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## **Spoiling in Algeria and the Collapse of the FIS: An Analysis of Algeria's Spoiler Problem, 1994-1995**

The Algerian Civil War has cemented itself as a significant case study because of not only the longevity of its conflict (approximately ten years) or because of its violent and often brutal nature (over 150,000 casualties), but because of the significant spoiler problem that occurred within Algeria's peacebuilding initiatives. These peacebuilding initiatives between 1994 and 1995 represented the most significant period of mutual dialogue between the Algerian regime and the Islamist rebel groups. There have been two common assumptions about the Algerian Civil War. The first is that the conflict is often defined by the Islamist challenge, meaning that the various armed Islamist actors have often been construed as "spoilers" to the peacebuilding measures. They are construed to value their radical ideologies over pragmatic considerations and utilize violence and terror as weapons. The other is that the Algerian Civil War consisted of primarily two sides, one the armed Islamist camp, and the other the government camp. Both of these assumptions are wrong. An analysis of Algeria's civil war spoilers between 1994 and 1995 uncovers who spoiled these peace initiatives and why these spoilers emerged.

This chapter functions as a targeted case study bound in both time and space, to focus not only on the Algerian Civil War (1991-2003), but also more specifically on the peacebuilding initiatives and spoiling behavior during the first two years of the reign of Algerian President Liamine Zéroual (1994-1995). The analysis of this conflict will use three peacebuilding initiatives as vessels to study Algeria's spoilers. The spoiling behavior in opposition to these initiatives halted the negotiations between the Algerian regime and the principle rebel group, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). This spoiling behavior forever changed the dynamics of future Algerian peace initiatives and the Algerian political chessboard.

This case was written by Brian Riedy and was created for the Spoilers of Peace Program in Spring 2010. This case is intended for classroom discussion and is not intended to suggest either effective or ineffective handling of the situation depicted. It is brought to you by E-PARCC, part of the Maxwell School of Syracuse University's Collaborative Governance Initiative, a subset of the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC). This material may be copied as many times as needed as long as the authors are given full credit for their work.

This study will synthesize the theoretical underpinnings of spoiling behavior with the empirical case study of the Algerian Civil War. This synthesis reveals an apparent spoiler problem in Algeria's peacebuilding initiatives. The best method for this investigation is a combination of the theoretical literature on spoilers and spoiling behavior. This includes ideological intent, rational cost-benefit calculations, the structural context of the state, and consideration of the normative situation. This chapter probes the intentions of Algeria's spoilers through these four theoretical approaches, concentrating on the reason(s) for when and why spoilers emerge or withdraw.

The goal of this chapter and these case studies are to further the study of the spoiler problem in peace processes. This lends analysis on behalf of both the spoiler concept abstractly and theoretically as well as gaining a greater understanding of the Algerian Civil War. The Algerian case study has helped to expand and refine the application of the spoiler concept in analyzing the Algerian conflict, the opposition to Algeria's peace initiatives, and what policy measures can assure stronger and more sustainable peace processes. The examination of spoilers in the Algerian case reveals different types of spoilers and reasons for their emergence.

This study reveals four conclusions. First, that the investigation of spoilers is most effective using a comprehensive approach that combines the analysis of ideology, rationality, structural context, and the normative situation. Second, the analysis of the Algerian case identifies spoilers existing within both the Islamist rebel groups and the Algerian regime. Third, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the eradicator wing of the Algerian regime are the most effective and consistent spoilers, undermining each of the three peace initiatives. Fourth, that the spoiling problem in Algeria permanently changed the situation on the ground. The peace initiatives between 1994 and 1995 represent a formative moment within the conflict, and turned the tide for the FIS, eventually leading to its collapse.

The structure of this chapter will begin with a section addressing the key aspects behind the conception of spoilers and spoiling. This theory section provides greater flexibility with the conception of spoiling by integrating both Stedman's article with many of the more recent contributions, to allow a broader and more comprehensive use of the spoiler terminology to the Algerian case. Following the theoretical frame, the second section of this case study will then briefly examine the conflict background of the Algerian Civil War.

The third, and main section of this work will focus on the peace initiatives—Zéroual's winter 1994 initiative, Zéroual's autumn 1994 initiative, and the Sant' Egidio Platform—within three subsections. The first section begins with the origins and context of the peace initiatives, followed by the second section's spoiling analysis. The spoiling analysis focuses on the groups that have undermined these peace initiatives, the reasons why they have opposed the initiatives, and the spoiling tactics they have adopted. The final section describes the outcome of these initiatives. Following the third and main body section, the chapter will conclude by emphasizing the transportable and abstract findings relating to spoilers and a greater understanding of the Algerian Civil War. The conclusion will also include some lessons in these fields of study and avenues for future study.

## **SPOILERS AND SPOILING: THEORY, DEFINITIONS, AND TYPOLOGY**

The conceptual use of spoilers began in 1997 with Stephen Stedman's "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes."<sup>1</sup> Stedman's work is foundational for the conception of spoilers, providing the major definitions and relevant typologies for profiling civil war spoilers. Stedman's model does not represent all of the spoiler literature and the addition of articles and chapters by Kelly Greenhill, Solomon Major, Marie-Jöelle Zahar, Edward Newman, Oliver Richmond, and Karin Aggestam, help to contribute significantly to deepening the analysis of this niche within conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Stedman provides the foundation for spoiler terminology and emphasizes the management of spoiler through profiling and categorizing the intent and ideology of spoiler groups. The nuanced approaches addresses the rational cost-benefit calculations of the groups involved, the structural context of the state (including opportunity and capability), and the normative context of the conflict and peacebuilding measures. In sum, this combined approach further operationalizes this concept and the analysis of the Algerian Civil War.

This theory section will be divided in two, with descriptions of the relevant definitions and typologies of Stedman's article on spoilers, followed by some of the nuances to the spoiler and spoiling conception. First, Stedman defines spoilers as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it."<sup>2</sup> Stedman's greatest contribution to the spoiler conception has been through his profiling and categorizing of spoilers by his creation of multiple typologies that address the varying circumstances behind their actions. Stedman argues, "Spoilers differ by the goals they seek and their commitment to achieving those goals."<sup>3</sup> Stedman explains his spoiler typology based on addressing four facets: the position of spoilers, the number of spoilers, the type of spoilers, and the locus of spoilers.

The position of a spoiler conveys an important dichotomy between inside and outside. Inside spoilers are within the peace process and initially signal a willingness to implement a settlement or peacebuilding, but spoil by not fulfilling key obligations to these agreements.<sup>4</sup> In the Algerian case various segments of the Algerian government and military at times acted as inside spoilers because of their location within the implementation of peace initiatives and their decisions to spoil instead of support the action. Outside spoilers are parties that have been excluded or choose to be excluded from the peace process, and remain on the outside of peace-building initiatives and agreements. Outsiders spoil primarily through the use of violence and adopt strategies to undermine the particular peacebuilding efforts.<sup>5</sup> In Algeria the most notable outside spoilers have been the GIA and the GSPC, because of their use of violence and terrorism to undermine Algerian peacebuilding efforts.

The type of a spoiler is defined by three different categories. Stedman explains his linear typology with limited spoilers at one extreme and total spoilers at the other, with greedy spoilers

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 5-53.

<sup>2</sup> Stedman, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Stedman, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Stedman, 8.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

serving as a middle category. Limited spoilers maintain narrow and defined goals, and because of this they can often times be persuaded in negotiation if their aspirations or goals are remedied or alleviated.<sup>6</sup> Greedy spoilers follow a rational course, spoiling when faced with low costs or risks, but when costs and risk are high they often refrain and instead seek negotiation.<sup>7</sup> Total spoilers have fixed goals and care little about the costs they may have to incur in achieving whatever these goals may be.<sup>8</sup> Often times these goals seek “total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their goals are not subject to change.”<sup>9</sup> Total spoilers often see an all or nothing point of view, where they rely on a radical ideology instead of valuing pragmatic considerations, negotiations, and bargaining.

The number and locus of spoilers are Stedman’s last two categories. The number of spoilers is significant because the actions to marginalize or undermine one spoiler or group may inadvertently strengthen another.<sup>10</sup> This has been seen often in Algeria because of the complexities and factionalization within the Algerian conflict. Actions by the Algerian regime aimed at undermining either the GIA or FIS-AIS often led to increase in the unity and empowerment of the other. Similarly attacks by the GIA on the FIS-AIS strengthened the hand of the Algerian eradicator wing forcing an eventual ceasefire with the FIS-AIS. Also the locus of a spoiler can be significant. The locus of a spoiler refers to whether it is the leader or followers that are defining and leading the spoiler behavior.<sup>11</sup> Attempts by the FIS to negotiate with the Algerian regime were problematic because the FIS leadership lacked the necessary time and ability to communicate with the entire FIS, thus the locus of much of the armed Islamic movement suffered from lack of continuity between leadership elements and the broad masses within the group.

Stedman also addressed three strategies to manage spoilers. He described the first as inducement, to take positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct peace. This method hopes to induce these spoilers into joining the peace process by positively addressing a spoiler’s demand.<sup>12</sup> The next method is socialization. This strategy requires setting norms of acceptable behavior to other parties both materially, by calibrating the supply of carrots and sticks, and intellectually, by regular normative persuasion by custodians.<sup>13</sup> The last strategy that Stedman mentions is the use of coercion. Stedman describes this strategy as “the use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior or reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt the peace process.”<sup>14</sup> In sum, Stedman’s article is especially significant and relevant to address the spoiler problem in peace processes. Stedman’s emphasis on probing the intentions of spoilers to determine their goals, strategies, and tactics will be used to analyze much of the conflict and peacebuilding within the Algerian case.

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<sup>6</sup> Stedman, 10.

<sup>7</sup> Stedman, 11.

<sup>8</sup> Stedman, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Stedman, 9.

<sup>11</sup> Stedman, 11.

<sup>12</sup> Stedman, 12.

