



PROGRAM FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF RESEARCH ON CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION

Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution

NOVEMBER 2012

**Editors:
Dr. Nimrod Goren
Prof. Miriam Fendius Elman**

Based on a workshop conducted by Mitvim—The Israeli Institute
for Regional Foreign Policies and the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv
Kfar Shmaryahu, Israel
July 23, 2012

“Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution”
Edited by Dr. Nimrod Goren and Prof. Miriam Fendius Elman

**Copyright © 2012 by Mitvim—The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the
Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC).
All rights reserved.**

ISBN: 7-00-7617-965-978

CONTENTS

Preface <i>Dr. Nimrod Goren</i>	4
Introduction: Challenges of Peacemaking and Spoilers <i>Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal</i>	5
Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution <i>Prof. Miriam Fendius Elman</i>	7
The Dangerous Status Quo Calls for Pro-Activity <i>Attorney Gilead Sher</i>	18
About the Contributors	21
About the Partner Organizations	23

Preface

Nimrod Goren

On July 23rd 2012, Mitvim—The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies has conducted a workshop in cooperation with U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv on the topic: “Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution.”

The workshop, which took place at the residence of the U.S. Embassy’s Counselor for Press and Public Affairs, Ms. Hilary Olsin-Windecker, featured two speakers with extensive academic and practical expertise on the topic: Prof. Miriam F. Elman from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and Attorney Gilead Sher, former Chief of Staff to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and co-Chief negotiator at the 2000 Camp David Summit.

This publication, the first published jointly by Mitvim and the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC) at Syracuse University, features the lectures delivered by Prof. Elman and Attorney Sher at the workshop. It also consists of an introduction by Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University and Mitvim, which sheds light on some social-psychological dimensions of the spoilers phenomena.

Past attempts at resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict have shown just how much negative impact spoilers can have on jeopardizing peace processes. In recent years, attempts have been made to bring new constituencies into the peace process. Engage them, moderate them, make them part of the process. These have not yet yielded the desired results, and must be broadened.

Currently, with no substantial Israeli-Arab peace process underway, we are facing a different type of spoilers. Not those using violent means to stop negotiations, but rather those preventing a process from even taking place. These spoilers are not the militant spoilers of the 1990s, but rather large segments of the Israeli and Palestinian mainstream, which have lost hope in peace, doubt its desirability and feasibility, and lack a sense of urgency regarding it.

Many of these current spoilers are acting within the marketplace of ideas—they shape mindsets, perceptions and paradigms. The popularity of the “no Palestinian partner for peace” notion, launched as a political spin by Prime Minister Ehud Barak following the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit, is perhaps the most striking example for a spoiling paradigm.

In order to advance Israeli-Arab peace, the issue of spoilers of peace should be better understood and addressed. We at Mitvim hope that this publication will make a contribution towards this goal. We would like to thank the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv for partnering with us on this project, and especially Ms. Hilary Olsin-Windecker, Ms. Anne Walter, and Ms. Linda Slutzky. We are also thankful to Ms. Jenia Yudkevich, project coordinator at Mitvim, and to Ms. Nicole Audette, Master’s candidate in International Relations and Public Diplomacy at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, for their assistance; and to PARCC for providing funding to the “Spoilers of Peace” project, directed by Miriam F. Elman and Bruce Dayton (Associate Director of the Moynihan Institute for Global Affairs, Maxwell School of Syracuse University).

Introduction: Challenges of Peacemaking and Spoilers

Daniel Bar-Tal

The peacemaking process by its nature requires major societal change involving substituting the dominant socio-psychological repertoire that supports the continuation of the conflict with new peace supporting repertoire. This change, however, is very difficult as the dominant repertoire is well anchored in the hegemonic culture of conflict.

After years of living under the conditions of an intractable conflict, with the hegemonic ethos of conflict providing a very clear outlook on reality, a new context of peacemaking develops. This context requires a new repertoire that is often unaccompanied by a complete change in the conditions of the intractable conflict. Moreover, during the decades of intractable conflict society members learned to adapt psychologically to the conditions by evolving a repertoire that was functional to the lasting context. It provided an unequivocal ideological picture about the reality guided by views, impressions, information processing, explanations of experiences, judgments and decisions making. On the psychological level, society members learned to live with the conflict situation and become habituated to it.

Peacemaking confronts not only the continuous challenges of satisfying basic needs and coping with stress, but also the challenge of mobilizing society members for this process. The mobilization challenge is closely related to the essential provision of a meaningful and comprehensive view of the new reality which will satisfy the needs of predictability and security. This is the challenge that the agents of peace, entrepreneurs, face. They have to construct the new reality and then explain and justify this dramatic change in direction.

The new evolving repertoire suggests building a new future that cannot be guaranteed, is based on assumptions and negates the pillars of the dominant ideological societal beliefs. Due to this unfamiliarity, many members of society have difficulty adapting to this new emerging situation, where they are being asked to accept new beliefs while remembering old images. Even when they are ready to support the peace process, they still are unable to completely abandon the repertoire that functioned during the climax of the intractable conflict and enabled them to cope with the conflict challenges.

Moreover, in most of the cases peacemaking is not accepted willingly by all the segments of society. There are often spoilers that make every effort to stop the process by using various tactics of persuasion and incitement. There are groups on the rival side which propagate continuation of the conflict, as well as groups within the ingroup which object vehemently to the peace process. Thus, societies involved in peacemaking are often polarized with intra-societal schisms between those who support peacemaking and those who refuse to compromise in reaching a peaceful solution. The latter group views peacemaking as a traitorous process that harms society and works to delegitimize the idea of settling the conflict peacefully and those who support this idea. This group may even resort to violent means to prevent the process of peacemaking by violently targeting the rival group and ingroup members who support it.

Cases in France and Israel provide a good example of these processes. In both states very powerful spoilers to peacemaking made considerable efforts to stop the process. In France, the French settlers in Algeria, *pieds-noirs*, who viewed Algeria as part of France, tried to stop the peacemaking process. They acted as an underground force using political and violent barriers

to peace through the support of various political and military forces like the OAS-Secret Armed Organization¹. Eventually, the determination of the French President de Gaulle, the target of assassination attempts and a military putsch, facilitated an end to the conflict and the completion of the 1962 Evian Accord peace treaty. In contrast, in Israel a well-organized campaign by Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supported by the major right wing political parties, objected to the peace process with the Palestinians and succeeded in stalling the peacemaking process. The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was murdered by an Israeli Jew who rejected any compromises and replaced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who objected to the Oslo Accords and worked to slow the peace process.

