Addressing the Citizenship and Democratic Deficits: The Potential of Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration

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Addressing the Citizenship and Democratic Deficits: The Potential of Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration

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Abstract

This article reviews and synthesizes diverse streams of literature to assess the potential of deliberative democracy for American public administration. It asserts that the field should refocus its attention on the role of citizens in the work of government to help address the pervasive citizenship and democratic deficits in the United States. American public administration has an obligation to address these deficits because (a) it is required to do so by democratic ethos, (b) it has contributed to the deficits with its widespread embrace of bureaucratic ethos, and (c) it must find ways to effectively engage citizens within modern network and collaborative governance structures. This article identifies deliberative democracy as one potential method to help fulfill these obligations and explains how deliberative processes may help address the deficit problems. The article concludes by identifying a preliminary research agenda for exploring the potential of deliberative democracy for public administration.

Keywords
democratic ethos, bureaucratic ethos, deliberative democracy, citizenship deficits, democratic deficits

Introduction

This article asserts that American public administration, both as a field of academic study and professional practice, should take deliberative democracy seriously, as such processes provide concrete methods by which to address the growing citizenship and the democratic deficits in the United States. Although the field’s concern about public confidence in government and citizen participation has ebbed and flowed over the decades (for discussions, see Frederickson, 1982/2008; Roberts 2008a), current indicators of the citizenship and democratic deficits suggest
wide-reaching and pervasive problems that threaten the legitimacy and stability of the political system (Dalton, 2006; Durant, 1995; Macedo et al., 2005; Rimmerman, 2001).

Public administration, in both its academic and professional pursuits, has a significant role to play in addressing these deficits for at least three reasons. First, democratic ethos guides the field to do so; public administration has historically accepted among its responsibilities educating citizens about government and governance and promoting and maintaining democratic practices. Second, public administration has contributed to these deficits with its long-standing embrace of bureaucratic ethos; the field’s focus on managerialism and instrumental rationality has eroded its abilities to consider and implement effective citizen engagement processes. Third, relatively recent shifts to network and collaborative governance structures require new processes that better engage citizens in the work of government.

Beyond its normative or intrinsic benefits, deliberative democracy has instrumental benefits for both individuals and public governance that may help ameliorate the citizenship and democratic deficits, and do so within the networked environment of modern public administration (Elster, 1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Pateman, 1970; Young, 2000). Moreover, deliberative democracy offers inclusive, institutional designs that are sensitive to the value plurality inherent in complex policy issues, which in turn can help resolve conflict and build capacity for effective public action (Fung, 2003, 2006; Roberts, 2008a; Weeks, 2008). These institutional designs provide the field a way to rediscover the role of the public in shaping societal affairs. In doing so, deliberative democracy may also help public administration address, and perhaps abate, the inherent tensions between bureaucratic and democratic ethos in the field. To the extent that deliberative democracy yields these returns, public administration should explore its potential.

This article reviews and synthesizes a wide swath of literature in several different fields, including public administration, political science, sociology, and others, to develop the above argument. Unlike other researches that focus on singular issues (e.g., the democratic or citizenship deficits, deliberative democracy, or bureaucratic vs. democratic ethos), this article links these literatures together to explore and articulate the theoretical and practical importance of deliberative democracy for American public administration. In this way, the article takes an angle that has not yet been explored and provides insights into how the public administration might make advances in all these areas.

To that end, the article first explains the citizenship and democratic deficits and explores why public administration has a responsibility for addressing them. The article then examines deliberative democracy. It compares deliberative democracy with aggregative/representative democracy, provides an overview of deliberative processes, and discusses their potential benefits vis-à-vis the deficits. Third, it briefly examines the deliberative democracy movement and the concomitant calls for the institutionalization of deliberative practices in government. Finally, the article concludes with a preliminary research agenda about deliberative democracy for public administration. The goal of the research agenda is to lay the groundwork for a more integrative approach to theory development, one that will lend itself to future proposition and hypothesis testing. Moreover, in the longer term, such research will move the field toward consilience in this area, that is, the cumulation and integration of both theory and empirical evidence (see Talbot, 2005; E. O. Wilson, 1998).

**The Citizenship and Democratic Deficits**

Many scholars claim that the United States is experiencing a citizenship deficit among the general public and a democratic deficit in its institutions of government (e.g., Dalton, 2006; Dennis & Owen, 2001; Durant, 1995; Frederickson, 2008; Macedo et al., 2005; Mathews, 1994;
Rimmerman, 2001). Although concern about civism and public confidence in government has waxed and waned in American public administration (Frederickson, 1982/2008), the pervasive-ness of these deficit problems in modern times requires public administration to refocus its attention on these issues.

The term *citizenship deficit*, broadly refers to an erosion of civil society and civic engagement and more specifically to an erosion of civic skills and dispositions among the general public. Evidence of a citizenship deficit in the United States is seen in the numerous statistics that purport to show a decline in the political engagement, civic dispositions, and social capital of the public, among other areas (Dalton, 2002; Dennis & Owen, 2001; Mathews, 1994; Miroff, Seidelman, & Swanstrom, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Rimmerman, 2001; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Wattenberg, 2002). For example, voter turnout rates in presidential year elections decreased steadily from 1960 (when 63.1% of the voting-age population turned out) until 1996 (when only 49.1% of the voting-age population turned out). Voter turnout rates have since slowly begun to rise (but with a less than 8% increase from 1996 to 2008), with 51.3% turnout in 2000, 55.3% in 2004, and 56.8% in 2008 (http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html). However, voter turnout rates in off-year elections have hovered in the mid-30% range for the past several decades, after falling from a high of almost 50% of eligible voters in the 1960s. In addition, there has been a decline of public involvement in other political activities, such as working for political parties, signing petitions, attending political rallies or speeches, and running for office (Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Wattenberg, 2002).

There have also been declines in the civic dispositions of Americans, including internal and external political efficacy (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990), and trust in government (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000). The literature on social capital also points to declining membership in associational groups as evidence that Americans are experiencing a general decline in their ties to each other and to the political system (Putnam, 2000). Although many of these indicators have been on the upswing in the late 2000s, their general decline over the past several decades has led to a “growing sentiment among contemporary political scientists and political analysts that the foundations of citizenship and democracy in America are crumbling” (Dalton, 2006, p. 1).