<sup>13</sup> Stedman, 13.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

Second, looking beyond Stedman's work some important nuances also help to bolster and enforce the spoiler concept in the case of the Algerian Civil War and the subsequent peacebuilding efforts. Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major's "The Perils of Profiling Civil War Spoilers," which offers an important critique to Stedman's article.<sup>15</sup> Greenhill and Major argue that the causal mechanism of Stedman's model should be reversed, and that he neglects the focus on the prevailing opportunity structure of the conflict and peace process. Greenhill and Major state, "the type of spoiler does not determine the kinds of outcomes that are possible; instead, the kinds of outcomes that are possible determine the type of spoiler that may emerge at any given time."<sup>16</sup> Greenhill and Major favor the use of a capabilities based model, which instead focuses on identifying incentives and disincentives and the determinant structural factors within the conflict and peace process.

Greenhill and Major emphasize the questions of when and why do spoilers emerge or retreat. The capabilities model attempts to answer these questions by its focus on the inherent structural factors of the conflict. They state, "It is the prevailing opportunity structure, not actors' intentions, that present them with the available options, in which in turn determines their behavior."<sup>17</sup> Therefore in Greenhill and Major's capabilities based model it is opportunity structure that is the most significant determinant. Greenhill and Major focus much of their article on causation through opportunity structure and focusing on the spoiler problem through the lens of bargaining. They conclude, "Spoiler behavior is thus, we posit, more closely causally linked to strategic exigencies than to individual motivations."<sup>18</sup>

Greenhill and Major's article builds upon Stedman and is an important contribution to the study of Algerian Civil War spoilers because of their focus on the prevailing opportunity structure as a determinant for the emergence and retreat of civil war spoilers. Greenhill and Major's model therefore focuses on the relative change of power in both domestic opposition and custodians. The model should illustrate a trend that spoilers emerge and act more frequently or retreat based on the circumstances and relative power that the prevailing opportunity structure permits.

Lastly, Greenhill and Major emphasize the difficulty of this structural and opportunity model. They state, "calculating the relative balance of power is itself a notoriously imperfect and difficult sort of science."<sup>19</sup> In conclusion, Greenhill and Major lend an important dimension in the study of Algeria's spoilers, by moving beyond Stedman's profiling/typology concept and instead focusing on the determinants of opportunity structure as driving the actions and emergence of spoilers.

Marie-Jöelle Zahar's chapter titled, "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes," focuses on the insider and outsider dimension of spoilers and also adds an important cost and benefit

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<sup>15</sup> Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major, "The Perils of Profiling Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 7-40.

<sup>16</sup> Greenhill and Major, 8.

<sup>17</sup> Greenhill and Major, 9.

<sup>18</sup> Greenhill and Major, 12.

<sup>19</sup> Greenhill and Major, 40.

analysis model to the spoiler problem.<sup>20</sup> Zahar attempts to reframe the debate in two ways. First she argues about the best method to study violence in peace processes. She contends a move away from the concept of spoiling and to instead concentrate on the adoption of violent strategies by different groups. The second is “to address the twin notion of capability and opportunity, which I argue, provide the context in which decisions to use violence are taken.”<sup>21</sup> Zahar thus steers the focus of spoilers onto violence more generally and to contextual factors. Capability is based on the amount of resources available to the groups and individuals, and opportunity on the various constraints in place posed by the presence of the state, custodians, or other actors.<sup>22</sup> Through the proper use of cost-benefits and incentives-disincentives, “Decision-makers find that ‘just as they were once trapped in a cycle of conflict, now the structure of incentives works to trap them in the politics of moderation.’”<sup>23</sup>

Zahar’s article like Greenhill and Major asks the question of why do actors choose violence? And how do they assess the costs and benefits of such action? In conclusion, this article builds upon the theoretical literature by also calling for a contextual cost-benefit approach focused on capability and opportunity. Zahar’s argument is also particularly nuanced because of its consideration to move away from the concept of spoilers and to instead focus on the use of violence.

Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond’s edited book, *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*, approaches the spoiler concept with an open mind, aimed at broadening the activities and standard actors who are often labeled as spoilers.<sup>24</sup> Their primary contention is that normative considerations of conflict and peace processes cannot be delinked from determining who is a spoiler. Newman and Richmond decided upon a broader definition of spoiling behavior, they state, “the activities of any actors who are opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason, from within or (usually) outside the peace process, and who use violence or other means to disrupt the process in pursuit of their aims.”<sup>25</sup> Newman and Richmond give careful consideration to the subjective nature of the term spoilers, especially when used as a noun. They also warn of the bias of third parties, hegemony, and power on the nature and labeling of spoilers. Newman and Richmond continue, “What is clear is that all parties have the potential to be spoilers; the phenomenon is more an issue of tactics, not actors.”<sup>26</sup> Newman and Richmond’s take on biases and the normative framework within a spoiler gives another nuance that deserves recognition within the analysis of Algeria’s spoilers.

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<sup>20</sup> Marie-Jöelle Zahar, “Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes,” in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, Edited by John Darby and Roger MacGinty, (Palgrave Macmillian, 2003), pp. 159-177.

<sup>21</sup> Zahar, 159.

<sup>22</sup> Zahar, 166-167.

<sup>23</sup> Zahar, 165.

<sup>24</sup> Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during conflict resolution*, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006).

<sup>25</sup> Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, “Obstacles to peace processes: Understanding spoiling,” in *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during conflict resolution*, Edited by Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Newman and Richmond, 5.

Karin Aggestam's chapter titled, "Internal and external dynamics of spoiling: A negotiation approach," that unites much of Newman and Richmond with that of Zahar.<sup>27</sup> Aggestam touches on analyzing spoiler action based on situational rationality and the specific context of the conflict. Aggestam also approaches the normative aspect of spoiling, mentioning the value-laden terminology often used, specifically the "for" or "against" mentality.<sup>28</sup> Aggestam posits that spoiling should be considered as similar to "competitive negotiation."<sup>29</sup> Her negotiation approach emphasizes the highly dynamic and non-static nature of spoiling, because interests change over time.<sup>30</sup> The dynamic nature of spoiling thus becomes more limiting because of the difficult nature concerning diagnosis, categorization, and predictability. Aggestam's negotiation approach is helpful as it bolsters both Zahar's contextual approach of costs and benefits with Newman and Richmond's emphasis on the consideration of the normative dimensions. In conclusion, Aggestam also adds and reinforces some important critiques and nuances within the study of civil war spoilers.

The paragraphs above have illustrated some of the key uses of the spoiler concept. This section has outlined many definitions, typologies, and nuances within the study of spoilers, which help further the investigation and spoiler analysis of the Algeria case. First, Stedman's typologies will be valuable for distinguishing some of the characteristics of various spoiler groups, focusing on ideology and typological profiling. Second, the nuanced approaches of Greenhill and Major, Zahar, Newman and Richmond, and Aggestam bolster the spoiler focus by providing additional critiques and questions to contribute towards a spoiler's analysis. These approaches help to form the framework for approaching the Algerian case, its conflict, its peacebuilding measures, and the analysis of its various spoiler groups.

The spoiler frame of this chapter attempts to combine these spoiler theories to better address the Algerian case. Stedman's approach will help to analyze and categorize the ideology and actions of a spoiler group to answer who is undermining the peacebuilding efforts under investigation, why they are opposing these initiatives, and what tactics they have adopted. Greenhill and Major, Zahar, and Aggestam, provide a frame to investigate the structural and rational factors of spoiling, such as the domestic institutional constraints, opportunities and capabilities, and the cost-benefit calculation that the spoiler faces. This helps to provide for many of the significant factors of spoiling that Stedman had missed. Lastly, Newman and Richmond and Aggestam also help to constantly question the value-laden and normative nature of who is and isn't a spoiler. This leads us to the empirical case beginning with Algeria's conflict history, followed by the origins of the peace initiatives to be investigated.

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<sup>27</sup> Karin Aggestam, "Internal and External dynamics of Spoiling: A negotiation Approach," in *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during conflict resolution*, Edited by Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp. 23-39.

<sup>28</sup> Aggestam, 36.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

## CONFLICT BACKGROUND

Algeria's conflict background addresses three issues. The first is to examine the roots and bases of the conflict, the second is to identify the major stakeholders, and third is to give a brief conflict history. The roots of the Algerian conflict are two-fold; the first is the authoritarian nature of the state. This dates back to the Algerian war of national liberation (1954-1962), which left the state under the control and development of the military. The other factor is Algeria's Islamic-secular divide. Like Turkey and Egypt, Algeria focused its development after statehood as a modern secular state. This path has led to consistent tensions with Islamic groups and individuals within society.

The major stakeholders within this conflict can be divided into those within the Algerian regime, those outside of the Algerian regime but within Algeria, and those outside of the regime and Algeria. The two main actors within the Algerian regime are divided into two separate wings, the eradicators and the conciliators. These factions are divided based on their strategy with Islamist and rebel elements during the civil war. The major Islamist political parties outside of the Algerian regime are the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), which represents the military wing of the FIS, and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), represented the three main rebel Islamist groups. The National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) represent the two largest non-Islamist political parties in Algeria. Internationally both France and the United States have been involved within the Algerian Civil War. The French colonial legacy in Algeria, its support of the Algerian regime, and its near proximity to Algeria make it a key international stakeholder. The United States has become increasingly involved within Algeria following the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has maintained ties with Al-Qaeda thus engaging U.S. interests and making the United States another key international stakeholder.

The conflict history in Algeria begins with Algerian independence and statehood in 1962, after eight years of war with the French. The government of Algeria was turned over to the nationalist front that advanced Algeria's independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN). The National Liberation Army (ALN), the armed wing of the FLN, was also intricately involved with Algeria's initial statehood. These two institutions represented the strongest and most capable to govern and lead development in Algeria, but only after three years this stasis failed as the Algerian army assumed control of the state. This occurred when Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne seized power in a military *coup d'état* from Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella in June of 1965.

With Boumedienne in control the army entrenched itself into the political system using the FLN as the sole political party and puppet of the state. Boumedienne's successor, Chadli Bendjedid assumed the Presidency after Boumedienne's death in 1978. The army once again played the decisive role in the appointment of President Bendjedid, rising to the presidency from his former position as Defense Minister. Poor economic conditions characterized the 1980's because of the failures of state led industrialization and the decline in oil prices. The national riots of 1988 signified the growing tension between society and the regime as rioters and police forces clashed. This event became known as Black October, which forced the hand of President

Bendjedid. He decided to amend the constitution to open up the political system, hoping to stymie the anger directed at the government and his regime.

