External contributions to post-mass-crime rehabilitation

Louis Kriesberg

In this chapter, I examine important ways in which external actors affect people in localities, regions and countries where mass crimes were committed, as those people try to recover from their dreadful experiences. External actors include innumerable persons and groups, including national governments and international non-governmental as well as governmental organizations, which intervene in ways that affect overcoming the legacy of mass crimes.

Many developments in this increasingly globalized world enhance the effects of external actors in mitigating, but also sometimes exacerbating, the occurrences of mass crimes and the subsequent traumas. The global developments include growing economic integration and interdependence; speedier, broader and more intensive information transmission; the expanding number and influence of international governmental and non-governmental organizations; and also increasingly shared values and norms. Consequently, the occurrence of mass crimes and their consequences are less and less isolated from involvement by external actors.

Furthermore, the perpetrators and the survivors of mass crimes are aware of this possible engagement and they seek it out or fend it off, directly by appeals or indirectly by modifying their own conduct.

External actors, it should be kept in mind, have their own interests, values and perspectives, about which they themselves differ greatly. Therefore, the engagement of some external actors is likely to be consistent with those of some local groups, but many external actors may engage in ways that are not consistent with many other local groups.
For example, some external actors generally support external tribunals to pass judgment on those who may have committed gross human rights abuse. This may reflect a reasonable interest in deterring other such actions elsewhere in the world, but may be seen by some local actors as hampering efforts to minimize further bloodshed and efforts to restore economic activities, at least for an initial period of time.

The earlier chapters, which describe the great impact of direct involvement in mass crimes and the variability of that experience, suggest that external actors do not fully understand what has happened to the people in a locality, region or country where mass crimes occurred. The difficulty in grasping what happened affects the way external actors conduct themselves in trying to help people overcome the consequences of what they experienced.

Important external actors possessing values and norms at variance with those of particular local actors are likely to urge mass-crime-recovery policies that are not appreciated by major local groups. This is manifest in policies and actions regarding gender roles, with Western groups favoring more equality between men and women and greater protection of human rights for women, while many local men view such policies as misguided interference. Leaders of the external actors have their own constituencies to which they must give attention. Furthermore, occurrences of mass crime impact the many diverse external actors, in varying ways; this is notably the case for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in diaspora communities that help sustain policies opposing local accommodation.

Of course, external actors also provide many resources that make important contributions to recovery by the people who have been victimized. They may facilitate or mediate mutual understandings and respect, which in time become institutionalized. They may condition their continuing support upon fair and just treatment of formerly subordinated groups, basing their policies on widely shared standards regarding human rights. They may monitor the way agreements reached about dealings with the aftermath of mass crimes are implemented and impose sanctions in accord with a group’s compliance.

Authors all have personal ties with the issues they examine; those ties affect their interests and interpretation of the issues, as suggested in chapter 1. My lifetime experiences, my training and my studies of conflicts shape my approach to the matters discussed in this chapter. I grew up in Chicago, Illinois, in the 1930s, the son of immigrants from what was Tsarist Russia. I heard many stories of the anti-Semitic pogroms in Russia from my parents and relatives and I lived as a Jew in a non-Jewish neighborhood, experiencing the anti-Semitism of that time and place.

I became fascinated by the wars of the 1930s and the threats of horrendous future wars abroad, I collected pictures of the Japanese invading China and of the Spanish Civil War and I listened with apprehension to Adolf Hitler’s speeches.

My response was not so much anger and the desire to retaliate, but to figure out what was going on and how to stop the horrors I knew of and prevent those I feared would soon occur. I went to college and graduate school wanting to learn what might be done; I discovered sociology and thought it would provide the most fundamental understanding of wars and mass violence, and thus how they could be controlled. At the same time, I also simply enjoyed the sociological perspective and found the academic life congenial.

I analyzed aspects of international cooperation while also doing more conventional sociology. But in the early 1970s, I began to focus all my work on threats of war and how to counter them. In particular, I studied US–Soviet and Israeli–Palestinian relations, drawing from the literature in peace studies as well as in international relations. I also began to teach and do research in the emerging new field of problem-solving conflict resolution. All this, mixed with my decades of experience traveling to many parts of the world and living in Mexico, Germany, Israel and France, sen-sitizing me to the ongoing nature of large-scale conflicts as well as their changing trajectories. My present work is a response to the current world from the perspective of my past experience. In the last few years, I have been analyzing the transformation of intractable conflicts and the role of reconciliation in such transformations.

This chapter builds on my past endeavors, but is focused on external organizational responses to mass crimes and how the responses sometimes contribute to the transformation of the destructive conflicts of which large-scale violence is a part. It is based on a wide range of personal accounts, secondary reports and interviews with persons who worked in governmental and non-governmental organizations engaged in peace-building, and with many people in countries where mass crimes had been committed.

The occurrence of mass crimes and their aftermath are examined here in the larger context of the conflicts in which they are embedded. Mass crimes are episodes, large and gruesome as they may be, within the course of conflicts that preceded the mass violence and that continue in some fashion afterward. Each outbreak of gross human rights violations examined in earlier chapters had a history of prior confrontations between members of the groups perpetrating and suffering grave injuries. The rehabilitation, which did and did not occur after those prior episodes, affected the outbreaks examined in this book.
Mass crimes also frequently have repercussions that spread out, resulting in additional destructive conflicts and new mass atrocities. The mass crimes committed by Nazi Germany and its allied forces against various peoples of Europe contributed to subsequent forced expulsions, profound hatreds and new atrocities in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The genocide in Rwanda reverberated throughout Central Africa and contributed to new wars and atrocities there. External actors clearly have a stake in the aftermath of mass crimes.

Particular conflicts, however, even those marked by the commission of mass crimes, become transformed and sometimes come to an end. The transformation and ending may be imposed, in varying degrees, by one party to the conflict or by external intervention. The endings vary in the degree to which they are mutually agreed upon and explicitly formulated. Even formal agreements to end or control violent conflicts often fail to be implemented and are soon followed by renewed destructive fighting. Other settlements, however, help transform violent conflicts and subsequently the relations between former adversaries improve.