The spoilers often act in a favorable context because during the peacemaking process, while the conflict may stop being intractable, it still continues to exist. It still continues to have violent expressions such as terror attacks on civilians, military encounters, aggressive rhetoric, or agitation. Hostile and aggressive acts do not stop immediately after achieving a formal agreement to settle the conflict. However, when signs of conflict continue to occur, the conflict repertoire becomes accessible and these acts continue to be used by spoilers waiting to employ these types of events to inflame animosity, fear and hatred. In such a situation the reaction of leaders and the media to the threatening cues is crucial. Leaders are supposed to lead the society in this transition and must go beyond merely accepting the new goals of peacemaking, to include satisfying the needs of the society members.

When leaders frame the events in support of the conflict orientation, the peace process has very low chances to evolve. In contrast, when the leaders and media on both sides explicitly condemn the acts and their perpetrators, minimize the perpetrators' importance, reassure the public, and repeat their commitment to peace goals, the chances are high that the peacemaking process will survive and gain the momentum needed to reach the stage of conflict settlement. The cases of negotiations in South Africa and Northern Ireland illustrate the power of determination of leaders in reaching an agreement. In the South African murder of ANC leader Chris Hani in 1993 and in the Northern Ireland 1998 terror attack by Real Irish Republican Army in Omagh where 29 people were killed, the violence did not prevent a successful conclusion of the peacemaking process because of the actions of the leaders.

Nelson Mandela provides an excellent example of leader's determination towards peacemaking when after the murder of Chris Hani he said "*tonight I am reaching out to every single South African, black and white, from the very depths of my being. A white man, full of prejudice and hate, came to our country and committed a deed so foul that our whole nation now teeters on the brink of disaster. A white woman, of Afrikaner origin, risked her life so that we may know, and bring to justice, this assassin. The cold-blooded murder of Chris Hani has sent shock waves throughout the country and the world. ... Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for – the freedom of all of us.*"

The present publication sheds light on the phenomenon of spoilers as an inseparable part of the peacemaking process.

¹ Horne, A. (2006). *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*. New York: New York Reviews Books.

Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution¹

Miriam Fendius Elman

Together with a group of faculty and graduate students at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, I have been involved for the past several years in a project on peacemaking and post-conflict transitions. We commissioned a group of graduate students to write up case studies of failed peace agreements and the role that spoilers played; we had another group of students do a comprehensive review of the spoiler literature.

Then, the faculty team reviewed the findings and I would like to share some of these with you. I will draw on some of the cases that we and our students considered, especially:

- 1) The collapse of the 1991 and 1994 peace agreements in Angola;
- 2) The run up to the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the failure of the Arusha Peace Agreement; and,
- 3) The failure of the Russo-Chechen peace process in the 1990s, and the emergence of violent conflict following the signing of the Khasavyurt peace agreement in 1996.

Peacemaking and (versus?) Statebuilding

Let me start by saying that most of these cases are studied in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. The goal is to figure out how to build a stable, durable peace out of the wreckage of civil wars. In most of these cases, we have not only the necessity of peacemaking but also state-building (typically the goal is democratic statebuilding).

Many peace agreements call for not only a complete and permanent cease fire, but also free and fair multiparty elections. Yet, these are two very distinct processes—peacemaking and democratization—and the very solutions to one, like powersharing, may in fact undermine the other.

The received wisdom is that peacebuilding and democratic state-building are compatible strategies. But I'm not sure this is invariably the case. After all, strong states with restrictions on freedoms may be better able to control spoiling than weak, democratizing states. In these instances, we may prefer that security come first and democracy second.

¹ An earlier version of this essay was delivered as a keynote lecture on the program “Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution” at Kfar Shmaryahu, Israel on July 23, 2012. I thank the event's discussant, Gilead Sher, and the members of the audience, for their insightful comments and feedback. I also thank Hilary Olsin-Windecker of the U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv and Anne Walter, Linda Slutzky and the other staff members of the U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Office for the time and care they took into planning the event and the many advance preparations involved. Lastly, I thank my colleague and good friend Nimrod Goren for inviting me to be part of Mitvim and to participate in its July 2012 programming. Funding for this research was generously provided by the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC), Maxwell School of Syracuse University. I thank Megan Weaver and Nicole Audette for research assistance.

By way of example, consider the Arusha peace agreement for Rwanda. In August 1993, the Hutu dominated government of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed an agreement in an internationally sponsored effort to end Rwanda's civil war which has begun three years earlier. Even before the accord was signed, in 1990 and 1991, Habyarimana had initiated a series of political reforms—the legislature approved a multiparty constitution with executive power shared between president and prime minister.

These changes opened up the political system but had a negative impact on the course of the conflict. Democratization challenged the ruling Hutu's grip on power; moderate Hutu parties became the RPF's allies. The ruling elite tried to strengthen its power by appealing to ethnic Hutu solidarity. So the previously bilateral conflict between the government and the RPF was transformed into a multilateral competition—and it solidified a conservative political alliance that saw a negotiated outcome as inimical to their domestic political power. As Benjamin A. Valentino cogently notes, "The accords all but locked the Hutu extremist parties out of power...The moderate Hutu political parties were prepared to acquiesce to this deal, but the extremists could never have accepted it. Its biased terms simultaneously steeled their resolve to deal with the 'Tutsi problem' by any means necessary and played into the extremists' strategy of polarizing Rwandan politics and society."²

By February 1993, as escalating violence threatened to sink the peace process, the RPF broke the cease fire and launched a large scale offensive against government troops. The failure of the cease fire was a turning point—it tested the military capabilities of both sides, but also the unity of the multiparty political consensus that had sustained the Arusha negotiations. The military stalemate had propelled the peace process but so too had the moderate coalition's desire for peace. After the RPF's offensive though, the alliance between moderate Hutu opposition parties and the RPF began to fray. Radical factions emerged in the mainstream moderate opposition parties. Extremists could more easily use the fragmentation to raise doubt about the wisdom of ethnic reconciliation.