The first set of open parliamentary elections allowed the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the newly created Islamic party, to claim an unprecedented number of seats in December 1991. This dramatic victory for the FIS was too much for the Algerian military to handle. The FIS victory was viewed by the military as a clear threat and political rival to their control of the state. What followed was an immediate cancellation of the next round of elections, and the first round results. As the situation worsened the Algerian military intervened and forced President Bendjedid from office in a *coup d'état* on 11 January 1992. After the ouster of Bendjedid the Algerian military took over formal political control of the country and banned all political parties based on religion, especially the FIS. The army also rounded up and arrested individuals associated with the FIS and other Islamic parties. The military's disregard for the political mandate set in the parliamentary elections and its jailing and condemnation of Islamic political parties, became the catalysts for the Algerian Civil War.

Many groups and parties within Algeria joined the FIS because of their common opposition to the Algerian regime. These groups (such as the FIS, FLN, FFS)<sup>31</sup> were frustrated by the authoritarian control of the regime, its military *coup d'état*, its disregard for the FIS political mandate and its condemnation of Islam. While the army lacked legitimacy, having no constitutional right, democratic mandate, or any convincing patriotic credentials to warrant their hold on the power of the state.<sup>32</sup> The goal of these opposition groups was to obtain through arms what they could not reach by political means. Direct and violent clashes between Islamist rebel groups and the Algerian regime followed.

Algeria's conflict history expounds upon the two main tensions in Algeria. The political limitations upon society and political actors, the failed development programs, the economic recession of the 1980's, the military *coup d'état*, and the lack of regime legitimacy underlie much of the authoritarian tension and conflict in Algeria. The secular-Islamic tension has increased with the rise of the FIS. The results of the December 1991 election also signaled a growing animosity and rise of political Islam in Algeria. Both of these forces underlie much of the Algerian Civil War and its peacebuilding initiatives.

## **PEACE INITIATIVES AND SPOILER ANALYSIS**

The attempts at negotiation between the Algerian regime and the FIS were the most hopeful and significant between 1994 and 1995. After the HCE appointed Liamine Zérroual as President in January of 1994, a series of peacebuilding efforts, initiatives and dialogue would largely frame the most sustained attempts at a mutual peace process since the outset of the Algerian Civil War. During this time period President Liamine Zérroual put forth two significant efforts towards

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<sup>31</sup> Initially the FLN and FFS were rival parties of the FIS, but even though the FLN was suffering a disastrous setback in the December 1991 elections, and the FFS, a strongly secular party oriented towards the Berber regions of Algeria, both of them should have applauded the banning of the FIS. Instead the FLN and FFS joined the FIS in protesting the intervention of the Algerian military calling for a return of the political process.

<sup>32</sup> Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002*, (London, Verso, 2003), 169.

negotiation and a formal peace process. Algeria's main political parties also responded with an initiative as well, known as the Sant' Egidio initiative or Rome accords. These three initiatives represent the peacebuilding measures and spoiling behavior targeted for investigation.

The peace initiatives and spoiler analysis will be divided into three parts. First, the origin of each event provides the contextual makeup surrounding the peacebuilding initiative. This section explains about the peacebuilding initiative itself, its history, how it got started, what it calls for, and the parties involved with it. The second and main section will focus on the analysis of groups that were involved as spoilers within the peacebuilding initiatives. The spoiler analysis will focus on the three groups that undermined the peace initiatives, the GIA, the eradicators, and the conciliators. Each of these groups will have their spoiling behavior examined to determine what they did to undermine the peacebuilding efforts, why they opposed it, and the tactics they adopted. The theoretical literature on spoilers will also be addressed within the analysis including both ideological as well as pragmatic considerations. The layout of the domestic institutional constraints and opportunities for the opposition and spoiler groups will also be analyzed as well as how other actors and custodians have dealt with these opposition groups. The third and final section will continue the history following the Algerian civil war spoilers. The outcome and failures of these peace initiatives represent a dynamic and formative time period within the Algerian conflict.

### **ORIGINS: Zérroual's Initiatives and the Sant' Egidio Platform**

The origins of Zérroual's peace initiatives and the Sant' Egidio Platform begin after nearly two years of conflict between the Algerian regime and the Islamist rebel groups. The military directly controlled the state between 1992 and 1993 through the High Council of State (HCE), a governing body consisting of military officers. Michael Willis, author of *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria*, explains "The cancellation of the elections and the dissolution of the FIS were signals to these elements that the movement should resort to the more fitting means of acquiring power through armed struggle."<sup>33</sup> Between 1992 and 1993 the Algerian conflict continued as neither the armed elements of the FIS or the Algerian regime led by the HCE wished to negotiate, believing that the other would capitulate first.<sup>34</sup>

In late 1993 the Algerian regime revised its strategy to consider possible political options as the conflict and Islamists was proving more difficult than they initially imagined. In September 1993 the Algerian regime created the National Dialogue Commission and National Reconciliation Conference, with the task of achieving dialogue and consensus between the opposition parties to the Algerian regime.<sup>35</sup> This overture failed decisively as no representatives of the FIS were invited to attend. This led to boycotting by the other major Algerian political parties, believing that negotiations were pointless without the participation of the FIS. The regime then used the conference to shift focus away from the HCE and install a new transitional leader of the Algerian regime. General Liamine Zérroual became the President of Algeria and official head of the HCE, ascending from his former position as Defense Minister. Zérroual

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<sup>33</sup> Michael Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History*, (New York University Press, 1996), pp. 305.

<sup>34</sup> Willis, 307.

<sup>35</sup> Willis, 311.

would serve his position for a three-year term, but to many this action confirmed their beliefs that the military “had merely reinvented themselves under a new guise.”<sup>36</sup>

### **Zéroual’s First Peace Initiative**

In January of 1994, Liamine Zéroual was sworn in as the official leader of Algeria. From the outset he led initiatives intent on seeking a dialogue with Algeria’s political parties. Zéroual declared, “that dialogue should seek the involvement of all political forces without exception.”<sup>37</sup> This move by Zéroual was the first public signal of negotiation sent by the Algerian regime to the FIS since the outset of the civil war. Zéroual’s first attempt to ameliorate the conflict began with his order to release several hundred Islamist prisoners under detention without trial, including two of the seven original leaders of the FIS, prior to starting negotiation and dialogue.<sup>38</sup>

Zéroual’s overtures ultimately met with failure. The eradicator wing of the Algerian army represented by the Mohammed Lamari, Redha Malek, and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) pushed on Zéroual from the inside, while vehement opposition to such dialogue from the outside came from the GIA. The eradicators within the army were “clearly hostile to discussions with *any* Islamists.”<sup>39</sup> While the GIA began a campaign of assassinations of both intellectuals and members of the National Consultative Council that “coincided with the beginning of the HCE’s first real attempts at multi-party dialogue and was clearly designed to halt this process.”<sup>40</sup> The lack of cooperation between the Islamists, specifically the FIS and GIA was also becoming dangerous. Willis points out, “that some figures within the FIS...willing to talk to the regime were met with dark warnings and threats of violence from the GIA.”<sup>41</sup> These sharp actions by the eradicators and GIA halted the positive momentum of Zéroual’s first initiative.

### **Zéroual’s Second Peace Initiative**

Between April and September of 1994 another attempt was made at a political solution and dialogue between Zéroual and the FIS. Zéroual’s hope was that this dialogue and his overtures would lead to the renunciation of violence by the FIS. The FIS was also warming to the idea of a political solution knowing that to achieve an outright military victory over the Algerian regime would be an endless blood bath and conflict, resulting in anarchy. Sudanese leader, Hassan al-Turabi also pushed for the FIS to seek a negotiated settlement. This then led to the first positive step forward with an exchange of letters between Zéroual and the imprisoned FIS leaders. The two primary leaders of the FIS were Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj. Both Madani and Belhadj stressed the importance of their release from prison, which was granted after they had acquiesced to many of Zéroual’s terms. Zéroual himself noted that this “represented a significant first step

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<sup>36</sup> Willis, 312.

<sup>37</sup> Willis, 316.

<sup>38</sup> Willis, 319.

<sup>39</sup> Willis, 321.

<sup>40</sup> Willis, 323.

<sup>41</sup> Willis, 324.

by the FIS.”<sup>42</sup> On 13 September 1994 Madani and Belhadj were released from prison and confined to house arrest.

Once again the eradicators undermined Z roual’s move. Mohammed Lamari and Redha Malek were again at the center of this collusion that called Z roual’s actions as a “unilateral concession” that “put in deadly danger the Republic.”<sup>43</sup> They further criticized the release of Madani without the condition that he would unambiguously denounce terrorism in order to be released. Others also argued that the levels of violence in Algeria did not decrease following the release of Madani and Belhadj, signaling their loss of control over the Islamist armed groups.<sup>44</sup>

The GIA also opposed the initiative. The following day of Madani and Belhadj’s release, the GIA condemned all acts of compromise with “the apostate regime and restated their established credo of neither reconciliation, nor truce, nor dialogue.”<sup>45</sup> A car bomb on 12 October 1994 disrupted the beginning of the official dialogue between Z roual and the FIS, highlighting the opposition of the GIA and its use of violence to undermine both the peace initiative and the leadership of the FIS.

To unite the elements of the FIS and most of the armed Islamists behind the leadership of Madani and Belhadj turned out to be a complicated task. Madani and Belhadj required time and their release to consult with the extended leadership of the FIS. Rabah Kebir explained, “a simple appeal for a truce, even if it comes from Abassi, will not stop the bloodshed. We must gather together all our cadres in both political positions and in the armed groups.”<sup>46</sup> This complicated task proved to be the breaking point of Z roual’s peace initiative. This demand by Madani and Belhadj was virtually impossible for the already pressured Z roual. The eradicators and hardliners had already seen Z roual’s actions as excessive concession and conciliation towards the FIS and they would tolerate nothing beyond what Z roual had already committed. After three meetings through September and October the initiative was announced as a failure.<sup>47</sup> The government charged the FIS with accusations of negotiating in bad faith as the reasons behind the failure.

