




E-PARCC

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE

Program for the Advancement of
Research on Conflict and Collaboration

JOINT ACTION PLAN: NEGOTIATIONS ON THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

TEACHING NOTE



LOGISTICS, SETUP, AND INSTRUCTIONS

Preparation time: 120 minutes (60 minutes for individual prep time done as homework + 60 minutes for group prep time in class)

Negotiation time: 3 hours includes time for groups to reconvene as well as for side conversations with other groups.

Debrief time: 1 hour

Variations

This simulation can be run with either 12 negotiators (two per role) or six negotiators (one per role). Multiple groups can be run simultaneously. If six-person groupings are not possible, groups can negotiate without India, Saudi Arabia, or Israel. If time is an issue, the simulation can proceed without first negotiating the negotiation protocols.

Materials Checklist

1. General information which includes:
 - a. Background information
 - b. Description of participants
 - c. Description of issues and options
2. Draft negotiation protocol
3. Confidential instructions for each role (6)
4. Preparation for Negotiation Worksheet

This simulation was written by Anil Raman and Steven Smutko of the University of Wyoming and was awarded Honorable Mention in E-PARCC's 2015-2016 Competition for Collaborative Public Management, Governance, and Problem-Solving Teaching Materials. The simulation is intended for classroom discussion and not to suggest either effective or ineffective responses to the situation depicted. It may be copied as many times as needed, provided that the authors and E-PARCC are given full credit. E-PARCC is a project of the Collaborative Governance Initiative, Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration- a research, teaching and practice center within Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.

https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/parcc_eparcc.aspx

Operating Procedures

Preparation should be done both individually and in groups. Hand out instructions to students before the simulation so that students can study the scenario and their roles individually. Allow 45 minutes for students to read and review the materials. It is best to hand out the materials in advance so that individual preparation time does not take up class time.

After the students have read the material, have them meet in groups of their respective roles (e.g., all students assigned as Iranian representatives meet). In their groups, the students will work through the *Preparation for Negotiation Worksheet* by discussing and answering the questions. Allow 45 minutes for group preparation.

Before starting the negotiation, make sure that everyone understands the general instructions and the mechanics of the negotiation.

1. Answer questions about background and setting.
2. Explain that your role is to observe and assist with the negotiation process. You will call for formal votes throughout the negotiation and keep track of time.
3. Explain that the final decision must be approved by at least 5 of the 6 negotiators and that the P5+1, Iran, and the EU must be part of the agreement.
4. There will be three formal votes taken during the negotiation:
 - a. Vote #1 will be taken 15 minutes into the negotiation
 - b. Vote #2 will be taken 1 hour into the negotiation
 - c. Vote #3 will be taken 2 hours into the negotiation

You will call for the votes at the appropriate time

5. The negotiation is complete when at least 5 of the parties settle.
6. Debrief the negotiation.

NEGOTIATION DEBRIEF AND DISCUSSION

After the students have completed their negotiations and while they are still in their negotiating groups, ask them to take 15 minutes to discuss the following questions together:

1. What made the negotiation process work well? Identify and discuss specific actions and behaviors by specific people that enabled the group to make progress.
2. What made the negotiation process challenging? Identify and discuss specific actions and behaviors by specific people slowed progress or prevented the group from reaching an agreement?

Following the in-group assessment, record the negotiated outcomes of each negotiating group using the table below. For each issue, record the option number that was finally agreed to. Some negotiating groups may have settled on a blend of options. If this is the case, record the option number that most closely corresponds to their negotiated outcome.

Outcomes		Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Number of Parties in Agreement					
Issue Agreements:					
	Uranium Enrichment				
	Plutonium Accounting				
	IAEA Inspections				
	Economic Sanctions				
	Weapon Restrictions				

The discussion and debrief of this simulation can cover three topics: negotiating the process, negotiation and problem solving, and negotiating across cultures.

Negotiating the Process

The negotiating parties had to find a way to agree on a set of protocols to guide their negotiations. This can be tricky; given that they have to find a way to reach an agreement before establishing a code of conduct.