The endurance of any settlement depends not only on the content of that settlement, but also on the nature of the conflict, the characteristics of the opposing sides, the nature of their relations and the way the agreement was achieved. In addition—and of special interest here—the durability of the settlement depends on the engagement of persons and groups who are outsiders to the settlement.

Those external actors include multinational corporations, transnational churches and other religious associations, exile and diaspora organizations, international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Human Rights Watch.

External actors are particularly important in this increasingly integrated world. Indeed, globalization diminishes the very distinction between internal and external actors, factors and processes. For example, a multinational petroleum corporation has close ties with governments, local businesses and trade unions in many countries; consequently, the decisions made by such groups in one country impact many groups in other countries. Members of diaspora groups are another example. They often remain in close relations with compatriots in their native lands, sending remittances back to relatives, receiving information about the cultural and political life in their country of origin and engaging in political activities by providing funds or even weapons to political organizations in their homeland. I focus here on ways IGOs and INGOs affect particular social processes that are often crucial for rehabilitation after the commission of mass crimes and for the attainment of a durable peaceful accommodation. Mass crimes have profound impacts at the individual, community, national and regional levels. At the individual level, the responses vary in emotions, cognitions and behavior, including grief, depression, anxiety, apathy, anger and hate, but also resolve and engagement in recovery. At the community level, the deaths and injuries, physical disruption of services and communications, and other severe damages resulting from mass crimes can exacerbate inter-organizational differences and social cleavages across ethnic, religious and economic lines. But experiences also can increase the need for cooperation within a community and among communities. At the national level, leaders and institutions may become illegitimate and ineffective. New leaders and new solutions to the problems arising from the mass crimes may arise, but they may not be appropriate for the problems at hand.

The processes examined in this chapter pertain especially to reconciliation, which is briefly discussed later in this chapter. Durable and constructive agreements and other instruments of accommodation often contribute to and are based upon some degree of reconciliation. Reconciliation, as understood by members of the parties that had been involved in mass crimes or other destructive conflicts, however, may not figure significantly in reaching a stable, mutually acceptable accommodation. For example, in post-Franco Spain, the horrors of the Civil War and its aftermath have not been dealt with by explicit acts of reconciliation; indeed until recently they have been generally treated with widespread silence. Nevertheless, analytically, the silence may provide a kind of minimal security and even regard, which are components of reconciliation as understood here.

To discuss the complex ways people do and do not accomplish post-mass-crime rehabilitation, the major components will be analyzed separately here, before considering their interconnections. First, I examine the qualities that characterize a destructive conflict and the changes in those qualities that constitute the conflict’s transformation into a more tractable or even constructive conflict. Second, I analyze the major dimensions of reconciliation, regarded broadly, and discuss the many groups between whom reconciliation occurs in varying degrees. Third, I examine the numerous IGOs and INGOs that may speed the degree to which a conflict is transformed constructively, recognizing as well that some may sustain and intensify the destructiveness of a conflict. In the final section of this chapter, I bring together the previous discussions and examine how various IGOs and INGOs affect major dimensions of reconciliation so as to foster equitable and stable accommodations, even after mass crimes have been committed.
Characteristics of destructive and constructive conflicts

Four components, or characteristics, of the adversaries and their relationship combine to constitute any social conflict. First, at least one antagonist has a collective identity distinct from another group or people, and actions related to such views tend to result in members of each side regarding themselves to be in a contentious “us” against “them” relationship. Second, members of at least one side regard themselves as aggrieved, suffering threats or injustices. Third, members of at least one side formulate goals that include seeking a change in the other side that would reduce their grievance. Finally, members of an adversary side believe that they are able to take actions towards the other side that will change it so as to advance them toward their goals.

These components vary in ways that make for relatively more destructive or more constructive conflicts, as shown in table 10.1. Thus, some kinds of collective identities and conceptions of the adversaries contribute to a conflict’s destructiveness and to the commission of mass atrocities, while other kinds foster constructively waged conflicts. For example, national identities vary in several relevant ways. They may be formulated in terms that make it hard for others to share an identity, defining membership in terms of ascribed qualities (those determined at birth) rather than achieved qualities (those acquired by later actions). Nationalism defined by ascribed qualities is one of the features of ethno-nationalism, while civic nationalism is inclusive, allowing others to share it by participating in the country’s life as a citizen who supports it.

Furthermore, identities may be formulated in terms that rank the collective self as superior and another people as inferior, even sub-human. As discussed in the chapters by Scott Straus and by René Lemarchand and Maurice Niwese in this volume, prior to the genocide in Rwanda, some Hutu leaders mobilized people to commit the mass killings by characterizing the Tutsis as sub-human. It is possible, however, for other groups to be viewed as different without denigrating comparisons; after all, the tourist industry is so large partly because people enjoy seeing others who act differently than they do. There is evidence that people can be patriotic in the sense of celebrating their own qualities, without being nationalistic in the sense of seeing others as inferior to them. The tendency to denigrate the other rather than appreciate the differences that are believed to exist contributes to conflicts becoming destructive and results in mass crimes.

The nature of grievances also varies in ways that affect the destructiveness of conflicts. Thus, the members of a collectivity may fear that their individual or collective survival is endangered by another collectivity; or, they may believe themselves to be relatively disadvantaged, but not existentially threatened. In the former cases, conflicts are more likely to become destructive than in the latter. The analysis by Natalija Bašić demonstrates how combat soldiers on each side of the wars in the Balkans could believe that they were defending themselves against threats to their existential interests.

Goals also vary greatly in relevant ways. The goals may be premised on the belief that their attainment must come at the expense of the other side; or, the goals may be based on the expectation that significant mutual gains are possible. The former beliefs give the conflict a zero-sum character, and are conducive to a relatively destructive conflict, compared to the latter beliefs that give the conflict a mixed-sum character. For example, more security for one’s own group may seem to require less security by the enemy; but alternatively, the situation may be configured so that one’s own security can be attained only by the enemy also feeling safe.