The failures of Z roual’s second peacebuilding initiative and dialogue drastically reduced his political capital and credibility within the government because of his highly invested nature in a settlement. The failures of his conciliatory efforts over the last ten months were beginning to shift government officials over to the eradicator camp at the expense of Z roual’s credibility. Z roual’s goal to regain his credibility began with an address to the nation. Z roual vowed to redouble his efforts against terrorism, and the intention of his regime to organize presidential elections before the end of 1995 to reintroduce and legitimize his government.<sup>48</sup> Following his

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<sup>42</sup> Willis, 334.

<sup>43</sup> Willis, 335.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Willis, 336.

<sup>46</sup> Le Martin Newspaper, Algeria, 9/25/1994.

<sup>47</sup> Willis, 337.

<sup>48</sup> Andrew Pierre and William Quandt, *The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West*, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996) 32.

remarks violence resumed in Algeria, as the opening week of November was the bloodiest since the beginning of the conflict three years earlier.<sup>49</sup>

As Algeria was returning to outright conflict and civil war, Algeria's former political parties took the lead in launching their own initiative headed by the FLN and FFS. The goal of the FLN and FFS was to create a genuine national dialogue and consensus between Algeria's political parties, which would lead to a national contract that would help steer negotiations with the Algerian regime. This new initiative would make up the Sant' Egidio initiative or Rome talks, which would become the Sant' Egidio Platform or the Rome Accords.

### **The Sant' Egidio Peace Initiative**

In November of 1994 under the auspice of the Sant' Egidio Catholic Community eight Algerian political parties met to reach a consensus on a negotiated solution to present to the Algerian regime. The groups represented over 80% of Algeria's constituency that voted in the 1991 parliamentary elections, headlined by the FLN, FFS, and the FIS.<sup>50</sup> Graham Fuller, an expert on the Algerian conflict, stated "the representation of almost all major parties reflected an exceptionally high proportion of the potential Algerian electorate—giving its peace plan a particular legitimacy unmatched by almost any other political forum in Algeria in decades."<sup>51</sup> The most difficult question next was how to navigate the issue of how to represent the FIS, because the members of the FIS in Algeria were not permitted to leave the country, leaving out Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj (the two chief leaders of the FIS.)<sup>52</sup> To compensate, invitations were sent to FIS leaders aboard, Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam to represent the FIS.<sup>53</sup> After two days of negotiating the parties split up planning to reconvene in a few months to draw up a formal compact.

Before the parties returned in January Madani and Belhadj were presented with a list of proposals, demands, and concessions from the November talks, in which they gave their official support. After five days of discussion the "Platform for a political and peaceful solution to the Algerian Crisis,"<sup>54</sup> was reached on 13 January 1995. Sofiane Khatib highlights some of the key elements of the platform,

In their final statement, the parties jointly proclaimed the rejection of violence to achieve political goals, as well as the respect of human rights and democracy. The statement also explicitly asked the Algerian regime to withdraw the army from the political scene, to recognize ethnic rights, to implement détente measures, and to end the practice of torture, retaliation against civilians, extra-judicial execution, and censorship. Similarly, the statement also asked rebel groups to cease

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<sup>49</sup> Willis, 340.

<sup>50</sup> Sofiane Khatib, "Spoiler Management During Algeria's Civil War: Explaining the Peace," *Stanford Journal of International Relations*, (2006), <[http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.06\\_khatib.html](http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.06_khatib.html)>.

<sup>51</sup> Graham Fuller, *Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State?* (RAND Arroyo Center, 1996), pp. 102.

<sup>52</sup> Willis, 341.

<sup>53</sup> At the last moment Rabah Kebir was unable to make the conference and his close ally Abdelkrim Ould Adda stood in his place.

<sup>54</sup> The Platform can be found in: Pierre and Quandt, 59-63.

attacks against civilians, foreigners, and public assets. Finally, the parties demanded the creation of a national assembly that would prepare and oversee new general elections.<sup>55</sup>

Signatories of the Sant' Egidio Platform were the National Liberation Front (FLN), the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), the Workers Party (PT), the Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA), the Islamic Renaissance Movement (al-Nahda party), the Contemporary Muslim Algeria (JMC), and the Algerian Human Rights League (LADDH). Hugh Roberts also noted that the platform was written with unprovocative and uninflamatory terms, to offer, "an honorable way out with minimal loss of face," to the Algerian regime.<sup>56</sup>

Some questioned the backing of the Sant' Egidio Platform by the FIS and specifically Ali Belhadj. Belhadj responded through publicized letters that, "the beginnings of a peaceful and legitimate solution are contained in the national contract."<sup>57</sup> With the large number of signatories and Belhadj's personal backing, hope was renewed that this would add credibility to the peace initiatives and better elicit a favorable response from the two most significant and volatile elements to restoring civil peace—the regime and the armed groups. The initial reactions by the GIA were ambiguous, owing to the factionalized nature of the group at the time.<sup>58</sup> The reaction of the regime though was not ambiguous, "We reject it in total and in detail."<sup>59</sup> The regime's rejection was based on its long-term political plan, as elections loomed in November of 1995 coupled with a heightened security policy and military approach.

What made Sant' Egidio especially significant was two circumstances. First is the fact that the number of parties involved encompassed much of the Algerian electorate, yielding tremendous and unmatched legitimacy and weight behind the peace platform. Second the role of the FIS to participate in the talks furthered its own legitimacy towards negotiations when produced in the right context. The Sant' Egidio Platform represented a large majority of the Algerian electorate, but did not itself represent the regime, instead the peace negotiations relied on the political parties themselves to reach a compromise, that would in turn lead to the regime's support. This strategy failed as the Algeria regime denounced the Sant' Egidio process, believing it would undermine and usurp the power and legitimacy of the state and its strategy to hold new presidential election in November of 1995.

By the end of 1995 as Z roual's election loomed all three of these peace initiatives had failed and the positive momentum behind them had been extinguished. The analysis of the main contributors and spoilers during these peace initiatives will follow in the next sub-section.

### **ANALYSIS: The GIA, the eradicators, and the conciliators**

The initiatives by Z roual and Sant' Egidio had ended in failure, based largely on the spoiler problem within Algeria. The three parties most responsible for the spoiling behavior between the 1994 and 1995 peace initiatives were the GIA, the eradicators, and the conciliators. This

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<sup>55</sup> Khatib.

<sup>56</sup> Roberts, 174.

<sup>57</sup> Financial Times, 1/26/1995.

<sup>58</sup> Willis, 346.

<sup>59</sup> Mideast Mirror, 1/19/1995.

sub-section will attempt to answer questions who these spoilers are and why they emerged. Each group will be investigated as to why they undermined these particular peace initiatives, what they were opposing, what spoiling tactics have they adopted, how did they deal with domestic and institutional constraints and opportunities. The theoretical literature on spoilers and spoiling will help to frame and bolster the analysis of the spoiling groups as well. Each of the spoiler groups will be analyzed through Stedman's typologies focusing on the location, number, locus, and type of the spoiler being investigated. They will also be analyzed based on rational, structural, and normative factors from the other authors within the theoretical literature.

### **The Armed Islamic Group (GIA)**

The GIA represent the most apparent spoiler during the peace initiatives. The GIA emerged as an offshoot originally from the FIS. The GIA "broke with the latter organization [the FIS] because of its emphasis on electoral politics and its declared uneasiness with violent resistance to the government and attacks on supposed civilian collaborators of the FLN."<sup>60</sup> Many of the fighters in the ranks of the GIA were former veterans of the Afghan mujahideen fighting the Soviets in the 1980's.

Analyzing the GIA according to the Stedman's spoiler typologies reveals the GIA as both an outside spoiler and a total spoiler. The GIA clearly represents itself as an outside spoiler because of its exclusion from all three of the peace initiatives listed above and its use of violence to undermine the peace initiative. The GIA would be classified as a total spoiler because of its participation in spoiling behavior during all three peace initiatives as well as its strict and rigorous pursuit of a complete overthrow of the government in order to install an Islamic state. The GIA refused to accept any negotiation or dialogue preferring the use of arms and violence instead to accomplish its goal. The fact that during this entire period the GIA maintained this ideological stance sharply opposed to negotiation in favor of violence illustrates its immutable ideological preferences and categorization as a total spoiler.

The GIA from the outset looked beyond the politics of pluralism and believed that through arms was the only way to their goal of a true Islamic state. The leader of the GIA in December of 1992 stated, "We reject the religion of democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is equal to sedition. It has never been our intentions to participate in elections or enter parliament. Besides, the right to legislate belongs solely to God."<sup>61</sup> The GIA's representation as a radical Islamist group is defined publicly by the group itself as well as by other actors.

Hugh Roberts clarifies, "the GIA subsumed various elements which were never in the FIS, and always opposed its constitutionalist strategy, favoring a strategy of violence, namely the 'Afghans' and *al-Takfir wa 'l-Hijra*."<sup>62</sup> The GIA defines much of Stedman's total war typology by fulfilling his qualifications of immutable truths. Luis Martinez describes the binary belief system of the GIA. They "classified all individuals as either 'enemies of Islam' or 'supporters of the *jihad*.'"<sup>63</sup> One advantage of this ideological binary is that although much of the Islamic

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<sup>60</sup> James Ciment, *Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge*, (New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1997), 95-96.

<sup>61</sup> Jeune Afrique, 1/27/1994.

<sup>62</sup> Roberts, 154.

<sup>63</sup> Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), 208.

armed groups were divided and factionalized, the members of the GIA were extremely unified because of their small size and shared emphasis on their absolute ideology.

The direct opposition of the GIA to the peace initiatives transcends from their radical and revolutionary ideology. The three initiatives advanced a peace that to put it plainly was entirely unacceptable to the GIA. The GIA strictly opposed compromise and negotiations with the Algerian regime. The GIA were beyond the political goals of the FIS, which was to return the state to the status quo of the December 1991 parliamentary elections. The GIA saw the Algerian regime instead as illegitimate upon religious grounds, borrowing from Sayyid Qutb's conception of jahiliyya and jahili regimes.<sup>64</sup> The strict adherence of the GIA to their ideology left little room for compromise or negotiation since their only goal was to defeat the "apostate" Algerian regime and reach an Islamic state. Thus the peace initiatives sit in stark contrast with their ideology and are why the GIA was inherently in opposition to it.