Related to the citizenship deficit is the democratic deficit, which refers to a situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation. Although the term *democratic deficit* is generally used with regard to the political order of European Union (Mitchell, 2005; Moravscik, 2004), it has found applications within the United States (Aman, 2004; Durant, 1995), where it broadly refers to the disconnect between citizen opinions and preferences and political decisions and policy outcomes (Chomsky, 2006). This broad conception of the democratic deficit is directly connected with the American system of popular representation. To the framers, representatives were to play two key roles: (a) to “represent sectional and other interests in the national decision-making process by mediating competing claims” and 2) to “mediate and moderate the passions of the mob” (Rimmerman, 2001, p. 17). However, “[t]oday the link between ordinary citizens and their representatives is stretched so thin that it has almost disappeared” (Stivers, 2008, p. 85). In theory, citizens hold some power over public policy because elected officials must vie for their favor; however,
Leib (2004) finds the problem to be much deeper, and is worth quoting at length:

Generally, voters select among candidates with a bundle of policy commitments that cannot be disentangled; federal lawmaking in accordance with Article I, section 7, of the United States Constitution leaves most bills losing steam prior to passage; the committee system is vulnerable to manipulation; divided government often renders legislatures impotent; and the policies that are enacted are often selected by lawmakers for less than kosher reasons (pork-barreling, rent-seeking, log-rolling, etc.). When voters take matters into their own hands through initiative or referendum, they act out of ignorance or self-interest (rational or not), under the influence of mass media campaigns that are often aimed to misinform; and poor turnouts cast a further shadow of suspicion over electoral results (especially when the poor and minorities are underrepresented and undercounted). (pp. 2-3)

Durant (1995, p. 26) echoes this argument, identifying “four interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends” each of which “distorts policy discourse” and contributes to the democratic deficit. First, a “policy-challenged, vocal, and increasingly impatient citizenry” desires more popular and direct participation in the affairs of government because they believe that government is not addressing their concerns with legitimacy and accountability (p. 27). Second, the media has shifted the frequency, substance, and tenor of content on government and governance. Stories tend to be more negative and emotionally charged, and issues are covered in such a way as to block and distort cognitive processes. “In the process, factoids get confused with facts, ‘affect’ (or emotion) drives out ‘intellect’ in evaluating news, and a confused public paradoxically presses further demands for redress upon a federal government it perceives as ineffectual” (p. 28). The result is that citizens tend to overestimate (or underestimate) the severity of problems and issues and place more and conflicting demands on government. Third, “risk-averse, resource-dependent, and media-conscious politicians” see “scant rewards in a trusteeship model of public service geared toward leavening public understanding, policy discourse, and civic debate” (p. 29). Thus, elected officials tend to communicate in sound bites and pass off responsibilities to the bureaucracy. Finally, “a plebiscitary agenda,” conditioned by “the administrative orthodoxy of hierarchy, rules and regulations, and departmentalization by function” (p. 29) produces “a fragmented and parochial organization . . . wherein overly regulated sub-units are pitted against each other in a zero-sum conflict over resources, jurisdiction, and influence” (p. 30). The result of these four trends is a democratic deficit, a “policy implementation structure that is too hollow in capacity to nurture either policy goals, public approbation, or a truly deliberative democracy” (p. 30).

The citizenship and democratic deficits are problematic because they presumably threaten the stability and overall political health of American government (Dalton, 2006; Dennis & Owen, 2001; Durant, 1995; Macedo et al., 2005; Putnam, 2000). The deficits work to reinforce and exacerbate one another in a circular causal process. As citizens withdraw from political activity, their preferences are less known and, therefore, less well reflected in public policy decisions. In turn, as more policy decisions poorly manifest public preferences, citizens further withdraw from political activity. The threat is that as citizens withdraw support from government, the legitimacy of the democratic regime is called into question (Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974).

It is useful to briefly interject with the views of critics who assert that the citizenship and democratic deficits do not exist, or to the extent that they do exist are exaggerated. In a review article, Stolle and Hooghe (2004) lay out four different arguments and evidence formulated against the civic decline, or citizenship deficit, thesis. One group of scholars rejects it on empirical grounds, questioning the validity of the data used to support the claim. A second group accepts the decline thesis, but views it as an example of American exceptionalism, that is, social capital and civic engagement are not declining to the same extent in other Western societies as in the United States.
Similarly, a third group also accepts that traditional participation is on the decline but argues that current measures fail to capture emerging forms of participation and interaction that serve the same civic functions and purposes. Finally, a fourth group accepts the decline thesis but rejects its normative interpretations, arguing that the decline is immaterial for the future of democracy. Regardless of one’s opinion about these arguments, “hard-nosed empirical evidence is scarce and many causal relationships are still left unexplored,” leaving all claims about such data open for further investigation; thus, debate continues about the citizenship deficit and “whether social capital and civic engagement are declining or just transforming, and about the consequences of this evolution” (Stolle & Hooghe, 2004, p. 164).

Two criticisms of the democratic deficit thesis are worth noting. First, some scholars assert that a historical review of governance and legislation in America demonstrates an expansion of public access to the work of government. Voting laws (Keyssar, 2000) and citizen participation regulations (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006) are cited as evidence of this claim. Others suggest that the Government Performance and Results Act and the National Performance Review (Callahan & Holzer, 1994; Epstein, Wray, Marshall, & Grifel, 2000) as well as the Administrative Procedures Act (Rosenbloom, 2003) and its 1996 Negotiated Rulemaking Act and Administrative Dispute Resolution Act amendments (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005) have generally expanded public access to and say in the governance processes of federal administrative agencies.

Second, some scholars assert that individual and aggregate policy decisions are responsive to public opinion (for a review of this literature, see Manza & Cook, 2002; see also Stimson, 1998, 2005). Evidence of responsiveness is found in studies of legislation regarding equal employment opportunity (Burstein, 1998), welfare reform (Weaver, 2000), Medicaid (Jacobs, 1993), and defense spending (Hartley & Russett, 1992; Wlezien, 1995, 1996), as well as in policy domains such as social security, business regulation, tax cuts, and petroleum policy among others (Quirk & Hinchliffe, 1998).

