TDPE presents: Bilgehan Karabay

With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? The authors suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In their model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed; (iii) Widely disparate initial tariffs prevent free trade even with FTA. Speaker: Bilgehan Karabay is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He is currently a visiting faculty at the University of Virginia. His research interests are in International Trade, Applied Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy and the Economics of Information and Uncertainty. When is it optimal to delegate: The theory of fast-track authority By authors: Levent Celik, Bilgehan Karabay and John McLaren Speaking: Bilgehan Karabay Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics University of Auckland, New Zealand Sponsor: Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Co-Sponsor Trade, Development, and Political Economy, Co-Sponsor