The principle tactic of the GIA was the use of violence from outside the peace processes to undermine the process itself and the actors in support of the process. The belief system of the GIA opposed not only the Algerian regime, but also the FLN and the FFS because of their negotiations with the regime. The GIA also opposed the FIS, declaring them not to be "true Muslims," because of their capitulations with the Algerian regime and their goals of a constitutionalist and pluralist state. Martinez describes, "the GIA went to war against all the social groups which, involuntarily or deliberately, ensured that the regime continued in power."<sup>65</sup> James Ciment described that the GIA "has waged an all-out war against both the government and that segment of the civilian population it sees as insufficiently Islamic."<sup>66</sup> This strategy of total war is evident by GIA attacks on both public officials and public assets as well as on civilians by bombing cafes and stores. The GIA has also attacked international targets, specifically the French and aircraft hijackings. Much of their strategy was built around acts of terrorism, including the assassination of foreigners, journalists, and intellectuals in Algeria.

Hugh Roberts explains that their refusal of dialogue with the state has been coupled with a relentless employment of the most ferocious and savage methods and spoiling tactics.<sup>67</sup> Roberts's states, the GIA "has made the most atrocious acts of terrorism in general, and the killing of foreigners in particular, its trademark."<sup>68</sup> He continues, "The GIA has claimed the responsibility for all 36 foreigners killed since last September, and is likely responsible for the killing of intellectuals and unveiled women, and for the assassination of a former prime minister, Kasdi Merbah, last August."<sup>69</sup> In late 1993 the GIA issued a public deadline to all foreigners in Algeria giving them one month to leave the country and that "anyone who exceeds that period will be responsible for his own sudden death."<sup>70</sup> Michael Willis described the terror and assassination methods as, "The GIA demonstrated that it was willing to expand the armed

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<sup>64</sup> Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2001).

<sup>65</sup> Martinez, 208.

<sup>66</sup> Ciment, 96.

<sup>67</sup> Roberts, 154.

<sup>68</sup> Roberts, 164.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> The Times, 11/20/1993.

struggle in much more extreme and sinister directions.”<sup>71</sup> The spoiling tactics by the GIA illustrate the use of extreme violence and terror to undermine the peace processes, by not only targeting the process itself, but also the actors and civilian population in support of it.

One of the best examples of GIA spoiling tactics occurred just two weeks after the signing of the Sant’ Egidio Platform. GIA militants attacked the Algiers central police station in a suicide car bombing, killing 43 individuals.<sup>72</sup> The GIA attack succeeded in undermining the peace initiative setting off a chain reaction of back and forth violence between the GIA and the Algerian regime. The violence that followed effectively halted any last hope for a Sant’ Egidio breakthrough. The best theoretical method of analysis for the GIA is an approach focusing on their ideology and intent. Stedman’s profiling of the GIA is helpful as it clearly fits his criteria as both an outside and total spoiler. An analysis of the GIA finds its ideology as the most significant determinant of its action the works by Greenhill and Major, Zahar, and Aggestam focusing on structural and rational theoretical arguments help to further the analysis of the emergence of the GIA as a spoiler.

A rational model of cost-benefit analysis bolsters the GIA’s ideological reasoning. For the GIA it makes more sense to engage in armed combat and undermine these peace efforts than to support them. The peace initiatives are not only against their ideological vision, but also spoiling is their only negotiating chip. Marie-Jöelle Zahar states, “actors who are left out of the negotiated settlements have no stakes in peace and may have extensive stakes associated with the continuation of the conflict. From their perspective, the cost of peace is extremely high and its benefits low...violence, on the other hand, does not really cost them much.”<sup>73</sup>

The small constituency of GIA membership also disadvantages its political visions and ideology if used in a democratic or pluralistic setting. For the GIA as Zahar points out, violence and spoiling the peace initiatives fit not only its ideological goals for an Islamic state but also fits as a rational and strategic action.

The structural situation involving the GIA focuses on the domestic institutional constraints and opportunities within Algeria. The opportunity structure was permissive for the GIA to spoil these initiatives. During the periods of dialogue Algerian military offensives were slowed. The large territory of Algeria and the ongoing conflicts within the civil war made it difficult for the HCE to project its control over the Algerian state. There were little constraints to such action by the regime besides the threat of armed action in retaliation. The GIA’s acceptance of these risks no matter the cost limited the constraints of the Algerian regime. The capability of the GIA to spoil was boosted by this permissive opportunity structure and lack of institutional constraints.

The GIA had numerous arms and ideologues also increasing their capability. The GIA formed similar to many of the recent strains of *takfiri* or radical political Islamist groups after the Afghan *jihad*, such as Egypt in the 1990’s. Much of the membership of these groups were involved in the Afghan *jihad* and upon returning home turned a critical eye on their own domestic regimes. Luis Martinez also comments on a “deep-seated ‘longing for dissidence’ existed among the

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<sup>71</sup> Willis, 282.

<sup>72</sup> Khatib.

<sup>73</sup> Zahar, 166.

young.”<sup>74</sup> Martinez also describes, “the GIA gathered only ‘fanatics,’ impelled by hatred of the regime.”<sup>75</sup> The combination of the Afghanis, the *takfiris*, and a restless young population, combined with arms from campaigns in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Israel-Palestine, and Egypt represent the capability and resources available to the GIA. This combination of structural forces helped to support the emergence of the GIA as a capable and determined spoiler to Algeria’s peace initiatives.

In sum, the rational and structural additions to Stedman’s approach help to address the full context of the GIA’s opposition to the Algerian peace initiatives. Stedman’s model helped to profile the GIA as both outside and total spoilers, but the rational and structural additions by Greenhill and Major, Zahar, and Aggestam, help to complete the analysis for the GIA’s spoiling behavior. Greenhill and Major posit strategic exigency over individual motivations, but the emergence of the GIA as a civil war spoiler is best described by this combination of theoretical methods.

### **The Eradicators**

The eradicators make up one of the two major factions of the Algerian regime. They are described as the hardliner elements within the Algerian military and regime. The eradicators are drawn primarily from former officers of the French army who have held command positions in the Algerian military hierarchy or were French educated members of Algeria’s political class.<sup>76</sup> Hugh Roberts explains that the eradicators are “powerfully present in the army hierarchy, and has enjoyed the constant sympathy of Paris, as well as the vigorous support of the bulk of the French-language press in Algeria.”<sup>77</sup>

Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army General Mohammed Lamari and Prime Minister Redha Malek are the leaders of the eradicator wing. The political parties behind the eradicators have been the small Berberist party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), led by Said Sadi, the National Trade Union (UGTA), led by Abdelhak Benhamouda, and the former communist party (Ettahaddi) led by El-Hachemi Cherif. The eradicators are a strongly unified force united in their specific political ideology.

Categorizing the eradicator wing by Stedman’s typologies makes it an inside spoiler and a greedy spoiler. The eradicators are an inside spoiler during Zérroual’s peace initiatives because of their location within Zérroual’s regime and involvement in the process. During the Sant’ Egidio process the eradicators were outside spoilers as they were located outside of the peace initiative. The eradicators spoiled during Zérroual’s two peace initiatives because of their initial involvement in the peace initiative, only to later back out and change their support to undermine the initiative. The ideology of the eradicators is nearly as extreme as the GIA denouncing negotiation and conciliation with the Islamists and rebel groups. Although, unlike the GIA, the eradicators are not total spoilers because they have at times relented in their ideological commitments. This fact is partly obscured because as the position of the eradicators improved after 1995, and the relative decrease of power in the armed Islamist camps (especially the FIS),

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<sup>74</sup> Martinez, 207.

<sup>75</sup> Martinez, 208.

<sup>76</sup> Roberts, 155.

<sup>77</sup> Roberts, 155-156.

they were more willing to allow negotiations and amnesty packages to the Islamist and rebel groups.

The political vision and ideology of the eradicators has been to support the development of a modern state. This implies a “a radical rupture with the populist tradition of the FLN state and a secularist separation between politics and religion.”<sup>78</sup> Hugh Roberts describes their ideology as, “all-out repression as the way to deal with political Islam in general and the armed rebellion in particular.”<sup>79</sup> The eradicators opposed negotiation with what they termed terrorists, preferring to “eradicate” them, which is how they have been defined.

This ideological commitment by the eradicators puts them in clear opposition to the peace initiatives under Zéroual and Sant’ Egidio. The inclusion and re-legalization of the FIS is in direct contradiction to their ideology. The second initiative illustrate the inside spoiling behavior by the eradicators only after Zéroual continued to heed to more and more demands of the FIS without any security guarantees.

The tactics that the eradicators used were different from the GIA because of their insider spoiler position. The eradicators often acted behind the scenes to stir up opposition to Zéroual’s initiatives from the inside. During Zéroual’s first initiative, “dissident elements within the regime, although unable to openly express dissent, worked to mobilize opposition against Zéroual’s dealings with the FIS.”<sup>80</sup> The eradicators also worked more overtly by helping to stage marches, demonstrations, and executing their military strategy to provoke the FIS and GIA.<sup>81</sup> Willis concluded that, “the President’s initiative finally collapsed at the end of March, much of the credit for its failure went to the pressure exerted by figures such as Mohammed Lamari and Redha Malek on Zéroual.”<sup>82</sup>

The second peace initiative by Zéroual also highlights the tactics used by the eradicators to undermine and spoil Zéroual’s initiatives as an insider. Upon the release of the FIS leaders the eradicator leaders Lamari and Malek publicly spoke out against the initiative calling it a “unilateral concession.”<sup>83</sup> Lamari and Malek also criticized Zéroual for not sticking to the condition that Abassi Madani would have to unequivocally condemn terrorism before being released. “The demand that the FIS be permitted to reunite its leadership proved unacceptable to a regime which was already under pressure from its hardliners over excessive concessions to the FIS.”<sup>84</sup> The insider spoiler tactics by the eradicators clearly spoiled much of the negotiating efforts by Zéroual throughout 1994.

A rational and cost-benefit model for the emergence of the eradicators as a spoiler identifies their small size but large political and economic role in the state as a leading cause for their spoiling behavior. The eradicator wing represents a small constituency of the Algerian populace, even

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<sup>78</sup> Hugh Roberts, “Algeria between Eradicators and Conciliators,” *Middle East Report*, (July-August, 1994), pp. 26.