Finally, the methods that are chosen to wage a conflict clearly affect the trajectory of a conflict, particularly since they tend to be reciprocated by the other side. For example, as seen in several chapters, targeted people often use the violence directed at them to justify their own more violent responses. Gross human rights violations can engender fear, anger, hate and other feelings and acts that contribute to destructive conflict escalation and prolongation.

Clearly, the qualities of these four components affect each other. Some

Table 10.1 Conflict Components and Conflict Destructiveness

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>More Destructive</th>
<th>More Constructive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Exclusive of other</td>
<td>Inclusive of other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascribed qualities</td>
<td>Achieved qualities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining self by opposing other</td>
<td>Defining self independently of other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td>Believe existence is threatened</td>
<td>Believe existence is not threatened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel humiliated by others</td>
<td>Issues appear negotiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Regarded as in zero-sum conflict</td>
<td>Regarded as in mixed-sum conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seek destruction of other</td>
<td>Other side’s goal given legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Seek revenge</td>
<td>Believe non-coercive means possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Believe violence only recourse</td>
<td>Use of violence greatly limited</td>
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kinds of identities, grievances, goals and conflict methods tend to reinforce each other in contributing to a conflict's destructiveness or to its constructiveness. These conflict qualities tend to change and become less conducive to destructiveness as a conflict de-escalates. As an accommodation between the adversaries is reached, further changes in these conflict qualities need to occur to help consolidate the accommodation.

This discussion should make clear how the commission of mass crimes tends to prolong and even escalate the destructiveness of a conflict. When a group has suffered mass crimes, the identity of survivors and others sharing that group membership may be affected in ways that increase the likelihood of future mass crimes. They tend to see themselves as beleaguered, vulnerable and isolated. The perpetrators' identity also may be affected in ways that perpetuate destructive conflicts; they may tend to justify their actions by thinking of themselves as being under attack.

Members of each side are likely to feel aggrieved, as they may fear the consequences of the crimes. As members of each side try to protect themselves from the threats, they may act in ways that confirm the other side's belief that they are being threatened; this epitomizes the security dilemma.

Experience with mass crimes may even make such acts more likely again because the barriers against them have been lowered, and the desire for retaliation helps justify gross human rights violations. Thus, the riots and massacres in Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi formed an escalating series of killings leading to the mass killing and consequent wars, as examined by René Lemarchand and Maurice Niwese in chapter 7.

Since this book is focused on the aftermath of mass crimes, attention to their termination is needed. Some end by expulsion or by imposition and the continued repression of the targets of the mass crimes, which may continue for a very long time. Such cases are discussed in the chapters in this book examining Bali and post-Soviet Russia. Many other cases can be cited, including the Ottoman treatment of Armenians, Chile under Pinochet and Spain under Franco. In such circumstances, past crimes are denied; people who might protest them are silenced and suffer not only the losses, but also feelings of guilt and fear, which are hidden. Rehabilitation then has those burdens to overcome as well.

Many conflicts that include mass crimes, however, are ended by agreements often marking important transitions in a conflict. They vary in comprehensiveness, specificity and explicitness. They may be reached through negotiations, with a great deal or very little engagement by outside actors. Whether the agreements help foster and solidify a constructive peace process or fail to do so and are followed by destructive breakdowns depends in part on how the agreement helps to transform the conflict components previously discussed. The agreement may settle some grievances and provide legitimate ways to manage future contents, providing a basis for further progress. Various elements of reconciliation can contribute significantly to the transformation of a destructive conflict, particularly one with a legacy of oppression, atrocities and mass crimes.

Dimensions of "reconciliation"

Reconciliation is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing processes as well as particular aspects of the relationship between two or more persons or collectivities. As is evident in many chapters in this book, reconciling parties in large-scale conflicts is done by many diverse persons and groups. Particular individuals, who see each other as members of large collectivities with a history of antagonistic and destructive relations, may engage in conversations about that past, carry out cooperative work, or even form intimate friendly or marital relations. Often public attention is focused on official representatives of two previously antagonistic communities who engage in reconciliatory actions. These actions may range from carefully choreographed mutually arranged events to relatively spontaneous gestures by a leading figure from one party. Even when the reconciliatory steps are impelled by political and economic calculations, the steps may contribute to progress along the road toward rehabilitating relations after awful atrocities have occurred.

Particular groups within one or more adversary may also take reconciliatory actions. The groups may include members of legislatures, audiences for films or readers of books about grievous past events, or participants in public commemoration events. Finally, reconciliation may be embodied in institutionalized conduct that contradicts past oppression and hostility. This includes promotion of social integration across lines of past divisions and laws against discrimination or disrespectful language. For example, in the village of Carhuahuar, Ayacucho, Peru, a law was passed against gossip (Ley Contra Chismes), banning spreading stories about a villager's past involvement with the Shining Path.

Noting the variety of persons and groups possibly engaged in reconciliation also indicates that some people may be acting in a reconciliatory manner in some capacities and situations, but not in others. Thus, while leaders, small groups or even general practice demonstrate steps of reconciliation, many other people on one or both sides of a destructive conflict may remain un-reconciled to its transformation. Some of the unreconciled may passively resist the new relationship while others may even seek to subvert it. Still others may reject the new accommodation
and try to continue the fight and restore a previous relationship. Such groups, acting as spoilers, often undermine the implementation of agreements to settle a conflict.9

Furthermore, the boundaries of any system that adversaries make up are to a greater or lesser extent porous to outsiders. In communal conflicts, people who share communal identities with one or more sides often live outside the system, sometimes across borders dividing the land on which a people live. Some of them also live in distant countries, as members of diaspora groups. Frequently, members of such diaspora communities form organizations that support the struggle of their religious, ethnic or linguistic compatriots, sometimes even after the contenders in the primary locus of the conflict have reached an accord.

Before examining IGOs and INGOs and their impacts on rehabilitation after mass crimes, it is necessary to discuss four major dimensions of reconciliation.9 The dimensions are shared truths, justice, regard and security. Different analysts have emphasized one or two of these dimensions and variously defined them. My use of the term reconciliation incorporates all of them and each dimension is regarded as broad and to occur in varying degree.