Later, after the military coup in Burundi in October 1993 in which the democratically elected Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated by the Tutsi military, opponents of Rwanda's Arusha agreement could again discredit it. The events in Burundi were an important trigger to the unraveling of the peace agreement because they undercut the position of the Hutu political party alliance that had been the core of the consensus on negotiations and power sharing.³

Peace as a Default Outcome

It is important to note too that in most cases of armed conflict, whether civil or international, the preferred outcome of warring factions is not to negotiate a reconciliation. The preferred outcome is to impose their own terms on a final settlement. Approximately 85% of civil wars end in the

² Benjamin A. Valentino, "Still Standing By: Why America and the International Community Fail to Prevent Genocide and Mass Killing," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2003): 571. For more on how the Arusha Accords marginalized Hutu Power see, for example, Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: the Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

³ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda," in Donald S. Rothchild and Stephen John Stedman, editors, *Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner): 485.

military victory of one side over the other. In the remaining 15%, warring factions come to the negotiation table because they recognize that they cannot achieve a decisive military victory.

In fact, according to a recent study in the journal *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, for the years 1945 to 1999, 63 countries fought and ended 108 civil wars. But 34 of these states went through more than one civil war—renewed conflict took place between at least 2 of the same warring factions in 23 of the countries.⁴ As Matthew Hoddie and Caroline A. Hartzell note, “The recurrence of civil wars points to the fact that there are often powerful opponents of peace seeking to derail the settlement process if given the opportunity.”⁵

So peace settlements are in many cases default outcomes. Former warring parties may spoil a negotiated peace once their military capacity for war-fighting has been restored. And if the expected payoffs from peacemaking do not materialize, former warring parties may calculate that the payoffs from renewed violent engagement is higher than maintaining the peace.

The case of Angola’s civil wars in the 1990s is instructive here. After Angola’s independence from Portugal in 1975, several independence movements—the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—fought a long war of attrition for most of the 1980s with generous support from South Africa and Cuba respectively. With the end of the cold war, this patronage plummeted and the impetus for peace grew—the result was the UN sponsored 1991 Bicesse peace accords. Yet Jonas Savimbi, leader of the rebel group UNITA, reneged on 2 separate peace agreements once he realized that his political power would be diminished in a post-conflict, democratizing Angola.

After Savimbi failed to get the majority of the votes in the 1992 presidential election, he reinitiated the war. As long as Savimbi thought UNITA would do well in the elections, he was willing to adhere to the peace process. After being defeated at the polls, all bets were off. So, Savimbi signed a peace agreement in 1991, but he never really gave up on the military option. He made sure that he had the capacity to continue funding a war option if he needed to, by seizing diamond mines before the agreement was signed, and dragging his feet on demobilizing UNITA’s armed forces and integrating the remainder into a new national Angolan army.

Savimbi only returned to the negotiation table when UNITA’s military gains against government MPLA forces began to evaporate. When the military option became less tenable for Savimbi he agreed to sit down with the MPLA—a state of non-war was restored with the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. But by that time 300,000 Angolans had died in the worst fighting since Angola’s independence.⁶

The upshot is that peacemaking is always a process of deterring potential would be spoilers. It is actually pretty intuitive: if combatants believe that they have the capacity of achieving a better deal than the one on the table, they are likely to resort to spoiling behavior. And if former combatants think they are being played for suckers, they are also likely to renege on the deal.

⁴ Caroline A. Hartzell, “Settling Civil Wars: Armed Opponents’ Fates and the Duration of Peace,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2009): 347-365.

⁵ Matthew Hoddie and Caroline A. Hartzell, “Introduction,” in Hoddie and Hartzell, editors, *Strengthening Peace in Post-Civil War States: Transforming Spoilers into Stakeholders* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011): 3.

⁶ For an extended discussion see Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, “The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07): 7-40.

Challenges to peace processes emerge when one (or both) sides of the conflict distrust that their rivals will fulfill the commitments specified in the agreement. Observers often say that peace deals fall apart because of lack of trust and mutual suspicion, but this really means that at least one side is wary of fulfilling its own obligations while the other side cheats. So preventing spoiling requires that the custodians of peace build into an agreement both 'fear reducing provisions' (reassurance) and 'cost increasing provisions' (deterrence), and that they implement these provisions down the road.⁷

It goes without saying that once former warring parties decide to spoil, effective management requires sufficient peacekeeping forces. The failure of Angola's 1991 Bicesse Accords is due at least in part by the fact that the UN approved only 350 observers to the country after the settlement was forged. The limited rules of engagement for the UN force in Rwanda, as we know, also meant that this mission was insufficient to the task of providing post-settlement security.

Spoilers of Peace: Defining a Concept

While the spoiler concept has become a cottage industry, it seems, given the number of published articles, books, and policy reports that use the term—the concept is actually quite problematic.

According to one seminal study, by Stephen John Stedman, "Peacemaking is a risky business...the greatest source of risk comes from spoilers—leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it."⁸ For Stedman, as for much of the literature, spoilers can be either insiders or outsiders—they can be signatory to the agreements themselves, or they can be outside—excluded from the forum of peace negotiations. And it follows from Stedman's definition that spoilers can only exist when there is an actual or existing peace to spoil; when an agreement has been signed, or at the very least, former warring parties have publically committed themselves to a peaceful settlement. So far so good.

But Stedman's definition focuses on spoilers (as a noun), and not on spoiling actions (spoiling as a verb). Labeling groups or individuals as spoilers inserts bias because it can be a means to exclude specific groups from the post-conflict reconstruction effort. Also problematic is Stedman's assertion that violence is a necessary feature of spoiling. This ignores the fact that spoilers may use non-violent methods.

In fact, in democratizing, and quasi democratic political space, it will be more common to see spoilers using violence. In these contexts, the state is weak and lacks a monopoly on the use of force; different parties may retain armed forces and militias because a nationalized military has yet to be established. The rule of law and formal governance institutions will also be less entrenched than in mature democracies. These features make it likely that potential spoilers will put far less faith in the democratic process, and will be more likely to fall back on armed force as a spoiling option. By contrast, in mature democracies, spoiling occurs when dissenters to a peace process foil the majority's interest in sustaining the peace by working within the system.

⁷ Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, "Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53 (2009): 737-759.

⁸ Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn 1997): 5.

A better working definition is: *spoilers are either individual political actors or political groups that use violence or non-violent means to destroy a peace process preferred by the majority and in so doing jeopardize peace efforts. These spoilers can be found on the inside or outside of the peace process and can be either state or non-state actors.*

Ideology versus Context: Explaining the Durability of Peace

One of the central debates in the literature on spoiling is whether ideology or context matters more. For Stedman, identity is key—his is a goal-driven analysis based on the degree of commitment to renegeing on the deal. Thus, spoilers can be limited, greedy, or total spoilers and different mitigating strategies need to be applied to each. For Stedman, analysts must know a great deal about the actors themselves, and this involves knowledge of the language, interviews of leaders and leadership analysis, all that goes into in-depth field work.