Clearly, there are strong arguments both for and against the existence and tenacity of the deficits. Nevertheless, as researchers work to make sense of the data and trends, there seems to be an increasingly pessimistic view of the state of citizenship and democracy in the United States. Regardless of the extent to which one agrees with arguments about the deficits, there can be no doubt that public perceptions matter. As Dennis and Owen (2001) assert, public dissatisfaction with politics and government is connected fundamentally to popular perceptions about the political process and representation. In a fully operative democracy, people are likely to have developed the firm expectation that they have the right to be heard, and that officials should be responsible to their needs and take action. If people have come to feel that their own needs, wants, interests, concerns, values, or demands are not being effectively represented in the policy process, then no matter how felicitous the nature of the system outputs is perceived to be, popular resentment likely will result. (p. 401)

The Responsibility of Public Administration to Address the Deficits

Public administration has, to varying degrees in its history, always been concerned with civism (e.g., Frederickson, 1982/2008) and the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy (e.g., Pugh, 1991). Moreover, a significant volume of work has been generated on engaging citizens in with government (see generally, Roberts, 2008a) to facilitate public learning (Ventris, 1989/2008); build community (Nalbandian, 1999/2008); improve responsiveness (Rosener, 1978/2008); serve and empower citizens (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000/2008); build trust in government, citizen efficacy, and a shared conception of the common good (Levine, 2008/1984); and generally reduce citizen discouragement and apathy (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998/2008).
Given the breadth and depth of the citizenship and democratic deficits, it is important that these concerns are elevated again in the academic study and professional practice of public administration for at least three reasons. First, the democratic ethos of public administration requires the field to actively address the current deficits in citizenship and democracy. Democratic ethos embraces concepts such as regime values (Rohr, 1976), citizenship and public interest (Lippmann, 1955), and social equity (Frederickson, 1990; Rawls, 1971; Waldo, 1948). These values require the field to accept among its responsibilities and obligations the promotion and maintenance of civic education and democratic operations. Implicit in democratic ethos is the idea that “the basic end product of government [is] its capacity to educate, that is to say to inform, to impart knowledge, to increase citizen comprehension of (and appreciation for) the humanistic imperatives of democracy” (Gawthrop, 1998a, p. 764; see also Gawthrop, 1998b).

Classical political thinkers from Aristotle to Jefferson have emphasized the importance of civic education and the responsibility of government in providing it. Likewise, scholars throughout the history of public administration have placed emphasis on the integration of administrative practices and democratic values (e.g., Croly, 1914, 1909/1963; Follett, 1942/2003; Lindblom, 1990; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; Lippmann, 1929/1957, 1914/1961). Two of the best-known scholars in this area may be Frederick Mosher (1968/1982) and Dwight Waldo (1948, 1980), both of whom sought to reconcile the need for effective governmental administration with the requirements of democracy. But other scholars have tackled these issues as well. For example, well before he argued that “[a] theory of public administration in our time means a theory of politics also” (Gaus, 1950, p. 168), John Gaus (1923-1924, p. 220) examined the problems between discretionary administrative authority and democratic control and accountability. Similarly, arguing that “government is politics,” Paul Appleby (1945, p. 7) asserted that public servants should have governmental mental sense that compels them to think with “a public-interest attitude” (p. 3). Wallace Sayre (1951, p. 9) argued that “[t]he central concern about values in public administration in a democratic society turns around the arrangements for the responsibility and accountability of the administrative agencies for their policies and their programs of action.” Likewise, Norton E. Long (1962) argued that public policies have to balance reason with democratic processes.

These perspectives have been echoed by scholars in relatively recent decades. For example, Wildavsky (1979, p. 255) asserts that public administration must realize that an “essential task” is to “facilitate intelligent and effective participation” to help “increase people’s capacity of handling their own problems and finding solutions to them.” Ventris (1987, p. 37) argues that public administration must work to achieve an educated citizenry and that to do so, “the public must be inexorably linked with the activities of public administration to facilitate a political educative process between the public and administrator.” Likewise, Gawthrop (1998a, p. 765) contends that public administrators are responsible “for involving citizens in the democratic processes of governance and developing in them an enriched sense of community, civility, and the common good.” Similarly, Raadschelders (2002, p. 45) asserts that public decision makers “are expected to be enlightened in their service of multiple publics” and “play a pivotal role in the education of citizens.”

Second, long-standing frames of reference in public administration have contributed to the deficits. Although there has always been (and may always be) an inherent tension in public administration between democratic and bureaucratic ethos, the field has tended to favor and embrace the latter (for a discussion, see Pugh, 1991). As compared with democratic ethos, bureaucratic ethos is guided by a very different set of values, including efficiency, efficacy, expertise, loyalty, and accountability. These norms are evident in both the theory and practice of public administration. As Pugh (1991) notes, bureaucratic ethos is rooted in several intellectual traditions, including the Wilsonian concept of the politics-administration dichotomy (W. Wilson, 1887), the Weberian model of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946/1997); Taylor’s (1967) theory of scientific management, and the application of rationalism to public administration (Goodnow, 1900; Willoughby, 1937).
The operational values of bureaucratic ethos have also dominated in the practice of public administration. For example, they are clearly evident in W. Wilson’s (1887) argument for the neutral and “practical science of administration,” Gulick’s (1937) articulation of POSDCORB, and Simon’s (1947) emphasis on bounded rationality and satisficing decision making. These values also guide the modern practice of public administration. The most obvious examples are New Public Management and other recent reform movements such as Reinventing Government and the National Performance Review, which actively promote bureaucratic and managerialist norms.

The widespread embrace of bureaucratic ethos has serious implications for the field. “The branching out of government in a wide range of policy areas since the 1930s raised the need for more expertise among those who developed and implemented policies” (Raadschelders, 2002, p. 13). Thus, policy and decision making have been increasingly dominated technocrats, experts who generate and analyze statistical data at the expense of judgment, opinion, and understanding (Yankelovich, 1991). However, when the facts and data of objective knowledge are disconnected from cause and consequence, other types of knowing are excluded from policy- and decision-making processes, such as intersubjective understanding (e.g., insights in motives, values, world views of people) and emancipatory knowledge (as provided by, for instance, history, literature, philosophy, religion, language, and art) (the distinction of these three types is based upon Habermas; see Yankelovich, 1991: 213, 235). (Raadschelders 2002, p. 14)

Moreover, to the extent that technocratic public administration focuses on bureaucratic issues of managerialism, organization theory, and public agencies, it fails to adequately confront and understand the issues of public administration in a democracy (Ventris, 1987, 1998; Wamsley et al., 1990).

