Discursive Legacies: The U.S. Peace Movement and “Support the Troops”

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To mobilize support for war and to control dissent, governments draw upon deeply engrained discourses regarding soldiering and the citizen’s duty to support the troops. We identify the cultural and political evolution of the discursive legacy of “support the troops” from the Vietnam War through the Iraq War. Using longitudinal and comparative organizational analyses, we analyze how this discursive legacy was engaged by U.S. peace movement organizations (PMOs).

PMOs frequently made positive references to U.S. troops during both the Gulf War and Iraq War, creating a stable discourse centered around supporting the troops. Moreover, during the Gulf War the movement expanded the web of support by asking who else should be cared about beyond the troops, thus de-coupling the support discourse from the nation and the state. During the Iraq War, PMOs also developed an elaborated “discourse of betrayal” by redefining what it means to support the troops. Here they deployed proactive, anticipatory discourses, turning the tables on the Bush administration. PMOs also increasingly criticized the troops during the Iraq War due to well publicized human rights abuses.

The findings demonstrate that movement discourses are both stable and flexible, influenced by past rounds of discursive contention as well as contemporary political events. We highlight the cultural constraints imposed on movements by dominant discursive legacies, and the strategic responses made by movements in response to emerging discursive opportunities. Keywords: peace, discourse, social movements, troops, Iraq War.

The relationship between soldiering and citizenship in the United States is long and intimate. The colonial militias required episodic military service as part of citizenship. During the Civil War, male immigrants of new minority groups were cajoled to prove their commitment to the United States and shunted directly into the military upon landing ashore. In general, military service has been valorized as the definitive demonstration of citizenship, the most heroic, the most dangerous, and the most selfless (Shapiro 1994; Snyder 1992; Tickner 1992).

With the cooperation of the mainstream media (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Small 1994), policy elites have successfully used these widely and deeply resonant beliefs about citizenship and soldiering for two purposes: to mobilize popular support for war and to stigmatize...
war opponents. During the Vietnam War, protest was equated with disrespect for the troops, demonstrators were marked as failing in their citizenship (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990; Fendrich 2003; Huebner 2002), and the media portrayed them as extremist (Gitlin 1980). During the Gulf War, war supporters were often characterized as normal citizens while protesters were deviant rebels who failed their civic duty to rally round the flag (Allen et al. 1994; Kelman 1995). Nonetheless, our research shows that this is not a one-way discourse. The peace movement “talked back” (Steinberg 1999), deploying the support the troops mantra to mobilize opposition to war.

Through carefully conceived, rigorous longitudinal and comparative organizational analyses not common among many studies of social movements, we assess how the U.S peace movement has engaged hegemonic constructions of soldiering and the need for citizen support for the troops across two conflict periods: the Gulf War and the Iraq War. Understanding movement discourse during these periods means we must examine in a secondary way the Vietnam War-era peace movement. Throughout we identify, define, and elaborate on the meanings of the discursive legacy of “support the troops.” We find that movement discourses are influenced by past rounds of discursive contention as well as by contemporary political events. Consistent with our concept of discursive legacy, the findings indicate that the movement made extensive positive references to soldiers in both the Gulf War and Iraq War periods, demonstrating that social movements can produce structured and relatively stable discourses across conflict periods. On the other hand, despite being identity based and ideologically driven, the U.S. peace movement also adapted and changed its discourses in response to previous experiences and to shifting discursive opportunities. Amidst the sea of yellow ribbons during the Gulf War, the U.S. peace movement articulated an expanded “web of concern” that went beyond caring for only U.S. soldiers. During the Iraq War, movement organizations anticipated the power of the support the troops discursive legacy and took advantage of interrelated cultural and political changes to proactively develop an elaborated “discourse of betrayal” that was directed at the Bush administration’s own failings to support the troops. In so doing, they took the discourse in a new direction, which shifted the role of betrayer from the peace movement to the government. Peace movement organizations clearly learned from previous rounds of discursive contention that war supporters would focus on criticizing their level of support for the troops. This led them to anticipate both new and recurring challenges. The discursive legacy concept and the broader results reveal how experience with past rounds of discursive contention interact with contemporary contexts to shape movement discourses.

We begin by discussing the theoretical underpinnings of our research, then explain our data and methodology, followed by the data discussion. Since the discursive legacies concept is central to our analysis, we approach it initially through the research on policy legacies and later from the point of view of discourse analysis and framing.

Policy Legacies

People structure their understandings of a current war through their memories and interpretations of earlier conflicts (Chatfield 2004; Lembcke 1998). Thus, if World War II was the good war, then the Vietnam War was the bad one. More recent peace movements have been constrained by the pitched contestations in the United States over the Vietnam War. For example, a faulty historical memory about the Vietnam War peace movement was a robust cultural resource elites used to mobilize popular support for the Gulf War and to trivialize dissent (Beamish, Molotch, and Flacks 1995; Hackett and Zhao 1994). We found that even the Iraq War peace movement was impacted by deeply embedded cultural beliefs emanating from 40 year-old discourses about the Vietnam War. Policy research helps to better understand this phenomenon.
Some policies produce cues or “focusing events” that draw citizen attention to a policy and contribute to how those policies are interpreted (Kingdon 2002). Certain public policies are so influential that they develop legacies that significantly affect later policy making. These “policy legacies” have multiple impacts. They affect later policies, information flows, social learning, actors’ emotions and even their normative understandings about practices, institutions, and organizations linked with the policy (Halfmann 2003; Skocpol 1992). There is, in other words, a deeply cultural and interactive component to a policy legacy, particularly when focusing events happen. This also occurs during political turmoil, when “critical junctures” occur and policy actions are taken that represent substantive departures (Gal and Bargal 2002). The Vietnam War era and the policy legacies it spawned are a useful example.

The Vietnam War has a hauntingly long reach, hovering like a ghost over contemporary discourses and policy making (Herring 1991; Morgan 2000). Following the Vietnam War, U.S. foreign policy was partially constrained by the Vietnam Syndrome, which in turn gave rise to the Powell Doctrine. The Vietnam Syndrome refers to a presumed degree of reluctance among the U.S. populace and some policy makers—following the Vietnam War—to support full-scale military interventions abroad. One of its effects was that it contributed to U.S. presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan relying more on covert military interventions and so called “low-intensity warfare,” including with proxy armies, to further U.S. geo-strategic interests globally (Klare and Kornbluh 1988).

Still, many yearned to be free of the Vietnam Syndrome constraints. As President Reagan explained, a major cause of the United States defeat by Vietnam was because U.S. troops were “denied permission to win.” His successor, G. H. W. Bush, claimed that the troops were forced to fight in Vietnam “with one hand tied behind their backs” (Appy 2004:B12). The Powell Doctrine, developed in advance of the Gulf War, said that the United States ought to intervene militarily only with overwhelming force and with explicit and achievable objectives. This would allow for both demonstrable policy success and a relatively quick withdrawal, two interdependent outcomes thought necessary to maintain public support for the war. Indeed, this is why President G. H. W. Bush euphorically announced at the end of the Gulf War that, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!” (Herring 1991:104).

**Discursive Legacies**

In the same way that the Vietnam War spawned policy legacies, it also gave rise to what we call “discursive legacies.” Discourses are ways of talking and writing that carry a set of underlying assumptions about how the world does and should work. Discourses structure how we think about and discuss the world around us. Discourse can either transmit dominant ideas or be used to create an upheaval of ideas (Foucault 1978). Social movements attempt to shift or transform these dominant discourses (Naples 2003:91). To do so, a movement must provide new ways of talking and writing that mix criticism of conventional thinking with alternatives. These new approaches are most likely to shift popular thinking if they resonant with the comfortable dominant discourse.

We define discursive legacies as well-established, repetitive, restrictive, and culturally recognized ways of talking and writing about a particular issue over time. They are the discourses that have triumphed in the contention over the terms of public debate on a recurring

1. We conceive of discursive legacies as a particularized dimension of the broader embedding concept of discursive fields. Discursive fields refer to the discursive terrain across which meaning contexts occur, and which encompass cultural materials as well as social movements, action targets, counter movements, the general public, and the media (Snow 2004; Spillman 1995; Steinberg 1999).
issue. In this sense, they often roughly reflect existing power relations. Put differently, in political discourse the past matters; previous ways of talking and writing about a recurring public issue shape contemporary discourses. There is no *tabula rasa* upon which a peace movement organization can etch its official statement.

Similar to policy legacies, discursive legacies influence information flows by informally establishing boundaries on what is relevant, on what information is brought to bear, and on which interpretations are perceived as credible. We argue that in these ways a discursive legacy can have demonstrable epistemological effects in a society as it structures both individual and collective learning. There are also normative components. Discursive legacies deliver packages of normative understandings that because of their familiar and authoritative nature are difficult to question (e.g., the troops deserve our support, or, true patriots must support the troops).