Critics though say that it is enough to assess the context in which potential spoilers are operating—what constraints and opportunities do they face? This is by far an easier risk assessment—all the analyst needs to do is analyze the groups' military capabilities for war fighting.

In this perspective, there are no madmen, or total spoilers. Spoilers are always strategic actors responding rationally to constraints and opportunities. They may appear irrational because of their actions (for example, suicide bombing) or the degree of their demands, but faced with the right incentives and disincentives all would-be spoilers can be deterred or co-opted.

In looking at various cases in the course of our Maxwell School project, we have found, not surprisingly, that both ideology and context matter. There are no short cuts in determining would be spoilers, and the best way to prevent their emergence. We also found that other motivations also matter: For one, we need to remember that spoilers are often driven by a principled rejection of the terms of the agreement. Even when actors use violence, it is important not to lose sight of the (often legitimate) criticisms that they have with the peace process.

Spoilers are typically marginalized from the peace process itself; while there are internal spoilers—those signatories who wind up renegeing—peace processes are typically spoiled by actors that have never been given the opportunity to become stakeholders of the peace.

We also found that in many of our cases, scuttling the deal was imperative for domestic political power reasons. That is, the target of the violent spoiling is often not the external enemy but an internal political competitor. Not all parties, or even factions within parties, will benefit equally from a peace deal. Because peace agreements tend to produce winners and losers, the losers can morph from potential into actual spoilers.

Preventing Spoiling, Managing Spoilers

Given that the motivations for spoiling the peace are so strong, how can spoiling be prevented? In our project, we identify a number of ways in which peace can be sustained:

To prevent spoiling, signatories and 3rd parties need to put in place disincentives that discourage renegeing on the agreement. They also need to change the payoffs associated with continued cooperation. We also found that better agreements can decrease the likelihood of

spoiling. In general, peace agreements should increase the costs of returning to violence and increase the benefits of peace for the majority of both societies.

Like terrorism, spoiling is a small-group phenomenon. Like terrorists, spoilers need the support and complicity of a much larger part of society. It follows that peace agreements must be 'sold' appropriately; it is important to make it difficult for critics to present the agreement as a sham. This requires that the agreement not be over-sold to be something more than it is. Too often, peace agreements are billed to the public as 'end of conflict' deals. Yet this only raises the public's expectation that interests will be fully realized and that there will be less violence. When these outcomes fail to materialize, expectations are dashed. Spoilers can then easily move in to highlight the discrepancy between the agreement and reality. Even if there have been mutual concessions and positive moves, spoilers will always be able to point to the cup half empty.

A good example of this dynamic is the rise in Chechen insurgent attacks into regions of Russia between 1996 and 1999, and the Russian military invasion of Chechnya in October 1999. Ironically, the ratcheting up of the Russo-Chechen conflict occurred after the Russians and Chechens signed the August 1996 Khasavyurt Agreement, negotiated by General Lebed on behalf of then-Russian President Yeltsin and Aslan Mashkadov, leader of the insurgent movement who would later become the President of Chechnya. The agreement was followed by a treaty between Yeltsin and Mashkadov in May 1997. Yet, as one commentator noted "in some ways, the peace process culminated in a more horrifying situation in Chechnya than had existed before the process started."⁹

The 1996 peace agreement had only three provisions—both sides renounce the use of force; both sides agree to construct their relations in accordance with International Law; and the treaty would serve as the basis for further negotiations. The issue of the status of Chechnya was left out. But most Chechens believed that the agreements were in fact de facto recognition of Chechen independence. Yeltsin though had no such intention. Recognition of Chechen independence would have required revisions of the Russian constitution and would have inevitably limited the extensive powers of the presidency and weakened Yeltsin's political power.

In reality, Yeltsin had only pushed for a peace accord in 1996 because public opinion polls showed dissatisfaction among the Russian public for the war in Chechnya and elections were looming. In effect, the 1996 and 1997 agreements, despite all the fanfare, was a premature peace—it was politically expedient to get a ceasefire, but the quickly drafted and adopted agreements did not go far enough in addressing the issues between the two groups.

In the interest of stopping the immediate violence neither side insisted on solving the permanent issue of Chechnya's status—the rush to agreement allowed the parties to declare the war over, based on very little negotiation. The vagueness meant that the public could interpret the agreement in different ways. The Chechens expected an improvement in the political and economic situation, but Yeltsin and the Russian government never followed up with the necessary follow on negotiations, thus weakening the position of Mashkadov. When the promised results of the peace process did not materialize, Mashkadov found it harder and harder to control the Chechen warlords. Basayev, a veteran of the first Chechen war, emerged to lead a new insurgency that actively used violence to sabotage the peace process. As more

⁹ Juliette Shedd, "When Peace Agreements Create Spoilers: the Russo-Chen Agreement of 1996," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2008): 95.

and more Chechens lost patience with and faith in the peace, Basayev continued to gain strength.

Yet the peace agreements signed by the Russian and Chechens had promised the Russian people protection from terrorist attacks. The Russian public was willing to back a new military strategy advanced by Putin—who campaigned in 1999 on the promise to deal with Chechen terrorists and violence. They backed Putin because their expectations had been dashed—the promises of safety had not been met.¹⁰

One way of not overselling an agreement is to avoid the big fanfare of public, high profile summits with named peace agreements. Incremental change that builds mutual trust via tit-for-tat concessions is actually a harder process for spoilers to derail because such incrementalism does not bill itself to be anything more than it is—tentative, cautious, yet deliberate steps away from violent conflict and toward a final status agreement. Of course, media and public relations/diplomacy must present these incremental moves as positive steps forward. All too often the media’s negative framing of peace processes makes it more difficult to rally public opinion in support of the peace.¹¹

Central to the prevention of spoiling is figuring out which actors should be suppressed or marginalized and which should be co-opted and integrated into the peace process. We found that it is important to recognize that some actors will not “get with the program” of peacemaking; some will never be converted to peace. Stedman is right—there are sometimes total spoilers, extremists who are, and will always be, unwaveringly opposed to a peace settlement no matter what its conditions or circumstances. It is important to identify these actors early on in the process, and make it very hard for them to renew violence. Here, unlike as happened in Rwanda, peacekeepers need to avoid appearing weak, neutral, or inconsistent—early in the post-peace process they need to raise the costs for actors who refuse to abide by the agreement’s terms.