One of the fundamental flaws in making public bureaucracy the starting point of public administration is that it easily supports the substitution of organizational concerns and measures of performance for those of a democratic polity, including the rule of law. . . . Democratic polities must focus on: the sustained capacity of the political system itself to make and act on collective choices, opportunities for effective citizenship and political leadership, ensuring a limited government, nurturing the civic infrastructure necessary for collective action without public authority, providing the institutional structures necessary for operations of the economy, and protecting individual freedoms and rights. These are very different issues than those seen at the organizational level. (Kirilin, 1996, p. 418)

Other scholars extend this argument to examine the impacts of the market ethos on public administration and management. For example, Ramos (1981) contends that American public administration (indeed all of contemporary social science) accepts, often unconsciously, instrumental rationality as its guiding logic. The result is that the field suffers from cognitive politics:

Today the market tends to become the shaping force of society at large, and the peculiar type of organization which meets its requirements has assumed the character of a paradigm for organizing human existence at large. In such circumstances the market patterns of thinking and language tend to become equivalent to patterns of thinking and language at large. This is the environment of cognitive politics. Established organizational scholarship is uncritical or unaware of these circumstances, and thus is itself a manifestation of the success of cognitive politics. (Ramos, 1981, p. 81)

The predication of American public administration on the “instrumental rationality that is characteristic (and reflective) of the prevailing market system in society” is problematic because the market is “deeply (and inherently) antipublic” (Ventris & Candler, 2005, p. 353).
Some go a step further, arguing that public administration “has been rolled . . . by classical liberal economic thought” such that rational voluntary action and exchange have become its guiding principles (Golembiewski, 1996, p. 139). Likewise, Rimmerman (2001, p. 16) asserts that political socialization in the United States is guided by “the radical notion of individualism embraced by the framers,” which encourages the “right of individuals to pursue private property and their individualistic impulses in the private economic sphere.” Thus, he argues,

As people pursue “the American dream” as personified by the acquisition of private property and other material pleasures, they fail to devote the time and energy to engaging in the kind of public politics required by advocates of the participatory democratic vision. (p. 16)

Scholars have expressed fear that these conditions have produced “balkanization” (Samuelson, 1995, p. 236) and “tribalization” (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 18) in American life.

In short, the general embrace of bureaucratic ethos in public administration has nourished the citizenship and democratic deficits; “the lingua franca of [bureaucratic] institutions . . . revenue, offices, supervisors, performance, outcomes” has become an assumed part of modern life and has eroded the norms and values of community, civil discourse, consensus, trust, and responsiveness (Frederickson, 1996, p. 28). As Stivers (2008, p. 5) notes, “[s]o pervasive is the reach of managerialism that the very word ‘governance’ seems to have shifted its meaning” from “statecraft, that is the exercise of distinctively governmental responsibilities” to management “grounded in market theories and objectified views of state and society” (p. 93).

This brings us to the final reason why public administration has an obligation to address the citizenship and democratic deficits: relatively recent changes in government structures and governance patterns have exacerbated the problems caused by the historic embrace of bureaucratic ethos. Beginning in the 1960s, federal policy responsibilities were devolved to subnational governments for implementation (Hall & O'Toole, 2004). As states and localities gained responsibility for policy implementation decisions, including allocation, service delivery, monitoring, enforcement, and other core administrative tasks, they too farmed out policy responsibilities to nonprofit and private organizations. The resulting “hollow state” (e.g., Milward & Provan, 2000) required administrators to refashion organizational structures, processes, programs, policies, and goals to meet growing demands for coordination and accountability within the new systems of partnerships, contracts, and networks.

These shifts in responsibility have fundamentally changed the historic nature of public policy and administration. Public administration is now in a “new governance” era (Salamon, 2002), an era where our traditional understanding of governmental, sectoral, and organizational boundaries no longer serves administrative or political needs (Kettl, 2007). Because the new governance era promotes the privatization and contracting out of the activities of government to both private and nonprofit actors, public administration has emphasized “seeing governance as what goes on in the networks of public-private arrangements” (Stivers, 2008, p. 110).

Attention to networks has enabled public administration to better handle the administrative challenges of this new governance era. We have understanding of how networks operate (Kamensky & Burlin, 2004; Milward & Provan, 2006) and the management skills necessary for effective management in such environments (McGuire, 2006; O’Leary & Bingham, 2007). However, the field has given less serious attention to the political challenges that have emerged, particularly with regard to how networked government affects “responsibility for effecting the public interest; responsiveness to public preferences; and enhancement of political deliberation, civility, and trust” (O’Toole, 1997, p. 448). As the state has become “hollow,” the “conversation has shifted to devolution, privatization, networks, and markets, and the question of citizens’ role in government has almost disappeared” (Stivers, 2008, p. 105). This is problematic because
Administration is the most permeable region of government, the one in closest proximity to citizens. Agencies are also the field upon which many of the issues that touch the lives of ordinary people are played out . . . This remains true even despite the “thinning out” of administration that has accompanied privatization and devolution. (Stivers, 2008, pp. 10-11)

For this reason, the administrative structures and patterns of the new governance suggest, in principle, a need for greater citizen engagement in the work of government. Calls for such efforts can be seen throughout the literature in public administration. For example, Mary Parker Follett believed that “substantive participation [of citizens ad policy experts] and a mentality receptive to integrative solutions . . . will lead to the formulation of the collective will and its realization in the concrete activities of everyday life” (Fry & Raadschelders, 2008, p. 125). Similarly, Charles E. Lindblom argued in favor of “interactive problem solving, wherein expert and allegedly non-partisan professionals hammer out policy in constant cooperation with lay and partisan citizens” (Fry & Raadschelders, 2008, p. 282).