In addition, discursive legacies may also structure emotion expression. This is done overtly as in the slogan: “America’s best are proud to serve and we are proud of America’s best, our troops,” but also more tacitly. For example, a Google search on the “support the troops” phrase returns as the first site: “America Supports You, Our Military Men and Women.” This U.S. Department of Defense Web site was set up in November 2004 to encourage support for the troops in Iraq. It features an interactive box called “Thank the Troops for Your Freedom,” where heartfelt messages are left that thank, celebrate, and encourage the soldiers. This site is in part a product of the support the troops discursive legacy, and yet at the same time it continually reproduces that legacy. It is also an instance of powerful actors using their organizational capacities to reinforce discourses and cue responses that legitimate their agendas.

Recent studies have highlighted the ways that organizational identities and ideologies can inhibit discursive adaptation (e.g., Reese and Newcombe 2003; Rohlinger 2002; Steinberg 1999). The formation of systematic beliefs, core value convictions, and strong group commitments combined with discursive legacies could lead to the expectation that movement discourses, once created, remain mostly fixed over time. Yet, discursive legacies are not impervious to new challenges. For example, peace groups attempted to change the ascribed roles in the discourse, so that it is the state that is said to betray the troops, not the peace movement. Indeed, as our data will show, new challenges from oppositional groups may effectively modify a discursive legacy, amending its boundaries, changing its content, and modifying its meanings. Such innovations often constitute creative responses to lessons learned from past rounds of discursive contention or the seizing of opportunities for heightened resonance presented by changing political and cultural circumstances (Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005).

Finally, a discursive legacy contains within it some of the rhetorical contestations of the originating events. Later discourse is informed by the original exchanges and responds to the earlier contests that were formative in creating the legacy. However, later rhetorical disputes are not constrained by a discursive legacy in any deterministic sense. It is better to think of a legacy as the water within which today’s discourse swims. The water is deep enough and wide enough to provide room to maneuver within the shores of the legacy. Getting completely out of the water, however, is another matter all together.

Our concept of discursive legacies is best understood within the broader context of the literatures on social movement framing and discourses. We set that context in what follows immediately below.

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2. Many have apparently taken the cue to offer thanks to the troops for their freedom. By March 3, 2007, 265,292 messages had been posted to the troops in Iraq, who in turn left 2,358 responses to those original postings of thankfulness (U.S. Department of Defense n.d.).
The Symbiotic Relationship of Discourse and Framing

A frame is an “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding” issues, events, and experiences (Snow and Benford 1988:137). In other words, framing is a process that offers interpretations and assists in constructing meanings. Framing an issue in a new way is a measurable and recordable action. As such, it can help researchers capture how participants in framing have the agency to influence discourse. Yet, it is important to note that discourses and frames are actually in a relationship of mutual benefit or dependence, i.e., they are in symbiosis. Thus, dominant discourses also possess the potential to shape and constrain frames (Ferree 2003; Steinberg 1999). We further argue that the presentation of the new frame is a contribution to the discourse around a particular phenomenon. Most frames are not designed to make a radical break with the existing discourse, but are aimed at shifting the discourse direction (Tarrow 2003).

Frames that resonate with the general public often do not appear widely through the discourse in the exact form the movement proposed. There are feedback mechanisms that shape and modify the initial frame. Positive and negative feedback can lead to increased use, abandonment, or modifications. Frames that do not fit into the dominant discourse or attempt to shift it too quickly or too radically are likely to risk negative feedback from general audiences. When a frame fits well it resonates with the general public and its potency may be increased (Snow and Benford 1992). Frames used consistently gain legitimacy and develop a deeper resonance. They can carry a historical momentum and create a future trajectory reaching beyond the initial framing act. Thus framing can be used to harness or challenge the dominant discourse (Coy, Maney, and Woehrle, 2003; Maney et al. 2005).

Framing analyses too often suggest that activists can easily combine symbols and fashion them into a multitude of persuasive messages. Marc W. Steinberg (1998, 1999, 2002) proposes substituting the concept of discursive repertoires for frames. He defines discursive repertoires as ideological processes driven by specific sociocultural contexts and patterns of interaction with dominant discourses. Once challengers have drawn from a dominant discourse, they often find themselves limited in terms of their rhetorical options. Steinberg’s dialogic analysis and his concept of discursive repertoires was an important but partial corrective to this problem insofar as it did not adequately specify historical and contemporary contextual factors shaping discursive practices (Steinberg 1999). While acknowledging that past conflicts shape discursive repertoires, his analysis focuses upon the actions of the English cotton spinners in the 1820s and early 1830s rather than over several decades. Our concept of discursive legacies demonstrates more clearly how and why past rounds of discursive contention reaching back more than 40 years continue to shape contemporary political discourse. In addition, Steinberg notes that few studies have managed to demonstrate that movement discourse is produced in stable and structured forms. Our methodology empirically demonstrates the existence of a structured and relatively stable discourse used over time by prominent peace movement organizations.

To describe the relationship of discourses and frames another way, each discourse is like one of the many threads used to weave the fabric of a society. Together the various discourses help create the cultural context into which frames are introduced. Colors and textures of the threads (discourse) may shift, but they continue carrying ideas forward even within a context of change. Frames are the sections of the woven fabric of society upon which people are encouraged to focus. During discursive debates and exchanges, different ideas are debated. That pulling and tugging can shift the dominant discourse. Yet, some of the threads (discourses) have impressively strong staying power and these serve as an anchoring point where challengers try to tie in new threads, shifting the fabric, or the meanings of the discourse. These persistent ideas and language we call discursive legacies, one of which we analyze in detail below. They have high levels of resonance and long-term staying power. Discursive
legacies can serve the purposes of the dominant discourse or they can be the anchoring point for alternative frames aimed at creating new ways of thinking and talking about important and recurring social issues.

Method

Our research is primarily based on two original data sets, one from the Gulf War and another from the Iraq War. The first data set consists of the official statements of five major U.S. peace movement organizations issued immediately before and during the Gulf War of 1990–1991.1 The organizations included are the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC); the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR); Peace Action (PeaceA); Pax Christi (PaxC); and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). As with most social movements, the U.S. peace movement experiences changes in its organizational composition over time. In particular, several new peace movement organizations formed after the September 11th attacks. To increase confidence that the discursive patterns exhibited by PMOs included in our analysis are representative of patterns in the movement as whole, we include data from an additional nine U.S. PMOs that issued statements from the run-up to the Iraq War in 2002 to just past the two-year anniversary of the beginning of the war in March 2005. The additional nine PMOs are: the Black Radical Congress (BRC); the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR); CodePink (CodeP); Moveon.org (Moveon); the New York City Labor Against the War (NYCLAW); True Majority (TM); United States Labor Against the War (USLAW); the War Resister’s League (WRL); and the Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND). The Gulf War data set contains 94 documents from five groups while the Iraq War data set includes 311 documents from fourteen groups, for a total of 405 documents. The diversity of organizations included in terms of their membership, interests, and tactics (women, African-American, labor, internationalism, pacifism, Quakerism and Catholicism, Islam, and cyber-organizing) ensures that this data set represents the discursive practices of a broad swathe of formal organizations in the U.S. peace movement. In addition to these two data sets, we read and utilized social and cultural histories of the Vietnam War-era U.S. peace movement in order to set the historical context, and to document and understand the issues associated with the support the troops discourse both during that war and during the period between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War.

We defined “official statements” as press and media releases, printed statements, editorials, and public calls to action from an organization’s national office, issued in the name of the organization. These statements are released to the mainstream media and/or posted to the organization’s Web site. They represent the public face and voice of the group and provide the best record of an organization’s evolving positions. Such statements offer a tangible representation of organizational discourse and as such can be effectively used in data analysis (Coles 1999; Coy et al. 2003; Coy and Woehrle 1996; Maney et al. 2005). The statements establish a partial historical record of an organization’s words and actions, demonstrating how they contribute to discursive processes that create social knowledge and shape public policy.

With the assistance of NVivo software, we coded individual paragraphs as our unit of analysis. Our coding process involved a series of analytical development stages. The codes were generated through both deductive and inductive approaches. The list of 53 primarily inductively-generated codes used for an earlier publication that was based on part of the Gulf

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3. Repeated e-mails and phone calls to other groups trying to obtain their Gulf War statements were unsuccessful. We then also conducted an exhaustive search of the Swarthmore College Peace History archives, which produced comprehensive data for five major, nationally recognized peace movement organizations during the Gulf War. We were able to add nine more groups during the Iraq War period due partly to historical and technological shifts (e.g., the Internet), expanding the field of nationally recognized groups with written materials easily available.
War data set provided a starting point for a code list (Coy and Woehrle 1996). We then read all the data, adding new codes to the list, ending with just over 100 codes. To develop our initial coding protocols and check for inter-coder reliability, randomly chosen documents were coded by all three researchers and compared. Based on the coding protocols that emerged from that initial comparative analysis, the entire data set was then split into three parts and each document was coded separately by two researchers. Dialogue between the two coders of each document then established the final coding.