First, many partisans of a conflict, as well as analysts, regard truth as an important dimension of reconciliation since members of antagonistic sides tend to deny what members of the other side experience and believe to be true. At a minimal level, persons on each side may openly recognize that they have different views of reality. They may even acknowledge the possible validity of elements of what members of the other community believe. At a fuller level, members of the different communities develop a shared and therefore more comprehensive truth. Official investigations, judicial proceedings and literary and mass media reporting are ways for perpetrators and those complicit with them to acknowledge abuses that had been hidden or denied. In the larger global context, additional resources are available to seek and sustain truths that might otherwise be denied. Then, in some future time, matters that might have been hidden are brought into the light.

The second major dimension of reconciliation is justice, in its manifold meanings. Many persons who have suffered oppression and atrocities in the course of a destructive struggle seek redress for what they endured. Redress may take the form of tangible restitution or compensation for what was lost; it may also be in the form of punishment for those who committed injustices and it may be exhibited in policies that offer protection against future discrimination or harm.10

The third important dimension in reconciliation incorporates expressions of regard by members of each community towards the other. This includes according respect to the people in the community that has suffered mass crimes, by members of the community to which the perpetrators belonged. It also includes expressions, by those who have suffered harms, which acknowledge the humanity of those who inflicted the injuries. At a minimal level, this entails recognizing the humanity of the others and their human rights. At its most extreme, the acknowledgment may convey mercy and forgiveness, which is stressed by some advocates of reconciliation. It is given support by widespread religious beliefs regarding the value of every human being before God.11 Frequently, recognition of the other side’s humanity entails only expressing the thought that many members of the adversary community did not personally and directly carry out harmful actions and that the next generation is not responsible for the acts of past generations. Sometimes, members of previously hostile sides simply carry on social interactions without explicit acknowledgements of the past hurts. In so doing, a minimal level of regard may be evident.

Certainly, regard is not likely to be given by persons who have suffered mass crimes to everyone who belongs to the collectivity from which variously responsible perpetrators have come. The great range of responsibilities that people had and the various responses those who were injured have towards them is made evident at the interpersonal micro-level analyses provided in many chapters in this book.

Security is the fourth dimension of reconciliation, in the sense of personal or collective safety and well-being. Security exists as the adversaries have reason to believe they can look forward to living together without one side threatening the other, perhaps even in harmony and unity. This may be in the context either of high levels of integration or in the context of separation and little interaction. However the sense of security is supported, believing that it exists in good measure contributes to and is sustained by trust. Ethical dilemmas involving security arise when those who have committed criminal acts, or more likely ordered them, are given amnesty. That runs counter to the injured parties’ insistence upon obtaining justice and truth, and it hampers according them decent regard.

Clearly, all these dimensions of reconciliation cannot be fully realized at the same time. Indeed, they are often contradictory at a given time.12 Thus, forgiveness and justice often cannot be satisfied at the same time, although they may occur sequentially. Nevertheless, if expressed by different members of the previously antagonistic sides, some degree of forgiveness and justice may be compatible even simultaneously.

Significantly, these dimensions are interdependent in many ways. Thus, if many members of one community acknowledge that their acts have injured another community, forgiveness or at least acceptance of their humanity is easier to be felt and openly expressed by the injured party.
Members of a group who feel safe are more likely to acknowledge truths of past misdeeds. The complex, multi-levelled workings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission illustrate the interdependence and the dilemmas such interdependence creates.

A high level of reconciliation is not a one-sided matter. Some members of one side may seek justice from another one that is viewed as responsible for the injustice; but members of that other side may deny responsibility and then there is no reconciliation movement, as is shown by Kimberley Theidon about Peru in chapter 4. Expressions of regret may be recognized by members of the injured party and not deemed fully adequate by some of them. Often both sides have suffered injuries at the hand of the other, although not in equal measure. Reconciliation actions by members of one party often are ineffective because they fail to reflect the appropriate symmetries and asymmetries.

The degree of asymmetry between the parties who had been involved in mass crimes is a major aspect of every dimension of reconciliation. A high degree of reconciliation usually entails significant complementary reciprocation. If members of one side assert truths that are ignored or denigrated by the other, their assertion is hardly a mark of reconciliation; the truths need to be shared or at least acknowledged to indicate some degree of reconciliation on that dimension. Expressions of regret and apology and acts of contrition must be recognized and in a sense accepted by the other side if reconciliation is to progress. Security for one side can hardly be called reconciliation when it means insecurity for the other side, even if the relationship remains stable. Similarly, terms that only one side deems just and the other regards as unjust do not indicate a significant level of reconciliation on that dimension.63

Varieties of IGOs and INGOs

This chapter is focused on international governmental and trans-national non-governmental organizations, but national governments and national non-governmental organizations also take actions that affect the people in other countries after experiencing mass crimes. For example, Augusto Pinochet, who ruled Chile for 17 years after the 1973 military coup he led, oversaw a harsh repression. In 1998, he was arrested in Britain at the request of Spanish courts on murder charges. Although he was allowed to return to Chile on the grounds of his poor health, court proceedings on various charges followed in Chile.

Enemies and former enemies relate to each other in a context that includes many international governmental and non-governmental organizations, which readily penetrate the boundaries of the adversaries, affecting each of them and their relations with each other. The organizations include businesses buying and selling products and services; public and private investors; and organizations transmitting news and producing entertainments. They also include religious and academic institutions, many of whose members set forth truths and norms to guide conduct. Here, I focus on the organizations that have relatively direct impact on the work of building peace after mass crimes have been perpetrated.

International governmental organizations vary greatly in their geographic and functional scope. Almost all the governments of the world are members of the United Nations and it has a wide scope of functions, but it has little supranational authority. Under some circumstances it has been able to act collectively and impose cessations of violence, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. The UN undertakes many important activities to prevent wars, to end them if begun, to help those suffering the consequences of the wars and to build enduring peace. They are carried out by the various organs of the UN, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and by the associated specialized organizations such as UNESCO.