More recently, calls for greater citizen participation are seen in the literature on collaborative public management (see generally, Bingham & O’Leary, 2008). Some argue that the new governance era explicitly supports practices and processes for citizen participation in government (e.g., Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005), and others suggest the need for citizen-centered collaborative public management (e.g., Cooper et al., 2006; Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2008). Some take the idea further, insisting that “collaborative public management must encompass not only collaboration between and among organizations but also the role of the public and citizens in governance” (Bingham, O’Leary, & Carlson, 2008, p. 3).

These arguments about why American public administration must refocus its attention on the citizenship and democratic deficits bring us to a question: If public administration has an obligation to address the deficits, how can it do so? One potential method is found in the concept of deliberative democracy.

**Deliberative Democracy**

Many scholars promote deliberative democracy as an alternative way of making public decisions (e.g., Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Cooke, 2000; Elster, 1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Leib, 2004, Lindblom, 1990; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; Roberts, 2008c; Weeks, 2000/2008). Some readers may dismiss deliberative democracy as impractical and burdensome; however, theory, research, and practice provide insights and evidence that deliberative democracy processes are practical and practicable, can effectively address the citizenship and democratic deficits, and can produce other benefits for government and governance.

Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to infusing government decision making with reasoned discussion and the collective judgment of citizens; it connects participation in public decision making to the practice of deliberation (Cohen & Fung, 2004).

The notion includes collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the democratic part. Also . . . it includes decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part. (Elster, 1998, p. 8)

Definitions of deliberative democracy vary, but there is some agreement on its core elements; it requires reason giving, must take place in public and be accessible to some (if not all) citizens affected by decisions, seeks to produce a decision that is binding for some period of time, and is dynamic and keeps open the option for continuing dialogue (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004).
In contemporary political theory, deliberative democracy stands in contrast to aggregative democracy. Whereas both political models share assumptions about the structuring of democratic institutions, they focus on different decision making processes (Young, 2000). In general, deliberative democracy is “talk-centric,” whereas aggregative democracy is “vote centric” (Chambers, 2003, p. 308). The aggregative model, which forms the basis of representative government, relies on the aggregation of individual preferences to arrive at public policy decisions and uses voting and bargaining to determine how those individual preferences are cumulated (Mansbridge, 1980; Young, 2000). Because voting and bargaining encourage strategic behavior based on individualist and economic incentives (Barber, 1984; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1982), the aggregative model is also an adversarial model of democracy (Mansbridge, 1980). In this adversarial model, policy and other governmental decisions are seen as a zero-sum game where majority rules (for a discussion, see Radcliff & Wingenbach, 2000).

In contrast, deliberative democracy moves away from competitive pluralism by encouraging the distinctive rationality of “the forum” as opposed to the rationality of “the market” (Bohman, 1998). Deliberative democracy begins by turning away from liberal individualist or economic understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in concepts of accountability and discussion . . . [It] focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting. Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy. A legitimate political order is one that could be justified to all those living under its laws. Thus, accountability is primarily understood in terms of “giving an account” of something, that is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying public policy. (Chambers, 2003, p. 308)

As compared with aggregative approaches, deliberative approaches have a different view of participants and participation (for a discussion, see Shapiro, 2003). Because deliberative processes are open to those who are affected and/or interested in the issue(s), access is broadened and deepened to include not only government, public, and private entities but also “everyday” citizens and community groups. The nature and quality of participants’ voice is also different. Deliberative democracy processes build on the theory of principled negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1981), which emphasizes the interests that underlie and form individual preferences and positions (Innes & Booher, 2003). This interest-based approach allows deliberative processes to be inclusive and sensitive to the plurality of values involved in policy discussions. Moreover, it promotes political judgment through the consideration of different perspectives in unconstrained dialogue. In this way, deliberative democracy provides a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism that is more than a mere aggregation of individual interests (Young, 2000).

Before examining the potential benefits of deliberative democracy, three additional points must be made. First, many democratic theorists point to the normative, or intrinsic, value of democracy and assert that democracy and participation are ends in and of themselves and should be judged as such regardless of their other potential benefits (for a discussion, see Shapiro, 2003). Although this conception of democracy is extremely important, space limitations preclude its examination in this article. Moreover, it is only with the empirical testing of instrumental benefits that the field can begin to learn and understand the where, when, why, and how of using deliberative processes to address policy problems. Second, “[a]lthough theorists of deliberative democracy vary as to how critical they are of existing representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an expansion of representative democracy” (Chambers, 2003, p. 308). Third, deliberative democracy does not translate into a single method or process; rather, it is an umbrella term for a wide variety of processes, such as the Kettering National Issues Forum, deliberative polling, consensus conferences and planning.
cells, citizen juries, the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, study circles, and various
e-democracy initiatives, among others (Gastil & Levine, 2005; for a chart describing almost two
dozen dialogue and deliberation processes, see http://www.thataway.org/exchange/files/docs/
ddStreams1-08.pdf; for descriptions of a variety deliberative processes, see http://www.thataway

A discussion about the specific design of these and other deliberative democracy processes is
beyond the scope of this article; however, it is useful to identify similarities and differences
among the processes. Key features shared among deliberative processes include a focus on
action, an appeal to values, the absence of preexisting commitments, mutuality of focus, the free
exchange of knowledge and information, and activities occurring within small groups, although
the overall process may involve several thousand participants (Lukensmeyer & Brigham, 2005;
Torres, 2003). Salient differences among the processes include, but are not limited to, who par-
ticipates in deliberation, how participants exchange information and make decisions, the link
between the deliberations and policy or public action, and the point of connection to the policy
process (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Fung, 2006).

Despite their differences, deliberative democracy processes offer a concrete way to bring
together citizen views and insights in a way that is both inclusive and sensitive to value plurality.
Deliberative democracy

fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and losing (as adversarial
democracy seems to); it purports to give all citizens a “voice” rather than just the most pow-
erful or the most numerous (as tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages
citizens to make decisions based on “public reasons” that can be supported through delib-
eration rather than on individual prejudices that thrive in the privacy of the voting booth.
(Levinson, 2002)

Thus, on the whole, deliberative processes engage and transform individual preferences and
values such that policy decisions represent more than the aggregation of individual interests. In
doing so, deliberative democracy provides institutional designs that might allow public adminis-
tration to better rediscover and reflect the publicness in public affairs. These assertions are made
clear in the following discussion about the potential benefits of deliberative democracy.

