The Effect of Judges' Institutional Interests on a Free Press: South Asia, Europe, and the Americas

The Moynihan Institute’s South Asia Center presents Stephan Stohler, associate professor of political science.

Free press protections are fundamental to constitutional democracy, yet their enforcement varies when judges themselves face media scrutiny. Drawing on 658 decisions from nine democratic countries and the European Court of Human Rights, Stohler and co-author Matthew Ingram (SUNY Albany) show that judges are significantly less likely to uphold press rights when coverage targets the judiciary rather than elected officials or bureaucrats. This pattern persists across different constitutional systems and legal traditions, even after accounting for legal doctrine, coverage tone, and institutional strength.

Using regression analysis, sentiment scoring, and qualitative case studies, we demonstrate that judges often invoke distinct justifications when limiting press freedoms. By examining judicial decision-making through the lens of institutional self-interest, this article contributes to scholarship on judicial behavior, comparative constitutional law, and freedom of expression. Our findings reveal a fundamental limitation in constitutional governance: rights enforcement weakens when judges face accountability pressures. These dynamics raise serious questions about whether judges can reliably protect critical oversight as democracies worldwide increasingly entrust unelected judges with decisions that shape citizens' lives.

Stephan Stohler is an associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He holds a Ph.D. and J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on law and courts. He is the author of Reconstructing Rights: Courts, Parties, and Equality Rights in India, South Africa, and the United States. He is currently writing a book about the internet and the First Amendment.