Of the 245 international intergovernmental organizations active in 2004, 177 were regionally oriented. Regional IGOs are particularly important in Europe; those relevant to post-conflict peace-building include the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and NATO. Non-governmental international organizations are much more numerous and diverse than IGOs. In 2004, there were 7,261 such organizations. They tend to be based in the developed world and many operate globally. These trans-national organizations have grown in number and size as a result of the ever-greater integration of the world. The processes of globalization further enhance the effects of these organizations at the same time as their growth reflects and fosters increasing globalization. Many INGOs are engaged in peace-building activities related to humanitarian relief, aid to refugees, economic development, protection of human rights and supporting non-violent conflict resolution methods.

In reality, IGOs and INGOs are not fully independent of each other. The UN has complex formal and informal ways of relating to INGOs. INGOs provide information as well as propose options for IGO actions, sometimes lobbying for particular policies. Increasingly, INGOs contract INGOs to provide particular services in post-conflict situations, and therefore provide significant support for some INGO operations.

Finally, it is important to recognize that neither IGOs nor INGOs represent a unified "international community". Their member governments or national non-governmental associations differ immensely in power and influence, and in values and interests. Since the Cold War ended and the
Soviet Union dissolved, the United States’ global dominance grew and that increased its influence in various IGOs. However, in the years of President George W. Bush’s administration, this power has been used to bypass the UN and other major IGOs.

Non-state actors, including INGOs, can provide vehicles for action that complement or counter governmental actions. They can operate transnationally to influence national governments and thereby affect international norms and organizations, for example in leading the movement to ban landmines. Even INGOs, however, often are led by persons and groups from the United States and other developed Western countries, albeit representing diverse views in these pluralistic countries.\textsuperscript{17} This is evident in the importance of the women’s movement in the West and the consequent attention given to mass crimes committed against women, as in the criminalization and punishment of mass rapes.\textsuperscript{18}

The impact of IGOs

This discussion of the effects of IGO activities upon reconciliation and rehabilitation after mass crimes is organized in terms of the IGO activities’ impacts on the four dimensions of reconciliation and their contribution to changing the basic components of conflicts. See table 10.2.

*Shared truths*

IGOs can foster the development of shared truths among adversaries about their history and relationship in several ways. One important way is through public trials of individuals accused of committing specific criminal acts in the course of a war or state repression, which serve as an increasingly significant way in which some IGOs cast light on particularly awful events. For example, in 1993 the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).\textsuperscript{19} Although the ICTY is located in the Hague, Netherlands, its proceedings receive attention in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{a}

The UN General Assembly convened the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC), and in 1998 it finalized a draft statute.\textsuperscript{20} Some governments have not joined the ICC, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel and Turkey; however, 137 nations do support it. The ICC formally opened in March 2003, in the Hague.\textsuperscript{21} As discussed in Thomas Sherlock’s chapter in this book, about remembering Soviet mass crimes, revealing truths about past relations can reduce the sense

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconciliation Actions</th>
<th>Identities</th>
<th>Grievances</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Methods</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truths</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trials</td>
<td>Revise history</td>
<td>Lower injury</td>
<td>More shared</td>
<td>Less purely coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inquiries</td>
<td>And self-concept</td>
<td>Raise for others</td>
<td>More complementary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curriculum material</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trials</td>
<td>More inclusive</td>
<td>Lower injury</td>
<td>More delimited claims</td>
<td>Judicial and political</td>
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<td>Restitution</td>
<td>Raise for others</td>
<td>Less revengeful alternatives</td>
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<td>Set standards</td>
<td>Provide redress</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regard</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set standards</td>
<td>Includes sense</td>
<td>Mitigate past grievance</td>
<td>More shared</td>
<td>Consider others’ humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group dialogue</td>
<td>of responsibility</td>
<td>Reduce humiliation</td>
<td>Accord other legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Recognition</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>More overarching</td>
<td>Reduce fear</td>
<td>More mutual</td>
<td>De-legitimize violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protecting rights</td>
<td>Reduce security dilemma</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rely more on political set</td>
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<td>Monitor standards</td>
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<td>Demobilization</td>
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<td>Police training</td>
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Table 10.2 International Governmental Organizations’ Activities Fostering Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation Impacts on Conflict Conditions
of grievance among those who suffered from the actions of an adversary party but they may also be used to mobilize struggles to redress a raised sense of grievance. Furthermore, if the revelations are regarded as one-sided, which may be the case with trials conducted by members of one side against the other, new grievances are likely to be created. Other methods may be more productive of mutually shared truths. These could be the product of joint groups or commissions issuing reports or mutually accepted history texts, as fostered by UNESCO. History textbooks are often contested because they do influence self-identities as well as conceptions of adversaries.

IGOs may undertake fact-finding missions or support other inquiries that report on past human-rights violations or other atrocities. For example, the Commission for the Historical Clarification of Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have Caused Suffering to the Guatemalan Population, sponsored by the UN, issued its final report in 1999. It found that in the early 1980s the armed forces committed genocide and racism in a ruthless campaign against guerrillas. However, external intervention was not adequate to provide enough security and safety for people to speak openly about their past experiences. This is also evident in chapter 8, on Bali after the bloody repression there in 1965/66.

Justice

Of course, trials represent a primary vehicle to achieve various components of justice, particularly after the commission of mass crimes. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established in 1995 and convened in Arusha, Tanzania, is "trying the masters behind the genocide" of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In addition, lower-level suspects are being tried within Rwanda in local communities in a process called gacaca. As Scott Straus observes in chapter 5, the traditional gacaca process was used to settle community disputes and now allows survivors to confront those accused of murder, rape and theft. This process can deal more speedily with many more cases than the ICTR and, due to the engagement of the people in the local community where the alleged perpetrators committed atrocities, it can help restore some measure of mutual regard.

IGOs play a significant role in advancing justice by setting standards about what constitutes justice. A transformational step in this regard was the 1948 proclamation by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This has been followed by numerous UN declarations and covenants, notably the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which entered into force in 1976. Several regional intergovernmental organizations have also adopted human rights declarations.