Advocates assert that beyond its normative or intrinsic value, deliberative democracy also has
instrumental value for both participants and for public governance. The individual instrumental
benefits are largely captured in the argument that deliberative democracy has an educative effect
on participants (Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Pateman, 1970). The major
psychological quality that deliberative participation is expected to produce and develop is political
efficacy (Pateman, 1970, see also Finkel, 1985; Mansbridge, 1995; Morrell, 1998, 2005). How-
ever, other scholars extend these individual benefits, arguing that it can make for “better citizens”
by fostering and increasing political sophistication, interest, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotro-
pism, or public spiritedness (Luskin & Fishkin, 2003). In addition, participation is thought to be
a circular causal process (Finkel, 1985) whereby “the more individuals participate, the better able
they become to do so” (Pateman, 1970, pp. 42-43).

The theory is that the deliberation helps participants cultivate skills such as eloquence, rhe-
torical ability, empathy, courtesy, imagination, and reasoning capacity (Fearon, 1998). Through
the active exchange of ideas, and the voicing of and listening to preferences expressed in an ideal
speech situation (Habermas, 1984, 1990), deliberation can help people clarify, understand, and
refine their own preferences and positions on issues (Elster, 1998). Even if preferences are not
transformed, collective discussions may create greater understanding among persons with diver-
gent preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views because people may begin to
think beyond their own self-interest, to include greater concern for others and their community (Benhabib, 1996; Cooke, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004). In this way, deliberative democracy can help create Hannah Arendt’s concept of an “enlarged mentality.” To the extent that deliberative democracy has these educative effects, advocates assert that it is able to reduce the citizenship deficit. The idea is that if an informed citizenry is “able to function effectively and collaboratively through open and conveniently organized processes . . . public alienation toward government and toward public administration is reduced” (Frederickson, 1991, p. 415). Stated differently, when citizens become more involved in assessing public services, the public “confidence deficit” in the government will be alleviated (Kettl, 1998).

Deliberative democracy is also argued to have instrumental benefits for modern government. Specifically, the procedures and preconditions of deliberative democracy are argued to result in “better” decisions and improve the quality of governance (Button & Ryfe, 2005; Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2006; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004; Young, 2000). Because deliberation deemphasizes the aggregation of and/or bargaining among preestablished preferences and individual interests (Button & Ryfe, 2005), it can reveal private information, add new and different types of information to the discussion, force justification of demands, and increase consensus. This can help recognize weaker political groups and break the cycle of political inequality, improve the justice of decisions, legitimize the ultimate choice, and make for Pareto-superior decisions (Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2006; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004). The generation of legitimate outcomes may lead to increased buy-in and longer-term support of policy implementation (Fearon, 1998) and generally improve the effectiveness of public action (Fung, 2003, 2006). Advocates claim that deliberative democracy is better able to handle the problems of modern governance, because it recognizes that

administrative legitimacy requires active accountability to citizens, from whom the ends of government derive. Accountability, in turn, requires a shared framework for the interpretation of basic values, one that must be developed jointly by bureaucrats and citizens in real world situations. (Stivers, 1990, p. 247)

In short, because the institutional designs of deliberative democracy are inclusive and sensitive to the value plurality inherent in complex policy issues, they can help rediscover the public’s preferences and ameliorate the democratic deficit.

It should be noted that not all scholars agree that deliberative democracy has such benefits; in fact, many see a distinct dark side to deliberative democracy. On a practical note, some scholars point to the high transaction costs for participants in deliberative forums and suggest that these costs may outweigh the potential benefits of participation for citizens and policy makers. For citizens, transaction costs may include time, money (e.g., lost wages or child care costs), and otherwise forgoing more preferable activities (Rydin & Pennington, 2000). For government officials and decision makers, the most notable transaction costs include money and time (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004) and the ability to broker policy compromises and satisfy citizen demands (Ostrom, 1990; Sunstein, 2003).

Some scholars argue that participation can injure citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and powerlessness. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) note, real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place. (p. 191)
Other scholars assert that deliberative democracy may increase opportunities for co-optation. For example, Arnstein (1969) argues that

participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the status quo. (p. 217)

Young (2003, pp. 102-103) articulates this point well, demonstrating how a political activist, a person who would be expected to want to participate in deliberative democratic efforts, might have legitimate moral objections to the compromises required during deliberation:

The activist is suspicious of exhortations to deliberate, because he believes that in the real word of politics, where structural inequalities influence both procedures and outcomes, democratic processes that appear to conform to norms of deliberation are usually biased toward more powerful agents. The activist thus recommends that those who care about promoting greater justice should engage primarily in critical oppositional activity, rather than attempt to come to agreement with those who support or benefit from existing power structures. (pp. 102-103)

Clearly, there is disagreement among scholars about the potential benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, and although a review is beyond the scope of this article, suffice to say that current empirical research does little to resolve this debate (for a review of the empirical literature evaluating the impacts of deliberative democracy, see Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Ryfe, 2005). The need for more evaluation of deliberative democracy processes is clear, and a preliminary research agenda is suggested at the close of this article.

Although the argument above suggests the need for public administration to take deliberative democracy seriously, many readers are still likely to dismiss it as impractical and unwise or as a passing fad among certain groups of scholars with too large a normative disposition. Only time will tell if these readers are correct. Nevertheless, the field of public administration cannot ignore the fact that the deliberative democracy movement is growing rapidly and shows no signs of waning in the near future.

**The Deliberative Democracy Movement**

The growth of the deliberative democracy movement, particularly in nonprofit and academic settings, cannot be doubted. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a rapid proliferation of organizations, research institutions, and scholarly work devoted to the subject. For example, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the creation and development of numerous nonprofit organizations that seek to understand and institutionalize various deliberative democracy processes and programs, such as the Deliberative Democracy Consortium, the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, the Co-Intelligence Institute, Public Agenda, Public Conversations Project, Everyday Democracy, Conversation Cafés, and AmericaSpeaks.