<sup>79</sup> Roberts, 164.

<sup>80</sup> Willis, 321.

<sup>81</sup> Willis, 322.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Willis, 335.

<sup>84</sup> Willis, 337.

when combining all three of the eradicator political parties (the RCD, the UGTA, and Ettahaddi). Roberts concludes, “Because of its small following, the eradicator position has been consistently oriented towards the most authoritarian concept of the state and the most repressive strategy for dealing with the rebellion.”<sup>85</sup> Even with a small constituency the eradicators hold a disproportionate amount of power in the state. This balance lacking constituency and legitimacy coupled with political, economic, and military power leaves much for the eradicators to protect. The rise of the FIS on religious grounds, but more importantly as a political rival, especially in a pluralistic system represented a clear threat to the eradicators. The distribution of relative power forces the eradicators to act and spoil. The legalization of the FIS and including them into a pluralist political system would inherently strengthen the FIS and weaken their power. The rise of a greater pluralistic and democratic system, led by the FIS, would begin to marginalize the eradicators hold on power and threaten their legitimacy. These rational and cost-benefit reasons strongly support the emergence of the eradicators as spoilers for Algeria’s peace initiatives.

The emergence of the eradicators as spoilers is reinforced by their unique structural position within the Algerian political system. The authoritarian nature of the state and their partial control of it allowed the eradicators to exert strong political influence. The opportunity structure of the Algerian Civil War provided an accommodating situation to engage many of the Islamist and rebel elements in society. Through arms the eradicators protected their position on top of the Algerian political food chain from Islamists and pluralists. Their position within the Algerian regime limited them from most constraining factors to their spoiling behavior. Their political, economic, and military control also yielded nearly limitless capabilities for spoiling as well. The eradicators benefited from the structural and contextual factors of a high level of capability and resources to pursue their ideological beliefs within a permissive opportunity structure for such action.

The eradicators have also had the support of important international actors. “The international community is not, of course, eager to see the Islamists enter into political power and will thus give the Zeroual regime maximum benefit of the doubt in his assertions of interest in opening a national dialogue.”<sup>86</sup> The French government in particular strongly supported the eradicators in their spoiling tactics and their commitment against the FIS and the Islamists. The French often gave aid to the eradicators and political support, such as French Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua.<sup>87</sup> With friends like Pasqua, the eradicators did not need to support a dialogue. Lastly, negotiations with the IMF by the Algerian regime and military in 1994 succeeded in allowing the government to reschedule its debt repayments, proving a substantial financial windfall.<sup>88</sup> They were also given over forty billion Francs from the international community to back economic liberalization, which was under their control.<sup>89</sup>

In sum, the emergence of spoiling behavior opposed to the peace initiatives follows not only their ideological sentiment, but is supported rationally, and structurally as well. The spoiling tactics of the eradicators illustrate their disdain for the peace initiatives and their willingness to

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<sup>85</sup> Roberts, “Algeria between Eradicators and Conciliators,” 26.

<sup>86</sup> Fuller, 106.

<sup>87</sup> Kapil, 4.

<sup>88</sup> Martinez, 179.

<sup>89</sup> Martinez, 228-229.

act upon these grounds. The ideology of the eradicators to completely eliminate the Islamists in pursuit of a modern state underlies their opposition to a strengthened and revived FIS under the peace initiatives during the Z eroual presidency. Roberts goes as far as to say that “The main obstacle to the necessary meeting of minds...is the Algerian army.”<sup>90</sup>

## **The Conciliators**

The leader of the Conciliator movement is President Liamine Z eroual. The conciliators make up the other wing within the Algerian regime. They are defined by their belief that repression and security measures alone cannot work and that a political solution aimed at a compromise between the regime and the Islamists movements, including the FIS, have the best chance to end the civil war in favor of the regime.<sup>91</sup> The conciliators do not maintain the same level of unity that is seen in the eradicators or GIA because of the more fluid ideology compared to the eradicators and the GIA.

Using Stedman’s typologies, the conciliators acted as limited spoilers because of their limited goals of regime stability and legitimacy while also lessening the conflict in Algeria. During Sant’ Egidio initiative the Algerian government was not involved and remained an outside spoiler. The conciliators were squarely against the Sant’ Egidio platform and spoiled the initiative and instead focused on their push for presidential elections and increased security.<sup>92</sup> The ideology of the conciliators focuses on regaining control of the state through negotiations and a political solution, particularly with the FIS. The Algerian government lacked political capital and a large constituency, while proper negotiations with the FIS would add their constituency and political capital of the people back to the Algerian regime. A solution to the conflict would then best be reached not by the eradication of the FIS, but through working with the FIS. Hugh Roberts states,

The conciliators have operated on the premise that the state’s massive loss of legitimacy since 1989 makes the implementation of a radical program of Jacobin modernization in the teeth of popular resistance a total non-starter, and they have accordingly argued that a compromise must therefore be struck with the substance of the Islamist movement, namely the FIS. Only by readmitting the FIS to the legal political process can the state recover the necessary legitimacy in the eyes of majority public opinion, and only if the FIS has a stake in the political process and a share of power can its formidable capacity for channeling public opinion on the streets be harnessed by the state...<sup>93</sup>

Giving the FIS a stake in the state and utilizing their potential large-scale capital and constituency would offer the regime its chance to regain its legitimacy and lessen the civil conflict. The conciliators believed that it would be better off for the state to harness the FIS then to continue military campaigns that have not provided any increases in either stability or security, but instead seemed to be only diminishing the legitimacy of the regime itself. If a political solution or agreement could be worked out with the FIS, then the political sphere and stability of the Algerian state would increase. The resurgence of control and legitimacy of

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<sup>90</sup> Roberts, 178.

<sup>91</sup> Roberts, 164.

<sup>92</sup> Fuller, 103.

<sup>93</sup> Roberts, 156.

the regime could allow the military to retreat from its overly exposed political position, preferring to rule but not govern.<sup>94</sup> This will then help to further return legitimacy to the military and the regime by moving further out of the political limelight while safeguarding its positions and influence within the state.<sup>95</sup>

The platform of Sant' Egidio was to a large extent in line with that of the conciliators. The reason for the emergence of the conciliators as spoilers has to deal with the timing of events and shift in Zérroual's strategy. After the failure of Zérroual's two initiatives he and the conciliators had lost much of their political capital within the Algerian regime and had to acquiesce to some of the demands of the eradicators in order to strengthen their own internal ranks.

Zérroual's changed his strategy in October of 1994 following the failure of his two peace initiatives and before the Sant' Egidio process. Zérroual decided that instead of using the FIS and negotiations to increase his political capital and legitimacy, he would instead hold Presidential elections. This would allow him to increase the legitimacy between the regime and society, while also placating to the eradicators by giving them an increased role for military intervention to increase his legitimacy with them.

The spoiling tactics adopted by the conciliators against the Sant' Egidio Platform was to disregard and reject the contents of the platform. The Algerian regime also "continued through the early part of 1995 to prosecute both its long-term political plans as well as a vigorous security policy."<sup>96</sup> Willis concurs, stating "It became clear during the early part of 1995 that the centerpiece of the regime's political policy was the pledge to hold presidential elections before the end of the year."<sup>97</sup> Luis Martinez also signals that the failures at Sant' Egidio were because the initiative clashed with the new combined strategy of Zérroual to restart elections.<sup>98</sup> Even with the concessions in Sant' Egidio the FIS did not unequivocally condemn political violence, but did drop charges to restore the 1991 election results. With Zérroual's new strategy (presidential elections coupled with increased military pressure) in motion the time for negotiation for the moment had passed leading to the emergence of the conciliators as spoilers to the Sant' Egidio process.

The increased military strategy is highlighted by the promotion of the head eradicator Mohammed Lamari, giving the military a free hand in engaging rebel groups. This promotion also signaled Zérroual's attempts at appeasement to the eradicators.<sup>99</sup> Zérroual also sought to "break up the unity of Sant' Egidio grouping of opposition parties by co-opting certain of them into political cooperation."<sup>100</sup> Zérroual's strategy of increased military pressure with a divide and conquer covert negotiating strategy destroyed much of the momentum of the parties at Sant' Egidio.

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<sup>94</sup> This concept along with authoritarian stability by the military can be found in: Steven Cook, *Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2007).

<sup>95</sup> Roberts, 157.

<sup>96</sup> Willis, 346-347.

<sup>97</sup> Willis, 348.

<sup>98</sup> Martinez, 223.

<sup>99</sup> Pierre and Quandt, 32.

<sup>100</sup> Fuller, 105.

The rational model of costs and benefits fits the change in strategy for the conciliators and their choice to spoil Sant' Egidio. The emergence of the conciliators as spoilers has more to do with timing than it does ideology. The strategic shifts within the Algerian political situation forced Z roual's hand into managing a strategy to regain his own legitimacy at the expense of undermining the Sant' Egidio process.

The structural situation for the conciliators primarily explains their spoiling behavior. The domestic institutional constraints and opportunities within Algeria were shifting and the advantage of negotiation with the FIS was diminishing. The opportunity structure and capabilities for the conciliators to spoil was nearly effortless since the FIS and the Sant' Egidio platform was counting on the regime to take their national charter as a serious step in negotiations. The only constraints to their spoiling behavior was the lack of social support for the regime in early 1995, but the increased security measures and free hand of the eradicators worked to protect the regimes interests. Thus the failures of the first two initiatives forced the regime to seek out strategies to legitimize its rule and lessen Algeria's civil conflict.

Consideration of the Algerian regime and President Z roual himself as limited spoilers represents the expanded focus on the normative considerations within spoiling. The special circumstances of Sant' Egidio to reach 80% of the Algerian population and agree upon a national consensus without the regime, still represents a legitimate and significant peace initiative. The choice of the conciliators and the Algerian regime to undermine leads to its categorization as a spoilers. The broad approach of spoilers by Newman and Richmond sets much of the groundwork for the conciliators and President Z roual to be listed as spoilers.

In sum, the failure of Z roual's two peace initiatives led to a revised strategy for the conciliators. This strategy still fit their limited goals to lessen the Algerian conflict and maintain regime legitimacy, but instead of negotiations with the FIS, this new strategy advocated spoiling behavior by the conciliators against the Sant' Egidio process. The structural and rational analysis of spoiling provides the best insight for the emergence of the conciliators as spoilers.

