ISAF, stated in August 2006 that NATO’s goal was “to strike ruthlessly” at Taliban fighters seeking to undermine the Afghan government. NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan directly contributes to the U.S. goal of denying terrorists sanctuary there, and it is of crucial importance to the alliance. ISAF troops are de facto conducting counterterrorism as well as counterinsurgency operations, and this is NATO’s first combat mission since its creation. The lead role in counterterrorism in Afghanistan remains with U.S. special forces, however, not NATO, and U.S. troops are the largest contingent in ISAF. NATO’s role in Iraq is even more limited. Many member states have individually contributed troops to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, but the alliance’s sole contribution to stabilizing Iraq has been the training of military officers.

NATO’s Military Concept emphasizes consequence management, in contrast to the U.S. strategy of giving priority to preventing attacks, and it has two main goals: to respond to an attack once it occurs, and to minimize the effects of an attack that has taken place. At its 2002 Prague Summit the alliance adopted a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan to improve its ability to respond to attacks involving WMD, and it has developed a range of capabilities to respond to such attacks. The alliance has also established a center of excellence to further explore defenses against WMD. NATO’s contribution to the fight against terror is thus important, if not central to U.S. efforts to fight terrorism. But the United States’ commitment to working through the alliance is unclear. Three factors explain this. First, two critical changes in the international system, the emergence of U.S. hegemony and of a security community, particularly among European states, have led NATO’s members both to differ among themselves on a broad range of global issues, and to perceive security threats differently. They also differ on appropriate means for responding to perceived threats, as was most evident in the dispute over the U.S. invasion of Iraq. These shifting alignments and attitudes have reduced U.S. willingness to accept alliance constraints. Second, U.S. military capabilities are greater and more sophisticated than those of its allies, which makes it difficult for even close U.S. allies to coordinate with U.S. forces in front-line military activities. Some U.S. officers point out that one goal of NATO training exercises is to illuminate these differences, as a way to spur allies to improve their capabilities. But NATO’s expansion to incorporate the newly independent states to its east has eroded its military capabilities further. Combined with the increasing use of national caveats, which constrain what individual military forces can do in NATO operations, the alliance’s ability to work with the United States in confronting immediate military threats appears limited, at best. Third, the nature of the war on terror itself limits NATO’s contribution to U.S. strategy. One factor is that the threats facing the United States and its European allies are different. The United States has chosen to combat terrorism as far from its shores as possible; in contrast, several European states face a domestic threat. Their large Muslim minorities create the potential for “homegrown” terrorists. This gives European states a different set of priorities in fighting terrorism, because the threat they confront is local, not distant.
The United States is unlikely to abandon NATO, however. In spite of its rejection of alliance constraints on its own actions, NATO provides a crucial forum in which the United States can discuss foreign and security policy with its key allies, to reach common understandings of shared problems. This is particularly vital to the United States as the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy begins to coalesce and influence the policies of European states. Only in NATO does the United States have a voice in European security affairs. This helps explain U.S. support for expanding the alliance, and it has sought to make NATO the forum for discussion of a broad range of security problems affecting Europe and North America. Moreover, Washington recognizes that combating international terrorism requires extensive cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral. So long as the United States views NATO as a valuable forum in which it can convince its European allies that they share the same goals and that they share the same threat in the war on terror, it will continue to value the alliance. If threat perceptions within the alliance diverge further, however, this could make it harder to reach agreement on common policies. Notably, European states appear to differ among themselves about the threats they face; this is not simply a transatlantic divide. U.S. policy increasingly acknowledges the importance of nonmilitary measures such as public diplomacy and the “war of ideas” in combating terrorism. Increasing recognition that the terrorist threat is evolving means that U.S. approaches are likely to move toward greater concurrence with current European policies on terrorism, which stress intelligence, law enforcement, and quiet engagement with the Muslim world. This would ease some of the frictions in Washington’s relations with its European allies. It would not, however, lead to a greater role for NATO in confronting terrorism. Rather, it could accelerate the tendency to utilize mechanisms outside the alliance framework to address this urgent threat. NATO’s military value as a partner to the United States against terrorism also remains in question. Should the United States confront terrorists militarily in the future, this is likely to be done by special operations forces working either alone or with host-government troops. A few alliance members may participate in such operations, but not the alliance. Further, the bulk of the struggle against terrorism requires nonmilitary means. NATO may have a useful diplomatic role to play, both among its members and with regard to key states like Russia, but many of the critical tasks in this fight are outside the military domain, leaving NATO with a little role. Many observers point to NATO’s ISAF mission as the essential test for its survival. NATO’s success or failure in Afghanistan will be a critical indicator of the alliance’s ability to address the type of security threats that will emerge in contested regions around the globe. Success would confirm NATO’s unity and capability to act “out of area,” but a defeat would undermine NATO’s claim to a broader global mission.

The alliance would continue to provide for the defense of Europe, and the alliance members’ shared values may be sufficient to sustain NATO as an organization, assuming its political consultation and dialogue functions continue to thrive. But such a defeat would raise serious questions about NATO’s contribution to its members’ core security concerns, if these are seen as out of area. If NATO’s major member-states do not seek to address their most urgent threats within the alliance framework, its military value could atrophy.
FLAS Fellowship Competition

Syracuse University’s center for European studies announces the foreign language and area studies (FLAS) fellowship competitions for summer 2008 and academic year 2008-2009 in European studies. The FLAS program provides tuition and stipend for graduate students who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents to undertake intensive language training and area studies that complements their program of study. FLAS awards are open to SU graduate students in any program, with interests in contemporary European studies.

Summer FLAS fellowships may be used toward study abroad in any accredited language program at the intermediate level or above in any European language. Fellowships may provide up to $4000 for tuition with an additional $2500 stipend. Proposals for internships or dissertation research are generally not accepted unless they contain a substantial language training component. Summer fellowships are also available to qualifying graduate students at other universities.

We anticipate awarding six academic year FLAS fellowships for 2008-2009 that will provide a $15,000 stipend and up to 24 credit hours of tuition coverage shared by the Center for European Studies and the graduate school. Preference for academic year FLAS awards may be given to those studying at the advanced level in one of the commonly taught European languages at SU (French, German, Spanish, Russian, and Italian) or at beginning or intermediate levels in the less commonly taught European languages at SU (Polish, Turkish, or Portuguese). Preference may also be given to professional program students and those who may work in public service in future. Generally, FLAS fellowships are awarded to students undertaking coursework, but may be available for dissertation writing under restrictive conditions and subject to special approval.

Fellowship Eligibility Requirements

- MUST BE A GRADUATE STUDENT
- MUST BE A CITIZEN, NATIONAL OR PERMANENT RESIDENT OF THE U.S.
- MUST BE ENROLLED (OR ACCEPTED FOR ENROLLMENT) IN A PROGRAM THAT COMBINES MODERN FOREIGN LANGUAGE WITH AREA STUDIES TRAINING WITH PROFESSIONAL OR DISCIPLINARY STUDY

Successful applicants will show potential for high academic achievement based on such indices as grade point average, class ranking, recommendations or similar measures that the institution may determine.