- Did any groups have difficulty walking the fine line of negotiating protocols without having a code of behavior from which to establish behavioral norms? What were the most difficult hurdles for you in negotiating these protocols?
- This list of negotiation protocols was admittedly very brief for such an important negotiation. In hindsight, would you have included additional protocols or guidelines to help smooth your negotiations? What guidelines would have been helpful?
- Reaching an impasse on procedural details can easily scuttle international negotiations before they begin. Can you think of mechanisms for establishing negotiation protocols in international negotiations that reduce the risk of failure before negotiations begin?

Negotiation and Problem-Solving

Discuss the opportunities and challenges of creating value and reaching agreement on the issues presented in the negotiation. Investigate how the students prepared for their negotiation, what negotiation strategies the students intended to employ, and how they adapted their strategy as the negotiation progressed.

- What strategy did you decide to use before getting to the table? Was it a distributive/competitive strategy or an integrative/collaborative strategy?
- How did you adapt your strategy as the negotiation progressed? Did it shift from competitive to collaborative or vice versa, or did it remain constant?
- How well were you able to communicate your interests to the other parties? Do you think you fully understood the interests of the other parties? What helped or prevented you from sharing interests?
- Did you work to articulate a common or shared goal among all parties early in the negotiations? If so what was it?
- Were you able to establish a modicum of trust among the negotiators in your group? What enabled you to gain trust? What made it difficult? Do you feel that any negotiators in your group were untrustworthy? What made it difficult for you to trust them? Did anyone one in your group model trustworthiness? What did they do to gain and keep your trust?
- Each negotiator came to the table with a hierarchy of preferences on each issue. This created a complex problem to resolve -- figuring out who valued which option and why, and then trying to knit solutions together that reflected the preferences of each negotiator. How did you handle this complex task?
- How did you reach agreement on any one issue? Did any parties use strategic concessions to their advantage? Did you engage in “logrolling”, trading low-value options for high-value options?
- What helped you break potential impasses? Were any behaviors or actions taken by certain negotiators particularly useful?
- What made it challenging to reach an agreement? Were any behaviors or actions taken by certain negotiators especially unhelpful or challenging?

Negotiating Across Cultures

The instructor material on negotiation and culture (included below) may be presented before or after the debrief. Another option is to use the material as a reading that students would complete before or after the negotiation. Discuss the challenges involved when negotiators are communicating and negotiating through vastly different cultural lenses. Before going through the list of questions, ask each negotiator to reveal a particular negotiation style or behavior that

they were instructed to use. Discuss these on the culturally defined shared values of individualism/collectivism, power distance, masculinity/femininity, religiousness/secularism, and past/future orientation.

- Each negotiator was instructed on how to communicate and to perceive others through a specific cultural lens. Was it easy or difficult for you to play your role convincingly? Why?
- Were you able to adapt to the cultural norms and needs of the other negotiators? Which cultural norms and/or behaviors that were different from yours were you able to accommodate? Which norms or behaviors were most difficult for you?
- Did cultural differences arise during the discussion of negotiation protocols? If so, what were they?
- Did the choice of negotiation strategy (distributive/competitive vs. integrative/collaborative) differ among the parties because of culture?
- In what way, if any, did cultural differences affect the outcome of this negotiation?

INSTRUCTOR MATERIAL: NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE

Culture deeply affects how people think, communicate and behave, and influences the kind of deals they make and how they make them.¹ Scholars, like Jeswald Salacuse, argue that negotiation customs are different in different cultures and that culture can influence “negotiating style” – the manner individuals from various cultures conduct themselves in the negotiation process.² In the Joint Action Plan negotiations, the involvement of individuals from at least six countries and as many cultures ranging from the US to Europe to the Middle East to Asia presents the complex process of negotiation. The primary parties, namely the United States and Iran, have widely differing cultures which have implications for negotiation styles.³

Influence of Culture in Negotiations

Culture shapes an individual’s four main social elements: values, norms, attitudes and behavior. These can be understood to affect the other sequentially i.e. values affect norms which influence attitudes which shape behavior. In negotiation, while behavior is apparent and attitudes can be discerned, norms and values are harder to judge while contributing to the

¹ Roy J Lewicki, David Saunders, Bruce Berry, *Negotiations, Readings, Exercises and Cases*. (New York: McGraw-Hill; 2010): 339-370.