Substantial differences occurred in the volume of statements and words; some peace movement organizations (PMOs) were more prolific. Also, even when examining only the five organizations issuing statements in both periods, there were more statements for the Iraq War than the Gulf War. In order to conduct meaningful organizational and longitudinal comparisons of coding frequencies, we created a series of weights based on the number of words produced and the average number of words per paragraph. We triangulated our analysis by examining code frequencies and correlations both between organizations within a conflict period and across conflict periods. Consistently high levels of code frequencies and strong correlations among different PMOs, as well as over both conflict periods, provides quantitative evidence of discursive legacies. Conversely, variations in code frequencies and correlations between different PMOs and conflict periods suggest period-specific influences on discourse. As far as we know, this is the first study to provide a rigorous, comparative, longitudinal analysis of the discursive work of a representative number of organizations of a single social movement.

The strong presence of a nontroop-related code does not necessarily mean that the code features significantly in PMOs' discourses about the troops. A high probability that a code appears in the same paragraph as a troops-related code, however, helps to confirm the conclusions from our qualitative analysis that the code forms an important part of the discourse about the troops. Accordingly, using NVivo, we conducted proximity searches to determine the frequency that a code would appear within the same paragraph as troops-related codes (i.e., troops-positive, troops-negative, troops-betrayal). The searches yield two measures of correlation: the number of passages in which the two codes concur and the number of documents containing at least one passage in which the two codes concur. For definitions of the codes used in the tables, please see the Appendix.

There are at least two aspects of our methodology that have not been frequently seen in social movement studies: (1) longitudinal frequency analysis of variations in thematic emphasis across different historical moments (i.e., conflict periods), and (2) code concurrence analyses (within passages; within documents) that provide greater confidence in qualitative assertions regarding the close couplings of themes within discourse. The former analysis assists in identifying discursive trajectories, including discursive legacies. The latter analysis assists in identifying discursive elaborations (e.g., troops betrayal discourse).

We turn now to the analysis itself, first setting the cultural context for our analysis of the Gulf War and Iraq War data sets with an interpretive reading of cognate themes drawn from scholarly histories of the Vietnam War-era peace movement.

“Support the Troops” and the Vietnam War-Era Peace Movement

The discursive legacy from the Vietnam era that has most impacted later peace movements centers on supporting the troops while opposing the war. Support the troops is a rhetorical phrase and a political stance freighted with many meanings. What it means to offer
support to deployed U.S. soldiers has been highly contested at least since the Vietnam War. There were many actors in that discursive drama, including policy elites, peace activists, pundits, and soldiers themselves. For some serving in Vietnam, domestic protests against the war were plainly unsupportive acts, irrespective of the rhetoric about supporting the troops that activists might have employed while demonstrating. Of course, not all soldiers felt this way. For some, the peace movement’s efforts to end the war were welcomed insofar as the war was not even supported by many who were charged to wage it. During the Vietnam War, the military was itself in crisis about the war.5

For many in the peace movement, the individual soldier was a central and tragic figure, a pawn exploited in the game of power politics, such that supporting him or her included working for a speedy withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam (Huebner 2002). For example, the 1968 founding statement of a student peace group said, “We’re not asking you to be unpatriotic or to turn against your countrymen. We are asking you to follow American ideals. We want you to support our boys in Viet Nam and not the ones who send them there” (Huebner 2002:14). During this organization’s first demonstration they tried to simultaneously encourage Americans to thwart the draft and support the troops, while also asserting their patriotism. More generally, the peace movement directly assisted military resisters and deserters, while also reaching out to and befriending veterans returning from service in Vietnam, including welcoming them into movement leadership positions (Crandell 1992; DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990).

The peace movement had gained enough adherents by 1967 so that the Johnson administration could no longer ignore it. The administration embarked on a campaign to isolate the movement by launching a domestic counteroffensive, using the hegemony of the support the troops perspective as a sharp political wedge (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990). For example, the White House provided direct assistance for organizers of the “Support our Boys in Vietnam” parade in New York on May 13, including functioning as liaison between them and sympathetic congressional and labor leaders. Seventy thousand showed up to wave American flags for “our boys” (Small 1989:101). By late 1969, the war was going badly for the United States. Faced with a military embarrassment abroad and a potential policy defeat at home, Vietnam became a metaphor for a struggle over the collective identity of the American people as it was expressed in symbols and myths (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990:257). Consequently, in Nixon’s attempt to destroy his domestic opposition, the peace movement was attacked on the symbolic level—with the government invoking traditional values and symbols—even more so than it was on its policy analysis (DeBenedetti 1980).

Vice President Agnew resorted to ad hominem attacks that invoked symbols with resonance among parts of the populace, calling the movement “an effete corps of impudent snobs who characterize themselves as intellectuals” (Lembcke 1998:50). California governor Reagan played the powerful supporting the troops card, charging that movement leaders “lent comfort and aid” to the enemy and that “some American (soldier) will die tonight because of the activity in our streets” (Lembcke 1998:50). In April of 1969, President Nixon even equated war dissent with terrorism: “When we find situations . . . where students in the name of dissent and in the name of change terrorize other students and faculty members, when they rifle files, when the engage in violence . . . then I say it is time for the faculties, the boards of trustees, and school administrators to have the backbone to stand up” (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984:243). Then two days before the May 4, 1970 shootings of Kent State students protesting the war (apparently when the backbone Nixon had been encouraging was stiffening

5. Most estimates of the number of soldiers serving in Vietnam who directly engaged in dissent and disobedience range from 20 to 37 percent, figures unprecedented in U.S. military history. Following the Tet Offensive in 1968, GI dissent in general and combat refusals in the field in particular were so widespread that the U.S. Army’s fighting abilities were seriously compromised (Cortright 1992; Moser 1996). Battlefield mutiny became so common that the “Army was at war with itself over the war in Vietnam” (Anderson 1992:105).
in Ohio), the President directly contrasted peace activists with soldiers. He said he had been thinking about "those kids out there (soldiers in Vietnam) . . . I have seen them. They are the greatest. You see these bums, you know, blowing up college campuses today . . . storming around about this issue . . . Then out there we have kids who are just doing their duty. They stand tall and are proud . . . we have to stand in back of them" (Beamish et al. 1995:352).

This sort of elite discourse has a long cultural shelf life, thanks to structurally-influenced inequities in access to the means of mass communication. In fact, images derived from elite discourse of the 1960s still serve to reinforce dominant ideologies, and are the “primary reference point” for ongoing contests with past and current challenging movements (Morgan 2000:91). Such is the reality of a discursive legacy. It becomes nearly impossible to argue substantively about the policy particulars without also engaging past rounds of contention. During the run-up to both the Gulf War and the Iraq War, emotions, symbols, and myths harkening back to Johnson and Nixon’s discourses were featured prominently. They included the general notion of a peace movement that has been hostile to soldiers since the Vietnam War and whose activism was somehow responsible for the U.S. defeat. In the intervening years this discursive legacy served as midwife to what is now a deeply embedded cultural mythology that continues to confront later iterations of the peace movement: that soldiers returning from Vietnam were routinely taunted and even spat upon by peace movement members. That there is little evidence to substantiate the charge demonstrates the considerable cultural clout that accrues to discursive legacies.

In their thorough analysis of peace movement coverage in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle from 1965 through 1971, Thomas Beamish, Havey Molotch, and Richard Flacks (1995) discovered that the most common story about peace movement-troop interactions (29 percent of 495 cases) involved peace movement criticisms of policy elites like Johnson, Nixon, and/or their administration for waging war. Alternatively, reports where the movement directly or purposely and negatively targeted troops are virtually nonexistent. In fact, there was not only substantial coverage of pro-troop sentiment and action by the peace movement (15 percent of the cases), but it was also “clear and explicit.” In contrast, the smaller percentage (6 percent) of cases liberally interpreted by the researchers as “anti-troop” all qualified as such only indirectly or by inference. What often happened in those cases coded as “anti-troop” is that the peace movement was frequently labeled in the media as being against the troops by national policy makers with vested interests, even while there was no direct reporting of anti-troop actions by peace movement activists.