Regard

The various human rights declarations contribute to people acknowledging the rights of others, as well as asserting their own. Such acknowledgment is a way of respecting others. To some degree, then, such declarations and the standards they proclaim help create an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, which contributes to self-identities and conceptions of others that are less likely to contribute to destructive conflicts. That also lessens the likelihood of resorting to methods of struggle that violate human rights.

The OSCE includes important structures to help prevent, limit and end destructive conflicts and practices, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The OSCE's activities include consultations, mediation, monitoring and missions in specific countries such as Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and the Ukraine.

Trials and truth commissions can also contribute to regard between communities that committed and suffered mass crimes. They can enable people in each community to differentiate among individuals and groups within the communal category that committed particular crimes. They can reveal that some members of the community from which offenders came actually resisted the commission of the crimes. Such differentiation helps to change the image that members of one community have about the other, and even their self-images. The official and non-official international support and celebration of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the transforming negotiations and agreements that ended apartheid contributed to the pride and hope that the peoples of South Africa had as they undertook their recovery from the crimes of apartheid.

Security

IGOs are particularly important in providing safety for persons or groups that are at risk even after a ceasefire or peace agreement has been reached. For example, a major activity of the UN is providing for the introduction of peacekeeping and then peacemaking missions. Such activities help reduce grievances that would otherwise arise as one or more groups live in fear of harassment and attacks from the other. As each group feels threatened and prepares to defend itself, the other side feels more threatened, resulting in a security dilemma. For example, peace-
keeping interventions in parts of the former Yugoslavia such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia helped sustain agreements by helping to ensure their implementation. The work to protect human rights also helps to provide security. For example, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) helped deter human rights abuses against opposition political groups during the peace implementation period of the 1990s. Such external interventions enhance the safety needed to sustain political institutions within a country, which then provide non-destructive ways of conducting internal conflicts.

In rare cases, external actors take responsibility for overseeing the implementation of agreements to establish a new political order. For example, in 1991, the Cambodian factions and 19 states signed what is commonly referred to as the “Paris Agreement”, the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. It established the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia to ensure the Agreements’ implementation. However, as Maurice Eisenbruch points out in chapter 3, unless the people staffing such externally based agencies are attuned to the local culture and work closely with local leaders, their efforts may be ineffective.

Care for refugees from territories where inhabitants face life-threatening conditions due to violent conflicts is an important service provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). That care often makes the survival of the refugees possible and also helps prevent the persistence of the original conflict or the outbreak of new ones. There are also times, however, when refugee camps become havens for fighters who recruit new members to their fighting units and renew their struggle. This was the sequence to a significant degree for the refugee camps dominated by Hutu fighters who had been defeated by Tutsi forces, who had intervened in Rwanda to stop the killing of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, as discussed in chapter 7 by Lemarchand and Niwese.

The handling of Palestinian refugees illustrates some of the complexities of internationally provided care for refugees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was created in 1949 to aid the 726,000 Palestinians who fled or were driven from their homes as a result of the war to establish Israel. UNRWA defines them and their descendents (3.8 million currently) to be refugees and aids them in camps in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. UNHCR, which was established in 1951 and which provides assistance to all other refugees, defines refugees differently and follows different policies. By UNHCR definitions, the number of Palestinian refugees would be fewer than one million. UNHCR status would provide for rights presently denied to Palestinian refugees. As it is, living with limited rights and imbued with the unimplemented wish to return to their homes in Israel, their right to return was one of the issues that was a great obstacle to reaching a final status agreement between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority in the negotiations of 2000/01. UNRWA was not charged with seeking a durable solution to the refugee problem: repatriation, local integration or third-country resettlement; but rather only to provide interim assistance, which helps perpetuate the refugee situation.

General impact

Since these various components of reconciliation are interrelated and affect each other, IGO activities that contribute to supporting one of them will also often help others as well. This is obviously the case for the contributions made by providing funds and staff training for reconstructing a society scarred by mass crimes. Such assistance can help rebuild the society’s physical and social infrastructure. However, given the complexity of reconciliation and issues about harmonizing progress among the various dimensions of reconciliation and also given the variety of missions and interests among IGOs and INGOs, attention to coordinating the activities of various intervening organizations is needed.

The impact of INGOs

As shown in table 10.3, INGOs can affect each dimension of reconciliation in ways that transform a conflict away from destructiveness and contribute to rehabilitation after mass crimes.

Shared truths

Human rights advocacy groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch contribute a great deal to raising awareness and acceptance of basic human rights and conduct activities that reveal their violations. Their work gives victims allies and resources in telling their truths with some degree of protection. Diaspora groups often are active in telling the story of their people to the world at large. They express truths that others take up and convey to those who would deny them, as has been the case for the Armenian diaspora groups’ accounts of the massacres of Armenians by Ottoman authorities at the time of World War I.
Table 10.3 International Non-governmental Organizations’ Activities Fostering Reconciliation and Conflict Transformation
Impacts on Conflict Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconciliation Actions</th>
<th>Identities</th>
<th>Grievances</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truths</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>Revise history</td>
<td>Lower injury</td>
<td>More shared</td>
<td>Less purely coercive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural media</td>
<td>and self-concept</td>
<td>Raise for others</td>
<td>More complementary</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Curricular material</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>More inclusive</td>
<td>Lower injury</td>
<td>More delimited claims</td>
<td>Judicial and political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>Raise for others</td>
<td>Less revengeful</td>
<td>alternatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future equity</td>
<td>Provide redress</td>
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<td>End oppression</td>
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<td>Regard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official apology</td>
<td>Includes sense</td>
<td>Mitigate past grievance</td>
<td>More shared</td>
<td>Consider others’ humanity</td>
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<td>Group dialogue of responsibility</td>
<td>Reduce humiliation</td>
<td>Accord other legitimacy</td>
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<td>Recognition</td>
<td>More self-esteem</td>
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<td>Therapy</td>
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<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accompaniment</td>
<td>More overarching</td>
<td>Reduce fear</td>
<td>More mutual</td>
<td>De-legitimize violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Reduce security dilemma</td>
<td>Internally diverse</td>
<td>Rely more on political set</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>procedures</td>
<td>procedures</td>
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<td>Monitor</td>
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</table>

Justice

Trans-national religious and ethnic organizations often provide assistance to people of the same religion or ethnicity who have suffered hardships in a particular country. Such humanitarian or other assistance provides the survivors with some restitution and compensation for their suffering, and so reduces their sense of injustice. Assistance includes aid in resettlement of refugees in other countries where compatriots have settled.