² W. Salacuse Jeswald, “Ten ways that culture affects negotiation results: A survey.” *Negotiation Journal* July (1998): 221-241.

³ Hamid Yeganeh, “The ‘Great Satan’ talks with the ‘Evil’ A cross cultural analysis of the American-Iranian communication/negotiation styles.” *International Journal of Conflict Management*. Vol. 22 No. 3, (2011): 219-238.

negotiation stance.⁴ Cultural differences affect negotiations in many ways. It can create misunderstanding in communications, cause difficulties in interpreting actions, have an impact on the form and substance of the deal, and influence the negotiation style or the manner in which people conduct themselves in the negotiation.⁵ While negotiation style can be assessed in various ways, one method of analyzing cross-cultural negotiations is through the framework suggested by Salacuse (1998).

Ten Factors in Deal Making across Cultures

Since the vast diversity of the world’s cultures makes it a difficult proposition to understand all the nuances of differing cultures. One way to analyze the effects of style is by identifying the factors which may affect the negotiation process as given in Figure 1.⁶ Goals may differ for different cultures: for e.g. for Americans it may be a signed contract but for others, especially Asians, it may be the establishment of a relationship.⁷ Compatibility of goals is affected by how a culture views the results of the negotiation. Some cultures like the American, European and South American view negotiations as a struggle in which one side gains while the other loses. Some like the Asian (Japanese, Chinese and Indian) as well as the French desire a negotiation which benefits all the parties.⁸ How a negotiator interacts, dresses, speaks and uses titles

Figure 1
The Impact of Culture on Negotiation

Negotiation Factors	Range of Cultural Responses
Goal	Contract ↔ Relationship
Attitudes	Win/Lose ↔ Win/Win
Personal Styles	Informal ↔ Formal
Communications	Direct ↔ Indirect
Time Sensitivity	High ↔ Low
Emotionalism	High ↔ Low
Agreement Form	Specific ↔ General
Agreement Building	Bottom Up ↔ Top Down
Team Organization	One Leader ↔ Consensus
Risk Taking	High ↔ Low

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⁴ Lewicki, *ibid.*341.

⁵ Philips Hughes and Brian Sheehan. ‘Business Cultures: The Transfer of Managerial Policies and practices from one culture to another’. *Business and the Contemporary World*, (1993).

⁶ Salacuse.*ibid.* 344.

⁷ L. Pye. *Chinese Negotiation Style*. (Cambridge, MA: Oelsgschager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).

⁸ Salacuse. *Ibid.*347.

influences his or her style. Americans, South Americans, and Indians consider themselves less formal while Europeans (particularly Germans) and East Asians adopt a more formal style of negotiation.⁹ How negotiators communicate is important: while Germans, Israelis, and Americans are direct, Asians and Arabs are indirect.¹⁰ These differences may lead to misperceptions regarding honesty and aggressiveness.

Time sensitivity varies across cultures. In general, Americans are quick to make the deal while Europeans and Asians tend to be slower and more deliberate.¹¹

Emotionalism is another factor which affects negotiations. As per Salacuse's survey, Latin Americans tended to be more emotional while Germans and Japanese tended to be less so. This affects not only the behavior of negotiators but often the substance of the deal.¹²

The form of the agreement also varies across cultures with Americans desiring a detailed written agreement which is viewed as a contract. Asians prefer a more general agreement since they see it as the establishment of a relationship.¹³ The form of understanding whether an inductive or deductive process also has been found to vary with cultures. In general, the Europeans and Indians prefer a top-down approach, i.e. from a general agreement to the specifics, while the Japanese and South Americans prefer a bottom-up approach.