### **OUTCOMES: Z roual's Election and the Collapse of the FIS-AIS**

The outcomes of the three peace initiatives between 1994 and 1995 had ended in failure. Much of the reasoning behind this failure was the spoiling by the GIA, the eradicators, and the conciliators. The failure of Sant' Egidio was the "last resort for political actors marginalized by the dynamics of the civil war."<sup>101</sup> Following Sant' Egidio the situation in Algeria worsened for the FIS and Algeria's Islamist.

Sofiane Khatib and Michael Willis describe the key events and problems following Sant' Egidio. First, was the inability of the FIS to signal its control over the armed Islamists. This included both the AIS and the GIA, which decreased the value and negotiating position of the FIS. If the FIS was not in total control of the Islamist militants then negotiating with them became less valuable, "the government could not have been sure who really controlled the insurgency."<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Martinez, 223.

<sup>102</sup> Khatib.

Second, this hesitation by the Algerian regime proved accurate as a suicide car bombing attacked the central Algiers police station two weeks after the Sant' Egidio platform killing forty-three people.<sup>103</sup> The third event was the response of the Algerian eradicators to the GIA suicide bombing, which represented the “determination of the military to gain the upper hand in the struggle with the armed groups.”<sup>104</sup> This response was the harsh military response to the riot within the Sekardji Prison in Algiers in February of 1995, leaving ninety-six Islamist prisoners dead. Many Islamists believed this attack was a response to the car bombing of the Algiers police station on 30 January 1995.<sup>105</sup> The fourth even was the Algerian military victory over the Islamists at Ain Defla in March 1995, which ended a weeklong battle leaving several hundred Islamists dead.<sup>106</sup> Fifth and finally, the Interior Minister of Algeria in March 1995 announced an expansion to the program on the formation of self-defense militias to combat the armed groups in remote settlements in Algeria.<sup>107</sup> These list of developments illustrate the increasing intensity between the Algerian regime and the FIS following Sant' Egidio and the conviction of the regime to stick to its policy of increased military action with the Presidential election looming in November of 1995.

The Algerian regime also issued the Rahma Law in early 1995 aimed at creating desertions within Islamist rebel groups. The Rahma Law declared that citizens who disarmed would be granted amnesty as long as they were not involved in blood crimes, permanent injuries, or destruction of public property and assets. Those involved in blood crimes would have their death penalty commuted to between fifteen and twenty years in prison, and all other prisoners would have their sentences reduced in half.<sup>108</sup> The main goal of this law was to create large numbers of deserters in the guerilla and Islamist camps. The regime identified that groups such as the GIA and GSPC would have to be dealt with differently than the FIS. The Rahma Law offered a political solution to some of the moderate members of these groups by inducing them to accept the lightened sentences, while allowing the regime and military to keep up the pressure on the rest of the Islamist groups.

On 16 November 1995 the Algerian presidential elections followed through as planned. The elections were highly contested as they were boycotted by the FIS, FLN, and FFS. The GIA also threatened violence to all who participated in the elections. After multiple disqualifications of some Z eroual's opposition candidates he won the election easily gaining 61% of the vote.<sup>109</sup> The elections were still considered by the conciliators as the best means for President Z eroual to regain his legitimacy and control over the political process in Algeria.<sup>110</sup>

The success of the elections strengthened the position of the Algerian regime and the success of its strategic turn back in October of 1994. This long-term strategy of Z eroual and his conciliators inadvertently benefited the military. For the most part the military's maneuver had

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<sup>103</sup> Khatib.

<sup>104</sup> Willis, 347.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Willis, 348.

<sup>108</sup> Khatib.

<sup>109</sup> The entire election results can be found in: Willis, 395.

<sup>110</sup> Fuller, 103.

worked by increasing the strength of the state while also beginning to discredit and delegitimize the FIS political mandate of 1991. “The surprisingly high turnout (officially 71 percent) and the successes of General Liamine Zérroual... showed that the government had to a great extent achieved what it had been setting out to get – the political parties that had won the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991 had now lost legitimacy. The choice of civil war strengthened the military in their political and economic choices.”<sup>111</sup>

Much of the reasoning behind Zérroual’s shift in strategy in October of 1994 was based on the troubled relations between the GIA and the FIS-AIS. The FIS had a difficulty of distancing themselves from the spoiling behavior of the GIA and more specifically from their violent attacks. FIS leader Rahah Kebir illustrates this point, “We don’t have any relations with the GIA because this group is only pursuing the military option. They alone are responsible for what they are doing inside Algeria.”<sup>112</sup> The FIS supported the armed rebellion against the Algerian regime because of the lack of political and constitutional means appropriated to them. This sharply distinguishes the FIS from the GIA because the GIA did not care for constitutional and political inclusion instead supporting the overthrow of the state to install an Islamic state.

Roberts explains that if the armed groups of the FIS, like the MIA and AIS “had been able to maintain a monopoly of the guerilla resistance to the regime, than a political resolution along the line Zérroual favored might be well advanced by now. But there has been a joker in the pack.”<sup>113</sup> The joker Roberts was referring to was the spoiling efforts of the GIA. The GIA’s strength and violent nature only continued to undermine the negotiating position of the FIS, as their leadership was considered less valuable if it could not help control the violence over all of the armed Islamists.

Throughout 1995 and 1996 the GIA intensified its attacks on not only the Algerian regime, but specifically against the FIS. The failure of the preceding peace initiatives and the high turnout at Zérroual’s election had struck the FIS a heavy blow.<sup>114</sup> The inability of the FIS to control the GIA destroyed most of the momentum and unity of the Sant’ Egidio. Even worse the GIA in 1997 pursued actions of mass civilian massacres, aimed at wiping out whole villages. The Rais massacre claiming between 200 and 800 lives while the Bentalha massacre claimed between 100 and 400 lives, both orchestrated by the GIA. The FIS-AIS, which at this point was engaged in an all-out war with the GIA as well as the government, found itself in an untenable position. The FIS-AIS was also afraid that the GIA massacres would be blamed on them. So on 21 September 1997, the AIS ordered a unilateral ceasefire starting in October. Their purpose was to unveil the GIA’s role in the massacres and clear their name. In conclusion following the failures of the 1994 and 1995 Algerian peace initiatives, Zérroual’s new strategy succeeded in an asymmetric shift in the Algerian political chessboard. The strategy of the Algerian regime to increase military pressure, push for presidential elections, and induce moderates to flea guerilla camps began to unlock and open up the situation in their favor.

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<sup>111</sup> Martinez, 223.

<sup>112</sup> Willis, 352.

<sup>113</sup> Roberts, “Algeria between Eradicators and Conciliators,” 25.

<sup>114</sup> Fuller, 106.

With the collapse of the FIS-AIS and the victory of the Algerian regime different interpretations have attempted to address the significance of Z eroual’s strategy and the role of the GIA, the eradicators and the conciliators. Fuller gives an explanation for Z eroual’s victory and the implications for Algeria’s regime and eradicators. Fuller states,

One interpretation of the elections could be that the junta’s hardline policies have “worked,” that is, the radical and most violent have been put on the defensive, they seemingly have no prospect for their own military victory, they were unable to stop the elections and the (partial) legitimization of Z eroual’s regime and the international community has been unwilling to undercut Z eroual and in fact is willing to accord him a greater degree of legitimacy (and time) than he has had in the past. Why, then, should the regime go on to make concessions to the FIS when it is in a position to continue to marginalize it in the political process.<sup>115</sup>

Willis states similarly that following the elections “Z eroual is confident of securing compromises from the FIS through capitalizing on the divisions and ructions the party has experienced since the presidential elections. He clearly hopes that a section of the party will effectively break ranks and negotiate with him in the hope of being allowed to participate in the planned legislative elections.”<sup>116</sup> Both of these quotes highlight the formative shift that occurred in Algeria, especially for the FIS and Algerian regime after the failures of the 1994 peace initiatives and Sant’ Egidio. The FIS seems to represent the biggest loser in this shift while the eradicators and conciliators appear to be the winners. The presidential elections and the collapse of the FIS-AIS demonstrated that the priorities for many Algerians had changed since 1991 and the political mandate of the FIS and its social capital had mostly faded away.

By the end of 1994, beginning with President Z eroual’s new strategy the situation for the FIS began to wane. The electoral capital of the FIS (the FIS electorate that voted for the FIS candidates in the June 1990 municipal elections and the December 1991 parliamentary elections), had all but dried up as this former electorate, “ceased from 1994 to identify with the actions of the armed groups in the cause of an Islamic state.”<sup>117</sup> The FIS was struck a major blow during this time period and continued to worsen, especially after the vigor of GIA attacks on the FIS and its massacres on civilians. The FIS-AIS had no other option but to accept a ceasefire and acquiesce to the regimes amnesty efforts. This ceasefire signaled the dire position of the FIS because of the changing nature of the Algerian conflict after the spoiling of Algeria’s three most significant peace initiatives between 1994 and 1995.

## CONCLUSION

The objective of this chapter was the synthesis of the spoiler concept within a time and space bounded case study. The goals of this study were to further the investigation and analysis of spoilers as well as to gain a greater understanding of the Algerian Civil War. The investigation of Algeria’s peacebuilding initiatives between 1994 and 1995 reveal four important conclusions. First, the best approach to the analysis of the spoiler problem in peace processes is a comprehensive approach that combines, ideology, rationality, structural context, and the normative situation. Second, a spoiler investigation reveals spoilers within both the armed

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<sup>115</sup> Fuller, 105.

<sup>116</sup> Willis, 388.

<sup>117</sup> Martinez, 111.

Islamist rebel groups as well as the Algerian regime. Third, the GIA and the eradicators represent the most effective and consistent spoilers, undermining each peace initiative. Fourth, the spoiling behavior of the three Algerian peace initiatives, represent a formative historical moment in Algeria as the collapse of these initiatives coincided with the collapse of the negotiating position of the FIS to the favor of the Algerian regime.