These deleterious characterizations of the Vietnam War-era peace movement as harmful to the troops, and as opposed not just to the war but also to the soldiers, were potent and long lasting. In fact, the spitting myth became so entrenched and gained so much cultural purchase that even Gulf War peace activists chanted the mantra that this time, this peace movement won’t disrespect the troops like they did during Vietnam. Thus Greg Sommers, director of the Quaker House in Fayetteville, NC, announced that during the Gulf War: “You

6. The government’s responses to the growing peace movement went far beyond negative framings. In 1969, Johnson ordered the CIA to launch “Operation Chaos” against the movement, burglarizing homes, wiretapping, infiltrating, opening mail, staging show trials, and implementing other “dirty tricks” (Small 1989:104; Wittner 1984:287). Meanwhile, the FBI’s COINTELPRO operation against critics of the war was even more massive, invasive, systematic and destructive of civil liberties (Cunningham 2004; Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984).

7. Significantly, the author’s also found no instance of any spitting on returning troops by peace movement members, nor even any examples of taunting. Similarly, Huebner’s (2002) analysis of the Rhode Island peace movement found no examples of peace movement-related hostilities toward returned veterans. Lembcke’s (1998) exhaustive national research reinforces these findings. In addition, he discovered examples of war protestors being spat upon by war supporters, and he also discovered multiple hostile acts toward Vietnam veterans by conservative, pro-war groups like the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and even by the U.S. Veterans Administration.
won’t see protesters spitting on soldiers as they come off the plane” (Lembcke 1998:24). Some peace groups born in opposition to the Gulf War even developed collective identities defined by two issues: support for the troops and disassociating themselves from the traditional peace movement, seen to be odd at best and unpatriotic at worst (Coles 1999). More generally, many current activists consciously counter these negative characterizations with dress, behavior, and discourse designed to demonstrate that the characterizations are unfair and untrue.

So how did the myth of the returning veteran being routinely abused and spat upon by the peace movement gain such purchase in U.S. society? Lembcke’s (1998) answer is manifold, and includes poor and selective memory, the snowball nature of urban myths, and the popularity of Rambo and other Hollywood films of the late 1970s and 1980s where the peace movement was portrayed as being anti-troop. These narratives also provided a much-needed alibi due to the inability of many in the United States to accept a military defeat at the hands of a small Asian country; the peace movement could be blamed for the past and neutralized in the future. We argue that the discursive legacy of White House portrayals of the peace movement that we discussed earlier should be added to that list.

In the preceding, we have outlined the cultural conditions and political environment during and immediately after the Vietnam War that contributed to the origins of the support the troops discursive legacy. How have peace activists responded to these perduring issues in more recent conflicts? To answer this question, we turn to our analysis of peace movement statements regarding soldiers serving in the Gulf War. We begin by again setting the cultural context, focusing on the potent symbol of yellow ribbons.

The Gulf War: Yellow Ribbons and Extending the Web of Concern

President George H. W. Bush’s emphasis in his January 1991 State of the Union speech on the need to “support our boys and girls” no matter one’s position on the impending ground offensive was designed to hamstring continued opposition to his escalating war. Once the war began, the debate and dissent that marked the war’s run-up dissipated as Congress and citizens closed ranks. The message from Washington and across the country was clear: support for the troops also meant support for the policy (Cheney 1992). An avalanche of yellow ribbons—touted as a symbol of solidarity with the U.S. troops invading Kuwait—soon followed. The hegemonic cultural context within which the peace movement tried to mobilize Gulf War opposition is best understood through the example of yellow ribbons.

In the three weeks prior to January 18, 1991, reports chronicling the policy debates and political controversies over going to war dominated newscasts about yellow ribbons on network television news 45 to 8. In other words, genuine policy debates dominated television news. But in the subsequent six weeks, newscasts about yellow ribbons won out decisively, 36 to 19 (Jowett 1993). The yellow ribbon symbol was widely embraced to rally support for the troops, and by extension for the war policy. The deleterious and often false characterizations of the peace movement after the Vietnam War prepared the cultural ground for a reactive outpouring of public support for the troops. The ubiquitous yellow ribbons of the Gulf War simply cannot be understood apart from their relationship to the discursive legacy of support the troops.

The U.S. Postal Service issued a stamp “honoring those who served” with yellow ribbons adorning stamp ads. Air Force bases were decorated with yellow ribbons, the Texas state capital was wrapped in yellow metal, bridges and town squares were blanketed in yellow, and Reno, Nevada used 25 miles of yellow ribbon to encircle the city. Classrooms were draped with yellow ribbons and curricula were designed around the phenomenon, as opposed to on the war itself. Factories and business districts were adorned in yellow bows and supermarkets used yellow cash register tapes. Television newscasts added yellow ribbons to their logos,
while newspapers ran the ribbons up their mastheads. Republicans in Congress greeted President Bush by wearing yellow buttons saying, “I voted with the President,” while Democrats donned plain yellow ribbons for his visit. The largest manufacturer of yellow ribbon saw sales increase nearly 1,000 percent in a year (Larsen 1994; Tuleja 1994).

Painfully aware of that dimension of the discursive legacy that said that the Vietnam War peace movement was not only unsupportive but critical of the troops, the Gulf War peace movement offered pointed policy criticisms, but left the troops out of the blaming equation completely. While the first Bush administration, congressional leaders, the mainstream media, and even individual citizens who failed to act were each deemed responsible by the PMOs, the soldiers deployed to the Gulf to implement war policies were never judged critically, held responsible, or blamed in any way by the PMOs (Coy and Woehrle 1996). There were no instances of the troops-negative code in the Gulf War documents. On the other hand, the five groups frequently used the support the troops discourse: the troops-positive code appeared 48 times in 32 out of the 94 documents. Weighted frequencies for troops-related codes can be found in Table 1.

Once the Gulf War began, the meanings of patriotism became hotly contested (Andrews 1997) and there were enormous cultural pressures in the United States to rally around the flag with yellow ribbons and close ranks behind White House policies (Allen et. al. 1994; Kelman 1993). Yet, each of these peace movement organizations refused, even while honoring the need to support the troops. Some directly addressed the issue, using forceful language with strong emotions as they harnessed the troops issue but decoupled it from administration policies. In the passage below, the President’s policies were so strongly rejected that they were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gulf War</th>
<th>Iraq War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops-negative</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops-positive</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops-betrayal</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human costs-nation*</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>102.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian casualties</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment***</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian relief</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights**</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture**</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law**</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror by state condemned</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human costs-domestic**</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
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<td>Concern bundle</td>
<td>192.7</td>
<td>202.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights bundle</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>151.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Limited to the 5 PMOs for which documents are available for both conflict periods. Codes weighted for variations in total number of words and number of words per paragraph among PMOs within each conflict period as well as across conflict periods. Concern bundle includes human costs-nation, civilian casualties, environment, and humanitarian relief. Human rights bundle includes human rights, torture, international law, and terror by state condemned. Results of bivariate regression of code on conflict period noted when significant. *p < .10 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
labeled as “cruel” to the troops, while the PMO harnessed both the soldier construct and the positive public memory about Martin Luther King, Jr.

To those who say that now that the war has started we must support the president, we say this: “We support and share the deep concern for our servicemen and women who were so abruptly and cruelly uprooted and sent into the desert to fight a war that never should have been. But we can never support the bankrupt foreign policy that sent them there. We want them home.” And we say with Martin Luther King Jr.: “The thunder of fearless voices will be the only sound stronger than the blasts of bombs and the clamor of war hysteria” (Fellowship of Reconciliation 1991).