In international negotiations, it is important to know how the other side is organized for decision-making. Americans tend to authorize one "supreme leader" while other cultures like the Asians and Europeans adopt a more 'team' approach.¹⁴

Risk taking is another important factor in negotiations which is affected by culture. As per Salacuse's survey, the British, French and Indians profess a greater risk taking ability compared to South Americans and Japanese. As is evident from the discussion above, the impact of culture on negotiation is significant and needs to form part of the preparatory actions. It is, therefore, important to examine the negotiation styles of the two primary parties in the Joint Action Plan Negotiation, namely Iran the United States.

⁹ E.T. Hal, and M Reed Hall. *Understanding Cultural Differences*. (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press,1990).

¹⁰ Lewicki, *ibid*,350.

¹¹ *Ibid*.

¹² *Ibid*.

¹³ Lewici, *ibid*,350.

¹⁴ *Ibid*. 352.

Comparison: Western vs. Middle Eastern Negotiation Styles

One method of comparing Western and Middle Eastern negotiating styles is through a cultural lens as explained by Hamid Yeganeh.¹⁵ While Yeganeh's focus is on the cultural characteristics of Iranian negotiators, this comparison is broadened somewhat to include cultural differences between the Middle East and North America/Western Europe more generally.

High context vs. Low Context

Middle Eastern culture is categorized as high-context since meanings are conveyed through the context of communication.¹⁶ In contrast, Western culture may be classified as low-context since meanings are conveyed through the message and context does not matter as much.¹⁷

Implications for negotiations: The quality of communications between Middle Eastern and Western negotiators could be affected by their differences in high/low context.

Poly-chronic vs. Mono-chronic Cultures

Polychronic cultures such as Iran give greater importance to people and human relationships rather than task accomplishment and building of lasting relationships.¹⁸ On the contrary, monochronic cultures such as North America and Europe are characterized by logic, task accomplishment, commitment to regulations and plans rather than people, and short-term/weak interpersonal relationships.¹⁹ Implications for negotiations: As a polychronic culture, negotiators from the Middle East focus on building relationships as a prelude to trying to achieve a deal.²⁰ Implications for negotiations: this communication style could frustrate monochronic Americans who would prefer to negotiate logically and arrive at well-thought plans by the defined deadlines.

Collectivism vs. Individualism

Many Middle Eastern societies are collectivistic, where identity is based on the social system, and individual interests are subordinated to group identity and requirements.²¹ In individualistic societies, identity rests on the person and primacy of the individual is paramount.²² North American and European cultures are considerably individualistic and characterized by features such as weak family ties, the supremacy of professional relations over personal ones, result-

¹⁵ Ibid. Yeganeh.

¹⁶ E.T. Hall. *Beyond Culture*, (New York: Anchor Press,1976).

¹⁷ E.T. Hall. 'The silent language of overseas business'. *Harvard Business Review*.1960. May-June, 87-95.

¹⁸ Hall (1976). *ibid*.

¹⁹ *Ibid*.

²⁰ W.O. Beeman. *Language, Status and Power in Iran*. (Bloomington: University Press,1986).

²¹ H. Yeganeh, Z. Su and D. Sauers. 'Toward a refined alternative of the cultural distance index', paper presented at Annual Academy of International Business, Indianapolis, IN, 2007.

²² G. Hofstede, *Cultures Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values*. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,1980).

orientation, and individual independence.²³ Implications for negotiations: Their linkages influence Middle Eastern negotiators to the centers of power and decision making, which may be based on family connections and loyalties.²⁴ Since identity is founded in the social system, keeping face is critical, and negotiation stance may be built on keeping face rather than concrete achievements. Informal mechanisms where rigid positions need not be taken are preferred, and negotiators tend to seek back-channels to attain their goals. In contrast, as members of an individualistic society, Westerners are less concerned about face, honor and loyalty towards their group and prefer logical options which achieve desired outcomes.