It is also critical that these actors—who will always be a small minority—not be conflated with the larger majority that seeks peace. In fact, these actors need to be peeled away from the majority, from the moderates (who may still be limited spoilers). But what often happens is that in deterring and compelling the spoilers, states pursue policies (like counter-terror strategies) that target the majority as well. These sorts of dragnets are the scourge of peace processes and make it that much more likely that spoilers will prevail. There are drawbacks in using force to deter and compel spoilers as this can run the risk of radicalizing moderates and the larger society.

Finally, it is vital that potential spoilers to the peace be brought on board early in the process. Our findings suggest that spoilers are created **before** a peace agreement is signed—so we need to look at the whole process and not just the post-agreement phase. Peacemakers need to include as many of the warring parties as possible into the peace negotiations. For example, in the Belfast Good Friday Accords all the principle conflicting parties were part of the peace process. The major paramilitary groups all became signatories. In particular, the inclusion of

¹⁰ For an extended discussion of spoiling in the Russo-Chechen case see Michael Makara, “Understanding Spoiler Behavior Following the First Russo-Chechen War,” Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration, *E-PARCC Collaborative Governance Initiative*, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, 2010. Available at www.maxwell.syr.edu/parcc.

¹¹ Tamir Sheafer and Shira Dvir-Gvirsman, “The Spoiler Effect: Framing Attitudes and Expectations Toward Peace,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2010): 205-215.

Sinn Fein increased Republican support to the peace process while reducing the likelihood of Republican spoiler violence.¹²

It is important to identify and include the broadest possible range of societal actors and interests so that excluded parties do not emerge as spoilers later down the road. It is possible to morph most spoilers into peacemakers. One way is to include the leaders of these groups into the peace process before an agreement is signed, so that key provisions of the agreement meets their interests. Another is to recognize criticism of the agreement as legitimate and to find creative ways in which potential spoilers can see at least some of their grievances addressed by the signatory parties and 3rd party custodians.

Lessons from the Israeli Case

Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often features as a case study in the spoiler literature, it is not entirely clear that the spoiling phenomenon applies to the conflict. After all, much of the literature on spoiling is written in the context of settlements following civil wars. Yet the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at least since 1993, while it shares some features of a civil intra-state war, is essentially an asymmetric conflict between a democratic state and a democratizing state in the making. To be sure, spoilers can arise on each side, for different reasons and using different strategies—both violent and non-violent—but the terminology of governing state versus secessionist rebels, common to the civil war literature, applies only loosely here.¹³ With this caveat, I proceed here by assuming that the spoiling phenomenon does apply. Certainly, many observers of the conflict have used the term to characterize parties and individuals as spoilers of the peace.

Many different explanations for the demise of the peace process in the 1990s have been raised and revisited. But key among them would have to be that violent spoiling, on both sides, was not nipped in the bud early on. Let me not belabor the point of Arafat and the PLO's response to Hamas terrorism in the immediate years after Oslo I and II were signed, but rather note the Israeli government's response to Jewish extremism, and in particular the Hebron massacre in February 1994.

To be sure, the extremist political parties *Kach* and *Kahane Chai* were immediately outlawed in the aftermath of the Hebron atrocity—but Yitzhak Rabin never did evacuate Hebron's Tel Rumeida neighborhood. He did not have to. Hebron was not a part of Oslo, but taking on this extremist enclave, especially after the Hebron terror event, would have gone far to mitigate the growing Palestinian mistrust of the peace process. In the event, Rabin's lackluster response to

¹² Gregory M. Maney, Ibtisam Ibrahim, Gareth I. Higgins, and Hanna Herzog, "The Past's Promise: Lessons from Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2006): 181-200. Of course, not all parties should be invited to participate in the political process. In Rwanda, for example, the central problem with the Arusha accords was not that the CDR party—the pro-government radical party—was not included in the new power sharing arrangement put in place. The problem was that the UN mission was so ill equipped to reign it in. Similarly, in any future negotiated agreement that emerges with the Taliban-dominated insurgency in Afghanistan, only those groups that agree to abide by the constitution, disband their militias and renounce the use of force, and sever ties with Al Qaeda should be allowed to participate in the political process.

¹³ For example, the case can also be considered as an example of insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN). In the 1990s, the Palestinian Authority was increasingly contested by an insurgency made up of Hamas and other critics of the Oslo Accords. Israel and the PA selected different COIN strategies to deal with these challenges to the new Palestinian governance structure.

the Hebron mosque massacre gave Hamas a convenient series of anniversaries on which to time their own acts of terror.¹⁴

The settler community, despite all the provocations and campaigns of civil disobedience in the early Oslo years—we can recall the many desperate campaigns of *Zo Artzenu*, for example—never did succeed in bringing down the Rabin government or derailing Oslo. In fact, the settlers have been quite ineffective as spoilers of the peace. From Yamit to Oslo I and II, to the Wye Accords to Amona, the settlers have lost every major confrontation with the government. Consider too the Gaza withdrawal. It was not easy, but Ariel Sharon managed it despite the many coalition defections and the fracturing of the Likud. Sharon was still able to cobble together an ad-hoc, momentary support for the Gaza withdrawal, something that two thirds of Israelis favored.

Much of the literature post-Oslo focuses on whether spoilers were internal or external to the peace process. The debate over Arafat's role continues. It is still not clear whether Arafat resorted to spoiling as a strategic bargaining method to improve the benefits of a peace deal, or whether he really wanted to derail the entire process. As far as Israeli leaders go, most observers characterize them as sincere peacemakers who nonetheless mismanaged and mishandled the negotiations. This clearly seems to be the consensus with regard to Ehud Barak, although a few critics—like Robert Malley and Hussein Agha—insist that Barak never intended to strike a righteous deal.¹⁵

How Israel's counter-terror strategies, which began in earnest under Shimon Peres, deprived the Palestinians, disempowered the moderates, and gave a boost to the dissenters of peace—most of whom were excluded from the process from the get go—rightfully gets the lion's share of attention in the literature. The peace process in the 1990s imploded because the signatories of the agreement failed to create sufficient 'buy in' from the Israeli and Palestinian public. Palestinian signatories underestimated the impact of Hamas and Islamic Jihad terror on the Israelis; Israelis failed to consider the negative impact counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency would have for Palestinian society. They also underestimated the way a general perception of continued occupation would undermine incremental moves that had been billed as offering the Palestinians far more. And as we know, consistent with the findings from other cases, terrorism was not only meant to spoil the Oslo process, but was also a way to 'outbid' political contenders who all had to vie for the vote in a newly democratizing Palestine.