Analysis of our Gulf War data reveals a demonstrable pattern in how the peace movement engaged the cultural dynamics of the support the troops discursive legacy. As the troops-positive code in Table 1 shows, the movement regularly expressed genuine concern for the troops. The PMOs also extended this concern in multiple directions. They created what we call a “web of concern” that included other people beyond the troops who the war also threatened (see the “concern bundle” in Table 1). This pushing against the constraining confines of the discursive legacy to create space for new information and different concerns marked many statements. In eight of the troops-positive passages, three of the five PMOs expressed concern for soldiers’ families and loved ones. Pax Christi and especially Peace Action often argued that each individual soldier is embedded in a web of familial relationships and in social networks at work. Because of these networks and relationship webs, the injury or death of even one soldier has impacts that ripple outwards throughout society. (See the code couplings in Table 2. Results presented in the table are limited to code couplings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Period</th>
<th>GW</th>
<th>IW</th>
<th>GW</th>
<th>IW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code coupling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with troops-positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian casualties</td>
<td>14 (29.2%)</td>
<td>25 (34.7%)</td>
<td>12 (38.7%)</td>
<td>22 (52.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human costs-domestic</td>
<td>5 (10.4%)</td>
<td>14 (19.4%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
<td>12 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human costs-nation</td>
<td>16 (33.3%)</td>
<td>19 (26.4%)</td>
<td>14 (45.2%)</td>
<td>18 (42.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence supported</td>
<td>8 (16.7%)</td>
<td>2 (2.8%)</td>
<td>8 (25.8%)</td>
<td>2 (4.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with troops-negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ghraib</td>
<td>NA (NA)</td>
<td>4 (25.0%)</td>
<td>NA (NA)</td>
<td>3 (60.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian casualties</td>
<td>0 (NA)</td>
<td>7 (43.8%)</td>
<td>NA (NA)</td>
<td>5 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>0 (NA)</td>
<td>4 (25.0%)</td>
<td>NA (NA)</td>
<td>2 (40.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0 (NA)</td>
<td>8 (50.0%)</td>
<td>NA (NA)</td>
<td>4 (80.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with troops-betrayal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian casualties</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>8 (29.6%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>8 (53.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. democracy</td>
<td>3 (42.9%)</td>
<td>1 (3.7%)</td>
<td>3 (50.0%)</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human costs-domestic</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
<td>4 (26.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human costs-nation</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>4 (14.8%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>4 (26.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretext</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>8 (29.6%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>7 (46.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>2 (7.4%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Limited to the 5 PMOs for which documents are available for both conflict periods. Base codes are troops-positive, troops-negative, and troops-betrayal. Results presented in the table are limited to code couplings whose number of passages or number of documents is two standard deviations above the mean for all code couplings examined. For each of the base codes, 85 code couplings were examined for the Gulf War period and 86 code couplings for the Iraq War period.
The example below reveals how the web of concern was expanded to include family and social networks, and it also demonstrates the PMOs use of strong emotional language. As we argued above, discursive legacies structure emotion expression, and they help create emotional opportunities, which we have defined elsewhere as moments when the public expression of particularly potent emotions is widely regarded as socially or politically appropriate (Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005; Woehrle, Coy, and Many forthcoming). The unnecessary death of good soldier citizens is such a moment.

We cannot forget that not only young soldiers on both sides, but also many women, children, and all peoples suffer and scream in very real pain. Families lose beloved sons and daughters, brothers, and sisters . . . history would hardly be able to grasp how so many human lives were lost in what began as a fight over the price of oil (Pax Christi 1990).

In the example below from Peace Action, the web of concern is extended in two different directions beyond the fallen soldier’s family. First, all those in whose name the war is being waged are said to experience tragedy when any soldier dies. And second, the social networks of Iraqi casualties are also included.

the dead, the maimed and crippled, the emotionally scarred, both soldiers and civilians, are an incalculable price to pay. These . . . are personal tragedies for wives, husbands, daughters, sons, fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers. This is true for Iraqis as well as Americans and all other peoples affected. These . . . are tragedies for all of us in whose name this war is being waged (Peace Action 1991).

These expansions of the web of concern were coupled with a more controversial one: to conscientious objectors and military resisters. Eight paragraphs coded troops-positive also included concerns for the rights of objectors and resisters in the military (coded as nonviolence supported, see Table 2). Most common was a call to mobilize people to offer counseling and various other kinds of support to resisters and objectors. Pax Christi went further and encouraged local groups and parishes to consider civil disobedience by formally offering sanctuary to resisters. So while these PMOs expressed concern about the welfare of all the troops, they tried to push common public concerns beyond that simple formulation to include those soldiers whose conscientious stands against the war may lead them to be both persecuted in popular culture and prosecuted in the legal arena.

During the Gulf War, all five groups also extended the web of concern to include Iraqi civilian casualties. Here the PMOs redefined the citizen’s supportive duties during war, expanding it beyond the soldiers to include the Iraqi people. Pax Christi utilized the civilian casualties rhetoric the most, accounting for more than 41 percent of its usage, one standard deviation above the mean frequency for all 5 groups. This Catholic group also addressed the human costs of the war for the Iraqi nation the most, accounting for nearly 27 percent of the appearance of the human cost-nation argument (see Table 3). Pax Christi’s documents also contained the most instances of the troops-positive argument, accounting for 34 percent of its usage during the Gulf War (Table 3). In addition, Pax Christi argued far more than others (two standard deviations above the mean) that U.S. foreign policy was not just a failure, but morally wrong. From a qualitative viewpoint, the tone and tenor of many of Pax Christi’s documents was occasionally harsh, and often morally judgmental. All of these positions are likely related to Pax Christi being driven by two religious traditions: the just war theory and Christian pacifism. In both traditions, paramount concerns are for civilians, for the human costs of war, and for the inviolability of the individual soldier’s conscience. Finally, the general

8. We comparatively analyzed issues of tone and tenor in the Gulf War statements of four of the organizations in an earlier work (Coy and Woehrle 1996).
finding in Table 2 of a strong link between the troops-positive code and a larger web of concern is reflected in Pax Christi's particular approach.

Another religious (interfaith) group, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), created a “civilian casualty fund to assist all civilians wounded in the war” by purchasing and distributing medical supplies and documenting civilian casualties. FOR accounted for over half of the passages coded as humanitarian relief (see Table 3). From October 1990 through mid-January 1991 (until the bombing of Baghdad), a series of FOR peacemaking delegations went to Jordan and Iraq. Their objectives included: delivering medical supplies to Kuwaiti refugees from Iraq’s invasion and to Iraqi civilians harmed by the embargo; providing comfort and counseling to U.S. hostages in Iraq, and securing their release; and calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and a nonviolent resolution to the conflict (Coy 1991; Rupert n.d.). Not only did FOR extend the web of support theme further still, but the group took action on behalf of refugees and hostages, and invited others to act on behalf of the many civilian victims.

The peace movement’s expansion of the support theme went beyond a decontextualized support the troops discourse, extending it where those who originated it never intended it to apply. This created cultural spaces to introduce oppositional ideas traditionally silenced in dominant discourses. But, it also legitimated the claim that the peace movement supported the troops, albeit in a more nuanced and critical way than was the norm. Surrounded by a sea of uncritical yellow ribbons, these PMOs nonetheless expanded the web of concern to include resisting U.S. soldiers and conscientious objectors, U.S. hostages in Iraq, Iraqi civilians, and Kuwaiti refugees. Thus we have shown that during the Gulf War, peace movement discourse about supporting the troops was impacted by the discursive legacy emanating from

Table 3 • Weighted Code Frequencies by PMO, Gulf War Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PMO</th>
<th>Troops-Positive Col. %</th>
<th>Troops-Betrayal Col. %</th>
<th>Human Cost-Nation Col. %</th>
<th>Civilian Casualties Col. %</th>
<th>Environment Col. %</th>
<th>Humanitarian Relief Col. %</th>
<th>Human Rights Col. %</th>
<th>International Law Col. %</th>
<th>Human Cost-Domestic Col. %</th>
<th>Total Col. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaxC</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>15.3*</td>
<td>2.5*</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PeaceA</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILPF</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One standard deviation above the mean

Notes: Limited to the 5 PMOs for which documents are available for the Gulf War conflict period. Codes weighted for variations in total number of words and number of words per paragraph among PMOs within the Gulf War conflict period. Concern bundle includes human cost-nation, civilian casualties, environment, and humanitarian relief. Human rights bundle includes torture, human rights, international law, and terrorism-state. Troops-negative and torture were omitted from the table because no passages were coded for the variable for the Gulf War period.
the Vietnam War, and that the organizations responded by dramatically shifting the meanings of support within that discursive legacy. Our findings highlight not only the cultural constraints imposed on movement discourses, but also the strategic actions movement organizations take to adapt their discourses in response. We turn now to an analysis of the troops discourse during the run-up and first two years of the Iraq War (2002–2005), comparing it to the Gulf War discourse (1990–1991).

Longitudinal Analysis

The data we collected, coded, and weighted allows for longitudinal and comparative analyses of discourses across conflict periods and also between organizations. Table 1 shows that positive portrayals of U.S. troops figured both prominently and roughly evenly in PMO discourse during the Gulf War and the Iraq War's first two years. A group of four codes we've named the “concern bundle” are focused on how war effects Iraq (i.e. human costs-nation, civilian casualties, environment, and humanitarian relief). The concern bundle figures prominently in both conflicts, and like the troops-positive argument, its usage remains rather constant across the two wars. This suggests that these movement concerns for civilians, for the national resources of the adversary, and for their human needs are ideologically-driven concerns (Oliver and Johnston 2000) that are central to these PMOs during war, irrespective of the particular conflict. It also demonstrates that this social movement produced stable and structured discourses across many years.