High Hierarchical Distance vs. Low Hierarchical Distance

Most Middle Eastern cultures are characterized by a high level of hierarchical distance.²⁵ Politically and historically, large hierarchical distance has been instilled in Iranian culture through the 2,500 years of the monarchy until the Islamic Revolution (1979) and the theocratic Guardianship after that.²⁶ Shi'ism, Iran's dominant religion promotes a hierarchical culture by advancing the importance of the clergy (imams) and their role in society as well as in politics.²⁷ North American culture is described as relatively low in the hierarchical distance.²⁸ This leads to lesser concentration of authority and equality of roles with the ideal leader being democratically elected. Implications for negotiations: Iranian negotiators may not have the power to make act independently at the negotiating table and may have to consult leaders before making decisions and accepting conditions.

Feminine vs. Masculine

Middle Eastern cultures such as Iran can be described as being relatively feminine in that they do not emphasize performance, and are characterized by higher levels of emotionality and preference with the status quo.²⁹ In contrast, Western culture is markedly masculine, placing emphasis on performance, effectiveness, and assertiveness.³⁰ Implications for negotiations: The feminine orientation of Middle Eastern societies may lead to a slow pace of negotiations and

²³ G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,2007).

²⁴ Yeganeh, *ibid*.

²⁵ A. Dastmalchian, M. Javidan and K. Alam. 'Effective leadership and culture in Iran: an empirical study'. *Applied Psychology*. Vol. 50 No. 4. (2001): 532-58.

²⁶ Yeganeh, *ibid*.

²⁷ Y. Richard. *L'islam chiite: Croyances et Ideologies*. (Paris: Fayard, 1991).

²⁸ S.H. Schwartz. 'Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries', in Zanna, M.P. (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 25. (1992): 1-65.

²⁹ Hofstede, *ibid*.

³⁰ R. House, et al. *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,2004).

procrastination.³¹ This would be tiresome for North American and European negotiators whose masculine culture emphasizes assertiveness and performance.

Religious/Traditional vs. Secular/Rational

Middle Eastern countries, can be categorized as traditional and religious.³² Middle Eastern society promotes values such as the importance of family ties, deference to authority, absolute moral standards, and rejection of homosexuality, divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide³³. By contrast, North America and Europe have relatively secular/rational societies in which religion is less prominent in daily life, authority is less respected, and decision making is based on rationalism.³⁴ Specifically, the Iranian leadership and the Iranian society view the West as an interfering and corrupting power that undermines pure religious values of Iranian society.³⁵ Iranians also have a sense of animosity towards the West remembering their bitter historical experiences with colonial powers like Britain, Russia, and the United States.³⁶ This deeply ingrained animosity is likely to affect Iranian negotiators' attitudes and the substance of negotiations.

The Past vs. Future Orientation

Iran and other Middle Eastern countries tend to focus on past glories rather than future challenges.³⁷ Mythological beliefs, both from the pre-Islam and Islamic eras, form part of the collective consciousness of Middle Eastern cultures which influence their views, opinions and daily activities. On Iran, the past glories of the Persian Empire instill pride and yearning for reclaiming that heritage but at the same time, the humiliation by colonial powers generates anger and distrust. The United States on the other hand, as a young nation, prefers to embrace the present and plan for the future. Implications for negotiations: To deal with Iranians it is important to understand their history and grasp that much of the Iran looks at the world through the lens of history and that its nuclear program is as much about reviving its past glory as it is ensuring its present security.³⁸ Iranians feel strongly that when countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India have nuclear arsenals, they are unfairly persecuted. Iran sees itself as one of the world's ancient and sophisticated civilizations, and that it deserves a prominent position on

³¹ E. Daniel. *The History of Iran*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,2001)

³² R. Inglehart, and W. Bake. 'Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values'. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 65, (2001): 19-51.

³³ *Ibid*.

³⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁵ S.P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1996).

³⁶ N Keddie and E. Hooglund. *The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic*. (Syracuse, NY : Syracuse University Press, 2003).

³⁷ Daniel, *ibid*.