Several research institutions have also emerged at universities and colleges across the country to study the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, such as the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University, the Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland, the Center for Deliberative Polling at the University of Texas-Austin, the Deliberative Democracy Project at the University of Oregon, and the Democracy Imperative at the University of New Hampshire. In addition, the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation lists more
than 30 deliberative democracy education programs at universities and colleges across the country (see http://www.thataway.org/exchange/).

The amount of research published on the subject is also impressive and demonstrable by rather unscientific but telling methods. For example, a quick search on www.amazon.com using the term deliberative democracy returns more than 4,400 books. Moreover, the same search term on www.scholar.google.com returns almost 48,000 articles. The field even has its own scholarly journal, The Journal of Public Deliberation, although one can find articles across a range of academic journals, fields, and disciplines.

Although most of this activity is happening in nonprofits and in the academy, the pressures for public administration to take seriously the work of deliberative democracy are growing. The prospective impacts of deliberative democracy on public administration increase as interest in deliberative democracy grows and as various groups and organizations seek to implement and institutionalize such processes in the regular practice of governance. There have already been calls for widespread governmental changes to institutionalize deliberation in national politics. For example, Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) propose Deliberation Day, a new national holiday for each presidential election year where citizens throughout the country would deliberate in public spaces about issues that divide the candidates. Similarly, Leib (2004) proposes an institutional design to embed the practice of deliberation in national government by integrating a “popular” branch of government into the existing federal structure. Even politicians are jumping on the bandwagon; in his One Democracy Initiative, former presidential candidate John Edwards called for the creation of “Citizen Congresses”—a program modeled on the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, through which millions of Americans nationwide would periodically participate in deliberations about critical policy issues, identify the challenges and trade-offs facing the country, and offer advisory opinions to leaders (http://johnedwards.com/issues/govt-reform/). More recently, President Obama issued the Open Government Memorandum, which calls for more public participation in federal policy making.

Although the more sweeping calls are unlikely to be heeded in the near future, it is clearly important for the field of public administration to understand both the theory and practice of deliberative democracy. As is evident from the history of citizen participation practices in the United States, the brunt of responsibility for the creation, development, implementation, and management of such efforts falls squarely on the shoulders of public administrators (Gawthrop, 1998A; see also Roberts, 2008a). Likewise, it is the pejorative “bureaucracy” and “bureaucrats” that are generally blamed for perceived failures in citizen participation efforts (Hummel & Stivers, 1998; King et al., 1998/2008; King & Stivers, 1998). To the extent that scholars and practitioners want to institutionalize deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government and governance, and to the extent that we accept public administration’s obligation to educate citizens and promote democratic practices, the field, both in its scholarly pursuits and in its professional practice, needs to understand deliberative democracy. So, what does public administration need to know about deliberative democracy? It is with this question that the article concludes.

A Preliminary Research Agenda

Given that interest in deliberative democracy spans numerous academic disciplines, one could write an entire article, if not a book, identifying a research agenda. Moreover, others have already identified several similar and highly relevant research agendas (e.g., Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Bingham & O’Leary, 2006; CDN, 2006; Roberts, 2008b). Thus, identified here are broad questions about deliberative democracy that relate specifically to the theory and practice of public administration. The research agenda is neither inclusive nor exhaustive; however,
it does lay a foundation for movement toward consilience in terms of the cumulation and integration of theory and empirical evidence (Talbot, 2005; E. O. Wilson, 1998).

At a theoretical level, scholars need to continue to give critical and sustained attention to the role of public administration in a democracy. As noted earlier in this article, the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy and between politics and administration were once given significant attention in the mainstream study of public administration; however, the field’s attention seems to have shifted away from these issues and toward managerialist research, particularly as applied within the framework of the new governance. There is no doubt that the new governance has changed the administrative landscape in the United States and elsewhere, and while understanding such public management issues is important, the field must also work to understand how this new era affects the role of public administration in a democracy. In particular, we need to examine the democratic implications of networked governance, how the structures and patterns of the new governance affect the balance of bureaucratic and democratic ethos, and how this balance affects, both positively and negatively, the citizenship and democratic deficits. Likewise, we need to examine the role citizens can play in networked government and collaborative governance. We also need comparative research to determine whether modern deliberative processes are more effective, less effective, or even different than other modern citizen participation processes, as well as older processes such as community boards, advisory commissions, and even the notion of representative bureaucracy (i.e., Jacksonian participation). In short, these old research traditions must be resurrected and resituated in the modern topography of public administration.

With this work as a foundation, researchers can explore whether and how deliberative democracy and other citizen engagement processes can be used to advance public administration. Theorizing should focus on several different levels of analysis. Roberts (2008b, p. 497) suggests that at the micro level we need “better theory building about direct, deliberative citizen participation” in public administration, especially as it pertains to the individual citizen; at the group level, we need “better theory on how deliberative groups function”; and at the macro level, we need to develop theoretical understanding about “how larger political, technological, economic, and historical forces may shape or inhibit direct, deliberative citizen participation.” We also need more theorizing at the level of organizations to explain how deliberative democracy and other engagement processes create (or hinder) institutional capacities for collaboration, conflict resolution, decision making, and effective public action.

Before providing suggestions for a practice-oriented research agenda, it is useful to note that scholars and practitioners face serious difficulties in determining what is really known about public deliberation and deliberative democracy. The problems are at least twofold. First, there are access problems. The literature has a long history, spans numerous disciplines, uses diverse methodologies, and often exists in less well circulated project reports. This leads to the second problem—comprehension. The historical and interdisciplinary nature of the work, coupled with the almost exponential variety in process design, setting, context, and implementation, makes systematic comparisons of results very challenging. Given these problems, it would be extremely useful for scholars to methodically collect, synthesize, assess, and distill the literature on particular topics in one place so that we can build an understanding of what we know, how we know it, and what questions remain unanswered.

Some of this work has been done. For example, Roberts (2008a) has published an anthology of Public Administration Review articles about direct citizen participation. The National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation Web site (http://www.thataway.org/exchange/) has a learning exchange center that gives access to thousands of resources and dozens of evaluations and reports on dialogue and deliberation. Similarly, some focused reviews of the empirical literature on deliberative democracy exist (e.g., Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Ryfe, 2005). Nevertheless, the systematic evaluation of deliberative democracy processes and their impact is in relatively early stages and
considerably more work must be done. The following are some suggestions for research focused specifically on the practice of deliberative democracy as it relates to public administration.