All this is very consistent with the general findings in the spoiling literature. But lost in this discourse, though, is how the peace process might have turned potential spoilers into stakeholders. From the beginning, a secularized peace camp never made it a priority to reach out to the national religious settler community. The settlers were seen as a nuisance, a surmountable obstacle. Strategies to foster settler 'buy in' could have been put in place in the early 1990s. They never were. Once Oslo I was signed, there was still a window of opportunity to do so (perhaps up until Rabin's death). But Rabin had no love lost for the messianic settlers. He was completely unable to understand the settlers' view of Oslo as a disaster spelling the collapse of their dream for Greater Israel. Rabin remained aloof, cold, and dismissive.

¹⁴ For an extended discussion of the consequences of the Hebron massacre for the Oslo peace process see, for example, Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: the Free Press, 1999): 244-285.

¹⁵ Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," *The New York Review of Books*, August 9, 2001; Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, "A Reply to Ehud Barak," *The New York Review of Books*, June 13, 2002.

The constructive unilateralism advocated by Gilead Sher's *Blue White Future* (<http://bluewhitefuture.org/>) is so compelling precisely because it, finally, attempts to morph the settlers from spoilers into stakeholders of the peace. Rather than casting the settlers to the east of the separation barrier as obstacles, as a people to be marginalized at best or demonized and suppressed by force at worst, *Blue White Future* insists that this community must be re-engaged, its grievances addressed and its values respected, and above all, its sacrifices for the state acknowledged.¹⁶

Why can't the Israeli peace camp accept the recent findings of the Levy commission and admit that Judea and Samaria are in fact not a foreign land, but belong to the Jewish nation and are part of the Jewish historical homeland, yet at the same time invite the settlers along with the rest of Israeli society to embark on a new mission: strengthening Israel as a Jewish democracy? It would mean recognizing the eternal right to the land while accepting that this right cannot be realized without undermining Zionism, not to mention the ethical core of Judaism. It would mean recognizing that for peace to work, the settlers must be persuaded; they cannot be defeated. Recently, in a July 2009 report by the International Crisis Group, several recommendations along these lines were also offered:

- ➔ The option for dual citizenship for settlers who want to remain in their homes
- ➔ The inclusion of religious leaders into the diplomatic process
- ➔ A guarantee of protection and access to Jewish holy sites
- ➔ And a voluntary, early evacuation compensation package¹⁷

Along with *Blue White Future's* policy recommendations, these creative solutions are likely to go far in defanging the growing vigilante violence in the West Bank, including the *Tag Machir* (Prince Tag) campaign.

Israel's form of democracy does tend to empower those who would spoil a peace preferred by the majority. Israel's pure proportional representation parliamentary system enables spoilers to pursue their hard-line preferences often without political costs. These actors do not have much incentive to change their positions. Parties develop niche clienteles and have little need to appeal to the median voter. A book that I am co-editing on the dilemmas of Israel's peacemaking includes a number of chapters that speak to this point.¹⁸

The argument rests on the assumption that there is an Israeli consensus for peace—the spoilers are not us, but them (the settlers and their political patrons). And so let me end this essay with this question: what if the spoilers of peace are not them, but us too?.

We know from poll after poll that, for well over a decade at least, a majority of Israelis have supported a two-state solution and withdrawal from much of the West Bank. But as the political

¹⁶ The mission of Sher's new organization, which he founded together with Ami Ayalon, Orni Petruschka and Avi Gil, speaks directly to the central ingredient of all durable peace agreements: creating an inclusive process that can be sustained by preventing potential would-be spoilers from morphing into actual ones and turning resisters of the peace into its stakeholders.

¹⁷ "Israel's Religious Right and the Question of Settlements," *International Crisis Group*, Middle East Report No. 89, July 2009.

¹⁸ Miriam Fendius Elman, Oded Haklai, and Hendrik Spruyt, editors, *Democracy and Conflict Resolution: the Dilemmas of Israel's Peacemaking* (New York: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming).

psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University and his co-authors have suggested in a number of recent publications, Israelis continue to feel a tremendous sense of insecurity; the Israeli mindset is a siege mentality that prevents constructive engagement with the Palestinians and the kind of compromises necessary for peacemaking.¹⁹

Most Israeli Jews support the idea of a two-state solution, but the devil is in the details. When you get down to the nitty gritty, Israelis object in large majorities to every Palestinian goal, whether it is the right of return, the future of Jerusalem, or the return to the 1967 borders. There is little recognition for the Palestinian narrative of the conflict and most Israelis see little urgency in ending it. There is growing confidence in Israeli society's resilience and strength—the majority of Israelis are far more interested in reducing socioeconomic gaps and affordable housing. Peace as a goal has simply become less dominant.²⁰

If this is true, then in the final account the spoiler phenomenon might not apply to the Israeli-Palestinian case after all. In the absence of society's support for peace, there is nothing to spoil.

¹⁹ See, for example, Daniel Bar-Tal, Tamar Magal, and Eran Halperin, "The Paradox of Security Views in Israel: a Social-Psychological Explanation," in Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, editors, *Existential Threats and Civil-Security Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).

²⁰ Daniel Bar-Tal, Eran Halperin, and Neta Oren, "Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peace Making: the Case of the Israeli Jewish Society," *Social Issues and Policy Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2010): 63-109.

The Dangerous Status Quo Calls for Pro-Activity

Gilead Sher

Speaking in mid-July at the end of a rapid round of talks in Jerusalem, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington would use "all elements of its power" to prevent Iran going nuclear and was working in "close consultation" with Israel over how to do so. She added that a resumption of talks between Israel and the Palestinians would only come about if the parties "do the hard work for peace."

In the last two years we have witnessed the collapse of Arab regimes and social structures, and the rise of Political Islam and the upper hand of the Arab Street, generally characterized with animosity to Israel.

With Iran threatening to annihilate Israel once it possess military nuclear capability, the uncertain situation across the Middle East comprises at the moment too many factors and variables. For Israel, it dictates sound and perpetual assessment of threats, opportunities and challenges. The dust has yet to settle.

Secretary Clinton's visit in the region marked precisely twelve years since the Camp David summit, summoned by another family member, Bill Clinton. Twelve years ago, President Clinton re-defined the formulae of "land for Peace" and suggested a framework for resolving the core contentious issues: territory and settlements, Jerusalem and the Old City, the refugees and security. Theoretically, the fundamental contour of the end game for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is known, and its parameters might still be within reach. But the way to getting there is definitely unclear. It is clear though that a third party, preferably US-led, is absolutely indispensable for moving ahead, and that the spoilers should be addressed adequately.