On the other hand, differences in discourse content existed across the conflict periods by the five groups. Table 1 presents both weighted code frequencies and the findings from regressions of codes on a binary variable for conflict period. Domestic costs for the United States were emphasized more during the Gulf War, while costs to the Iraqi nation were emphasized during the Iraq War. This may be related to the Gulf War being the first major conflict since the Vietnam War, which was one of the longest and costliest (financial and political) in U.S. history, and one that in 1990 was still impacting domestic public opinion and politics. Also, the Gulf War had a rather long, clear, run-up period following the early ultimatums from the first President Bush. In addition, the Gulf War was actually fought in Kuwait and was relatively brief, while the Iraq War was a full-scale invasion of Iraq, a large populous country, followed by a bitterly contested occupation.

Similarly, higher use of environment themes during the Gulf War is likely due to period-specific political issues, not to peace movement value shifts. The Gulf War was widely seen as primarily about securing Kuwait’s sovereignty and its oil fields for Western markets. Hussein’s torching of oil wells intensified the Gulf War’s environmental aspects. In addition, social movements influence each other. The Gulf War occurred closer to the “environmental decade” of the 1970s, to the first energy crisis, and to the emphasis in the Carter administration on conservation. This may have resulted in a spillover effect into the peace movement (Meyer and Whittier 1994).

The much higher use of human rights and international law discourses during the Iraq War (Table 1) and the higher frequency of concurrence of the human rights code with the troops-negative themes during the Iraq War (Table 2), reflects the increasing prominence of human rights discourse since the mid-1990s, following the well-publicized genocides in the Balkans and Rwanda, and the establishment of ad hoc United Nations criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court (Risse, Rupp, and Sikkink 1999). It also reflects differences in the two conflicts: the Iraq War being much longer with an occupation force fighting domestic and international insurgents; the presence of documented torture at Abu Ghraib; and a general disregard for the Geneva Convention and related human rights norms evinced by the Bush administration (e.g., Guantanamo, “extraordinary renditions,” etc.).
Table 2 provides frequencies for two codes appearing in the same paragraph divided by conflict period. It shows that support for soldiers as conscientious objectors (coded as nonviolence supported) was a more prominent part of the Gulf War discourse. This is probably due to the Gulf War being the first major war since the Vietnam War—a war that had the highest numbers of conscientious objector and military resisters in U.S. history, and where supporting them was a prominent dimension of movement activism, including for two of the five PMOs tracked across both conflicts, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (Dekar 2005; Smith 1996). Finally, during the Gulf War the PMOs argued that the troops were being betrayed for oil, while in the Iraq War the troops were presented as being betrayed by an administration waging war under the false pretense of removing a regime with weapons of mass destruction (coded as pretext). Overall, this longitudinal analysis shows that these PMOs remain relatively true to their core values and beliefs across conflict periods, producing stable discourses that transcend conflict periods. At the same time, these movement organizations also expanded their arguments for peace in response to changing political and discursive opportunities.

Anticipatory and Proactive Discourses

By the time of the Iraq War, the peace movement was intimately familiar with the support the troops discursive legacy and was concerned about the potential damage to its image and attractiveness due to this potent and emotional issue. All but one of the 14 PMOs (the online group, True Majority) used the troops-positive discourse during the Iraq War. This demonstrates a discursive tradition with a strong legacy since it has become increasingly difficult to critique U.S. war policies without also expressing support for the troops. Although troops-positive themes were broadly distributed across organizations, CodePink, NYC Labor Against the War (NYCLAW), and War Resisters League (WRL) used troops-positive themes the most during the Iraq War. This may reflect NYCLAW's desire to appeal to union members with nationalist identities, while CodePink and WRL may have been targeting the general public and military members and their families.

Our data shows that the Iraq War peace movement anticipated the importance of the support the troops issue. Unlike the Gulf War peace movement—whose discursive work appeared reactive and which did little to directly engage the dominant yellow ribbon tactic—the Iraq War peace movement was proactive. Our Iraq War data includes statements released in the eight-month run-up to the war (July 2002 to March 2003) and the first two years of the war itself. Nearly a quarter (24 percent) of the movement's Iraq War discourse that was supportive of the troops occurred before and within the first six months of the war. Over half (55 percent) of it occurred before or within the first year of the war. The anticipatory, proactive nature of the movement's support the troops discourse is further evidenced by the fact that there were 16 instances (9.4 percent) in the run-up to the Iraq War, before troops were even put in harm's way.

In addition, not only did the groups harness the good soldier construct, they actually claimed the support the troops issue as their own, applying it to the Bush administration assertively. They broke new discursive ground, taking advantage of political opportunities that the administration's strategic policy choices, its tactical management of the occupation, and its handling of soldier welfare created. For example, into these openings the WRL delivered a more elaborated discourse about soldiering.

While the peace movement seeks nonviolent ways for young people to serve their country, and decries the cynical manipulation of their untutored patriotism, it must also honor the open-hearted willingness of the soldier to serve. It must acknowledge soldiers' pride of service and support their demand that the government honor the contract it signed to care for them in return for that service (War Resister's League 2003).
This is no simple support the troops call. The WRL statement seems designed to appeal not just to the average U.S. soldier but also to veterans from earlier periods and wars, and to current soldiers and their families. Soldiers are characterized as “open-hearted” and serving with appropriate pride. Here the pacifist WRL is proactively countering the myth that the peace movement does not support the troops; it does that by extolling the virtues of the citizen soldier, and by calling the government to account for its end of the social contract. The citizen soldier construct has deep resonance with many Americans. This is due in large part to the prominent role of citizen soldiers in creating and maintaining the democratic state (Burk 2000, 2002), and to the fact that throughout U.S. history, military service on the battlefield has been considered by many (especially for minorities and new immigrants) to be a badge of full citizenship (Burk 2001; Segal 1989). But by honoring the “open-hearted willingness of the soldier to serve,” the WRL is also tapping into a particular notion of the citizen soldier in an all-volunteer military: one who largely determines for her or himself the nature and extent of their military service. Since the ending of conscription, the citizen’s military obligation is increasingly limited and is now more controlled by the individual citizen’s choice. Here the WRL contrasts these choices sharply with the “crass manipulation” of patriotism by the government and with its failure to provide for the soldiers’ welfare.

The Discourse of Betrayal During the Iraq War

The most important finding from the Iraq War is the movement’s development of a “discourse of betrayal” of the Iraq War soldiers by the Bush administration. There was well more than three times greater frequency of use of this discourse during the Iraq War than during the Gulf War (among the five organizations for which there is data for both conflict periods, and after controlling for differences in number of documents among PMOs and across organizations; see Table 1). PMOs were even articulating the discourse of betrayal early on, including in the first stages of the invasion. In fact, fully 43 percent of the instances of the betrayal discourse in our data occurred during the run-up and the war’s first year. The peace movement did not tarry in turning the support the troops tables on the Bush administration. All of this demonstrates that even in the face of the long-established support the troops discursive legacy, oppositional peace groups adapt their rhetorical tactics in response to new discursive opportunities in order to mount meaningful rhetorical challenges that redirect debate, and that potentially modify the content and meanings of the discursive legacy itself.

While use of the betrayal theme was widely distributed—with all but two of the 14 groups articulating it—AFSC, CodePink, and WRL led the way (Table 4). Here the PMOs proactively took the power of the citizen solider in U.S. society—something historically used against the peace movement—and deployed it in an anticipatory way against a government failing its soldiers. Thus, it is not the peace movement that needs to account for its support of the troops, but their commander in chief. His actions are characterized as a betrayal of a unique kind of trust that military superiors owe those serving under them.

The discourse of betrayal was uncommonly well developed by the PMOs in the first two years of the Iraq War; in fact, we found no less than 19 different manifestations of it.9 They included claims that the troops weren’t given proper training, their tours of duty were being arbitrarily extended, the poorly-planned and “bungled” occupation left them unnecessarily vulnerable, they didn’t have enough of the right kind of equipment, the wounded were not properly cared for, veterans benefits were being drastically reduced, troop levels were insufficient, there weren’t enough Arabic translators, the soldiers’ plight

9. This line of argument later found its way into the mainstream political discourse and likely contributed to the removal of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld toward the end of the fourth year of the war.
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*One standard deviation above the mean
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Notes: Includes 14 PMOs for which documents are available for the Iraq War conflict period. Codes weighted for variations in total number of words and number of words per paragraph among PMOs within the Iraq War conflict period.
was kept out of the news and presented in a sanitized way, they were fighting in an illegal, unnecessary war, soldiers depended on war profiteering corporations for supplies, and even that they were dying for a narrow, neoconservative global agenda. Taken together, this well-articulated discourse of betrayal is an instance of the peace movement turning the government’s own policy legacy back on it. In other words, it is the government that is actually forcing the troops “to fight with one hand tied behind their backs,” not the peace movement. The overwhelming force and militarily achievable objectives which came to define the Powell Doctrine were suddenly missing, and the U.S. peace movement did not fail to take notice.