Diaspora groups, however, also often engage in activities to sustain struggles of resistance and liberation for their compatriots in the homeland. They sometimes uphold more extreme positions than many of their compatriots, rejecting terms of agreement that may even have been accepted, albeit reluctantly, by most of their compatriots. They may resort to violence and even terrorism to rally attention to their cause and ignite a wider fight. This may be seen in the activities of organizations whose members or whose forebearers came from Palestine, Northern Ireland, Cuba or Sri Lanka.

Regard

A great many trans-national non-governmental organizations now work to foster coexistence, reconciliation, mutual tolerance and mutual respect. They provide training in skills contributing to such relations through workshops, dialogue circles and other structured experiences. INGOs such as International Alert and Search for Common Ground, among other activities, foster cooperative economic and social projects by members of adversarial groups. Associations with members from different ethnic, religious or other communal groups help prevent inter-communal conflicts from erupting into riots, as evidenced in research on Hindu-Muslim relations in India.

Many religious and humanist advocacy groups directly advocate the celebration of human diversity. Significantly, too, however, some trans-national religious and ethnic groups proclaim their superiority and denigrate other religions and ethnicities. Trans-national networks opposing immigration and rights for immigrants in various countries wax and wane in strength; they counter efforts at building enduring, mutually acceptable accommodations.

Security

Many INGOs provide services that supplement IGO activities that help protect and care for endangered minorities, returning refugees and other vulnerable groups. For example, peace accords for Guatemala included
provisions for the return and resettlement of Guatemalan refugees. Between 1993 and 1999, persons associated with INGOs accompanied the returning refugees, ensuring some protection for them. Organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also conduct activities that help protect persons whose rights have been or may be infringed upon. The Carter Center and other INGOs help monitor elections and many non-governmental organizations help provide food and medical relief.

These protective actions tend to sustain political institutions that offer alternatives to violent struggle and hence provide more constructive ways to engage in the inevitable societal conflicts. Relieving some of the suffering from the mass crimes’ consequences can alleviate the resentments and grievances that might otherwise help revive a destructive conflict.

General contributions

Many INGO activities contribute to promoting more than one of these components of reconciliation. The high interest in peace-building by strengthening political institutions and civil society results in projects that foster various combinations of increased security, mutual regard, truth and justice. One such way is by helping local organizations to analyse the circumstances they confront, assess the impacts of their projects and devise useful adaptations. See, for example, the work on peace and conflict impact assessment.

Conclusions and implications

This chapter has focused on external actors intervening in conflicts in which mass crimes have been committed. They can contribute significantly to overcoming the terrible legacies of mass crimes and reaching an enduring and equitable accommodation between communities that include members who have committed and/or have suffered such crimes. Nevertheless, as indicated throughout this volume, it is the members of the antagonistic communities, or, better said, those with the capability of acting in their names that must articulate the nature of that accommodation. If there is an explicit agreement, it needs to be implemented by the parties to the agreement; if conditions change, the parties should change the agreement by new negotiations and mutual affirmations.

Reaching stable and mutually acceptable accommodations between antagonistic collectivities, however, is particularly difficult after mass violence. Even if one party is able to impose its terms and the other is forced to accept them, when circumstances change the defeated group may rise up and try to overturn the terms of the imposed accommodation. Or, if the suppression is extreme and over time is widely and increasingly regarded as unjustifiable, mutually acceptable accommodations might not be reached until a new relationship is forged between the parties. Furthermore, different groups within each side usually are at different places on the road to conflict transformation. No collectivity is monolithic and settlement of a conflict is likely to favour some groups within each side while disadvantage others.

Reconciliation often contributes to conflict transformation and recovery from criminal atrocities. Some efforts to bring about reconciliation, however, can also hamper the movement towards a fair and enduring accommodation. After all, advancing one aspect of reconciliation may undermine attaining another at a particular time. Furthermore, advancements for one group in a complex set of social relationships may be accompanied by setbacks for another. Leaders of opposing sides often forge settlements that provide safeguards for each other; but consequently, the rank and file supporters on each side may feel that they have been denied justice.

External actors sometimes can help to overcome or at least reduce these difficulties. Although reconciliation actions may be more effective if conducted by the opponents themselves, rather than by outsiders, the antagonists are often unable to overcome the challenges in undertaking them. It then falls on the external groups to help initiate the necessary tasks – for example, to document what had happened – to bring individuals to trial and to ensure safety for vulnerable persons and groups, such as occurred to some degree in Guatemala.

External actors, however, do not always mitigate a conflict’s destructiveness. Indeed, they may prolong and intensify it. This usually happens as national governments or even IGOs join a fight to defeat one side in the conflict; but even attempts to pacify a situation may result in intense destructive escalation. Much more needs to be known about the impact of interventions by IGOs and INGOs, particularly since those interventions will probably continue to increase in this ever more integrated world. Furthermore, globalization is likely to benefit and harm subgroups on each side differentially, and thus generate new conflicts.

Admittedly, reconciliation can never be complete after mass crimes have been committed, at least for the generations that directly experienced them. Many people live on with little experience of reconciliation. Some will feel continuing pain, anguish, fear and hatred. Many others will appear to set aside what had happened and appear to have forgotten terrible occurrences; at least they do not discuss them. Some may seem to be numbed by the past, or possess what has been called collective autism. Various forms of post-traumatic stress impact interpersonal...
relations, even affecting the children of those who suffered the traumas. Nevertheless, there are many actions people can undertake that will mitigate the inevitable difficulties that challenge any accommodation reached after mass crimes have ended.