In the past decade, the Palestinians did not respond to the two major comprehensive peace proposals made respectively by Prime Ministers Barak and Olmert. It might be the time for more modest objectives than a permanent status agreement that ends the conflict. Attaining partial, interim or phased agreements is as good as it could get in the foreseeable future.

It is essential to change the "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" paradigm of Camp David, Taba, and Annapolis – into "what has been agreed should be implemented." Such approach would provide the ground for an agreement on boundaries, settlements, security, statehood and the economy. Subsequently, the negotiations over Jerusalem and the Refugees will continue in a state-to-state fashion.

However, it now seems unlikely that the two sides will return to substantive negotiations in the absence of a concrete initiative and assertive diplomacy efforts. An exchange of letters recently initiated by Washington in a resuscitation attempt has produced no results to-date. I feel that we are on garbage time until November 5th at the very earliest. As a consequence, politicians on both parties have chosen to sit and wait, merely moderating the conflict until the conditions ripen. I beg to disagree with them: The status quo would never be frozen in place. The long-term interest of Israel is ending the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. And time does not work in any of the parties' favor. In the meantime, the One-State vision spreads all over the place in both camps and sinks within hearts and minds of indifferent Israelis and frustrated Palestinians.

The two leaderships abstain from taking decisions and prefer the so-called status quo. They do not want to strike a deal. For three years, attempts to resuming negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian leadership have failed. Under US pressure, we had nine months of settlement freeze under a rightist government in Israel. It was apparently not enough to convince Abbas that he should take the 15-minute drive to meet Netanyahu in Jerusalem, or vice versa. We have a feeble Palestinian government and a right-wing coalition in Israel. Mister Abbas has no clear policy except for a unilateral action at the UN and as much as possible short-term measures such as release of prisoners. Mister Netanyahu is satisfied with repeated statements on the two-states-for-two-people, and no tangible action. Having said that, Abbas is possibly the best partner for Israel albeit his deficiencies.

I still believe that the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians want peace. That is not enough but it is something to build upon. Now, Israel does not need to wait for a final-status deal with the Palestinians. From an Israeli perspective, the two-state-solution is imperative and vital. It is the only way for us to remain the democratic homeland of the Jewish people within secure boundaries. This requires disengaging from the Palestinians, based on the vision of co-existence alongside a Palestinian demilitarized state. It is in our own hands.

I believe that Israel should adopt a pro-active approach to move ahead in resolving the conflict with the Palestinians, despite the uncertainties, in order to mitigate some of the threats we face.

Such initiative will inevitably improve Israel's strategic situation in more than a just few dimensions. First and foremost, it will secure Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state. It will improve Israel's political stature and image and counter the de-legitimization campaign. Furthermore, an Israeli initiative should table the Israeli issue from the Arab Street's agenda and reduce Arab incentive to attack. The Israel-US relationship will improve and any agreement reached with the help of Washington would reestablish the US position in the Middle East. Last but not least, it would provide an opportunity for Israel to restore damaged strategic alliances such as the one with Turkey.

The efforts should be focused on a negotiation process and the resumption of talks, facilitated and monitored by the United States. Revisiting the 2002 Road Map is one option that seems flexible enough in order to contain the developments and changes since then; acknowledging the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative would put it in a broader regional context. A series of mutual deposits with a reliable broker might also help.

Parallel to that, the parties should make progress unilaterally towards a reality of two-states, pro-actively seeking those steps that would not negate the negotiation process but rather complement it.

Israel should take constructive steps to advance the reality of two states based on the 1967 borders, with land swaps — regardless of whether the Palestinians have agreed to it. Mutual unilateralism would be even better. Through a series of unilateral actions, gradual but tangible changes could begin to transform the situation on the ground.

Such constructive Israeli steps might include a declaration of the Israeli government that it is willing to return to negotiations anytime and that it has no claims of sovereignty on areas east of the existing security fence; ending all settlement construction eastwards of the fence and in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem; preparing to relocate settlers living outside the security fence while establishing a fair and empathic compensation package for their absorption. Subsequent to the relocation, the IDF will remain in the Palestinian territories until a final status

agreement is reached or until a robust international presence replaces it and takes security responsibility. Finally, the proposed plan would take place either unilaterally or with Palestinian cooperation.

A recent joint poll shows that among Israelis 44% support the plan and among Palestinians 35% viewed it as good for the Palestinians. The civil society's challenge is to change the internal discourse and communication within the respective peoples. This is a practical way to obtain broader legitimacy to the idea of the two-states. Blue White Future, an NGO promoting the two-state-solution encourages Israelis to reach out to those sectors and communities that are likely to suffer from any change, namely the settlers. One of the spoilers often mentioned by conflict resolution experts, namely, Professor Miriam Elman of Syracuse University who gave a talk recently in Israel, relates to insiders versus outsiders—specifically those actors excluded from the process. Agreements and significant political decisions produce domestic winners and losers, and those losers are potential spoilers.

You need to change peoples' attitudes and habits towards transformation and change, because in the beginning of the shift to change they cannot see the potentially good new reality, rather the risk for loss. We should therefore try putting the words and images of the future in the consciousness of the public as well as of the leaders, assuming that the leaders would then be able to act more comfortably. The public opinion would be supportive of the change, because mindsets have been accommodated to it in due time, overcoming initial resistance. From there on, the next generation will speak a new language, will use a different terminology, will address a different reality and will use other texts.

Such internal dialogue within the civil society looks for common grounds and plants the seeds for solidarity between those who are bound to live together on the same piece of land. We cannot allow memories, ethos and emotions get the upper hand over reason.

Policy-wise, Israel should prepare a national plan for the absorption of the settlers who would relocate to Israel proper, whether before or after an agreement is signed. Such a plan should have urban, vocational, social, psychological and other appropriate components.

Once negotiations are resumed – they should be conducted in a binding, continuous and well-structured process, and follow a disciplined and managed mechanism. Parallel to that, or in the absence of such process, Israel should adopt a pro-active approach to gradually resolve the conflict with the Palestinians.

We now need an integrated approach compiling a top down diplomacy and a bottom up civil-society grass-roots action. Measured, independent steps aimed at advancing towards a two-state reality, combined with internal dialogues in the respective societies to accommodate peace making. And the international community should endorse and encourage it, while imposing a reliable process on the weary parties rather than putting a solution to them.

The Jewish prayer book contains a modern prayer - written only sixty four years ago - for the well-being of the State, and it reads: "Establish peace in the land, and everlasting joy for its inhabitants." Then, too, there was no peace, but the phrase carries with it throughout the years the hope that the situation will change.