³⁸ Shayegan. *ibid*.

the world stage. This conflicts with the American style that adopts an ahistorical, arrogant, and ethnocentric approach.³⁹

Evil vs. Great Satan

Iranian culture is steeped in the tradition of the Great Satan – the ancient religion of Iranian Zoroastrianism and is based on the struggle between Ahura Mazda (the “Lord Wisdom”) and evil satanic spirits.⁴⁰ Evil hidden hands have been held responsible for Iran’s woes. Traditionally foreign invaders and colonizers have been framed in this context. An example is the 1953 coup arranged by British and American secret agencies to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh, an event which rankles the Iranian psyche to this day.⁴¹ It was, therefore, simple for the revolutionary government in Iran, inspired by Zoroastrian and Islamic framing of evil, to label the United States as the “Great Satan”.⁴² With the United States pursuing a hostile policy towards the revolutionary regime in Iran through economic sanctions, military threats, funding dissident groups, creating ethnic/social unrest and supporting adversaries like Saddam, the imagery of evil was fully accepted by the Iranian people.⁴³ The United States on the other hand, also views Iran as a foe, with President George Bush using evangelical imagery to declare Iran, a member of the “Axis of Evil.”⁴⁴ Implications for negotiations: The reciprocated imagery of evil and mistrust that both sides have of each other raises the biggest obstacles to their bilateral communications/ negotiations. By framing the other as ‘evil’ the very idea of negotiation is blasphemous to the Zoroastrian, Islamic, and Judo-Christian heritages of both cultures involved, and therefore makes negotiations difficult.⁴⁵

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ F.R. Kluckhohn and F.L. Strodtbeck. *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, IL.: Peterson, 1961).

⁴¹ Shayegan. Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ F. Halliday. ‘Iranian foreign policy since 1979: internationalism and nationalism in the Islamic revolution’, in Cole, J. and Keddie, N. (Eds), *Shi’ism and Social Protest* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1986).

OPTION: ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE IRAN NUCLEAR

Agreement Negotiations

The aim of the negotiation is to reach an agreement on the neutralization of Iran's weapon program and the subsequent easing of economic sanctions applied to Iran since 2006. Certain additional issues like restrictions on conventional arms and missile capabilities and release of dues owed to Iran from banking restrictions were also included in the conditionalities for negotiation. While there are many methods to arrive at a solution to the negotiation, two possible results are using the Nash method and the Maximin method.

Nash Solution

The Nash solution is one which produces the best overall result in societal terms. Regarding the simulation, the Nash solution would consist of the best possible results within the overall negotiation framework for the maximum parties even if one party (in this case Iran) loses much more.

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Selected Option</u>
Uranium Enrichment	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 98 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 3 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 5000 in the next 10 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.
<u>Plutonium Accounting</u>	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) from Iran as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.
<u>IAEA Inspection</u>	24 hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; enforcement of Additional Protocols; IAEA safeguards under Code 3.1 (early notification of projects and design changes) enforced and IAEA access to sites within 45 days of reported suspicious activity.
<u>Economic Sanctions</u>	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years UN will cease to be seized of Iran's nuclear file; the heavy arms embargo lifted immediately.
<u>Missile & Conventional Weapons Restrictions</u>	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 3 years and missile restrictions in place for 5 years.

Maximin Solution

The Maximin solution is a more equitable solution than the Nash in that it maximizes the value of the party which has received less in the negotiation. Regarding the Iran nuclear deal simulation, the Maximin solution would consist of the best possible results within the overall negotiation framework for Iran while the other parties gain less.

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Selected Option</u>
Uranium Enrichment	Reduce stockpile of HEU by 90 %; Keep levels of enrichment to 5 %; reduce the number of centrifuges to 6000 in the next 12 years and no uranium enrichment permitted at Natanz plant.
<u>Plutonium Accounting</u>	Arak reactor redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium; ship out all spent fuel rods (source material for weapons-grade plutonium) from the country as long as this reactor exists; Iran not permitted to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years.
<u>IAEA Inspection</u>	24 hour access to all nuclear sites including military ones; selected enforcement of Additional Protocols and IAEA access to sites within 60 days of reported suspicious activity.
<u>Economic Sanctions</u>	UNSC terminates all previous resolutions targeting Iran's nuclear program on implementation day; for 5 years sanctions are subject to snapback; all frozen funds amounting to \$ 150 billion to be released on implementation day; after 5 years UN will cease to be seized of Iran's nuclear file; the heavy arms embargo lifted immediately.
<u>Missile & Conventional Weapons Restrictions</u>	A heavy arms embargo will remain in place for 5 years and missile restrictions in place for 8 years.