The online group Moveon.org frequently used the betrayal theme (accounting for 12.2 percent). It highlighted a disingenuous campaign by the Bush government wherein letters to the editor were sent to local newspapers extolling supposed successes in Iraq, ostensibly signed by soldiers from those newspaper towns. Trouble was, most soldiers weren’t even aware of the letters they supposedly sent and which contained evaluations about the war that many of them did not hold.

Table 2 shows the codes that most frequently appeared in the same passages, and the same documents, in the Gulf War and the Iraq War respectively, with our three troops-related codes: troops-positive, troops-negative, and troops-betrayal. The relative absence of codes like American identity, patriotism, and heroism occurring with troops-positive and with troops-betrayal may indicate a sophisticated strategy for engaging the hegemonic image of the U.S. soldier. PMOs clearly spoke frequently about the troops and, from a weighted, comparative perspective, in an overwhelmingly positive way (Tables 1 and 4). In the Gulf War there was absolutely nothing negative said about the troops, while the amount of negative comments during the Iraq War were minor and universally associated with human rights and cultural abuses (discussed below). However, the PMOs were still careful not to reinforce uncritical aspects of the nationalist discourse often associated with support for the troops, where soldiers are simply lauded as patriotic heroes no matter the wisdom of the policies they are carrying out. Peace Action, for example, contextualized it by saying it was “terrible to contemplate good Americans once again dying bravely in a bad cause” (Peace Action 1990). Here they deflected aspects of the nationalist discourse while also exploiting and ultimately transcending other aspects of it.

Early in the Iraq War there were not many soldiers willing to openly resist or even to publicly critique the war. Staff Sergeant Camilo Meijia was an exception. He refused to return to Iraq following six months of service there partly due to the prisoner abuse he saw. Meijia filed for conscientious objector status, but was prosecuted for desertion. One of the few appearances of the heroes code with the troops-positive code involved discussion of Meijia, and a PMO attempt to subvert traditional notions of heroism while redefining the meaning of a good soldier, one truly worthy of support. Here are two examples:

He [Meijia] will be remembered in the history books as the first in a long line of soldiers who rose up and helped bring an end to the occupation of Iraq. He will not be remembered as a deserter, but as a hero (CodePink 2004).

As information emerges about the torture, rape, and abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and the killing of hundreds of civilians in Fallujah, it becomes critical to support those troops brave enough to disassociate themselves from this horror (Fellowship of Reconciliation 2004a).

While there were few active soldiers willing to publicly critique the Iraq War, vets of earlier wars were willing, and the peace movement frequently utilized them (Heaney and Rojas 2006). AFSC and WRL both featured a group member who was a military veteran and who assisted in delivering the discourse of betrayal. By harnessing the hegemonic notion of the good soldier as their mouthpiece, these groups protected themselves while challenging the government’s geo-strategic policies, its tactical decisions in the field of war,
and even the government’s support for the troops. The relationship between movement discourse and tactical choices has not been well specified in previous research (King and Cornwall 2005). For pacifist groups like the AFSC and WRL to break with their traditions and feature military veterans as the public face and voice of the organization suggests a strong link between the discourse of the PMO and its tactical choices. The WRL even commented directly on the tactic it was using.

It is imperative that the peace movement reach out to resisting and questioning soldiers and families. Their voices have a particular cachet in the mainstream, and their credibility could put them in the forefront of the voices for peace . . . As Noam Chomsky notes, veterans, soldiers, and military families are “authentic groups,” groups it is hard for the mainstream to marginalize (War Resisters League 2003).

In the summer of 2005, when the Iraq War was more than two years old (and after we stopped collecting data), family members of troops serving in Iraq became a formidable force in U.S. politics. Cindy Sheehan’s son, Casey, was killed while serving in Iraq. Her dogged insistence to speak to President Bush—and the supportive gatherings that grew up around her in Crawford, TX—inspired other military family members to find their political voice. Many of them adopted the discourse of betrayal theme. In addition, our data demonstrates that peace movement organizations were featuring military family members a full year before Cindy Sheehan and other military family members became media sensations, and were already utilizing the powerful notion of parenting and “patriotic parenting.” This social construct was then employed to critique Bush policies in Iraq, and the entire military leadership. For example, Moveon announced it was placing a full-page *New York Times* ad that featured Larry Syverson, a Virginia engineer whose sons are in the military in Iraq:

I’m a patriotic American with three sons in the military, two serving in Iraq . . . But the leaders they serve have not acted honorably. They have failed my sons. They have failed all of us. At the very least, Donald Rumsfield must go (Moveon 2003).

By giving voice to veterans and family members to elaborate on the discourse of betrayal, these PMOs contested the symbolic and rhetorical tools normally available to the government and its war supporters, and also used them on behalf of oppositional goals.

Since the discourse of betrayal was deployed by 13 of the 14 groups, it was directed to many targets. Identity-based organizations used it to appeal to their traditional constituencies, the black PMO used it to mobilize the African American community, while labor PMOs targeted the labor movement and working people, as in the following examples:

Working people in this country will pay: with our sons and daughters in uniform; with destruction of our social services; with unprecedented attacks on labor, civil, and immigrant rights; with further blowback from terrorist attacks. The threat to working people isn’t Iraq, but our own government (NYC City Labor Against the War 2004).

It is essential that people of African descent . . . continue to make its collective voice heard . . . in the halls of government. That can only be done through making ourselves visible and outspoken in opposition to the bankrupt and disingenuous policies of an Administration committed to promoting domestic fear while our sons and daughters are killed or wounded in an illegal and needless conflict (Black Radical Congress 2003).

The discourse of betrayal was an elastic construct insofar as it was expanded in two different directions. It wasn’t just the government doing the betraying: multinational corporations and defense contractors also stood accused of betraying the troops. Some PMOs argued that more than the troops were being betrayed. They claimed there was so much Bush administration betrayal to go around that U.S. taxpayers, Iraqi translators, and Iraqis working with the U.S. occupiers, UN humanitarian staff, and Iraqi civilians were each betrayed in different ways by the invasion and “bungled” occupation.
The controversies over the sexual torture at Abu Ghraib provided discursive opportunities for the peace movement to create oppositional knowledge on the little-understood issue of sexual abuse of women soldiers in the U.S. military. AFSC did this by interpreting the sexual abuse of women soldiers as yet another manifestation of betrayal. While the Quaker group called the Abu Ghraib torture reports “horrific,” they also charged that thanks to Bush administration betrayals, “women soldiers aren’t safe in their own ranks.”

The Department of Defense admitted that there had been 112 reported sexual assaults among American troops recently in the Middle East . . . For women in the military the pain and humiliation of rape is aggravated by the pain and humiliation often inflicted after the assault by their superior officers, some of whom are more likely to punish the victim—whether officially or unofficially—than the accused attacker . . . Many victims are forced to continue to live and work among their attackers. Others are transferred against their will (American Friends Service Committee 2004).

Discussion of human rights violations and torture by U.S. troops was statistically closely associated (analysis not shown here) with use of the troops-negative discourse during the Iraq War. In addition, a close qualitative analysis reveals multiple approaches: some groups deflect responsibility upward as part of the larger discourse of betrayal, while fewer call for prosecution of individual soldiers.

President Bush’s cavalier attitude, coupled with the ongoing demonization of the Arab and Muslim world since Sept. 11, 2001, also sent another message, this one to the U.S. military. The intelligence interrogators and prison guards in Abu Ghraib prison understood it well. If Al Qaida were “the evil ones” and Iraq was an Al Qaida operating base, then their prisoners were as evil as though they personally flew planes into the World Trade Center . . . the Bush administration has claimed exemption for the United States from the constraints of international law. It is as though the United States is so fundamentally good, its purpose so noble, that it cannot and should not be bound by the Geneva Conventions, the International Criminal Court, or the need to listen to the international community. The systemic violence at Abu Ghraib is indeed shocking, but in such a climate, it is not surprising (Fellowship of Reconciliation 2004b).

The only Muslim group in our data set was the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR was clearly concerned about how the prison abuses would impact their adopted country’s image with their Muslim brethren overseas. In fact, over 75 percent of the occurrences of the troops-negative code were in documents from CAIR. Similarly, the Muslim group accounted for only 1 percent of the troops-positive passages, and just 3.2 percent of the troops-betrayal rhetoric (Table 4). CAIR’s discourse on the U.S. troops was overwhelmingly associated with culturally insensitive behaviors by U.S. troops. Their concerns ranged from simple name-calling to human rights abuses to torture. They were the only group that insisted on prison time for individual soldiers guilty of torture. CAIR’s collective identity as an Islamic civil rights organization seems to have influenced its discursive choices substantially with regard to U.S. troops. On other issues, too, the group often placed its collective identity in the forefront of its discursive practices. For example, CAIR condemned the mutilation of U.S. contractors in Fallujah as contrary to Islam, frequently tried to counter misconceptions about Islam, and even launched an online petition drive designed to disassociate Islam from the violent acts of a few Muslims. But even CAIR broadened responsibility for the prisoner abuse beyond the military.