The need for mutual negotiations became less important and the asymmetric differences between the FIS and the regime became more apparent. The failed initiatives in fact benefited the regime by eventually forcing the FIS-AIS to a unilateral ceasefire under the terms of the regime rather than under mutual negotiation. This fits with the description by Ekaterina Stepanova. She states, “Many conflicts in the world do not lead to *any* formal peace processes or *any* formal peace agreements (they either drag on or the solution is imposed or enforced, not negotiated).”<sup>118</sup>

### **Lessons for Spoilers and Spoiling**

The emergence of spoiling behavior by the GIA, eradicators, and conciliators answers the question of who spoiled these initiatives, but the reason for their emergence as a spoiler goes much deeper. The best method for the investigation of the emergence of civil war spoilers comes from a comprehensive spoiler analysis. The combination of Stedman’s ideological profiling with a structural and rational approach provided by Greenhill, Major, Zahar, and Aggestam provides a more complete spoiler analysis. Newman and Richmond’s emphasis on the normative nature of spoiling and peace initiatives is also important. The fact that Sant’ Egidio was the largest collection of Algeria’s constituency in a peace initiative but was spoiled by the Algerian regime is an important normative development and case for who can be a spoiler.

A comprehensive approach also allows for differing actors to be analyzed by the approach that best fits their emergence as a spoiler. In the case of the GIA they are best defined by their strict adherence to their radical ideology, they fit Stedman’s total spoiler as they continue to spoil even if it is not rational by disregarding the increasing costs without much benefit. The eradicators ideologically follow a course that is best suited in their best rational interest. For the eradicators spoiling provides them the ability to remain in a dominant position within the Algerian government and state. The conciliators only spoiled during the last peace initiative. The reasoning for their action is based on the changing rational and structural conditions in Algeria. This change made spoiling Sant’ Egidio more beneficial to their limited goals to lessen the Algerian civil conflict and reestablish the legitimacy of the government. In sum, each of these methods of analysis can provide valuable insight into the emergence of a particular group as participating in spoiling behavior, supporting a comprehensive approach.

The profiling of spoilers can be similarly advanced by this comprehensive approach. The categorization of the eradicators as a greedy spoiler instead of total spoilers is attributed not to their ideology, but instead to structural and rational factors. The GIA is considered a total spoiler because of its consistent radical ideology and its consistent violent attempts to undermine and spoil the peace initiatives. The eradicators are different from the GIA because of their structural position and rational choices. If the eradicators had been in the same position as the GIA they

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<sup>118</sup> Ekaterina Stepanova, “Terrorism as a tactic of spoilers in peace processes,” in *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during conflict resolution*, Edited by Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp. 78.

may have continued to spoil at all costs and be categorized a total spoiler. But the failures of the peace initiatives strengthened the relative position of the eradicators at the expense of the GIA, making the eradicators greater winners and the GIA greater losers by the situation. The continued position of the GIA as a loser in the conflict is mainly responsible for its continuation of spoiling at all costs and its total spoiler label. While the eradicators benefited from this asymmetric shift in the situation in Algeria and no longer needed to spoil as frequently, categorizing them instead as greedy spoilers.

Another lesson for spoilers might be the increased focus on William Zartman's concept of a "mutually hurting stalemate."<sup>119</sup> Zartman explains that conflicts can reach an equilibrium where neither side is getting closer to achieving their goals, and the costs of conflict for both sides becomes more costly than the benefits gained from conflict. This leads to the mutually hurting stalemate, which is the best time for negotiations and proposals for conflict settlement.<sup>120</sup> The peace initiatives by Z roual and especially the Sant' Egidio Platform revealed that to actors involved they had not yet reached a mutually hurting stalemate, and in some respects it was never reached. The strategy by Z roual and the stubbornness of the eradicators had led to greater relative advantage to each of these groups. After this shift it became clear that between the three peace initiatives a mutually hurting stalemate had not been reached.

One of the complexities with Zartman's concept is the lack of monoliths between sides during negotiation. In the summer and autumn of 1994 the FIS and conciliators were prepared to negotiate, while the GIA and eradicators were not. This complicates the situation as spoilers then can perhaps derail even these times of mutual negotiation, as I have argued was the case in the first two peace initiatives. The role of fringe and spoiler groups remains significant then because of their ability to represent a small minority, but pack a big punch. Such as the eradicators by occupying important positions of power within the state, or the GIA by their willingness to use extreme violence, both of these groups and strategies effectively neutralized what was becoming a ripe period for mutual negotiation. What was almost a ripe condition for negotiation in 1994 and 1995 had shifted so tremendously by 1997 that the primary Islamist armed group the FIS-AIS declared a unilateral ceasefire in the face of the growing strength of the Algerian regime relative to the strength of the FIS.

Avenues for the future study and use of the spoiler concept should be to better distinguish how to analyze the emergence of spoilers. Is a comprehensive approach best, does one method of analysis really contain the determinants of spoiler action? One of the biggest difficulties for continuing to investigate each of these avenues has been the difficult nature in gathering information to properly address the situation. Zahar agrees stating that this type of "calculus is naturally bounded."<sup>121</sup> Another avenue is how the spoiler concept relates with other concepts in conflict and post-conflict literature? The spoiler conception adequately addresses a label on losers from negotiations who use violence to undermine peace processes. Greenhill and Major's

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<sup>119</sup> I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 66-78. Also in: I William Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts," in *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry*, ed. Alexander George (Westview, 1983); Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Westview, 1985), pp. 258-60; I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Zahar, 163.

“lens of bargaining”<sup>122</sup> and Aggestam’s “competitive negotiation”<sup>123</sup> are other possible approaches in determining the behavior of peace negotiations and spoiling. Each of these questions is valuable in conflict and post-conflict study as well as in answering the big question on why has it been so difficult for dialogues and peace initiatives to take flight?

### **Lessons for the Algerian Civil War**

The synthesis of a spoiler analysis on the Algeria case also contributes lessons to the greater study of the Algerian Civil War. The formative shift in Algeria in 1994 and 1995 highlights the importance of legitimacy to the Algerian regime. Roberts states that the purpose of dialogue between 1993 and 1995 had been to “secure a transfer or redistribution of legitimacy.”<sup>124</sup> Once the Algerian regime gained legitimacy through their new strategy and presidential elections, they continued to use this momentum to reestablish the government holding referendums in 1996 and parliamentary election in 1997 (continuing a ban on the FIS).

The goals of the regime had always been to lessen the civil conflict and the maintenance of regime legitimacy to maintain their power, which is evident throughout the rest of the civil war. The momentum in favor of the regime no longer necessitated a mutual negotiation with the FIS. The collapse of the FIS-AIS and their unilateral ceasefire in 1997 and followed by their full disbanding in 2000 for the most part accomplished these goals. With the FIS-AIS out of the way the regime and military then targeted the isolated GIA. The GIA (torn by splits and desertions and denounced by all sides even in the Islamist movement) was rendered combat ineffective in 2002 after focused army operations, which concluded the Algerian civil conflict and civil war.<sup>125</sup> This situation in Algeria leading to the advantage of the regime was largely created because of the spoiler problem. The actions of Algeria’s civil war spoilers destroyed the best hope for a mutual dialogue and peace process between the Algerian regime and the FIS. The dialogue between the regime and the FIS failed largely in part to the spoiling and conflict from the GIA and the eradicators.

Another lesson from the Algerian Civil War focuses on the inability of the FIS to properly communicate and unite its various members. The FIS was derailed because of its difficulty in uniting and communicating with the locus of its group. The rivalry between the FIS and GIA exacerbated this problem, as the GIA greatly undermined the negotiating ability of the FIS. The international support of France, the IMF, and later the United States to the eradicators also is partly responsible for the capability and spoiling of the eradicators.

Lastly, the spoiler analysis helped to reveal much of the true nature and reasoning behind the civil war, brushing away the simple assumptions and dichotomies often associated with the conflict. Hugh Roberts clarifies, he states, “If we look for one moment at the configuration of the political chessboard in Algerian, we do not see a simple dichotomy between a revolutionary Islamists movement on the one hand and the state on the other. We find that the political actors

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<sup>122</sup> Greenhill and Major, 12.

<sup>123</sup> Aggestam, 36.

<sup>124</sup> Roberts, 168.

<sup>125</sup> The GSPC has continued to attack military and state targets in terroristic attacks since 2003, but the civil war and majority of the violence is over.

fall into at least six different categories, and that there are at least two of everything.”<sup>126</sup> The factions within the Algerian regime between the eradicators and conciliators, and in the Islamists between the GIA and FIS highlight this fact. The conflict can also be properly broken down into two primary contentions. The first issue is over the ideological question of the position of Islam in the Algerian constitution and the Algerian state. The second issue is a more pragmatic question over the re-legalization of the FIS.<sup>127</sup> Both of these conflicts find their roots since Algerian statehood as emphasized in Algeria’s conflict history.

Anwar Haddam declared at the end of Sant’ Egidio that, “The crisis is not due to divergences between the FIS and the Government. It is clear today that it is the whole political class, the civil society, that demands a return to the political process.”<sup>128</sup> This statement emphasizes that the FIS, FLN, FFS and many of the December 1991 FIS voters were not directly in conflict with the issues of Islam ideologically by 1994 and 1995, but instead were more concerned with the pragmatic issue of an end to the military’s authoritarian rule, the re-legalization of the FIS, and a return to the political process. Michael Willis points out that half who voted for FIS did so to punish the authoritarian order of the state.<sup>129</sup> The GIA on the other hand represents an actor more concerned not with the return of the FIS to the political system, but instead to the role of Islam and the state.

In conclusion, the Algerian case provides an important case study within the study of civil war spoilers. The GIA and eradicators were the principal spoilers in the conflict, and following Sant’ Egidio the conciliators as well. The emergence of these spoilers was not from only the Islamic question, but also from the authoritarian nature of the state and pragmatic questions relating to the re-legalization of the FIS. The actions of these spoilers impacted not only the specific peace initiatives, but also changed the civil war and conflict as a whole, with the collapse of the FIS-AIS. From the preceding analysis it is clear that there is a volatile and fragile nature within the peace initiatives, and that spoilers can undermine not only the specific initiative, but turn the conflict as well.

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<sup>126</sup> Roberts, 164.

<sup>127</sup> Roberts, 164-167.

<sup>128</sup> Willis, 342.

<sup>129</sup> Willis, 296.

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