Evaluation

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Importance (General)</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Maximin</u>	<u>Nash</u>
Uranium Enrichment	High	Iran	Most adverse terms. No HEU is available.	Very strict terms. Limited HEU is available.
	Very High	The Rest	Most favorable terms. Ensured blocking of Uranium route to weaponization.	Very favorable terms. Near complete blocking of Uranium route to weaponization which would be greatly delayed.
Plutonium Accounting	Low	Iran	Most adverse terms. No plutonium is available.	Most adverse terms. No plutonium is available.
	High	The Rest	Most favorable terms. Ensured blocking of plutonium route to weaponization.	Most favorable terms. Ensured blocking of plutonium route to weaponization.
IAEA Inspection	Less high	Iran	Very favorable terms. Intrusion restricted and no access to military sites.	Most adverse terms. Access to military sites permitted and plans and purchase of equipment to be scrutinized.
	High	P5+1	Very unfavorable terms. Complete access to all locations desired for the foolproof system to check weaponization. Adequate warning period to hide activities.	Most favorable terms. Access to military sites permitted and a mechanism to check future weaponization efforts included.
	Low	EU, Saudi Arabia, and Israel	Unfavorable terms. Greater warning period of hiding activities.	Favorable terms. Access to military sites permitted and a mechanism to check future weaponization efforts included.

	High	India	Very favorable terms Respect for Iran's sovereignty maintained	Very unfavorable terms Iran's sovereignty completely violated
Economic Sanctions	Very High	Iran, EU, and India	Most favorable terms. Immediate and complete relief from sanctions.	Most favorable terms. Immediate and complete relief from sanctions.
	Low	P5+1, Israel, and Saudi Arabia	Unfavorable terms. Leverage over Iran in the case of agreement violation is reduced. The increase in regional tensions is likely given funds for support conflict.	Unfavorable terms. Leverage over Iran in the case of agreement violation is reduced. The increase in regional tensions is likely given funds for support conflict.
Missile & Conventional Weapons Restrictions	Very High	Israel and Saudi Arabia	Very favorable terms Iran's military capability restricted	Very unfavorable terms Fewer restrictions on growth of Iranian military capability Arms race likely to increase regional tensions and instability.
	High	Iran	Less favorable terms Inability to build military capabilities to desired levels.	Favorable terms Fewer restrictions on growth of Iranian military capability
	Low	P5+1, EU, and India	Favorable terms Iran's military capability restricted	Less favorable terms Fewer restrictions on growth of Iranian military capability

Conclusions

1. The Maximin and Nash solutions of the negotiations have differing results. The Nash solution clearly favors the parties that are opposed to Iran whereas the Maximin solution is more balanced with Iran benefitting more of its issues.
2. The overall alignment and strong preferences of three parties, P5+1, Israel, and Saudi Arabia on critical issues such as uranium enrichment, plutonium accounting and inspections led to the former getting a more favorable deal. India gained the most as while it was for strict conditions on uranium enrichment and plutonium accounting, it was also for an early lifting of sanctions, which led it to benefit on three issues, especially if the Maximin solution is adopted. Iran gained the least as apart from the lifting of economic sanctions; it had to settle generally for less desirable options.
3. Overall the negotiations were a success since the countries which wanted to neutralize Iran's nuclear weapon program achieved it through strict conditions on uranium enrichment, plutonium accounting, and inspection regime. Iran benefitted because its economic sanctions would be lifted immediately and dues released.
4. While the danger from nuclear weapons has been vastly reduced, conflict in the Middle East is likely to intensify in the short term because the new economic relief to Iran and the relatively less binding restrictions on conventional weapons and missiles are likely to intensify the Sunni – Shia proxy war as well sets off an arms race.