Military authorities are incapable of dealing with an issue that may have already caused irreparable harm to America’s image in the Muslim world . . . Instead of getting a slap on the wrist, everyone who took part in or permitted these horrific acts needs to serve time in prison . . . (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2004).
Conclusion

Despite the view of some that the peace movement tends to be strongly identity based and ideologically driven—taking similar positions and repeating the same arguments from one conflict to the next—our data presents a more complex rendering of peace movement discourse over conflict periods. On the one hand, the peace movement clearly constructed comparatively stable discourses in support of the troops that were repeated across different conflict periods. On the other hand, our longitudinal and comparative analyses also show conclusively that U.S. peace movement organizations developed discourses about their central concerns of peace that they adapted and changed in response to previous experience and shifting discursive opportunities. Our research highlights not only the cultural constraints from the discursive legacy that movement spokespeople faced, but also the agentic dimensions of their responses.

The findings demonstrate that the U.S. peace movement has engaged the discursive legacy of the support the troops issue in manifold ways that are responsive to the particular circumstances surrounding each conflict. During the Gulf War, for example, PMOs tried to deflect the power of the ubiquitous yellow ribbon symbol, by expanding who it was that should be supported by conscientious U.S. citizens. We show that the peace movement articulated a web of concern that included social groupings beyond U.S. soldiers. This, in turn, gave the movement further grounds to critique administration war policies. During the Iraq War, on the other hand, PMOs learned from the previous rhetorical contests during the Gulf War and expanded their discursive tactics. They anticipated critiques that they did not support the troops, articulating proactive, anticipatory discourses that turned the tables on their critics and war supporters by aggressively redefining what it means to support the troops. Iraq War PMOs developed an elaborate discourse of betrayal that accused the administration of imperiling the troops through misguided strategic policies, and of shirking their constitutional duties to provide for the short- and long-term welfare of the troops. These findings support other recent work on the ability of social movements to learn over time and to develop and adopt strategic and tactical adaptations (King and Cornwall 2005).

In addition, this research contributes to theory building in that it goes beyond Steinberg’s (1999) important findings showing that movement discourse is deeply dialogical. Our findings demonstrate that movement arguments are also shaped by rounds of discursive contention that occurred decades ago. We’ve also shown that today’s movement discourse is influenced by past discourses arising in related areas of contention (i.e., human rights, international law) and by contemporary political events. This study plows fresh methodological ground in that it shows it is possible to rigorously assess discursive continuities and contextually related variations in one social movement across periods and movement organizations.

By expanding the web of concern during the Gulf War, the U.S. peace movement tried to decouple the support the troops discourse from the nation and the state. During the Iraq War, they recognized the need to work within the confines of the support the troops discursive legacy and critiqued the details of the government’s geo-strategic choices, its tactical battlefield decisions, and even its overall management of the military service system. Their elaborated discourse of betrayal of the troops in Iraq by the Bush administration best exemplifies this movement strategy. It is a strategy with considerable potential to impact the meaning and power of the discursive legacy in the United States about supporting troops during war. In this way, oppositional knowledge generated from within the movement may become more widespread, accepted, and even eventually institutionalized.

In addition, this study shows that specific discourses develop life histories. Some discourses have a burst of usage and then fade out never to be used again. Others slowly pick up momentum over time. Still others fluctuate with major peaks and valleys in different conflict periods. As time passes, social movement organizations layer, tweak, and extend discourses to
maximize their resonance and potency with various audiences, as well as to adapt and apply them to changing circumstances (e.g., shifting political context, changing public opinion, innovations in pro-war discourses).

Our research suggests there are several possible reasons why some movement discourses come into common and repeated usage over time. Future research could profitably investigate the following hypotheses:

Positive feedback loop: The more a discourse rewards the user in terms of mobilizing consensus, mobilizing action, persuading targets, and neutralizing opposition, the more likely it will be used again.

Repetition: Repeated use of a discourse enhances its legitimacy via familiarity. It may eventually be taken for granted as an element of oppositional culture and knowledge, and may even find its way into mainstream culture, as the PMOs discourse of betrayal did later in the Iraq War.

Cultural embeddedness: Discourses clearly linked to the dominant culture provide the oppositional knowledge in that discourse more legitimacy. For example, PMOs featured military veterans at peace protests and formed coalitions with veterans groups.

Context and timing: Discourses that take advantage of crises like Abu Ghraib to creatively engage target audiences on issues that activists care about may quickly become heavily used. They may also fall from use as those same social and political conditions change.

Negative feedback and termination: Movement discourses that deviate from established, positively reinforced patterns make few inroads and may be rejected and fall out of common usage.

Our study also points the way toward still other research projects on peace movement discourse. Archival research on the Vietnam War-era U.S. peace movement could establish the degree to which the web of concern approach taken by the Gulf War-era movement, and later adapted by the Iraq War peace movement, was also present in PMO statements during the Vietnam War era. The same is true with regard to the discourse of betrayal that was so prevalent during the Iraq War. In addition, peace movements worldwide have to face charges of being unpatriotic, of undermining the troops, even of assisting the enemy (Carter 1992; Wittner 2003). Great Britain provided more troops than any other U.S. ally in both the Gulf War and the Iraq War. Comparative research on British peace movement discourse about support for the British troops would reveal the degree to which this discursive contention occurred simultaneously in England, and whether peace movement discourses go transnational, become diffused, and are adapted elsewhere in differing political and social conditions.

Finally, we’ve shown that the discursive and symbolic contestation during the Gulf War over supporting the troops was played out on two historically specific yet interconnected stages: that of the Vietnam War and that of the Gulf War. And, when the curtain was eventually raised on the Iraq War’s version of this ongoing drama, we saw three interconnected stages. Each later performance of the “Who Supports the Troops?” drama is partly conditioned by what has gone before. But like any theatrical director or stage actor, the Iraq War peace movement was not completely constrained by the legacies of previous productions. They used different props, rearranged the stage, and developed new lines of interpretation in response to contemporary realities. In so doing, they reconstructed the content of the discursive legacy and what it means to support U.S. troops during war.
Appendix

Definitions of Codes that Appear in the Tables

Abu Grahib: References to Abu Grahib prison and treatment of prisoners there.

Civilian casualties: Includes references to civilian casualties and to civilian immunity. Also includes responses to sanitizing language such as collateral damage, smart bombs, and surgical strikes.

Environment: References to natural environment or environmental issues.

Human cost-domestic: References to the costs of war in relation to the United States, including adjustments to spending priorities to offset the costs of war, quality of life issues, and links to injustice.

Human cost-nation: References to the costs of war in relation to a specific country, other than the United States.

Human rights: References to those principles associated with the rights of the individual, including social, political, economic, and cultural rights.

Humanitarian relief: References to giving or organizing humanitarian aid to victims of war. Also includes references to long-term development aid projects, and food and medical aid.

International law: Specific reference to actions being against international law. Includes references to the International Criminal Court. Excludes general references to human rights.

Nonviolence supported: Advocating nonviolence and conscientious objection. Only code calls for less violence that also reject any violence in the future.

Oil: References to oil, the West’s need for oil, as a variable in war, war for oil, etc.

Pretext: Observations that publicly stated reasons for policies have little or nothing to do with the actual reasons for the policies.

Terrorism condemned state: State terror condemned. Direct state violence or state-sponsored paramilitary violence explicitly labeled as terror and condemned by the PMO.

Torture: References to the use of torture.

Troops-betrayal: References to those actions of the U.S. government and defense contractors that are claimed to result in increased dangers and costs incurred by the U.S. troops serving in the war, including such things as insufficient equipment, poor training, inadequate medical care, poor planning leading to increased risks, etc.

Troops-negative: Comments that criticize U.S. troops or that evaluate troop behavior negatively.

Troops-positive: Includes expressions of support or concern for U.S. soldiers (including simple references to numbers of dead or wounded). Simply mentioning how many troops are deployed is not sufficient. On its own, a simple statement of support for withdrawal of troops is also not sufficient, without an
expression of concern. The phrase, “Bring them home now” would, however, be coded given its historical resonance and meanings.

**U.S. democracy**: References for need for democratic debate in the United States, comments about democracy as a right for U.S. people, concerns over the status of democracy in the United States.

**Victims**: Specific references to victims—human, material, and conceptual. Must literally use “victim” word; otherwise code as human cost-nationality.

**References**