This analysis has policy implications. Rehabilitating inter- or intra-societal relations after mass crimes have been perpetrated is immensely complex. INGOs and IGOs have particular capabilities, interests and ways of intervening in a conflict and in peace-building. They can contribute much, but too often they fail to make effective use of their resources. Four policy guidelines, suggested by the preceding analyses, can help maximize the potential helpful contributions of IGOs and INGOs.

First, great attention needs to be given to the local conditions of each specific case. INGOs and INGOs risk choosing policies that derive from their previous experiences somewhere else in the world and ones they feel comfortable in implementing. Those policies often are not the most suitable for a given time and place. For example, economic development projects that may have been effective in stable societies with legitimate institutions may not work in countries that are in considerable disorder and whose institutions are weak. Policies to promote rehabilitation and to create equitable and stable relations between former enemies need to be constructed so as to fit each unique post-mass-crime situation. A fundamental way to accomplish that is to work closely with local persons and organizations in analysing what the current situation looks like to people from diverse vantage points. Working with local persons, however, risks collaborating with dominant groups that are oppressive or exploitative of subordinate groups. External interveners may usefully be guided by international human rights standards as they try to balance a wide variety of considerations. The ethical issues discussed at the outset of this book cannot be avoided.

Local persons should be engaged in planning and executing policies as much as possible, helping to generate a vested interest in the conflict's transformation and the building of peace. Persons and groups that are inclined to foster rehabilitation and conflict transformation should be recruited, but they should be drawn from a wide range of communities. Even some members of groups whose leaders may be "spoilers" can be usefully incorporated in peace-building projects. Large-scale engagement by outside personnel in the tasks of reconstruction can generate animosity because they tend to be relatively well-paid and prompt increased local prices. Involving local people can provide employment and training; it also contributes to effective implementation and the legitimacy of the effort.

Second, rehabilitation takes a long time. Recognizing and planning for that can help prepare constituents and supporters for the necessary long-term policies. This is important for governments, whose leaders will not sustain the needed effort if they do not believe they have an important stake in transforming the conflict and achieving a durable peace. Some INGOs, for example many faith-based ones, can sustain lengthy commitments to particular localities as part of their ongoing mission. Recognizing that years of sustained effort are generally needed to build the conditions for an enduring peace can help the peace-building process. It may be a reminder that some conditions that cannot be achieved immediately can still be attained in the future. For example, in many cases justice in the sense of bringing perpetrators of mass crimes to trial does not seem possible if a negotiated end of a destructive conflict is to be achieved. Yet, in some of those cases major alleged perpetrators have been put on trial years later.

Differences in the sequences of various aspects of reconciliation for different segments of each side in a conflict are inevitable. But reconciliation might not be attained for generations, if ever. What happens depends not only on the strategies various parties adopt, but also on many other factors, such as changing economic conditions, shifting political relations, normative changes and relative demographic trends.

Third, given the uniqueness of every situation, the people fashioning and implementing policies must think freshly, while drawing on relevant experience and knowledge. The general guidelines already noted can contribute to creative thinking and help construct an effective strategy for the unique situation at hand. The analysis in this chapter presents an approach that can help fashion appropriate strategies. The approach assumes that rehabilitation is part of a conflict's transformation away from destructiveness. Former enemies create new ways of contending with each other such that mutual benefits become increasingly possible. That kind of transformation means altering the basic elements of a conflict so that they are less conducive to waging the conflict destructively. Keeping in mind the significance of affecting identities, grievances, goals and means of struggle focuses the attention of interveners on the fundamental purpose of their peace-building efforts. That helps break away from the tendency to start with a set of policies as tools, choosing one that feels right because it is available and familiar. Rather, thinking about the basic goals that are being sought can help develop new ways to attain them. Furthermore, in this chapter I have examined how reconciliation contributes to conflict transformation, discussing how reconciliation actions may affect the components of conflict so that the legacies of mass crimes are overcome. More assessments of what has worked well and what has not are needed and the knowledge gained should be incorporated in educating policy makers as well as the people working in the field.
Fourth, the special capabilities of IGOs and INGOs relevant to overcoming the legacies of mass crimes should be recognized and utilized. They can contribute many kinds of social and material resources that are sorely needed in the aftermath of mass crimes. They can provide refuge and assistance to those bereft of home and safety. They can contribute credible security in some degree to those in fear.

Caught in their own tragedies, persons who have experienced the consequences of mass crimes are sensitive to the reasons why overcoming their awful consequences is difficult. Members of IGOs and INGOs often have had experience with previous conflicts that can provide them with a useful professional distance for handling subsequent ones. Outsiders with other experiences and cognizant of how other people have made progress in overcoming tragic legacies can give hope to people who feel helpless.

As relative outsiders, they can make suggestions that members of antagonistic sides can hear and consider seriously. They can make commitments to help ensure that agreements between opposing sides will be implemented. However, if past suggestions by a particular organization come to be seen as unfair or the commitments fail to be honoured, the credibility of that organization and others like it will be destroyed or seriously damaged. The responsibilities of IGOs and INGOs are great and in some ways inescapable. They need to be undertaken with care, so that the interventions do not do more harm than good. That is possible.

Notes

1. This is evident in the use of possible membership in the European Union as an inducement to countries that wished to join to ensure equal rights for all its citizens. The mediation efforts of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, particularly in the Baltic countries after their independence from the Soviet Union, has drawn on human rights standards to establish institutions and rules that would avoid punitive policies in light of the suffering these countries experienced during Soviet Russian rule.


14. Of course there are many more intergovernmental organizations, many of them based in one country and operating internationally; the number of other intergovernmental organizations that are presently active is 1,743. Similarly, the number of non-governmental organizations cited in the text is for non-governmental organizations that are international in composition and operations; the number of other international non-governmental organizations is much greater, totalling 13,590. See Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations vol. 1B, Munich: K. G. Saur, 2004, p. 2914, appendix 3, table 1.