First, although we must work toward theory that better explains the normative or intrinsic value of deliberative democracy for public administration and society, the advancement of deliberative practice also requires more research on whether and how deliberative democracy produces instrumental benefits. Do deliberative processes make for “better citizens?” Do they improve governance and make for better policy decisions and outcomes? Moreover, to the extent that such benefits exist, we must understand whether and how these benefits scale up to affect the citizenship and democratic deficits. How do these processes affect the public’s understanding of its roles in government and governance? Does it change individual perceptions of government and governance? A decent body of research on these questions exists; however, it shows mixed and incomplete results. For example, Delli Carpini et al. (2004) review several studies showing that deliberation produces more sophisticated, tolerant, efficacious, trusting, and participative citizens, but report other studies that show no effect or a negative effect on these and other civic skills and dispositions. This leads the authors to conclude that the possible positive effects of deliberation are more complex than imagined and dependent on many factors.

This insight leads to a second important area of research, one that focuses on the relationship between contextual factors, design choices, and deliberative outcomes. Some interesting theoretical work in this area could guide research efforts. For example, using the term minipublics to describe the convening of citizens in self-consciously organized public deliberations, Fung (2003) identifies eight important institutional design choices (vision and type of minipublic, how participants are recruited and selected, the subject and scope of deliberation, deliberative mode, frequency of recurrence and iteration, the stakes, degree of participant empowerment, and extent of monitoring) and hypothesizes about how these design choices affect the quality of democratic governance in terms of 10 functional outcomes (civic engagement as quantity of participation, participation bias, quality of deliberation, informing officials, informing citizens, democratic skills and socialization, official accountability, justice of policy, effectiveness of public action, and popular mobilization). Fung’s work provides a rich framework that is ripe for testing. Such research efforts could provide broad insights about the relationship between deliberative design and outcomes, which in turn could allow for the examination of the effects of other design choices on outcomes, such as the instruments and materials given to participants, the role of facilitators and moderators, and implementation issues such as logistics, venues, timing, honoraria and expenses, and reporting issues among others. Such work connecting the design of participatory processes to outcomes is especially important given the recent “citizen participation” efforts around issues such as health care reform that have led to anger, cynicism, and moblike behavior among the public and elected officials.

Although understanding the relationship between design and outcomes is important, research must also examine how deliberative processes connect to public administration, particularly in regard to decision making and the policy process. At what point(s) during the policy cycle are deliberative processes most effective? What processes are most effective at what points? Does the policy context within which deliberation occurs affect the outcomes? Again, some scholars have provided theoretical work that may be useful for answering these questions. For example, scholars have categorized deliberative process as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Bingham, O’Leary, & Nabatchi, 2005). Quasi-legislative processes occur “upstream” in the policy-making process; they are prospective activities that help set standards, guidelines, expectations, or rules and regulations for behavior. Quasi-judicial processes are retrospective, fact-based, and/or determine the rights or obligations of selected citizens or stakeholders. Fung (2006) provides a different way of thinking about the connection between deliberation and the policy process; his “democracy cube” maps the institutional possibilities for engaging citizens in democratic governance in different areas of public sector decision making.
Such frameworks may be helpful in examining the connection of deliberative practices to the stages in and domains of the policy process.

A fourth area of research contemplates several questions whose answers will be useful to public leaders and managers. What are the obstacles to greater use of deliberative processes? How should managers decide on what processes to use when? How do (or might) deliberative processes affect the discretion, power, and control of administrators and other public decision makers? How and how effectively are decisions from these processes implemented and monitored over time? Again, Fung’s (2006) democracy cube provides insights about these questions. On a related note, although we have some understanding of the legal authority of agencies and administrators to engage in work related to deliberative democracy (Bingham, 2008; Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005), future research should explore how these legal frameworks can be bolstered.

Fifth, we need research that explores deliberative democracy vis-à-vis public affairs education. What new knowledge, skills, and abilities are required of public managers who engage in deliberative democracy? How do we train the next generation of public leaders and managers in deliberative processes? Some work on teaching collaborative public management skills exists (e.g., O’Leary & Bingham, 2007), but more work on teaching deliberative and other citizen engagement processes is needed.

Finally, this type of research calls for academics and practitioners to work in concert. Although laboratory experiments are useful, field research offers the most promise for informing public administration about the “real-world” impacts and outcomes of deliberative democracy. Academics and practitioners should work together to identify opportunities for research and to design effective and rigorous evaluation protocols. Many more questions, in many more areas, could be identified. Hopefully this modest list will spark interest and help advance research on deliberative democracy as it relates to public administration.

Conclusion

This article has argued that public administration has an obligation to address the citizenship and democratic deficits. This responsibility stems from the intellectual tradition of democratic ethos in the field, the field’s contributions to the deficit problems, and the need to engage citizens within the structures and patterns of the new governance. The article also offered deliberative democracy as one potential method to help with these tasks. In addition to their intrinsic or normative value, deliberative democracy processes also have instrumental benefits that may help public administration to effectively address the citizenship and democratic deficits within the modern environment of networked and collaborative governance structures. Moreover, deliberative democracy offers institutional designs that may help the field rediscover the role of the public in shaping societal affairs and, in doing so, abate the inherent tensions between bureaucratic and democratic ethos. Even if one does not buy that argument, public administration cannot dismiss deliberative democracy from its attention. The deliberative democracy movement is quickly growing and gaining momentum, and the number of calls for the institutionalization of such practices in the work of government is increasing. To the extent that these efforts are successful, public administration, both as an academic discipline and as a professional field, will experience significant impacts. It is for these reasons that public administration must take deliberative democracy seriously and work to understand its many processes from both theoretical and practical perspectives. The modest research agenda that was provided may help with those efforts.

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Notes
1. This term has been used to describe the citizenship status of children and youth (e.g., Bhabha, 2003; Roche, 1999), women (Conrad, 2003), and minorities and indigenous peoples (May, 1998); however, I have not found the term used to describe the phenomenon discussed here.
2. This, perhaps the most famous acronym in the academic study of public administration, stands for Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting.

References


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