About the Contributors

Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal is Branco Weiss Professor of Research in Child Development and Education at the School of Education, Tel Aviv University. His research interest is in political and social psychology studying socio-psychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peace making, as well as development of political understanding among children and peace education. He has published twenty books and over two hundreds articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals, books and encyclopedias. He served as a President of the International Society of Political Psychology and received various awards for his work, including the Lasswell Award of the International Society of Political Psychology for “distinguished scientific contribution in the field of political psychology.” In 2012, he received The Nevitt Sanford Award of the International Society of Political Psychology for engaging in the practical application of political psychological principles, and creating knowledge that is accessible and used by practitioners to make a positive difference in the way politics is carried out.

Prof. Miriam Fendius Elman received her PhD in Political Science from Columbia University in 1996. A faculty member at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University since Fall 2008, she is an Associate Professor of Political Science, a Faculty Research Director in the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC), and the Director of the Project on Democracy in the Middle East at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs. Elman is the editor or co-editor of three books, *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (MIT Press, 1997); *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (MIT Press, 2001); and *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (MIT Press, 2003). She has authored over 30 journal articles, book chapters, and government reports on topics related to international security; international relations theory; religion and politics; Israel Studies and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An award winning teacher and scholar, her previous work has been supported by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University, and the U.S. Department of Education. Elman’s current book projects, *Democracy and Conflict Resolution: the Dilemmas of Israel’s Peacemaking*, and *Jerusalem: Conflict and Cooperation in a Contested City*, will be published by Syracuse University Press in 2013. She is a member of SAMED - the Syracuse Area Middle East Dialogue group.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Founder and Chairman of Mitvim--The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a Lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies and Political Psychology from the Hebrew University. In 2009-10, Dr. Goren was selected to take part in public policy training at Syracuse University as the Israeli participant in the U.S. State Department's Fulbright Hubert Humphrey Fellowship Program. Dr. Goren was the former Executive Director of the Young Israeli Forum for Cooperation (YIFC), and in this capacity he was awarded the 2009 Victor J. Goldberg IIE Prize for Peace in the Middle East. In addition, Dr. Goren served as a consultant in the Northern Ireland peace process, and has worked at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, The Nehemia Levtzion Center for Islamic Studies, and at The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace.

Attorney Gilead Sher is the former Head of Bureau and Policy Coordinator of Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak. He served as co-chief negotiator in 1999-2001 at the Camp David summit and the Taba talks as well as in covert peace negotiations. During the tenure of the late PM Yitzhak Rabin, Sher headed the negotiation project at the Planning Division of the IDF and served as delegate to the talks on the Interim Agreement (1994-5). Sher is a senior founding partner of *Gilead Sher & Co., Law Offices* (www.gsher-law.com). In 2012, Sher joined *the Institute for National Security Studies INSS* in Tel Aviv (www.inss.org.il) as a Senior Research Associate. His research fields are decision-making, security policy, the peace process, and regional dynamics and processes in the Middle East. Sher was a visiting professor on Conflict Resolution and Negotiations at the *Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania* (2001-2011) and teaches at the *Tel Aviv University*. He is the founding co-chairman of the movement *Blue White Future* (www.bluewhitefuture.org.il). A Colonel (Res.), former brigade commander and deputy division commander in the Armored Corps of the IDF, Sher also served as a military judge and defense counsel. His book *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001: Within Reach* was published by Routledge in 2006. He is a former board member at *The Association for Civil Rights in Israel*, a former president of *Israel Shotokan Karate Association* (Fifth Dan), a member of the *Council for Peace and Security*, chairman of the board of the *Sam Spiegel Film & Television School Jerusalem*, and serves as board member in a number of corporations.

About the Partner Organizations

Mitvim—The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (www.mitvim.org.il/en) is an independent foreign policy think tank that envisions a fresh start for Israel among the nations. It aims to reshape Israel's relations in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, by promoting new paradigms for Israel's foreign policies, enhancing Israel's regional belonging, and advancing Israeli-Arab peace. Mitvim was established in May 2011. Mitvim's objectives and goals are: (1) to promote a paradigm shift in Israel's foreign policy - introduce a coherent peace-oriented and multilateral foreign policy paradigm; make foreign policy considerations more prominent in Israeli decision-making, and Transform Israel's inward-looking culture; (2) to promote regional-belonging for Israel - enhance knowledge and understanding of regional issues; define Israel's desired relations with its adjacent regions, and; advance regional-belonging possibilities; (3) to promote Israeli-Arab peace - engage in policy dialogue with Arab and Muslim think-tanks; identify, create and maximize opportunities for peace, and; provide process-expertise to support peace-making efforts. Mitvim works at the political, diplomatic and public levels. It is comprised of Israeli experts, strategists, scholars, and journalists, who bring fresh and innovative thinking. Mitvim's current focus is on identifying and advocating the opportunities for Israel in the Arab Spring, promoting Israel-Turkey ties, and reaching out to new social and political actors in the Arab world via the media and similarly oriented think tanks.

The Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC, www.maxwell.syr.edu/parcc) at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University is a multi-faceted, interdisciplinary research center that advances both theory and practice in the fields of conflict and collaboration. Founded by Dr. Louis Kriesberg in 1986 with Hewlett Foundation funding, PARCC was initially known for its breakthrough work in conflict transformation, intractable conflicts, and identity conflicts in the international arena. With the addition of participating scholars, its areas of interest have grown to include environmental conflicts, advocacy and activism, and, most recently, collaborative governance. PARCC's commitment to practice can be seen in its Summer Institute, which has trained individuals in the skills of conflict resolution and collaboration for over 25 years, a graduate-level Certificate in Conflict Resolution, a Conflict Management Practice Group, and policy-relevant publications. PARCC faculty members serve as consultants for training, community development, negotiation, evaluation, and the design and study of peace-building projects. E-PARCC, an innovative education project, is a web-based collection of cases, simulations, and syllabi for the teaching of collaborative governance. All materials, authored by top scholars, are available in multiple languages for all to use.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Mitvim—The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies

11 Tuval St., Ramat Gan, 52522 Israel

Email: info@mitvim.org.il

Website: www.mitvim.org.il

PARCC—Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

400 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244 U.S.A.

Phone: 315-443-2367

Email: PARCC@Maxwell.syr.edu

Website: www.maxwell.syr.edu/PARCC

I SBN 978-965-7617-00-7



9 789657 617007